"Atheism is more 'logical' than theism" - Defend this statement (teaching, statistics)

[TRANSPONDER]

I am aware that my approach is rather concrete and I confess that I am deeply suspicious of attempts to prove something through abstract reasoning.

I am also aware that some of the most exciting advances in physics have been made through what seems like almost abstract theorizing (though by scientists, not philosophers, as I recall ) and so I am in a position of not believing that dualism and the cosmic field is proven, let alone 'God' and the unseating of the materialist default with a resultant shifting of the burden of proof to atheism (and that is what this is all about) until it is announced that it is proven, not just a persuasive hypothesis.

[Nozzferrahhtoo]

Originally Posted by Citizen401

Sorry, but did you not earlier claim to have fully read and understood this thread?

Yes. Which is why I am confused as to what these good points and arguments you are talking about actually are. Because I sure have not seen them. And the fact you can not adumbrate them either and keep ducking me asking you to suggests you can not either.

[Nozzferrahhtoo]

Originally Posted by Gaylenwoof

As I see it, you are not actually comprehending the concept of qualia. (By "you" I mean qualiaphobes in general.)

This ad hominem is useless. I understand your claims and see that they are wildly speculative and not substantiated. Realizing that an argument is unsubstantiated is not a "phobia". The phobia term is just one people hide behind when they can not lend credence to their own views.

As I said I am more than happy to engage with your hypothesis if and when you start substantiating it. If you stay at the wild speculation stage however there is not much for me to engage in.

Not agreeing with someone or not seeing any evidence for their views is NOT the same as not understanding them. I understand you perfectly. I just do not agree.

I repeat once again though, if you get past the wild speculation stage then by all means come back to me.

[Citizen401]

Originally Posted by Shiloh1

This is not my argument ... Saying that there is God and nothing else and then the universe comes into being is not illogical. It is the way in which the universe is actualized from the stated properties of that God. You hint that because God exist and he is the cause means that this does not violate ex nihilo nihil fit, as if to suggest that something exist from which something else comes therefore it is not violated. The problem is that the properties of this God mean that one must commit to creatio ex nihilo not creatio ex deo. As such, without a theory of immaterial causation to bridge the gap from God's potentiality to the actualization of this creation, the concept fails.

I am waiting for you to offer a viable immaterial theory on causation that bridges that gap [sic] without appeals to a material one or just so stories of magic (after all magical theories can be logical to)

You are the one invoking metaphysical possibilities so the onus is on you not just to logically state these propositions but to coherently incorporate them into a theory of immaterial causation and show that they work given the Christian properties of God and his creation from nothing.

Yet given the properties of this God and a lack of any coherent extra-natural process to bridge the gap between them - creatio ex nihilo fails.

Note your arguments as expressed in the bolded segments:

• There is no 'explanatory theory' for "immaterial causation".
• Therefore "immaterial causation" is metaphysically impossible.

This is the very same formally fallacious argument that you explicitly deny appealing to barely moments earlier. It contains the same non sequitur fallacy in that the conclusion in the argument does not follow from the fact that the mechanism for "immaterial causation" is unexplained.

Metaphysical possibility is determined by modal logical inference, not exclusively by the presence or absence of an explanatory theory. For your argument to be valid, you need to provide a sound premise that proves "immaterial causation" to be metaphysically impossible.

No I don't insist on it. As stated before I am waiting for you to offer, beyond mere assertion and just-so stories, a theory of immaterial causation that can bridge the gap between God's properties, as stated in the OP, and the actual creative act that brought the universe out of nothing - creatio ex nihilo.

I have never read Dawkins but if my point were similar it would still be more than you have to offer - your just playing in your metaphysical sandbox and acting like nothing else is needed. That is the only semblance of components you have - if I dare call them components of anything other than your mind playing abstract linguistic games.

until [you provide an alternative thesis] it is a place holder for talking about causality in general.

This is evidently fallacious reasoning. A model for "immaterial causation" must first be deemed to be adequate for the task before one can reasonably argue that it can be maintained as a 'placeholder' for a superior thesis.

Your own rule of thumb clearly fails in this regard, given that it is evidently absurd to assume by default that the concept of material causation somehow applies to the 'immaterial'. It manages to be an impressive three-fold error:

• It commits the composition fallacy.
• It blithely ignores the ontological distinction between natural and supra-natural.
• It disregards the epistemological limitations of a posteriori knowledge.

To summarize, neither of us can provide an adequate thesis for the mechanism by which the universe may have begun to exist. One can, however, reflect upon metaphysical possibility through reason, what you amusingly dismiss as 'conceptual games', apparently unaware that such analyses are rooted in the axioms of logic.

You are basically reduced to - 'God is all powerful so anything is possible so I don't have to say anything else about the matter.' And since this is not illogical it has some sort of metaphysical explanatory power that satisfies me as to what is actually real or really possible. Well I am not satisfied with that as having any worth to what is real or not - it seems wholly unecessary to invoke such concepts as an explanation - there are better models that are just as logical without the need for God/s.

You don't need to specify God because the OP has already done so and you are arguing on his behalf.

You seem to be stuck in a world of just-so stories simply because you define God as all potentiality or all powerful - yet ontologically wholly separate from this creation - and you seem to think that settles it by invoking logical metaphysical statements like extra-natural processes or an all-powerful being.

We've yet to even reach the issue of the identity and properties of the cause, given that you're still struggling with the metaphysics of causality, so this is straw man reasoning. There's simply no need to appeal to the omnipotence of God to defend the idea of creation by singular agency, given that the inferences to this are actually based upon:

• An appeal to the causal axiom: "From nothing, nothing comes".
• An appeal to Occamian priority and the absence of any evident metaphysical need to multiply causes beyond the singular.

In summary, what arguments have you offered for why one should breach Occam's priority on this matter?

• A composition fallacy: That one should simply assume that a material thesis should apply to the immaterial, despite it being both epistemologically and ontologically unsound.
• A non sequitur fallacy: That one should assume the latter fallacy by composition as a 'placeholder' until the mechanism of creatio ex nihilo is first known.

Christian apologists use material causation as support for their cosmological arguments - see the KCA.

Secondly, it is Christian apologists who do this, see the KCA, when they hide immaterial causation and material causation in the term 'cause' when formualting their argument.

Do you understand how the proposition: "Whatever begins to exist has a cause", is justified? It is a rewording of our favourite causal axiom: "From nothing, nothing comes"; the semantics for which we've already covered in the four-point thesis that you blithely dismissed a short while ago.

As an a priori ontological commitment corollary to Identity (logic) it cannot, in itself, refer specifically to material causation, or any other Aristotelian subtype of causation for that matter. Therefore, the Kalam Variation is incapable of equivocating on the terminology of "cause".

1) I am not insisting that at all - I am suggestiong that a priori metaphysical games do not get us anywhere without any further justification and that hiding in this realm of possibilities is a faulty methodology for figuring out what is actually real despite its coherence or logical nature.

2) I never claimed a priori knowledge to be useless, just that it is a starting point and that one should not remain there removed from a posteriori methods.

3) I never dismissed metaphysics per-se.

This is vague almost to the point of obfuscation. Let me remind you what you wrote:

It does no good to be stuck in mere a priori metaphysical concepts in order to [sic] remove oneself from actually arriving at any meaningful conclusions about what is veridical.

In other words, your claim reduces to the proposition that, for a conclusion to be 'meaningful', one must necessarily appeal to a posteriori (sensorily verifiable) knowledge. From this it follows that a priori knowledge, in isolation, is 'meaningless'. This basically amounts to a Verificationist claim.

I am not making the analogy but pointing out that this is really what you are getting at even though you deny it. It is the very concept of ontic seperation that causes the probelms I mentioned above. As an aside - coherence does not necessitate correspondence.

Just defining into existence this ontic separation and some vague extra-natural process and remaining there is really unsatisfying even if that is logical.

Creatio ex deo can be shown to be compatible with classical theism simply by showing ontic separation from creation to be possible. This is not the idea being 'defined into existence', but a modal logical operation - an important difference.

The adequacy of an argument is gauged by its 'sufficiency', not how 'satisfying' it is - a vague and subjective term that is open to considerable idiosyncratic interpretation. You also need to revise your knowledge of coherency and correspondence, because all your comments on this so far are nonsense.

That's not the explanation I am looking for - saying that the universe has an absolute begining (which is by no means clear or certain) is not being challenged. What is being challenged is the cause with certain properties, as you say, actualizing this universe from nothing. You have no theory of immaterial causation that makes any sense in light of these Christian properties of God and creatio ex nihilo. You invoke the 'extra-natrual process' as fulfilling this role - but this is just mere assertion of language. On what basis, other than metaphysical games, do you invoke such a concept?

Well you did appeal to a natural example - see post #336 'Any claim that this is metaphysically absurd can be easily refuted, simply by citing verifiable examples in which the full potentiality for an effect exists within the cause: A radioactive isotope releasing gamma radiation, or an explosion produced by the detonation of a time-bomb in the vacuum of space.'

I can't find one point here that isn't either lazily irrelevant or analytically defective. There's simply no excuse for this, unless you're becoming mentally exhausted or demoralized.

• The 'beginning of the universe' is the verifiable event being explained by the causal axiom, it is not the explanation itself.
• Nowhere have I used a linguistic device as an explanatory thesis for "immaterial causation". The allusion I make to "extra-material process" relates to the impossibility that it can be empirically described, not its possibility.
• Natural world examples of causation are not offered as proof that the process is also possible beyond the natural world. I've already explained this as clearly as I could.

Hope you enjoyed your weekend.

[stargazzer]

Citizen 401 declares the following with authority in foundation for the interesting position in discourse :

• The 'beginning of the universe' is the verifiable event being explained by the causal axiom, it is not the explanation itself.

How is it known what the word beginning ultimately means, to explain:

1) Experts will say yes, we have a BB understanding although the nature of it as a beginning cannot be claimed because it cannot be explained, the tool box is without capabilities.

The knowledge is relative to perception. Many will say we can't say the BB was the popular very small point, but certainly expanded from billions of years ago. Clip available.

2) what is the nature of what beginning would actually mean. How is it known there was ever a beginning at all.. past present or future issues in the ultimate reality that is being spoken to.

3) Is there proof that such a thing as a master clock exists ? Deception is no stranger to the setting, it took 1000's of years to figure out many twinkling stars are not there at all.... In another 100 yrs the understandings will likely be unimaginably different.

Originally Posted by Citizen401

Note your arguments as expressed in the bolded segments:

• There is no 'explanatory theory' for "immaterial causation".
• Therefore "immaterial causation" is metaphysically impossible.

This is the very same formally fallacious argument that you explicitly deny appealing to barely moments earlier. It contains the same non sequitur fallacy in that the conclusion in the argument does not follow from the fact that the mechanism for "immaterial causation" is unexplained.

Metaphysical possibility is determined by modal logical inference, not exclusively by the presence or absence of an explanatory theory. For your argument to be valid, you need to provide a sound premise that proves "immaterial causation" to be metaphysically impossible.

This will be my last post for a couple of weeks so I will leave it at this.

Once again that is not what I am arguing. I don't give much weight to mere Possibility arguments. I am not trying to prove that immaterial causation is metaphysically impossible - where did I ever say that?

This is evidently fallacious reasoning. A model for "immaterial causation" must first be deemed to be adequate for the task before one can reasonably argue that it can be maintained as a 'placeholder' for a superior thesis.

Your own rule of thumb clearly fails in this regard, given that it is evidently absurd to assume by default that the concept of material causation somehow applies to the 'immaterial'. It manages to be an impressive three-fold error:

• It commits the composition fallacy.
• It blithely ignores the ontological distinction between natural and supra-natural.
• It disregards the epistemological limitations of a posteriori knowledge.

To summarize, neither of us can provide an adequate thesis for the mechanism by which the universe may have begun to exist. One can, however, reflect upon metaphysical possibility through reason, what you amusingly dismiss as 'conceptual games', apparently unaware that such analyses are rooted in the axioms of logic.

Where did I ever say material causation applies to immaterial causation - I don't even believe in an immaterial world ontologically seperate from a material one. The problem is that Christian apologists use material causation to support the premises in their immaterial arguments. If there are two distinct and seperate ontic worlds where causation takes place using material causation to arrive at an immaterial causal conclusion is inadequate. Otherwise, all you are left with is an axiom, that when something begins to exist then it has a cause. So what, no one denies this? But what type of cause are you talking about - immaterial or material. I want to know how you move from an immaterial cause to a material effect. The axiom does not help us here. Furthermore, it is by no means necessary that matter/energy began to exist.

We've yet to even reach the issue of the identity and properties of the cause, given that you're still struggling with the metaphysics of causality, so this is straw man reasoning. There's simply no need to appeal to the omnipotence of God to defend the idea of creation by singular agency, given that the inferences to this are actually based upon:

• An appeal to the causal axiom: "From nothing, nothing comes".
• An appeal to Occamian priority and the absence of any evident metaphysical need to multiply causes beyond the singular.

Once again I don't have a problem with this. My use of God's omnipotence was in reference to the mechanism by which he causally created the universe out of nothing. It would seem that if from nothing nothing comes then creation from nothing is in violation without any futher explanation and appealing to God's omnipotence does not work causally since any and all knowledge of causality is based upon material causation which you admit should not be applied to immaterial causation. As a concept and a metaphysical possibility I am sure it is fine just not helpful in undestanding how this actually happened and how it actually works.

• A composition fallacy: That one should simply assume that a material thesis should apply to the immaterial, despite it being both epistemologically and ontologically unsound.
• A non sequitur fallacy: That one should assume the latter fallacy by composition as a 'placeholder' until the mechanism of creatio ex nihilo is first known.

Do you understand how the proposition: "Whatever begins to exist has a cause", is justified? It is a rewording of our favourite causal axiom: "From nothing, nothing comes"; the semantics for which we've already covered in the four-point thesis that you blithely dismissed a short while ago.


As an a priori ontological commitment corollary to Identity (logic) it cannot, in itself, refer specifically to material causation, or any other Aristotelian subtype of causation for that matter. Therefore, the Kalam Variation is incapable of equivocating on the terminology of "cause".

I don't assume it. I am working with Christian apologists who do use it as support for their arguments. If they want to keep them seperate then stop using material causation and its terms to enlighten your understanding about immaterial causation bringing about a material effect. Until you have a theory of immaterial cuasation or some examples then you are reduced to doing so. I am just playing along.

The proposition is fine as it stands but when supported Craig appeals to material causation. Can I ask what type of cause this premise is refering to - material or immaterial? Craig says it is an effcient cause, an Aristotelian term, is it a material efficient cause or an immaterial efficient cause? What ontological category is this 'cause' in? Is Craig trying to argue that the something that the universe comes from is nothing or God. If the latter how does this support creation from nothing given the axiom from nothing nothing comes? Saying that the universe, as we know it from the boundary point, began to exist, and therefore had a cause does not get us anywhere near God because nothing can be known beyond that point and certainly no model says that absolutely nothing existed prior to it. As a metaphysical possibitilty I am sure we can postulate abosolutely nothing and invoke God as the cause yet this still leaves us ignaorant of how this happened. Given our current knowledge I don't even see the need for such metaphysical possibilities.

This is vague almost to the point of obfuscation. Let me remind you what you wrote:

In other words, your claim reduces to the proposition that, for a conclusion to be 'meaningful', one must necessarily appeal to a posteriori (sensorily verifiable) knowledge. From this it follows that a priori knowledge, in isolation, is 'meaningless'. This basically amounts to a Verificationist claim.

Not at all! I don't think it meaningless, I just put more weight on a posteriori methods. I think isolated propositons of this sort don't get us very far.

Hope you enjoyed your weekend.

I did! Now I am off to to enjoy a few more weeks of materialism.

[Citizen401]

I am not trying to prove that immaterial causation is metaphysically impossible - where did I ever say that?

Whether you like it or not, you are effectively asserting creatio ex nihilo to be 'impossible' using a contorted metaphysics. This probably should have been explained to you more clearly:

When explained to you that a priori reasoning demonstrates creatio ex nihilo to be possible, you reject the idea on the basis that it lacks 'explanatory power'. When challenged on the epistemology of explanatory power, you retort:

I don't believe your semantics [of full causal potentiality] have any correspondence to/with reality!

It does no good to be stuck in mere a priori metaphysical concepts in order to remove [sic] oneself from actually arriving at any meaningful conclusions about what is veridical.

At least the Magician has the hat to start with!

In other words, you somehow equate meaningfulness, realism and truth with your criterion of explanatory power; which serves as a de facto 'Verifiability Criterion of Meaning' given your explicit a posteriori stringency.

It then follows, in the grandly inept Verificationist tradition, that the concept of creatio ex nihilo is meaningless, impossible or even 'magic'. Moreover, that statements such as: 'God alone created the universe', are nonsense propositions equivalent to proclaiming: Twas bryllyg, and ye slythy toves; Did gyre and gymble in ye wabe.

Where did I ever say material causation applies to immaterial causation - I don't even believe in an immaterial world ontologically seperate from a material one.

In the very same post, you state, regarding creatio ex nihilo:

If no other theory is offered and philosophy can't agree on a theory of causality I will assume the standard usage of such terms to mean that A actually 'causes' something to become something else - an effect. Pretty simple.

It would seem that if from nothing nothing comes then creation from nothing is in violation without any futher explanation.

You are still assuming material causation to be universally default, and not giving substantive reasons why. This is simply inexcusable now. For example, where in the statement: "from nothing, nothing comes", does it assert that: "everything that begins to exist has a material cause"; if you are not reading into that axiom your own metaphysical presuppositions?

Is this all down to a naive type of atheist presuppositionalism? In other words, are all inferences on your part laced with a 'question-begging' assumption of atheism as brute fact? In that case, no amount of reasoning, short of deep soul-searching and/or a life event, will be able to help you see beyond this de facto indoctrination.


Baron Munchausen rescues himself, and his steed, from a mire by tugging on his own hair; often cited to illustrate the absurdity of postulating a material cause for the existence of the material world.

I don't assume it. I am working with Christian apologists who do use it as support for their arguments. If they want to keep them seperate then stop using material causation and its terms to enlighten your understanding about immaterial causation bringing about a material effect. Until you have a theory of immaterial cuasation or some examples then you are reduced to doing so. I am just playing along.

The proposition is fine as it stands but when supported Craig appeals to material causation. Can I ask what type of cause this premise is refering to - material or immaterial? Craig says it is an effcient cause, an Aristotelian term, is it a material efficient cause or an immaterial efficient cause? What ontological category is this 'cause' in? Is Craig trying to argue that the something that the universe comes from is nothing or God. If the latter how does this support creation from nothing given the axiom from nothing nothing comes?

The problem is that Christian apologists use material causation to support the premises in their immaterial arguments. If there are two distinct and seperate ontic worlds where causation takes place using material causation to arrive at an immaterial causal conclusion is inadequate. Otherwise, all you are left with is an axiom, that when something begins to exist then it has a cause. So what, no one denies this?

The first premise is the 'axiom' in the form that "noone denies", as you helpfully admit.

It is ostensibly metaphysically neutral as to whether the mode of causation is material or immaterial. It does not specify material causation, and it is not justified, at least exclusively, via appeals to material exemplars.

Let's see how Craig himself explains this principle:

Briefly, the causal premiss of the kalam cosmological argument , namely,

1´. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.

leaves it an open question whether that cause is efficient or material and is, therefore, a much more modest premiss than (1) or (1*). It is the objector, then, who has the burden to prove that every instance of efficient causation of a (physical) object must be coincident with an instance of material causation as well.

For now, we won't get into the veracity of the second premise, and how theism can be deduced from the conclusion, given that it involves other areas of philosophy such as agent causation and dualism; and you've yet to grasp the somewhat simpler ideas here.

Now I am off to enjoy a few more weeks of materialism

Enjoy your qualia.

[Gaylenwoof]

Originally Posted by Nozzferrahhtoo

As I said I am more than happy to engage with your hypothesis if and when you start substantiating it. If you stay at the wild speculation stage however there is not much for me to engage in.

Ok, I'll avoid the speculative stuff and just focus on the science and logic. Here are two statements that I think you (and/or others in this thread) might find troublesome, even though they are not the least bit speculative, once the terms are understood:

(1) Qualia exist.
(2) Qualia are subjectively known.

These are not speculative ideas. It is true that you can find a few professional folks who claim that qualia do not exist, but if you do any extensive reading in either philosophy or neuroscience, you will find that the people who say that qualia don't exist are a few philosophers who are considered to be whacky and speculative on this topic. Obviously this does not make them necessarily wrong, but I have the impression that you think that you are the one being scientific about this while I am the one being speculative. The vast majority of philosophers would say that you've got this just backwards. The vast majority of scientists would say that the same thing once you define the word 'qualia.' (Qualia = the subjective/qualitative elements composing sentient experience.)

One of the major focuses of neuroscience for the past decade has been tracking down the neural correlates of consciousness. This entire realm of scientific investigation makes no sense whatsoever if qualia do not exist. Wikipedia seems to do a reasonably good job of this, so I will shut up for a moment and let them to the talking:

From Wikipedia entry on Neural correlates of consciousness:
The neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) constitute the minimal set of neuronal events and mechanisms sufficient for a specific conscious percept. Neuroscientists use empirical approaches to discover neural correlates of subjective phenomena. The set should be minimal because, if the brain is sufficient to give rise to any given conscious experience, the question is which of its components is necessary to produce it.

Discovering and characterizing neural correlates does not offer a theory of consciousness that can explain how particular systems experience anything at all, or how they are associated with consciousness, the so-called hard problem of consciousness, but understanding the NCC may be a step toward such a theory.

Hopefully this all sounds familiar because it is basically what I've been saying throughout this thread. Practically no professional expects the neural correlates alone to solve the hard problem. I've already outlined the major reasons why no one expects neural correlates alone to solve the hard problem, so I won't repeat all that.

So, now the question is this: If neural correlates alone cannot solve the hard problem, then what will it take?

People argue over whether quantum theory is necessary. Neuroscientists Christof Koch and Klaus Hepp are famous for arguing that quantum theory is not necessary for mapping qualia to brain processes. Here is a quote from them in their famous paper The relation between quantum mechanics and higher brain functions: Lessons from quantum computation and Neurobiology:

Although these dynamical ideas organize quite well the phenomenology of different levels of consciousness (attention, un-consciousness, and consciousness ) and lead to a number of interesting predictions (Dehaene et al. 2006), most of the major questions remain, some old and philosophical (such as the nature of qualia, is free will an illusion, the Freudian unconscious, evolutionary efficiency) and some new and testable (proportion of workspace neurons in V1, explicit or implicit representations, unconscious homunculus in prefrontal cortex…) (see Koch 2004). […] The purpose in discussing this particular implementation of global workspace is that it demonstrates how today’s consciousness research takes serious the challenge of mapping subjective feelings and percepts onto brain structures using purely classical neuronal events and elements.

Koch and Hepp might be right in saying that classical physics is sufficent to do the mapping. I'm not so sure one way or the other about that. In any case, I believe that QM (or, more precisely, a futuristic variation of QM) will be required in order to solve the hard problem. Why? Because QM is the fundamental theory upon which all of classical-level physics, chemistry, and biology are all based. YES I agree that qualia emerge at higher levels of organization, but emergence is not magic. Emergence is a physical phenomena and we are starting to get a pretty good handle on the principles involved in emergence - e.g., our ability to model chaotic self-organizing systems. But, again, this is not magic. The phenomena that emerge don't pop out of nowhere.

Any theory capable of explaining the emergence of qualia from brain processes must confront the subjective/qualitative nature of qualia. Otherwise you are not really explaining the emergence of qualia at all. Explaining the emergence of behavior is not the same as explaining the emergence of qualia. Psychology and neuroscience have become reasonably good at dealing with qualitative subjectivity, but physics currently has no ability to deal with it at all. (This is not speculation. It is just a fact of life.) This is why I suggest that neural correlates might offer some hope of a bridge between the sciences that are able to deal with qualitative subjectivity (psychology and neuroscience), and the science that is not (i.e., physics).

There is nothing wildly speculative about the stuff I've said above, although my suggestion for using NCC for the bridge between neuroscience and physics does, I admit, slip into some moderately speculative territory.

Now let's see if I understand what it is that you find problematic. You seem to reject that idea that a bridge is needed. I interpret you as saying that a purely objective science like physics can explain the emergence of qualia without any help from the subjective terms of psychology or neuroscience. You wave your hand in the general direction of emergent complexity and assume that some future objective theory can derive qualia. Let's be clear: YOU are the one who is being wildly speculative at this point. We can model the emergence of objective behaviors from other objective behaviors, but if you really think that we can model the emergence of qualia from purly objective behaviors, then all I can really say is: Good luck with that! I look forward to hearing how you explain my subjective feeling of phenomenal blue without referring to anything that logically implies the potential for qualitative blue to exist.

[stargazzer]

I'm on the fly and this is an interesting post by G and want to try and break this small part of it down. ( edit-opinion for now

"I look forward to hearing how you explain my subjective feeling of phenomenal blue without referring to anything that logically implies the potential for qualitative blue to exist."


1) Blue is an expression of conditional events in our setting which prompts quaila through witness in survival, also recorded in memory

2) Temperature is an expression of conditional events in our setting which prompts quaila through witness in survival, also recorded in memory.

Question now becomes:

3) Please explain how my very possible mental and viable subjective quaila feeling of being cold, without referring to anything that that logically implies the potential for qualitative cold to exist.

4) a) The body and mind does not have a potential for cold -an obstruction to survival...it only has a complying ability through evolution to deal with it, as an -obstruction to survival...

b) the body and mind has no potential for blue -a naturally adapted through dna and other complying realities in the color itself for -progress in all factual necessary contributory ways re setting ( photosynthesis nature ect)-( a healing color),...the body and mind in this case color, only has a comprehended complying ability with it, as a non-obstructive natured experience to survival. Fear is down..progress is possible. Progress requires an element of freedom.

Otherwise Quaila is void of translation and association enabling an experience, rendering experience groundless. A suggestion of a groundless experience. ( and memory is what it is)

Therefore the question may be construed without att to rudiment. All thats left is the potential to exist somewhat, and deal with the biology and setting, unfolding the experience. Maybe memory and neuro set up in the brain is a more accurate target, but then I don't see what could be acheived in this subject, with simply a cataloging which nature created over a very long time. It does seem a hard problem if theres a plan to try and put all of evolution in one sentence or one being, all at once as a concoction without ingredients....anyway that seems a bit vague and still need to read the post over.

[stargazzer]

Gaylenwoof...Ok, I'll avoid the speculative stuff and just focus on the science and logic. Here are two statements that I think you (and/or others in this thread) might find troublesome, even though they are not the least bit speculative, once the terms are understood:

(1) Qualia exist.
(2) Qualia are subjectively known.

SG...

Agreed

Gaylenwoof...

These are not speculative ideas. It is true that you can find a few professional folks who claim that qualia do not exist, but if you do any extensive reading in either philosophy or neuroscience, you will find that the people who say that qualia don't exist are a few philosophers who are considered to be whacky and speculative on this topic. Obviously this does not make them necessarily wrong, but I have the impression that you think that you are the one being scientific about this while I am the one being speculative. The vast majority of philosophers would say that you've got this just backwards. The vast majority of scientists would say that the same thing once you define the word 'qualia.' (Qualia = the subjective/qualitative elements composing sentient experience.)

SG

Yes my thinking is that behav emerges out of the accomplished subjective/qualitative experience or quaila , behav then a relative translation of the quaila elements. ( that seems obvious.

Gaylenwoof

One of the major focuses of neuroscience for the past decade has been tracking down the neural correlates of consciousness. This entire realm of scientific investigation makes no sense whatsoever if qualia do not exist. Wikipedia seems to do a reasonably good job of this, so I will shut up for a moment and let them to the talking:



Hopefully this all sounds familiar because it is basically what I've been saying throughout this thread. Practically no professional expects the neural correlates alone to solve the hard problem. I've already outlined the major reasons why no one expects neural correlates alone to solve the hard problem, so I won't repeat all that.

So, now the question is this: If neural correlates alone cannot solve the hard problem, then what will it take?


SG

If my hands, shoulders, neck, legs, backbone alone and individually cannot contribute a solution to the puzzling phenomenon of walking... then what will it take ? ( the short of it but in more depth below.

Gaylenwoof

People argue over whether quantum theory is necessary. Neuroscientists Christof Koch and Klaus Hepp are famous for arguing that quantum theory is not necessary for mapping qualia to brain processes. Here is a quote from them in their famous paper The relation between quantum mechanics and higher brain functions: Lessons from quantum computation and Neurobiology:


Koch and Hepp might be right in saying that classical physics is sufficent to do the mapping. I'm not so sure one way or the other about that. In any case, I believe that QM (or, more precisely, a futuristic variation of QM) will be required in order to solve the hard problem. Why? Because QM is the fundamental theory upon which all of classical-level physics, chemistry, and biology are all based. YES I agree that qualia emerge at higher levels of organization, but emergence is not magic. Emergence is a physical phenomena and we are starting to get a pretty good handle on the principles involved in emergence - e.g., our ability to model chaotic self-organizing systems. But, again, this is not magic. The phenomena that emerge don't pop out of nowhere.

SG...this sounds ok.


Gaylenwoof

Any theory capable of explaining the emergence of qualia from brain processes must confront the subjective/qualitative nature of qualia. Otherwise you are not really explaining the emergence of qualia at all. Explaining the emergence of behavior is not the same as explaining the emergence of qualia. Psychology and neuroscience have become reasonably good at dealing with qualitative subjectivity, but physics currently has no ability to deal with it at all. (This is not speculation. It is just a fact of life.) This is why I suggest that neural correlates might offer some hope of a bridge between the sciences that are able to deal with qualitative subjectivity (psychology and neuroscience), and the science that is not (i.e., physics).

SG...

Well I"m thinking the nature of Quaila is one thing .. the following individual translation for survival another < followed by behavior -free will or whatever depending on the individual. Thats the order Ive got.

My thinking is this...the brain gathers the available suggestion as quaila in the setting, once complete including organized assessment in surviving needs, ( yes-no at deeper unconscious levels including history ect) behavior follows in either instance's of defense, or freedom in line with survival, all in keeping with the ultimate surviving objective. Free will now in motion with a conscious opportunity to over-ride possible unconscious directives. So in this scheme, physics in an explanatory role is handcuffed as a secure capture in all these mechanisms as a single conscious reality. Containing or mapping quaila is then suggested only part of awareness...a huge part but none the less in keeping with above plays a role in the overall conscious experience. The mechanics seem twofold and in dynamic motion. Maybe the only target is the quaila but here Ive tried to show quaila is only part of the aware subjective experience, or whats known in the fullness of the hard problem, that of the full attribute of consciousness.

My opinion is that the nature of quaila is all to do with survival and then onto translation within survival as mentioned in last entry. Opinion and I think the subject tends to have a wandering nature to it, because theres so much opportunity for distraction in the significance of all the players..including your very own head...so my head is heading out, plus I think the nuero guys are too confident with their assumptions and noticed an interpreter ...with a few mistakes and disappointing in assumptive generalizations. So I think reading or watching clips with others ideas is the worst thing someone can do in this exploration. Once a contradiction or issue is noted which seems to be common in this subject its got to go, plus its your mind , no one else's. This entry is opinion for now as usual. ( plus as mentioned before by someone else.. its a subject that seems to be one of those ones that you want to deal with, and be done with, at least in your own view getting it down. If I missed something it may have to do with brain operations and knowledge in this area and agree with entries read, in the significance of a huge role in chemical activity. Mostly would like to get this off my mind as something un-understandable in a suggestion, however the suggestion surface's.