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Yep, agree. The post I was responding to implied that pan[en]theism provided explanations that were lacking in other approaches. I disagree - claiming something is fundamental in this manner is a good way to stop questions but it doesn't provide any more answers than "I don't know" or "goddidit".
I tend to ask questions like these in repose to those posts not because I'll get an answer, but because the silence tells us a lot.
In relation to question of whether or not subjectivity can fully reduced to the objective entities postulated by physics, the "silence" says only that I have been unable to provide a rigorous logical proof to the conclusion that subjectivity cannot be reduced to purely objective entities. My knowledge is limited, so there could be a proof that I'm not aware of. But, even if we assume that there really is no rigorous logical proof available, it might still be wiser to place your bets on non-reduction than on the promissory note of some possible reduction in the future. This is based on the weight of the inductive arguments that have been presented - some of which I'm not sure you've understood, since you have not yet directly addressed them. For example, the implications of radical skepticism: It seems that all knowledge of objective facts is logically dependent on our subjective experiences. In other words, subjective knowledge is logically prior to (or, at least, logically co-fundamental with) knowledge of an objectively existing world. If X is logically prior to Y, then you might be able to reduce Y to X, but you cannot reduce X to Y (because Y logically depends on X, but X does not logically depend on Y). Until you grapple with the problem of radical skepticism, you have no plausible basis for claiming that subjectivity is reducible to purely objective facts.
On a related note: You have not addressed the issue of indexical knowledge: To know that I ate pizza yesterday, it is not enough for me to know that someone fitting my physical description ate pizza yesterday. You could present me with a perfect description of every behavior of every atom of a person who ate pizza yesterday, and it might in fact be true that this description is a description of me, but if I have somehow become convinced that I did not eat pizza yesterday, then these physical descriptions might not be enough to change my mind. If I do not already know (via the subjective "feeling of knowing") that this set of objective facts constitutes a description of ME, then you cannot convince me, on purely logical grounds, that this description is a description of that which I subjective experience as "me." For me to believe that the objective description is a description of ME, an inductive leap is necessary. This "leap" might be logically minuscule, but the fact that some leap is required points to the intrinsically indexical nature of subjectivity - the feeling of being me, here, now that goes beyond the list of objectively accessible facts of what a collections of atoms are doing at a given moment.
This indexical nature of subjective knowledge is (as I see it) only a matter of perspective (thus it is not an argument for substance dualism), but the need for this perspective is fundamental to the nature of reality. It is a brute fact of reality that, for some physical systems, there is an indexical "something it is like to be" this particular physical system. The point of the "zombie" argument is that this "feeling of being" that constitutes this perspective is not required by the purely objective facts of reality. If it is logically possible for this collection of atoms to not feel what I feel right now, then the fact that this collection of atoms does feel what it is like to be me right now implies that some "extra fact" is required beyond the mere list of objective properties of the collection atoms.
Gaylenwoof;29838971]In relation to question of whether or not subjectivity can fully reduced to the objective entities postulated by physics, the "silence" says only that I have been unable to provide a rigorous logical proof to the conclusion that subjectivity cannot be reduced to purely objective entities.
S..
Your confused, I'm the one that has solved this problem relative to whats known. Not you. If its not attractive to know or understand, that has nothing to do with the issue. Plus theres more but why should I continue here, I won't.
G..
In other words, subjective knowledge is logically prior to (or, at least, logically co-fundamental with) knowledge of an objectively existing world. If X is logically prior to Y, then you might be able to reduce Y to X, but you cannot reduce X to Y (because Y logically depends on X, but X does not logically depend on Y). Until you grapple with the problem of radical skepticism, you have no plausible basis for claiming that subjectivity is reducible to purely objective facts.
S..
The IOW...is appreciated, subjectivity is a system with everything thats included in a system. Anything else on approach is ridiculous and ignores whats known.
G...
On a related note: You have not addressed the issue of indexical knowledge: To know that I ate pizza yesterday, it is not enough for me to know that someone fitting my physical description ate pizza yesterday. You could present me with a perfect description of every behavior of every atom of a person who ate pizza yesterday, and it might in fact be true that this description is a description of me, but if I have somehow become convinced that I did not eat pizza yesterday, then these physical descriptions might not be enough to change my mind. If I do not already know (via the subjective "feeling of knowing") that this set of objective facts constitutes a description of ME, then you cannot convince me, on purely logical grounds, that this description is a description of that which I subjective experience as "me." For me to believe that the objective description is a description of ME, an inductive leap is necessary. This "leap" might be logically minuscule, but the fact that some leap is required points to the intrinsically indexical nature of subjectivity - the feeling of being me, here, now that goes beyond the list of objectively accessible facts of what a collections of atoms are doing at a given moment.
S...
Your amazingly fascinated with the me me thing .Talking about pizza I made one up about jay carney...he couldn't answer questions to get a pizza delivered If something exists, guess what it exists...if it exists ...its got to occupy space....if it occupies space , the space it occupies belongs to that something....that something is experiencing motion in the space it occupies...not something or anything else....whatever its nature will be that exact experience...however consequential to the surroundings it occupies and in its whatever nature. Guess what...something is not something else !
and then organization is what it is and ive already explained how that most logically could be happening.
if my entries or idea cannot be broken down as bunk...its noticed.
if they cannot be understood, super....not surprised. Other then that this has become boring for an arts guy. I had no idea science was so stuck, coming from the arts this is amazing. ( seems a bit crafty ... G the hero with a new surprise knot . whats next anyway ? ( edit i gotta go for now.
Last edited by stargazzer; 06-02-2013 at 02:23 PM..
In relation to question of whether or not subjectivity can fully reduced to the objective entities postulated by physics, the "silence" says only that I have been unable to provide a rigorous logical proof to the conclusion that subjectivity cannot be reduced to purely objective entities. My knowledge is limited, so there could be a proof that I'm not aware of.
Sure, just like there might be a proof that materialism can easily account for subjective experience. We've got to work with what we have, and right now, I don't see anything constructive from all of this philosophical noodling about the subject.
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But, even if we assume that there really is no rigorous logical proof available, it might still be wiser to place your bets on non-reduction than on the promissory note of some possible reduction in the future. This is based on the weight of the inductive arguments that have been presented
Speaking of inductive arguments, when has rejecting materialism in favor of the subjective ever successfully resolved a question about the function of biological systems? I'm thinking it has struck out pretty much every time it has been tried. That seems to trump all of the made up hypotheticals and "it's logically possible"s in my mind.
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For example, the implications of radical skepticism: It seems that all knowledge of objective facts is logically dependent on our subjective experiences. In other words, subjective knowledge is logically prior to (or, at least, logically co-fundamental with) knowledge of an objectively existing world. If X is logically prior to Y, then you might be able to reduce Y to X, but you cannot reduce X to Y (because Y logically depends on X, but X does not logically depend on Y). Until you grapple with the problem of radical skepticism, you have no plausible basis for claiming that subjectivity is reducible to purely objective facts.
This is assuming an awful lot about brain function. Proof that the subjective processing of external stimuli happens before other parts of our brain get to work on it, please.
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On a related note: You have not addressed the issue of indexical knowledge: To know that I ate pizza yesterday, it is not enough for me to know that someone fitting my physical description ate pizza yesterday. You could present me with a perfect description of every behavior of every atom of a person who ate pizza yesterday, and it might in fact be true that this description is a description of me, but if I have somehow become convinced that I did not eat pizza yesterday, then these physical descriptions might not be enough to change my mind.
Or maybe they would be. Who knows. Maybe we should look to everyday experience and see - how hard is it to convince people who have blacked out due to drugs or alcohol that they did things they don't remember? Seems to happen all the time - so your assertions that brains need to experience something subjectively to ever possibly admit that it was "me" that did it seem to run counter to experimental evidence.
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If I do not already know (via the subjective "feeling of knowing") that this set of objective facts constitutes a description of ME, then you cannot convince me, on purely logical grounds, that this description is a description of that which I subjective experience as "me."
Really? If you had unlimited objective evidence of you eating pizza yesterday but didn't remember it, you wouldn't even consider the possibility that you ate pizza yesterday? There's absolutely no possibility that your brain doesn't keep a 100% perfectly accurate memory of everything that's ever happened to you? And it is always correct in knowing when it willed something to happen?
Anyway, the research shows otherwise. The brain relies on all sorts of external cues to figure out if it should feel that an action came from "me" or "them". It can easily be tricked into thinking it subjectively willed something to happen even when it's objectively known that it didn't.
See, that's the problem with attempting to figure out the real world using deductive logic and tricky made-up situations - it's no substitute for looking at actual evidence. That's why neuroscience has made huge progress in answering these questions.
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For me to believe that the objective description is a description of ME, an inductive leap is necessary. This "leap" might be logically minuscule, but the fact that some leap is required points to the intrinsically indexical nature of subjectivity - the feeling of being me, here, now that goes beyond the list of objectively accessible facts of what a collections of atoms are doing at a given moment.
Again, this assumes some sort of dualism is true. If the feeling of me being me is just something the atoms are doing, there's no issue here.
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The point of the "zombie" argument is that this "feeling of being" that constitutes this perspective is not required by the purely objective facts of reality.
What do you mean by "required" here? Are you saying there's no facts which point to the idea that consciousness exists? Or are you assigning some sort of teleology to nature?
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If it is logically possible for this collection of atoms to not feel what I feel right now
then it means you're assuming dualism of some sort, since it would mean that there's something to feeling besides the material stuff doing what it does. Of course you're going to end up with dualism if you assume it, but that doesn't prove anything.
It's also a hint that something being "logically possible" doesn't tell us much about what actually goes on in reality.
Since our knowledge of everything causal is material and no other type of causality has been offered and the argument is a theistic argument for an immaterial cause – I want to know what type of cause the 1st premise is referring to – material or immaterial - and since all he offers is an efficient cause which is based upon Aristotle's view which itself is based upon a material agent with knowledge of how to affect other material - it is Craig who assumes material causation when forming the 1st premise and seeking to justify that statement. What other causality is there and how did you arrive at this other than your own metaphysical assumptions based upon your religious dogma? A material cause is certainly all that Craig can muster when he seeks to support this premise.
My problem is not in the metaphysical statement itself even if it is vague and ambiguous to the type of cause it is speaking of and therefore reflects upon the argument as not being a good argument even if valid. It is when support is offered for the premise ‘everything that begins to exist has a cause’ uses material causation inferences, theories, or principles that pertain to the particulars of matter not the whole as premise 2 of the KCA refers too when trying to link it to some immaterial cause – composition fallacy.
Here let’s just rephrase this: Is this all down to a naive type of theist presuppositionalism? In other words, are all inferences on your part laced with a 'question-begging' assumption of theism as brute fact? In that case, no amount of reasoning, short of deep soul-searching and/or a life event, will be able to help you see beyond this de facto indoctrination
It would seem like a logical inference, given the two statements – ‘from nothing, nothing comes’ and ‘creatio ex nihilo’ (creation from nothing) that they are contrary to one another without question begging inferences on your part given both of us do not deny the reality of the physical world yet one of us postulates a separate ontic immaterial world – the burden of proof is on you. Last I checked creation is something andcreatioex nihilo is something from nothing. Given the two statements, the default, that the material one is eternal, is more parsimonious and if we are going to talk of causation/causality we use what we actually know rather than invent propositions regarding immaterial causation when no examples of such have been given.
This is one of the worst mischaracterizations of my thoughts. I have never even come close to postulating this particularly since I think matter/energy is eternal - uncaused - changing form – neither created nor destroyed. Now even if the Big Bang Model is correct and that which we know about the boundary point, from which the expansion started, it would still allow for a material (energy) cause. No model suggest anything remotely close to absolute ‘nothing’ philosophically or otherwise existing (meaningless if nothing actually existed) prior to or beyond this point.
Here is where my previous note on vagueness and ambiguity are apparent and unhelpful in having a good argument besides it being logical or valid. Its non-specificity is how Craig manipulates his responses when defending the premise under different contexts. When Craig says the cause is open to either efficient or material (false dichotomy) he gives it away that he is thinking in terms of Aristotle’s efficient and material causes. The former being the agent in whom the knowledge resides to affect the material from which the effect arises – the latter is the material itself from which that effect obtains. When I speak of material causation I am not limiting it to that from which an effect arises – I am referring to the ontological category itself that entails the entire material causal chain. As such the agent can be a material cause – a material efficient cause – after all, the agent is a human whose knowledge, informed by interactions of material objects (their experience), is instantiated within/upon material scaffolding – the biology esp. the nervous system. We know a lot about this ontic world as opposed to you who having nothing in way of, as you say, exemplars to show for your proposition of immaterial causation.
It is not a good or sound argument when the premises are left to ambiguity or modesty as you say. And when they are given more precision and defended it falls apart even more – either by composition or equivocation fallacies. The former uses the axiom for particulars and then applying it to the whole (matter/energy) and the latter hiding two different types of causation under the same term –cause. How do I know if the premises are true other than by mere a priori assertion or self-referentially, or by definition? You can say I am just speaking metaphysically – but how does this help us move forward? Why do you accept this argument as opposed to say this one: ‘Everything that does not begin to exist does not have a cause, matter/energy did not begin to exist, and therefore, matter/energy did not have a cause.’ So do you now want to become an atheist since this clearly shows no need for God cuasing the universe to come into existence? This is no more logical and valid than the KCA. Now that we have two diametrically opposed arguments what do we do – they both cannot be true? The metaphysics does not take us very far. It is not that they are ‘useless’ or ‘meaningless’ as you keep accusing me of it is that they don’t aspire to any semblance of truth outside of itself – and that’s why I give more weight to a posteriori methodologies and have little use for arguments like the KCA or creatio ex nihilo. The fact that you feel content to remain at this step is indicative of the problems with conceivability and possibility arguments.
Anyway - I am back form my break and this seems old already - just thought I would respond.
Cheers All!
The first premiss of the KCA is not complicated. It's the kind of thing that's easily grasped at the first year seminar level, so I can't seem to understand why you're struggling so much with it.
How nice to have you have you back, but how depressing that you can do no better than a facepalm icon and a dufus like Lane Craig as an authority.
The 'everything must have a cause' argument is a persuasive one, and you will no doubt know that the attempt to fiddle a solution with an uncreated god has more to do with wishful thinking than actual knowledge.
We really don't know enough about what is beyond the observable universe or what there was before the Big bang to draw any conclusions, but if we are going to appeal to the limits of human comprehension for a common sense 'someone mutha dunnit' solution, I'd suggest that a gradual emergence of the illusion we call matter (which is real because what it does is both unexpected and yet, when known, predictable) out of what we are pleased to call 'nothing' makes more sense than a fully evolved deity that didn't itself need to come from anywhere.
How nice to have you have you back, but how depressing that you can do no better than a facepalm icon and a dufus like Lane Craig as an authority.
The 'everything must have a cause' argument is a persuasive one, and you will no doubt know that the attempt to fiddle a solution with an uncreated god has more to do with wishful thinking than actual knowledge.
We really don't know enough about what is beyond the observable universe or what there was before the Big bang to draw any conclusions, but if we are going to appeal to the limits of human comprehension for a common sense 'someone mutha dunnit' solution, I'd suggest that a gradual emergence of the illusion we call matter (which is real because what it does is both unexpected and yet, when known, predictable) out of what we are pleased to call 'nothing' makes more sense than a fully evolved deity that didn't itself need to come from anywhere.
Well you seem to be doing a reasonable job of torpedoing your own arguments, so I have little else to add aside from one small piece of advice: Read what the Kalam Cosmological Argument actually states.
I'm afraid that you are the one on the end of the torpedo . It discredits a protagonist when, rather than make a case, they provide a couple of sources and suggest that we go and do their research for them.
I need no instruction from you on the subject of strawman fallacy. I am willing to accept correction, but not just underlinings with a suggestion that they are wrong but without any explanation.
It seems that you have learned nothing since our last exchange.
If it helps at all, 'illusion' is an easily misunderstood and misused word. It merely refers to the human limitations in perceiving real, nevertheless, phenomena.
I'm afraid that you are the one on the end of the torpedo . It discredits a protagonist when, rather than make a case, they provide a couple of sources and suggest that we go and do their research for them.
I need no instruction from you on the subject of strawman fallacy. I am willing to accept correction, but not just underlinings with a suggestion that they are wrong but without any explanation.
It seems that you have learned nothing since our last exchange.
If it helps at all, 'illusion' is an easily misunderstood and misused word. It merely refers to the human limitations in perceiving real, nevertheless, phenomena.
Aside from the obvious equivocation fallacy in your comment, what exactly are you actually seeking to do here? Are you seeking some kind of closure from your embarrassment earlier? If so, I'm afraid you're going about it in the wrong way.
If you want me to explain something you don't understand, I suggest you be clear about it.
(a) I'm saying you should make a case - not give people somewhere to do your work. If you have any argument about what I posted, YOU explain what it is (that doesn't mean apply a label and call that refutation). Don't tell me to go and research.
(b) the embarassment should be yours as I am showing up your invalid method of discussion, just as I did before, though of course, you close your eyes to it and simply pile up rhetorical trick upon rhetorical trick.
I know that you would like nothing better that to draw me into a debate on philosophy in which you have undoubted expertise and you would of course win by dint of superior training in the subject.
However, that does not do a thing to show that the claims that Lane Craig makes by way of making a case for God are correct (1). What we should be doing here is to make a case simply and understandably so that readers can follow the argument. If you would like to present a case or repeat some previous post where you explained it, (though I can't recall that you ever made a coherent case in any of your prior posts) then do so.
If I can provide a counter - case, I will, and if I don't feel I can, I'll say so.
(1) for the orientation of those unfamiliar with the 'Nothing can come from nothing' mantra dignified by the moniker 'Kalam cosmological argument' this only ever an appeal to limited human comprehension, based on what we were familiar with on earth. It was long known that in logical terms this was inadequate, not to say invalid, and the recent work on the quantum - edge of physics has made something from nothing look so feasible (not to say probable) that postulating that Goddunnit has to be the only answer is either boneheaded or blinkered.
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If something exists, guess what it exists...if it exists ...its got to occupy space....if it occupies space , the space it occupies belongs to that something....that something is experiencing motion in the space it occupies...not something or anything else....whatever its nature will be that exact experience...however consequential to the surroundings it occupies and in its whatever nature. Guess what...something is not something else !
. It discredits a protagonist when, rather than make a case, they provide a couple of sources and suggest that we go and do their research for them.
