what's the penalty for driving with VALID out-of-state license in ohio while being an ohio resident? (Cleveland: apartment)

[ramzai]

the only thing that i've found so far is a note in motor vehicle law that says:
- ohio law provides no specific "grace period" for converting your out-of-state license
- ohio courts and police agencies have considered 30 days the maximum period to convert out-of-state license to the ohio one.

any more specifics? greatly appreciate!

[Ohiogirl81]

I went without an Ohio driver's license until my out-of-state registration had expired, about 8 months, and I turned over everything at once. No big deal. The only problem is you have no ID with your current address on it. 25 years ago that was no big deal, but now it can hinder you on stuff like opening a bank account or renting an apartment.

[WhereForARt]

Technically, you're supposed to change it right away, but Ohio doesn't really enforce it unless you get pulled over for something else and they catch you.

However, if you let the out-of-state license expire, you'll have to retake both the written AND the driving test.

[PhillytoCincy]

I switched mine over like two months after moving here. Ohio really isn't too strict on this subject.

[Wilson513]

Not very many cases on driving w/o an in-state license would be reported, but here's an interesting case on this subject:

CITY OF UPPER SANDUSKY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. MATTHEW G.
HARRIS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

No. 16-82-6

COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT, WYANDOT COUNTY,
OHIO

1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 11524


August 1, 1983

PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from Municipal
Court.

DISPOSITION: JUDGMENT: Judgment affirmed.


COUNSEL: MR. RICHARD A. GRAFMILLER, Municipal Prosecutor, 119 N. Seventh Street,
Upper Sandusky, OH 43351, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee

MR. MICHAEL L. THAL, 1836 Euclid Avenue, Suite 319, Cleveland, Ohio 44115,
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

JUDGES: GUERNSEY and COLE, JJ, CONCUR.

OPINION BY: MILLER, J.

OPINION


OPINION

This is an appeal by defendant from a judgment of sentence and conviction
entered by the Municipal Court of Upper Sandusky for a violation of Section
335.01 of the ordinances of the City of Upper Sandusky. The cited ordinance
provides in pertinent part that:

"(a) No person, except those expressly exempted under Ohio R.C. 4507.03 to
4507.05, inclusive, shall operate any motor vehicle upon a street or highway or
any public or private property used by the public for purposes of vehicular
travel or parking in this Municipality unless such person, upon application, has
been licensed as an operator or chauffeur by the Ohio Registrar of Motor
Vehicles under Ohio R.C. Chapter 4507 (Driver's License Law).

"* * *

"(b) No nonresident of Ohio shall drive any motor [*2] vehicle upon a street
or highway of this Municipality unless he has in his possession a valid and
current operator's or chauffeur's license issued to him by another jurisdiction
recognized by the State of Ohio.

"No nonresident of Ohio, upon demand of any police officer at any time or
place, shall fail to prove lawful possession or his right to operate such motor
vehicle, or fail to establish proper identity. ( ORC 4507.04).

"* * *."

Defendant was stopped by an Upper Sandusky police officer on April 12, 1982
for speeding. At the officer's request defendant produced a valid driver's
license issued by the State of New York. Defendant was subsequently cited for
driving without a valid Ohio driver's license.

Defendant filed his motion to dismiss asserting that he was a nonresident of
Ohio duly licensed to operate a motor vehicle in New York, and thus not in
violation of the cited ordinance.

The trial court overruled his motion, the matter proceeded to trial and the
trial court found defendant guilty.

Defendant appeals to this court setting forth three assignments of error.

Assignment of error number one: "The trial court erred in finding that
appellant was not an O.R.C. [*3] Section 4507.04 'nonresident' of Ohio."

Assignment of error number two: "The trial court erred in finding appellant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."

Defendant herein was charged under the Upper Sandusky Ordinance and not R.C.
4507.04. However, R.C. 4507.04 provides that nonresidents of Ohio, permitted to
drive upon the highways of their own state, may operate any motor vehicle upon
any highway in this state without an Ohio driver's license and is comparable to
Section 335.01 of the ordinances of Upper Sandusky.

The issue under this assignment is whether defendant is a nonresident of
Ohio.

The two fundamental elements essential to create a residence are bodily
presence in a place and the intention of remaining in that place. 77 C.J.S.
295, Residence.

Defendant herein came to Ohio to attend law school at Cleveland State
University and did so attend for two years. Upon graduation he took the Ohio
bar examination in July, 1981 and February, 1982, learning that he was
successful during the last week in April, 1982.

Defendant was working part-time for a lawyer in Cleveland and part-time as a
bartender. He rented an apartment in Cleveland, registered his automobile in
[*4] Ohio, had never registered to vote in Ohio and, during his two years in
law school, paid non-resident tuition.

Defendant testified that a friend had talked to a New York lawyer on his
behalf prior to his graduation as to employment, but the lawyer wasn't hiring,
and that "three weeks ago I applied to two lawyers" in Buffalo, New York, that
he "intended to go back to New York", but would have to take the New York bar
examination" which he had not done due to the distance he would be required to
drive to take a review course, that if he "got a very good job offer", he would
probably intend to reside in Ohio permanently, but unless and until that
happened, he would classify Ohio as a temporary residence.

It is evident from the evidence that defendant had a bodily presence in Ohio,
the question being does the above evidence indicate his intention of remaining
in Ohio.

"Intent" as regards residence has been given many descriptions including the
intention of remaining in a place permanently or for an indefinite time, or
without any present intention of removing elsewhere. It need not be an
intention to remain in a given place for all time, and is generally sufficient
if the [*5] intent be to make presently the given location home, even though
the person may have in mind the possibility of making a change should future
events demand. The intent which is necessary is an intent to make a home for
the moment and not for the future, or a presently exercised intent. 7 C.J.S.
297 ff, Residence.

Here the issue of defendant's intent was to be gleaned by the trier of fact
from defendant's actions. We conclude that the trial judge could properly
determine beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence before it that defendant
did in fact intend to reside in Ohio, and was not a "nonresident" of Ohio as
contemplated in the ordinance under which he was convicted.

Assignment of error number three: "It was 'plain error' on the part of
appellant, not to bring to the attention of the trial court that Upper Sandusky
Ordinance, Section 355.01(A), as applied to licensed out-of-state Ohio
motorists, was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution."

In State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 117, the court stated:

"* * * This court has consistently held that an appellate court need not
consider an error which a party [*6] complaining of the trial court's judgment
could have called, but did not call, to the trial court's attention at a time
when such error could have been awarded or corrected by the trial court. * * *
[Citations omitted]. 'Any other rule * * * would relieve counsel from any duty
or responsibility to the court and place the entire responsibility upon the
trial court to give faultless instructions upon every possible feature of the
case, thereby disregarding entirely the true relation of court and counsel which
enjoins upon counsel the duty to exercise diligence and to aid the court rather
than by silence mislead the court into the commission of error. * * *."

Defendant asserts, however, that this court should apply the doctrine of
plain error and declare the ordinance unconstitutional as applied to licensed
nonresident drivers.

Criminal Rule 52(B) provides that "plain errors or defects affecting
substantial rights may be noticed although they are not brought to the attention
of the court."

In State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, paragraph three of the syllabus
provides that:

"3. Notice of plain error under Crim. R. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost
caution, under exceptional [*7] circumstances and only to prevent a manifest
miscarriage of justice."

We conclude that this court should not, under the circumstances herein,
resort to and apply the doctrine of plain error.

The third assignment of error is not well taken.

Finding no error prejudicial to defendant as assigned and argued, we affirm
the trial court's judgment.

Judgment affirmed.