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Old 01-24-2014, 09:02 AM
 
13,335 posts, read 12,533,724 times
Reputation: 42586

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Quote:
Originally Posted by nj185 View Post
So for those who take their stance on Putative Father laws, let me ask, since not all states even have them, and those which do have different requirements, what is a father in a state which doesn't have them to do when an adoption agency sends the mom from that state to a state which does to give birth and sign away her parental rights? Or when a state does and the father complies with the laws in the state in which he and the mother were living and she disappears to another state to give birth and relinquish the child which has different requirements?

These laws are a ridiculous answer to a problem they don't address. Deadbeat dads are not dads who have proven paternity and want to raise their own child rather than have it adopted when the mother doesn't want it. Why the barriers to allowing fathers to step up?
Society, in general, has not had a positive experience trying to get unmarried fathers to be financially (or otherwise) supportive of their children. Of course, there are exceptions. However, the article that I've linked to states that over half (56%) of unmarried fathers do not have a formal child support agreement in place. Out of those who do, a huge number fail to pay something that would be recognized as full or adequate child support. The numbers are substantially better for men who were married to the mother of their children, but have subsequently divorced. Again, one will find exceptions. However, the legal framework of marriage and divorce creates a better world for children than "shacking up" or "living together" does. The article offers a number of insights. For example, an unmarried father who lives with the mother is vastly more likely to have established paternity and to be paying child support than a father who does not reside with the mother. I analogize fathers who live with the mother to be involved in something akin to a marriage with their child's mother, if they are not already married to someone else.

*-*The Future of Children -


What I've found is that what much of this discussion often turns on is that there are two groups of people.

1. The first group takes the position that if only we'd treat these unmarried men better, they would step up to the plate and do more for their children than they have done historically. The people who hold this view tend to focus more on the "way things ought to be" rather than the way things are.

2. The second group (to which I belong) is more realistic and bases its view on long-term insights of not only human nature, but of anthropology. Generally speaking, women remain in more static locations and raise children. Men, on the other hand, have often spent long periods of time away from their children involved in everything from hunting for meat to fishing at sea.

Perhaps, some day will come in the future when unmarried men, on their own, choose to act more responsibly towards their children. When that happens, it may be time to revisit issues like the Putative Father Statute. However, the statistics I have quoted above tell me that day has not arrived yet.

Your question about Putative Father Statutes is a reasonable one. In my state, fathers from states without Putative Father Statutes get a few breaks they would not receive if they lived in my state. They are not held to the very letter of the law when they can demonstrate that they took reasonable measures to find out where their girlfriend and their child were. That much, though, is a necessity. They must show they were taking some action and not that simply all this happened and one day they were unhappy with the results and decided they wanted to overturn an adoption.
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Old 01-24-2014, 05:14 PM
 
13 posts, read 15,084 times
Reputation: 11
Exclamation Broke into 3 parts:

(last line copied to the top: )(email this to every affected parent you know!)
and an unmarried father cannot be deprived of custody of his child without proof of neglect and a fitness hearing that are accorded to married parents. An unmarried father has the right to refuse to consent to the adoption of his child.

Inside Constitutional Law: What Matters and why by Russell L. Weaver (Use google books to get to cheapest purchasing links)
[RIGHT][RIGHT][/RIGHT][/RIGHT]
[RIGHT][RIGHT]Chapter 9: Equal Protection(261)[/RIGHT][/RIGHT]
F. Classifications of Unmarried Parents and Their Children
The Supreme Court first extended the equal protection guarantee to the classes of unmarried parents and their children in 1968, in an era when children were described as being born out of wedlock or as illegitimate. Twenty years later, the Court ulti*mately endorsed the use of an intermediate scrutiny standard in Clark v. Jeter137 for evaluating laws restricting the rights of these children and their parents. One state interest offered to justify these laws in the earliest cases was the policy of discour*aging childbirth outside of marriage; this interest could be described as grounded in the moral condemnation of such conduct or in the state's right to enforce the legal formalities of marriage. The Court quickly labeled this interest as the expression of a bias that created an "invidious" classification in violation of equal protection; the Court also condemned the state's willingness to punish nonmarital children for a birth status beyond their control. The second, more longstanding state interest was the need to avoid proof problems in ascertaining the paternity of children; this interest was significant enough in the decades before Clarkto persuade the Court to validate some laws that burdened nonmarital children with special proof-of-paternity requirements not imposed on children of married parents. However, as the Clark Court recognized, by 1988 it was possible for DNA testing to exclude over 99 percent of "those who might be accused of paternity."
The timing of this scientific advance creates a quandary for the retrospective interpretation of the Court's precedents relating to the rights of unmarried parents and their children, because most of these precedents were decided during the era before DNA testing became commonplace. In that era, the state interest in avoiding proof-of-paternity problems carried considerably more weight with the Court that it would in the modern era. The Court's pre-Clark precedents relied on a demanding version of rational basis review, and the holdings that invalidated classifications based on birth status remain good law; a modern application of intermediate scru*tiny presumably would reach the same results based on even more critical assess*ments of the invalidated laws. However, the pre-Clark precedents that upheld the rationality of some classifications have been cast into doubt, not only because Clark requires the statutes in these cases to be reevaluated using intermediate scrutiny, but also because these old precedents invariably relied on the now less-substantial state interest in avoiding proof-of-paternity problems. These perspectives should be kept in mind when assessing the likely current precedential value of all of the Court's pre-Clark precedents.
In several cases before Clark, the Court considered the validity of laws restricting the rights of nonmarital children to obtain court orders of support from their par*ents, typically from their fathers.138 The most extreme restriction was a law that completely barred these children from seeking such orders, while allowing children born to married parents to obtain these orders. In Gomez v. Perez,139 the Court invalidated this law as invidious discrimination and reasoned that the state's interest in avoiding proof-of-paternity problems could not be weighty enough to justify the complete denial of the substantial benefit of rights accorded to children generally. The Gomez holding is a typical example of the Court's response before Clarkto state legislative decisions to deny rights entirely to nonmarital children. For example, in Trimble v. Gordon,140 the Court invalidated a law completely excluding nonmarital
137. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
138. Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
139. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
140. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
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Old 01-24-2014, 05:15 PM
 
13 posts, read 15,084 times
Reputation: 11
Part 3: Individual Rights(262)
children from sharing in their father's intestate estate, reasoning that the state could find more narrowly tailored strategies to reach a "middle ground" solution to the proof-of-paternity problem.
Similarly, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,141 the Court invalidated a law that deprived "unacknowledged" nonmarital children of eligibility for worker's compensation benefits, and subsequent decisions followed Weber's reasoning in invalidating similar eligibility bars to state welfare benefits and federal disability insurance benefits.142 Each of these holdings relied on even earlier authorities that invalidated laws that completely denied nonmarital children the right to recover for the wrongful death of a parent and vice versa. Although the avoidance of proof-of-paternity problems did not figure in the latter decisions, these earliest cases established the understanding that the pre-Clark scrutiny standard of rational basis would be more demanding than the deferential version and would require state legislatures to attempt to satisfy the need for proofs of paternity with stat*utory measures that did not entirely nullify the rights of nonmarital children and their parents.
The more difficult problem repeatedly confronted by the Court in the pre-Clark era was what to do with a restrictive statute that established a less-than-complete denial of rights. This was the kind of problem that was raised in Clark. The endorsement of the intermediate scrutiny standard in Clark did not neces*sarily make this kind of problem easier to solve, but it framed the issue in Clarkas follows: Is a six-year time limit on support suits by nonmarital children substan*tially related to an important governmental objective, namely the avoidance of proof-of-paternity problems? The Clark Court invalidated this time limit because the type of narrow tailoring required by intermediate scrutiny, embodied in the concept of a "substantial relationship" between the statutory means for the advancement of a state interest, could not be satisfied. Given the alternative solu*tion of relying on DNA testing to eliminate fraudulent support claims, the out*dated time-limit requirement lost its substantial relationship to the achievement of the state's objective. The Clark Court reasoned further that the lack of the required substantial relationship was evidenced by the state's failure to require time limits for other kinds of suits raising paternity issues and by statutory loopholes that authorized the filing of some support suits after the six-year time limit expired. Thus, the Clarkopinion illustrated how a classification restricting the rights of nonmarital children may be invalidated because of simultaneously overinclusive and underinclusive tailoring.
Using Clark as a template for the application of the intermediate scrutiny standard to laws restricting rights on the basis of proof-of-paternity problems, it appears that three decisions have been cast into doubt by Clark, although their likely outcomes under the intermediate scrutiny standard may be debated. In Parham v. Hughes,143 the Court upheld a law that prohibited an unmarried father from bringing a suit for the wrongful death of a child whom he had not legitimated in life. To avoid proof-of-paternity problems, the law required an unmarried father to file a petition for a court order of legitimation during a time when evidence would be available from both mother and child to support or contest the issue of paternity. Four dissenters in Parham argued that the Court should endorse intermediate scrutiny and invalidate the law, reasoning that the state could have no important interest in protecting tortfeasors from litigating the issue of paternity in suits involving the deaths of unlegitimated children. Instead of allowing the state to impose "blanket discrimination
141. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
142. Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
143. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
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Old 01-24-2014, 05:16 PM
 
13 posts, read 15,084 times
Reputation: 11
[RIGHT][RIGHT]Chapter 9: Equal Protection(263)[/RIGHT][/RIGHT]
against unmarried fathers," the Parham dissenters would have required the state to address paternity concerns by simply assigning the burden of proving paternity to any parent bringing a wrongful death action. In the era of DNA testing, the Parham Court's greater deference to the state's solution for resolving paternity issues is out*dated and seems unlikely to prevail in a similar case.
Similarly, in Labine v. Vincen144t and Lalli v. Lalli,145 the Court upheld the valid*ity of laws conditioning intestate succession rights on specific proofs of paternity, such as a father's notarized acknowledgment of the "desire to legitimate" a child in Labine or a court order of filiation obtained during the father's lifetime in Lalli. Four dissenters in each case argued that the laws should be invalidated because the state interest in verifying paternity could be achieved by the acceptance of less onerous proofs.
A final example of a debatable decision is Mathews v. Lucas,146 where the weight given to the government interest in administrative convenience now seems exces*sive. This impression undermines the Court's validation of the Social Security Act's barriers for nonmarital children seeking surviving-child-insurance benefits. The act allowed children of married parents with particular proofs of paternity to obtain such benefits, but denied benefits to all nonmarital children who could not show that their deceased father supported them at the time of his death, even if they could prove that he had supported them for many years before death. While the Mathews majority allowed such disparate treatment of similarly situated offspring to survive rational basis review before Clark, the Mathews dissenters viewed "the blanket and conclu*sive exclusion" of nonmarital children as "odious" and would have invalidated the contested provision of the act because it allocated benefits on grounds "which have only the most tenuous connection" to the "supposedly controlling factor" of a child's dependency on a deceased father.
Even in the pre- Clark era, however, the Court protected the constitutional rights of unmarried fathers to retain custody of their children in Stanley v. Illinois147 and Caban v. Mohammed.148 In Stanley, the Court relied on due process as well as equal protection to invalidate a law that deprived an unmarried father automatically of child custody when the mother died, while allowing an unmarried mother or married parents to be deprived of custody only after a fitness hearing in which proof of child neglect was established. In Caban, the Court relied on equal protection to invalidate a law on grounds of gender discrimination because it denied unmarried fathers the right to block an adoption, while providing that right to unmarried mothers.
When classifications relating to unmarried parents and their children are made in federal statutes that regulate immigration or naturalization, the Court does not use intermediate scrutiny, and its decisions reflect the same deference toward gov*ernment interests that is reflected in the decisions involving federal alienage classifications.149
Q: What rights cannot be denied to the children of unmarried parents, or to those parents, under equal protection precedents?
A: Children of unmarried parents cannot be barred from bringing suit for the wrongful death of a parent or from bringing suit for support from a father.

Nonmarital children who are dependent on a parent cannot declared ineligible for worker's compensation benefits, welfare benefits, or disability benefits. Unmarried parents cannot be barred from bringing suit for the wrongful death of a child,

and an unmarried father cannot be deprived of custody of his child without proof of neglect and a fitness hearing that are accorded to married parents. An unmarried father has the right to refuse to consent to the adoption of his child.

144. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
145. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
146. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
147. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
148. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
149. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
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Old 01-24-2014, 05:17 PM
 
13 posts, read 15,084 times
Reputation: 11
Sec. 458. [42 U.S.C. 658a
PROOF: Corruption charges: Accusations Of Judicial Corruption Bring Entire System Into Question
(Child support is artificially increased in 28 of the 50 states)
(Not every state uses the same calculations,
nor does every county court within @ state)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
https://www.google.com/search?client...42+U.S.C.+658a
https://www.google.com/search?site=&...port+kickbacks

Child support and Kickbacks
the federal government pays every state a kickback of about 10% of every child support dollar that the state collects. Of course, it's not called a kickback -- it's called an "incentive payment" -- and the payment is legal under current law. But the term "kickback" is not entirely inappropriate, because the financial incentive has a clear and dubious intent: It rewards states for taking kids away from one parent and giving them to the other in a custody decision. In fact, states are actually penalized financially for dividing custody equally between parents. And, since the kickback is calculated as a percentage of the child support amount, states have a vested financial interest in making the child support amount as high as possible, and to be paid for as long as possible, no matter what the actual needs are, no matter what it does to the payor, and no matter if the person made to pay is actually the father or not.

Due to the large number of divorces, this kickback money amounts to millions of dollars in every state's annual budget

States have been receiving this money since 1975, but the kickback in it's current form is the result of the Child Support Enforcement program in the federal law called the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act,
abbreviated as PRWORA, that was passed in 1996.

Sue the judges. If a judge takes your kids away from you for no good reason, then this may be your only hope. You'll be told that judges cannot be sued for the decisions that they make, which is true, unless -- and this is the one exception -- they violate a person's civil rights. Taking kids away from a fit parent must be a civil rights violation, especially if it is done for no reason other than to extract money from the estranged parent, since it is functionally equivalent to kidnapping and extortion. Judges will say they are just "following orders" by doing what the PRWORA law and their state wants them to do, and that law may protect their actions from being classified as criminal violations, but they are supposed to answer to a higher authority -- the Constitution. Suing the judges may also reveal the full extent of this organized crime activity, by exposing corrupt lawyers, corrupt psychologists, state officials, and social workers.
~~~~~~~~~~~~

Need A Winner cartoon
Question: Is Court-Ordered Child Support Doing More Harm Than Good?
~~~~~~~~~~~
19. yes states get kickbacks and do pass on bonuses to judges
yes states get kickbacks and do pass on bonuses to judges (Reply #19) - Democratic Underground
~~~~~~~~~~~

http://www.corruptusjudicialsystem.o...nklist.rtf.pdf
Gives a LOT of pages to go through:
"Child Support" ("CS") Enforcement Kickbacks/incentive under Title IV-D, US Code 42 USC 651 et seq. of Social Security Act ("SSA") that unconstitutionally establishes legalised kidnapping of children, destruction of families and incarceration of parents (almost exclusively, fathers) fraudulently for the federal incentive (below) money handed by the US federal government to its 50 states (state government, courts, county prosecutors and counties) as part of a social engineering program to remove fathers from families in order for the state to exert control of children. N.B. The file names are self-explanatory.
However, the second group of two files below ("overview" and annualreport2congress-glossary" may be reviewed for description of terms and further information. Moreover, please feel free to contact ( ahs@swissmail.org ) Dr. Amir Sanjari for further information regarding this scourge and crime perpetrated upon families. -----------------------------------------------

A History of Title IV-D Office of Child Support Enforcement FY 2004 Annual Report to Congress

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Most judges are breaking the law
Contains:
Financial Incentives and Kickbacks For More Child Support:
http://fathersunite.org/ChildSupport..._Kickbacks.pdf
http://www.laryholland.org/serendipi...tesbenefit.mp3
Form
More Evidence of The Lengths The
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Office of Child Support Enforcement FY 2004 Annual Report to Congress
Social Security Act §458
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...epayments.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...llections.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...penditure.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...eralshare.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...tateshare.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...gramcosts.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...tablished.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...ollection.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...upportdue.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...epayments.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...ons-byage.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...llections.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...tivecases.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...llections.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...2families.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...ons-byage.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...llections.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...eralshare.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...tateshare.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...ntsupport.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...fchildren.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...ycategory.html
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...en-phyllis.pdf
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...0-excerpts.pdf
http://corruptusjudicialsystem.org/c...gift-exh10.pdf ---
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Old 01-24-2014, 06:05 PM
 
13 posts, read 15,084 times
Reputation: 11
OK... 4 parts then....(part 1 & 4 went thru... here's 2 again)
children from sharing in their father's intestate estate, reasoning that the state could find more narrowly tailored strategies to reach a "middle ground" solution to the proof-of-paternity problem.
Similarly, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,141 the Court invalidated a law that deprived "unacknowledged" nonmarital children of eligibility for worker's compensation benefits, and subsequent decisions followed Weber's reasoning in invalidating similar eligibility bars to state welfare benefits and federal disability insurance benefits.142 Each of these holdings relied on even earlier authorities that invalidated laws that completely denied nonmarital children the right to recover for the wrongful death of a parent and vice versa. Although the avoidance of proof-of-paternity problems did not figure in the latter decisions, these earliest cases established the understanding that the pre-Clark scrutiny standard of rational basis would be more demanding than the deferential version and would require state legislatures to attempt to satisfy the need for proofs of paternity with statutory measures that did not entirely nullify the rights of nonmarital children and their parents.
The more difficult problem repeatedly confronted by the Court in the pre-Clark era was what to do with a restrictive statute that established a less-than-complete denial of rights. This was the kind of problem that was raised in Clark. The endorsement of the intermediate scrutiny standard in Clark did not neces*sarily make this kind of problem easier to solve, but it framed the issue in Clarkas follows: Is a six-year time limit on support suits by nonmarital children substantially related to an important governmental objective, namely the avoidance of proof-of-paternity problems? The Clark Court invalidated this time limit because the type of narrow tailoring required by intermediate scrutiny, embodied in the concept of a "substantial relationship" between the statutory means for the advancement of a state interest, could not be satisfied. Given the alternative solution of relying on DNA testing to eliminate fraudulent support claims, the out*dated time-limit requirement lost its substantial relationship to the achievement of the state's objective. The Clark Court reasoned further that the lack of the required substantial relationship was evidenced by the state's failure to require time limits for other kinds of suits raising paternity issues and by statutory loopholes that authorized the filing of some support suits after the six-year time limit expired. Thus, the Clarkopinion illustrated how a classification restricting the rights of nonmarital children may be invalidated because of simultaneously overinclusive and underinclusive tailoring.
Using Clark as a template for the application of the intermediate scrutiny standard to laws restricting rights on the basis of proof-of-paternity problems, it appears that three decisions have been cast into doubt by Clark, although their likely outcomes under the intermediate scrutiny standard may be debated. In Parham v. Hughes,143 the Court upheld a law that prohibited an unmarried father from bringing a suit for the wrongful death of a child whom he had not legitimated in life. To avoid proof-of-paternity problems, the law required an unmarried father to file a petition for a court order of legitimation during a time when evidence would be available from both mother and child to support or contest the issue of paternity. Four dissenters in Parham argued that the Court should endorse intermediate scrutiny and invalidate the law, reasoning that the state could have no important interest in protecting tortfeasors from litigating the issue of paternity in suits involving the deaths of unlegitimated children. Instead of allowing the state to impose "blanket discrimination
141. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
142. Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
143. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).

Last edited by BrianTJ; 01-24-2014 at 07:33 PM..
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Old 01-24-2014, 06:13 PM
 
13 posts, read 15,084 times
Reputation: 11
*Really* long day.... 9:05 was part 2; this is part 3 of 4
against unmarried fathers," the Parham dissenters would have required the state to address paternity concerns by simply assigning the burden of proving paternity to any parent bringing a wrongful death action. In the era of DNA testing, the Parham Court's greater deference to the state's solution for resolving paternity issues is out*dated and seems unlikely to prevail in a similar case.
Similarly, in Labine v. Vincen144t and Lalli v. Lalli,145 the Court upheld the valid*ity of laws conditioning intestate succession rights on specific proofs of paternity, such as a father's notarized acknowledgment of the "desire to legitimate" a child in Labine or a court order of filiation obtained during the father's lifetime in Lalli. Four dissenters in each case argued that the laws should be invalidated because the state interest in verifying paternity could be achieved by the acceptance of less onerous proofs.
A final example of a debatable decision is Mathews v. Lucas,146 where the weight given to the government interest in administrative convenience now seems exces*sive. This impression undermines the Court's validation of the Social Security Act's barriers for nonmarital children seeking surviving-child-insurance benefits. The act allowed children of married parents with particular proofs of paternity to obtain such benefits, but denied benefits to all nonmarital children who could not show that their deceased father supported them at the time of his death, even if they could prove that he had supported them for many years before death. While the Mathews majority allowed such disparate treatment of similarly situated offspring to survive rational basis review before Clark, the Mathews dissenters viewed "the blanket and conclu*sive exclusion" of nonmarital children as "odious" and would have invalidated the contested provision of the act because it allocated benefits on grounds "which have only the most tenuous connection" to the "supposedly controlling factor" of a child's dependency on a deceased father.
Even in the pre- Clark era, however, the Court protected the constitutional rights of unmarried fathers to retain custody of their children in Stanley v. Illinois147 and Caban v. Mohammed.148 In Stanley, the Court relied on due process as well as equal protection to invalidate a law that deprived an unmarried father automatically of child custody when the mother died, while allowing an unmarried mother or married parents to be deprived of custody only after a fitness hearing in which proof of child neglect was established. In Caban, the Court relied on equal protection to invalidate a law on grounds of gender discrimination because it denied unmarried fathers the right to block an adoption, while providing that right to unmarried mothers.
When classifications relating to unmarried parents and their children are made in federal statutes that regulate immigration or naturalization, the Court does not use intermediate scrutiny, and its decisions reflect the same deference toward gov*ernment interests that is reflected in the decisions involving federal alienage classifications.149
Q: What rights cannot be denied to the children of unmarried parents, or to those parents, under equal protection precedents?
A: Children of unmarried parents cannot be barred from bringing suit for the wrongful death of a parent or from bringing suit for support from a father.

Nonmarital children who are dependent on a parent cannot declared ineligible for worker's compensation benefits, welfare benefits, or disability benefits. Unmarried parents cannot be barred from bringing suit for the wrongful death of a child,

and an unmarried father cannot be deprived of custody of his child without proof of neglect and a fitness hearing that are accorded to married parents. An unmarried father has the right to refuse to consent to the adoption of his child.

144. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
145. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
146. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
147. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
148. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
149. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998).

Sec. 458. [42 U.S.C. 658a
PROOF: Corruption charges: http://www.lexisone.com/news/nlibrary/n042503g.html
(Child support is artificially increased in 28 of the 50 states)
(Not every state uses the same calculations,
nor does every county court within @ state)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
https://www.google.com/search?client=opera&q=Sec.+458.+%5B42+U.S.C.+658a
https://www.google.com/search?site=&source=hp&q=child+support+kickbacks

http://www.answerisland.com/child-support-kickbacks.html
the federal government pays every state a kickback of about 10% of every child support dollar that the state collects. Of course, it's not called a kickback -- it's called an "incentive payment" -- and the payment is legal under current law. But the term "kickback" is not entirely inappropriate, because the financial incentive has a clear and dubious intent: It rewards states for taking kids away from one parent and giving them to the other in a custody decision. In fact, states are actually penalized financially for dividing custody equally between parents. And, since the kickback is calculated as a percentage of the child support amount, states have a vested financial interest in making the child support amount as high as possible, and to be paid for as long as possible, no matter what the actual needs are, no matter what it does to the payor, and no matter if the person made to pay is actually the father or not.

Due to the large number of divorces, this kickback money amounts to millions of dollars in every state's annual budget

States have been receiving this money since 1975, but the kickback in it's current form is the result of the Child Support Enforcement program in the federal law called the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act,
abbreviated as PRWORA, that was passed in 1996.

Sue the judges. If a judge takes your kids away from you for no good reason, then this may be your only hope. You'll be told that judges cannot be sued for the decisions that they make, which is true, unless -- and this is the one exception -- they violate a person's civil rights. Taking kids away from a fit parent must be a civil rights violation, especially if it is done for no reason other than to extract money from the estranged parent, since it is functionally equivalent to kidnapping and extortion. Judges will say they are just "following orders" by doing what the PRWORA law and their state wants them to do, and that law may protect their actions from being classified as criminal violations, but they are supposed to answer to a higher authority -- the Constitution. Suing the judges may also reveal the full extent of this organized crime activity, by exposing corrupt lawyers, corrupt psychologists, state officials, and social workers.
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Old 01-24-2014, 07:39 PM
 
13 posts, read 15,084 times
Reputation: 11
I was an IT Admin in the late 80's (to just a few past y2k).


Now-a-days I recommend anyone starting over (or getting out of HS)
to get a law degree, (use stipend $ & expanded loans to survive)
do crapola work for a few yrs,
(fit some activist work in)
then go back & do *whatever* they wanted to do w/ their life;
teaching, engineering, etc.

Or since 1/3 of our US employment is technically gov, run for an office {teasing grin}

how to pass the bar without law school(Google)
https://www.google.com/search?num=30...out+law+school

ie: CA
How to Pass the California State Bar Exam Without Law School
http://www.wikihow.com/Pass-the-Cali...out-Law-School

Hmm... a Marine did this: obscure program called the California State Bar Law Office Study Program. How to Become a Lawyer | How to Pass the Bar Exam with No College
http://tutorials.ehlinelaw.com/becom...er-law-degree/

Aforementioned Marine's page continued (His site is VERY Worthwhile to read & pass to friends!)

The States that Still Let You Be An Attorney By Reading for the Law:

As far as I know, 7 U.S. states will still let you read the law in a law office with no law school degree: (Source):

Virginia;
Washington;
Wyoming;
California;
Maine;
New York;

WSJ:Who Needs Law School? Clarence K. Carter is a former Indiana prisoner
He applied to 13 law schools and was rejected from all of them.
He's suing Indiana, claiming the law requiring law-school graduation is unconstitutional.
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/07/06/...-the-bar-exam/

https://www.google.com/search?num=30...ence+K.+Carter

"Bill Gates Sends Ex-Con to Law School After Supreme Court Win"
http://indianalawblog.com/archives/2...ill_gates.html

http://indianalawblog.com/cgi-bin/mt...search=hopwood
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Old 07-15-2014, 11:46 PM
 
382 posts, read 588,262 times
Reputation: 231
Quote:
Originally Posted by Lizita View Post
In light of a recent Supreme Court decision I'm curious what people think about what rights unmarried fathers should have to be in their child's life and/or raise their child. Please consider the following two scenarios:

1. Anne and Bob are a couple when Anne becomes pregnant. A few months into the pregnancy they break up and Bob lets it be known that he has no intention of paying child support or being involved with the child. The two move away from each other and have no further contact during the pregnancy. Bob is basically MIA emotionally, physically and financially and is therefore failing to do anything to benefit his unborn child. He is taking no parental responsibility during the pregnancy or birth. But a few weeks into the baby's life Bob has a change of heart. He now wants to take care of his child and be an active part in his child's life in every way. Should he be allowed to be in his child's life at this point with this history?

2. The second scenario is identical to the first until the point where Bob changes his mind and wants to be a father. In this scenario Bob contacts Anne to let her know that he wants to step up to the plate and wants to see his baby. But to his surprise he finds out that Anne doesn't have the baby. The baby has been placed with another couple to be adopted. Bob is vehemently against the adoption and wants his baby to raise her on his own. Should he have the right to do so or has his history of lack of action during the pregnancy negated his right to father his child? Should men in Bob's situation, who are not married to the mother and has not provided support during the pregnancy, have the right to their child or have any say at all?

I'm curious what people think about both scenarios.

Note that I'm not talking about what the law says in these situations. I'm only wondering what your opinions are, not how things currently work legally.

So, what do you think?
The conversation has veered significantly from the questions asked:

1) He is a jerk, but "a few weeks into the baby's life" seems a "reasonable" period of time (not to say it is unseemly to leave it that long) to get involved, assuming he is committed for the full cycle to adulthood for his child (how one determines that, IDK).

If it is some years down the road, that is a different story.

2) "Identical", means "a few weeks into the baby's life". Whoops! The mother should have communicated her intentions. If she had, he may have legally had the opportunity to voice his objection/concerns. IDK the cutoff timeline, but assuming that the mother did not attempt to communicate with the father, that leaves open the question of his permanent intent and reasonable opportunity for him to make his claim. The mother would have been wise to make and show she attempted such communication.

Either way, sadly, the child's life will be much less happy than it could be, given two obviously immature people bringing her/him into the world, unprepared for the responsibility to support.

That said, if this ends up in court, without knowing the legalities, it seems that unless the father shows signs of being abusive to mother or child, or has some other egregious defect of character, a few weeks of absence or denial cannot rule out his "rights".

Last edited by Transplanted99; 07-15-2014 at 11:55 PM..
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