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I’m not certain as to the source for the above statements given they do not track with what actually is known to have happened. For over a year before the assassination of Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914, Kaiser Wilhelm had been privately stating his strong agreement with his military staff that a war with both France and Russia was a necessity. All that was needed was a pretext to launch it. The assassination of the Archduke, with whom Wilhelm was very close, gave Germany just that. In fact, both Helmut von Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff, and War Minister Erich von Falkenhayn urged the Kaiser to take advantage of this “golden opportunity” because such a chance might never arise again.
On July 3, 1914 the Kaiser communicated to his ambassador in Vienna that he should tell the Austrians that Germany was in full support of military action against Serbia. The Kaiser stated “Now or never. The Serbs must be disposed of, and that right soon!” On July 5th, the Kaiser met with the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, Count Ladislaus de Szogyeny. During this meeting, Count Szogyeny told the Kaiser that Austria was determined to move against Serbia, to which the Kaiser responded it should be done quickly so to “eliminate Serbia as a power factor in the Balkans”. This was followed on July 6th by a telegram sent to Emperor Franz Joseph and his ministers assuring the Austrians that Germany backed Austria’s plans to go after the Serbs. The telegram is now commonly referred to as the “blank check” because it amounted to Germany both giving Austria free reign to do as she pleased toward Serbia and pledging to defend Austria militarily should that become necessary.
Beginning on July 6th, the Kaiser departed Germany for a yachting holiday in Norway. From that date until July 23rd he sent repeated messages to his ministers to apply pressure on Austria to move quickly and invade Serbia. In addition, he was personally involved in efforts to recruit Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece into an alliance that would assist Germany in the likely war against Russia. As he put it “The task now is to muster every gun that is prepared to fight for Austria against the Slavs”. On July 25th, two days after Austria sent the war ultimatum to Serbia, the Kaiser ordered the High Seas Fleet to begin an immediate bombardment of Russian naval bases in the Baltic. The commander of the fleet, Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, was able to convince the Kaiser to postpone this action until the Austrians actually moved on Serbia. As he sailed home to Germany on the evening of the 26th, the Kaiser declared “Austria must become preponderant in the Balkans…and at Russia’s expense; otherwise there will be no peace”. When informed that France, Britain, and Russia had all offered to help mediate the growing crisis, the Kaiser rejected them out of hand. Upon receiving word the Russian Foreign Minister had stated Russia would declare war on Austria if she invaded Serbia, his response was “Well then, let’s do it!”
The only time the Kaiser actually hesitated about going to war was during a brief period from July 28th through July 30th. After having convinced himself that Britain would stay neutral should hostilities commence between Germany, France and Russia, the Kaiser received word which seriously called that into question. The British government informed Germany’s ambassador in London that since Serbia’s response to the Austrian ultimatum was so positive, negotiations between Germany, Austria, and Serbia should begin immediately. If this did not happen, then Britain would be less than sympathetic to Austria, and by extension, Germany, taking up arms against Serbia. The Kaiser immediately issued a proposal by which Austria would only occupy Belgrade, basically holding it in custody until the Serbs complied with all Austrian demands. However, the proposal came to nothing, largely because Austria by then was completely committed to war and the Kaiser did little to dissuade them. A personal communication from his cousin King George V seemed to reassure the Kaiser that Britain would stay neutral. But then follow up communications from the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, contradicted the King. Grey made it clear Britain would feel obligated to intervene should Germany go to war against France. On July 30th, the Kaiser mad a half hearted attempt to resurrect his Belgrade proposal but once again it went nowhere because events had progressed too far to be stopped.
When news reached Berlin on July 31st that Russia had mobilized her armed forces, any lingering doubts the Kaiser may have had evaporated. The Kaiser sent a personal telegram to Franz Joseph in which he asked Austria to forego war against Serbia and instead concentrate all efforts against Russia. He also sent messages to the governments of Italy, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey calling on them to also take up arms against Russia. Germany mobilized on August 1st, and for a moment a series of telegrams received on that day from the German ambassador in London seemed to hold the promise that Britain might yet remain out of the fray. But when they were revealed to be the result of a miscommunication between British officials and the German embassy, the Kaiser pressed on. He firmly believed victory against both France and Russia could be achieved so swiftly that Britain would arrive on the scene too late to prevent it. And so the First World War began.
The statements made by the Kaiser along with the actions undertaken by his government in the month following Franz Ferdinand’s assassination hardly paint a portrait of a man trying to reign in Austria in hopes of preventing a full blown war. Instead, they make it clear the Kaiser was actively seeking conflict to, as he put it “settle accounts with France” and “liberate the Balkans from Russia for all time”. The Kaiser got exactly what he wanted. Unfortunately, it didn’t end the way he expected it to.
Thank you for setting the record straight, I learned a good amount of info. I have only done a cursory reading on the German actions in the lead up to the war and came away with the impression that Wilhelm feared and opposed war on a broader scale, which he did, however, he also did support military action against Serbia and was prepared for Russia and France to join. Britain seemed to be the lynchpin and he apparently thought there was a chance Britain would remain neutral right up to the start of hostilities.
I have some more reading to do, thanks again for the info and clarification.
In itself it may not be the most important event, but the series of events that it unleashed (WWI, the fall of the dynasties of Europe and Russia, the rise of Communism and Fascism which led to WWII and the Holocaust, etc.) can all be traced back to that fateful day.
Were all of most of them destined to happen whether or not Franz Ferdinand had been killed? Was Europe such a powder keg that it would have only been a matter of time until something else triggered WWI or would the entire 20th Century have been different?
Well, yes...if you ignore the fact that the Europeans invaded and killed each other since the dawn of recorded history. Just look how many times England was invaded to one extent or another before they rose to power.
It wasn't until the advent of nuclear wheapons that the possiblity of coexistence was forced upon them and even then we have the regional "cleansings" and so on and so forth.
So basically, I view the assassination of the Arch duck as an excuse and if not for that something else would have triggered it soon after.
Very interesting reading Tony T, but I do think at the 11th hour that the Kaiser did try to stop the invasion of France thru Belgium when he learned that England would side with Belgium and France. It was certainly a last minute panicked decision that I believe was arrived on Aug 1st, but Wilhelm's chief of staff Helmuth Von Moltke ignored his orders and proceeded with the Schlieffen plan. Kaiser Wilhem decided he wanted to concentrate all the war effort on Russia, and that seemed to make more sense for Germany/Austria and their vision for control of the Balkans. For all the posturing Kaiser Wilhelm did in the weeks leading up to war, he did try to put the brakes on at the last minute and limit the scope of the war. He was the emperor of Germany and if the man changed his mind, then his chief of staff should have obeyed and halted the Schlieffen plan.
Thank you for setting the record straight, I learned a good amount of info. I have only done a cursory reading on the German actions in the lead up to the war and came away with the impression that Wilhelm feared and opposed war on a broader scale, which he did, however, he also did support military action against Serbia and was prepared for Russia and France to join. Britain seemed to be the lynchpin and he apparently thought there was a chance Britain would remain neutral right up to the start of hostilities.
I have some more reading to do, thanks again for the info and clarification.
You are most welcome. While there are many good books on the subject, one that I would highly recommend is titled “Europe’s Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914?” by David Fromkin. It’s very informative without being boring in it’s presentation of the facts and does an excellent job of revealing how events were manipulated to bring about war in Europe.
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Originally Posted by mofford
Very interesting reading Tony T, but I do think at the 11th hour that the Kaiser did try to stop the invasion of France thru Belgium when he learned that England would side with Belgium and France. It was certainly a last minute panicked decision that I believe was arrived on Aug 1st, but Wilhelm's chief of staff Helmuth Von Moltke ignored his orders and proceeded with the Schlieffen plan. Kaiser Wilhem decided he wanted to concentrate all the war effort on Russia, and that seemed to make more sense for Germany/Austria and their vision for control of the Balkans. For all the posturing Kaiser Wilhelm did in the weeks leading up to war, he did try to put the brakes on at the last minute and limit the scope of the war. He was the emperor of Germany and if the man changed his mind, then his chief of staff should have obeyed and halted the Schlieffen plan.
Thank you. I believe the incident you are referring to is related to the telegrams sent from London to the Kaiser by the German ambassador, Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky during the early evening hours of August 1st.
At 5 PM, it had been made public that Germany would mobilize it’s armed forces. In the hours that followed, there arose a debate among the Kaiser and his staff as to what should be done next. Admiral von Tirpitz advised that nothing should happen until all chances of a diplomatic solution were exhausted. Von Moltke and von Falkenhayn advocated following through with immediate mobilization. The Kaiser was not in agreement with either position but seemed unable to come up with an alternative.
It was at this point the first telegram arrived from Prince Lichnowsky, and when the contents were revealed, the Kaiser was both surprised and ecstatic. Lichnowsky relayed a conversation he had with Sir Edward Grey. Grey offered up the possibility of not only British neutrality, but a British guarantee of French neutrality in a Russian/German war as long as Germany pledged not to attack France. The Kaiser seized on this and told von Moltke “So we simply deploy the whole army in the East!” Von Moltke protested, saying it was impossible to do such a thing at this stage. But the Kaiser was adamant and ordered von Moltke to halt mobilization and any German troop movement westward. A follow-up telegram seemed to bring even better news; Britain would remain neutral even if Germany attacked France. The Kaiser could not believe his good fortune. Now he could wage war without the interference of the British.
But the mood turned sour quickly after another telegram arrived. Grey was now saying, absent a guarantee from Germany to respect Belgium’s neutrality, Britain would be hard pressed to “adopt an attitude of friendly neutrality”. Gone too was the British guarantee of France’s neutrality should Germany and Russia go to war. The Kaiser was enraged by what he interpreted as a prime example of British double dealing and trickery. He met with von Moltke and told him to restart mobilization immediately, ending their meeting with “Now do as you please; I don’t care either way”.
There is little question that von Moltke and von Falkenhayn had their own agenda when it came to war and in many ways pushed the Kaiser into taking steps that would further that agenda. But the Kaiser was not just an idle spectator either. And in the end, it was his decision to take Germany to war, and no one else’s.
Thanks TonyT for a closer look at the Kaiser and the events to kick off August in 1914. The part about the Kaiser telling Moltke to "do as you please" at the end of the meeting helped clear things up for me. Sounds like Britain was unsure about what to do or indeed playing tricks on the Kaiser with the "misscommunicated" telegrams they sent. I have to wonder how hard Britain would have fought for the Tsar if Germany would have not invaded Belgium and France.
Amazing when you look at pictures of the crowds that had gathered all over Europe, after the announcement of war.......at how happy they were !
No it was an important but other very importatn issues happened in ww1 such as the Russian Revolution, the Western front of war, the break up of the Austrian and Ottoman empires.
I'm in the camp that the assassination was merely the excuse for the war to begin not the cause. For a great book about the causes and inevitability of WWI read "The Proud Tower" by Barbara Tuchman.
I'm in the camp that the assassination was merely the excuse for the war to begin not the cause. For a great book about the causes and inevitability of WWI read "The Proud Tower" by Barbara Tuchman.
I think her "Guns of August" and Robert Massie's "Dreadnought" were far better books. I always felt that "The Proud Tower" was kind of thrown together after her success with "Guns Of August." It really only dealt with the culture of the age, and devoted little time to the coming catastrophe.
cpg- ive read "Guns of August" but have not read "Dreadnaught." However, I will get a copy of the book.
You are absolutely correct that the Proud Tower dealt with the culture of the time. However, wasnt it the culture, attitudes and mindsets of the monarchs, rulers AND general population that made all the sdes itch for a war. I believe Tuchmans point was that the culture led to the events that resulted in the war.
I just read TonyT's recomended book,"Europe's Last Summer"...If you read nothing else about the Great War.. READ THIS...
I,too, am a Barbara Tuchman fan, but this book makes more sense than anything else I've read. And is based on material that has just come to light.
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