Did Stalin Purposely Halt the Soviet Armies at the Vistula River During the Warsaw Uprising in WWII? (war, Roman)

[John Walmsley]

In a recent reading of Diane Ackerman's book The Zookeeper's Wife, I noted that she mentions the fact that the Red Army "had camped on the the east side of the Vistula River and complacently watched the bloodshed for two months solid, as thousands of of Poles were massacred, thousands more sent to camps, and the city extinguished."

During this period, the Polish Resistance fought valiantly, but was finally overcome by superior German forces. A number of reasons -- political, strategic, etc -- have been given for this strange cessation of activity by Soviet forces. It's true that Soviet losses (a figure of 123,000 is cited) were heavy in reaching the Vistula and rebuilding and replenishment were necessary. However the suspicion has lingered that Stalin, still seething over the Polish victory in the Polish-Russian war of 1919-1920, intentionally called a halt to the Soviet advance so as to let the Polish Resistance and German forces kill each other off. Anyone have a clarification or more information on this point?

[somebodymiami]

most likely cause Stalin didn't like neither countries or their races/religion

[mwruckman]

The Soviets did have a stop line on the Vistula in part for other Soviet Armies to catch up and to get the Red Army ready for the final campaign into Germany and the capture of Berlin. The Germans had an Army Group "North" that remained in the Baltic region all but cut off from Germany after the collapse of Army Group "Center". German Army Group "South" was still in the Balkans and was a Soviet concern. Although German forces were largely spent. A prudent Soviet commander would always ask what if the two Army Groups South and North were employed in a flanking or regard action against Soviet forces in Poland. Soviet forces involved with transport and logistics were primarily made up of poorly trained and armed non-russian divisions. German forces could have routed such divisions and caused disruption for the Red Army. What Polish partisans did or did not do was a minor concern to Soviet commanders.

[hornet67]

What? You mean that you doubt good old Uncle Joe would do something like that?
No love lost ever between the paranoid thug and mass murderer from Georgia, and the Poles. Remember the Katyn Forest Massacre?
Poles were fighting and dying not just in Warsaw then; also in Italy, France, and in the skies above Europe, and, also, some in Stalin's armies as well. Haven't ever understood that at all; I hope it was the only choice they had.

[Yac]

Also, Stalin specifically denied allied supply planes access to his airfields, effectively eliminating any help for those fighting and dying in Warsaw. The German forces still occupying Warsaw were no match even for the spearhead of the Red Army, and to say they didn't move because they were waiting for reinforcements, for two months, well.. I don't see it. This issue is quite extensively discussed on the wiki page.
Moral judgments aside, the way I see it the destruction of a nations capitol played well into Stalins plans. That's why he ordered his troops to stop and watch what was going on.
My grandmother was a soldier of the Polish resistance, fighting in Warsaw till the end. I've heard stories of how the Soviet army that came to "help" greeted poles asking for help - with machine gun fire. This is anecdotal, but fits well into what many historians claim.

[TonyT]

There has always been the suspicion that the failure of the Soviets to advance on Warsaw and assist the Polish uprising was a deliberate decision made by Stalin for purely opportunistic reasons. While this cannot be totally ruled out, the fact is the military situation along the Vistula had changed significantly by the beginning of August.

Field Marshal Walter Model had finally received Hitler’s consent to draw reinforcements from various theaters and had collected twelve divisions, including two panzer divisions, from Belorussia, the Balkans and the Western Front. He immediately began a counteroffensive which halted the Soviets advance at several points along the Vistula front and in some cases forced localized retreats. The Russians soon found themselves in a position where their troops were basically exhausted and unable to regain their forward momentum and with one flank seriously threatened by the Germans. Needing time to regroup and resupply, the Russians discontinued all efforts to enter Warsaw, shifting the focus of further offensive action northward into the Baltic region and south into Romania. These remained the main points of Russian operations well into the fall of 1944.

To put a finer point on it, the start of the Warsaw uprising on August 1st, ended up being poorly timed and premature. Believing the Germans would abandon Warsaw in the face of the Soviet onslaught, elements of the Polish Home Army launched a revolt. Unfortunately the day they picked happened to be the same day the Germans brought the Russian offensive to a dead stop. By August 5th, the Poles realized they were in serious trouble. Though the average citizen in Warsaw could not fathom why the Russians, who were so close, didn’t attack the capital, the staffers of General Leopold Okulicki’s Home Army knew exactly why. They attributed it solely to “the general collapse of Soviet offensive on the Vistula”. General Tadeusz Pelcyznski, Chief of Staff to the Home Army believed that at best, the earliest the Russians could begin to move again toward Warsaw would be on August 20th; a full three weeks after the uprising began. On the Soviet side, General Konstantin Rokossovsky, as late as July 28th, was confident he could capture Warsaw by August 6th, and said as much to Stalin. But as the German counteroffensive developed it quickly became clear that would not happen. General Rokossovsky was forced to acknowledge that the earliest he could launch an assault on Warsaw would be August 25th. On the 9th of August, Stalin confessed to representatives of the Polish Government in Exile that he had fully expected his forces to take Warsaw on the 6th, but the arrival of five German armored divisions to the north of the Polish capital made that militarily impossible.

So, is it within the realm of possibility that Stalin deliberately stopped his troops outside Warsaw for the specific purpose of allowing the Germans to eliminate for him any opposition to his future plans for Poland? Certainly, because such a maneuver would be in keeping with how Stalin’s mind worked. But based on the tactical situation at the time and statements made by Polish and Russian commanders on the ground, it is just as reasonable to conclude the decision not to advance was borne out of military necessity rather than being politically motivated.

[John Walmsley]

Tony T & Others,

Thanks for your interesting and informative comments on this subject. It would be easy to see why the people of Warsaw and the Polish Resistance would think a vengeful Stalin and the Soviet Army had abandoned them to destruction by German forces. However, it would also be understandable that the battered Soviet Armies were in desperate need of reorganization and replenishment. As pointed out by Tony T, the Warsaw uprising was fateful and ill-timed. Whether the Soviets required a full two months to rebuild before resuming their westward push in this sector may never be known.

[hornet67]

Methinks that if it was Polish communists staging an uprising in Warsaw, Stalin would have found a way to provide assistance. Yes, the Red Army had advanced far and rapidly, after destroying German Army Group Center in Operation Bagration, which began in late June. But, pardon me for being dubious regarding Soviet claims of being unable to provide much help. I cannot EVER give Stalin the benefit of the doubt.

[WIHS2006]

Originally Posted by hornet67

Methinks that if it was Polish communists staging an uprising in Warsaw, Stalin would have found a way to provide assistance. Yes, the Red Army had advanced far and rapidly, after destroying German Army Group Center in Operation Bagration, which began in late June. But, pardon me for being dubious regarding Soviet claims of being unable to provide much help. I cannot EVER give Stalin the benefit of the doubt.

I agree 100%.