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Old 06-12-2013, 06:35 PM
 
Location: Parts Unknown, Northern California
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June 13th, 1863:

Upon learning that Generals Schenck and Milroy had not pulled back from the forward positions in the Valley, General in Chief Halleck now sent what he viewed as a direct order to do so. Unfortunately he employed the word "should" in these orders and Schenck siezed on this to later claim that he thought it was not an order, merely a suggested course of action from his commander. In any event, Milroy's force remained in place at Winchester with Milroy convinced that the approaching Confederates were nothing more than an annoying cavalry raid.

By early afternoon, 150 years ago today, 12,550 rebels in the divisions of General Johnson and Early were closing in on Winchester and poised to launch an attack, something which would be a bit more unpleasant than a cavalry raid. Milroy was saved for one more day however when General Ewell arrived on the scene, evaluated the defenses before him and decided that a straight forward frontal attack was not the way to go after all. His concern was with the three forts the Federal had built and filled with two dozen artillery pieces. Ewell felt that he could overwhelm these positions, but the cost would be great in doing so.

Instead he cancelled the planned attack in favor of a double envelopment movement the next day. One division would fix Milroy in place, the other would take a roundabout route to scale some heights which overlooked the forts to the NW. If Ewell could get his own artillery up there, it would be able to pound the forts into pieces. Ewell's other division, was dispatched to Berryville to deal with the 1800 man outpost there.

While this was going on in the Valley, a series of telegrams were flying back and forth between Washington and Falmouth. At last aware that General Lee was apparently launching another invasion of the North, General Hooker did not initiate an immediate pursuit because he believed that he had a better idea. Rather than chasing Lee, Hooker proposed that in the absence of Lee's army, Richmond would be an easy target for capture. Further, Hooker argued, a movement against Richmond would cause Lee to abandon his march north and rush back to protect the rebel capitol.

Ninety minutes after sending a telegram with this proposal, Hooker received a reply from President Lincoln and it was thumbs down. Lee's army, the president stated once again, was the true target, not the capitol of the rebellion. Hooker was to move north, parallel to Lee, always keeping the Army of the Potomac between Lee and Washington, find the enemy and attack him.

Hooker would begin complying the next day, setting off after Lee who had a ten day head start.

On this same day out west, General Pemberton received the first communication from General Johnston since May 29th. Hoping for news that Johnston would be bringing a massive army to attack Grant's rear and break the siege, Pemberton's spirits were instead deflated when the message read:

Quote:
.

Lieutenant-General PEMBERTON:

I am too weak to save Vicksburg. Can do no more than attempt to save you and your garrison. It will be impossible to extricate you, unless you co-operate, and we make mutually supporting movements.

Communicate your plans and suggestions, if possible.

J. E. Johnston.
The American Civil War: May 29, 1863: "I am too weak to save Vicksburg."

So Vicksburg was to be abandoned, in contradiction to the direct orders Pemberton had received from President Davis, and apparently Johnston felt that Pemberton would have no difficulty waltzing through the siege lines in an escape which was coordinated with a force with whom communications were spotty and unreliable. And if such an improbable escape was accomplished, Pemberton might still be facing charges for disobeying Davis.

There are probably no words which adequately describe Pemberton's level of despair after absorbing Johnston's message. Not only was no help coming to save the city, but Johnston was expecting him to come up with the plan for the movements of both armies, this despite the fact that Pemberton had no idea of the disposition of the federal troops outside of those immediately besieging his lines.


Still, Pemberton obeyed and dispatched a modest proposal for an attempted linkup near Jackson. Pemberton knew that there was no way for his army to get there without having to cross the Big Black River once more, and was also aware that all of the crossing points were heavily guarded by Grant's men.

Johnston had kicked the ball into Pemberton's court, Pemberton kicked it back and in the end nothing at all would come of any of these plans. Pemberton did not have the strength to break out, Johnston did not have the strength to break through. Their communications at this point were little more than each man trying to absolve himself of any blame.


Unhappy General....John Pemberton

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Old 06-13-2013, 06:41 PM
 
Location: Parts Unknown, Northern California
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June 14th, 1863:

Most of the daylight hours 150 years ago today at Winchester, Virginia, were invested by General Early's division in making an eight mile flanking march and then hauling twenty artillery pieces up the back of a ridge which overlooked the forts which defended the city.

A little after 5 pm the guns were suddenly run into view along the crest and opened a surprise bombardment of the West Fort. The startled Union defenders raced to their guns and attempted to return fire, but they were overwhelmed by a storm of shells which continued for three quarters of an hour. While the shelling was taking place, two Louisiana brigades crept closer and closer to the works. At a signal, the rebel guns ceased fire and the Confederate infantry rose up and rushed into the fort. The defenders were put up but a short struggle and soon were fleeing out the back of the fort, heading for the other bastions. The rebels quickly turned the captured guns on those other forts and the battle settled into an artillery duel which continued until after dark.

Ewell, back in command after a brief timeout when he had been punched in the chest by a spent bullet, reasoned that General Milroy would attempt to escape during the night using the Martinsburg Turnpike which snaked off to the NE. To foil the success of such a movement, Ewell ordered General Johnson's division to make a night march and find a blocking position on the road from where he could give Milroy an unpleasant morning surprise. Johnson and his men departed at 9 pm, aiming for Stephenson's Depot on the railroad which paralleled Milroy's probable retreat route.

Ewell had correctly anticipated Milroy, even before Milroy's late night officer's conference where it was agreed that they had to pull out that night. All wheeled vehicles, wagons and artillery alike, would have to be abandoned to allow maximum speed. Their movement began at 1 am.

It would be a race. If won by Milroy his command would get away and make it to Harper's ferry. If won by Johnson, then Milroy was trapped.

Second Battle of Winchester



__________________________________________________ _______________________________

Also on this day...

At Port Hudson in Louisiana, General Banks was preparing a second attempt to take the rebel position by storm, the first having been bloodily repulsed on May 29th. This time it would be a nighttime assault, something rarely attempted during the war. Banks began the attack on the 13th with a prolonged bombardment of the defensive works. He then paused and sent a messenger forward under a flag of truce, demanding the capitulation of the Confederates. General Garner, noting that nothing had really changed since the previous assault, declined the invitation.

150 years ago today, several hours behind schedule due to the confusion of darkness, Banks launched his infantry assault at 3:30 in the morning. It was supposed to be a coordinated attack by all three of his Corps, but unsurprisingly, the darkness foiled the cooperation and the assaults went forward in a compartmentalized manner, allowing Garner to shift troops to meet any crisis. There were several incidents of Union regiments firing into one another. The Federal right flank didn't even get underway until after sunrise.

The attack was repulsed at all points with a one sided exchange of casualties, nearly 1800 Federals were killed, wounded or captured while Garner's force lost but 47. There was a reason that you didn't fight at night and Banks had just learned it the hard way.

So, as with Vicksburg, it was back to the siege approach.


Generic Photo of Generic Rebel Re-enactors Firing A Cannon Which I'm Inserting Here In Lieu Of Any Artist Depiction Of The Above Attack Which I Could Not Find.

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Old 06-14-2013, 06:12 PM
 
Location: Parts Unknown, Northern California
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June 15th, 1863:

General Edward "Allegheny" Johnson had received that nickname in the fall of 1861 when he was leading troops in western Virginia in the Confederacy's attempt to hold onto some portions of that breakaway region. In a skirmish dignified as the Battle of Allegheny Mountain, Johnson's brigade had held off an attack by a federal brigade led by General Robert Milroy, the same man whose escape from Winchester Johnson was now marching to interdict.

Johnson had the difficult task of disengaging from the battle's front, leading his tired men on a long night march that outpaced the enemy, and being in a position to fight in the morning.

These things Johnson accomplished. At 4 am the first brigade of his division reached Stephenson's Depot just minutes ahead of the appearance of the first troops of Milroy's retreating army. A confused fight erupted in the dark, one in which Johnson's men were heavily outnumbered. They were able to hang on until Johnson's other brigades arrived to tip the balance because while they had brought their artillery, Milroy had none, it had been abandoned in the haste to get away from Winchester. Johnson was helped further when the 18th Connecticut and the 87th Pennsylvania regiments of Milroy's army stumbled upon one another in the darkness, and wasted time and blood firing into one another.

By sunrise the rest of Johnson's force had arrived and the daylight revealed to Milroy that his planned escape route was blocked. Unable to cut their way out, Milroy broke off further attacks and simply abandoned all responsibility, issuing an order that everyone was to try and get away on their own hook as best as they could. Milroy then set an example for his men by securing a horse and being the first to flee.

Needless to say all command structure for the Federals ceased to exist and the soldiers scattered in wild individual flights for freedom. Their state of panic was such that Johnson was able to capture 30 of them personally, and without a weapon. Johnson would ride up to any refugees he could catch, point his spyglass at them and demand their surrender. They all complied.

The Second Battle of Winchester turned out to be an even larger scale victory than the first when Stonewall Jackson had stampeded General Banks. For a cost of just 269 casualties, General Ewell's force had killed or wounded 443 Yankees, and captured another 4000. Also falling into rebel hands were 28 artillery pieces, 300 horses, and nearly 300 wagons loaded with supplies. The Yankee defense of the Valley was completely shattered and the way had been opened for General Lee to march his entire army through it unmolested by opposition. Everything Ewell had been asked to do he had done, and more.

Maybe he was the reincarnation of Stonewall thought his men. At least for the moment.

As for Milroy, his hasty exit allowed him to elude capture, but he was relieved of command and would spend the next ten months coping with a Board of Inquiry. Ultimately he would be cleared and returned to action in the western theater in 1864.


General Edward "Allegheny" Johnson..his men called him "Old Club Foot" or "Clubby."

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Old 06-15-2013, 06:49 PM
 
Location: Parts Unknown, Northern California
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Jun 16th, 1863:

General Joseph Hooker sowed the seeds of his downfall as commander of the Army of the Potomac 150 years ago today. He took the bait from a trap set for him by General in Chief Henry Halleck.

Halleck kept an Ugly List. If you were on it you then your career was being undermined in a clandestine manner. Should he discover that he was in error about you, discover that you were suddenly needed to meet a crisis, or discover that in order to add someone even uglier to the list, he needed your help, you could escape the list. This had happened to Grant who had made the list by stealing Halleck's thunder out west with his capture of Forts Henry and Donelson. Restored to grace, Grant made the list again after being surprised at Shiloh, but escaped once more when Halleck was called east for the supreme command.

Joseph Hooker was currently the # 2 name on Halleck's list. His crime was having made an end around Halleck to deal directly with President Lincoln. He was able to get away with this because Lincoln chose to run the war in the east himself.

After more than a year on the job, Halleck had yet to exhibit anything that could be mistaken for a grand strategic vision. He seemed to see himself more as an administrator and referee than as the man charged with directing the war. Satisfied with Halleck as the nation's chief military clerk, Lincoln had decided to simply leave matters as they stood, make the strategic decisions himself and let Halleck convey his orders. Thus when Hooker approached Lincoln directly, the president was receptive. It had been that way ever since, Halleck reduced to little more than a glorified telegrapher passing along orders from the president.

Lincoln did not take a direct hand in the war in the west, but Generals Grant and Banks had both demonstrated talent for acting first and informing Halleck later. Halleck was being ignored by everyone and the focus of his anger over this became Hooker.

While not a strategic visionary, Halleck was clever at political infighting and he determined that the best way to get rid of Hooker would be by simply doing his job. Halleck had not interfered with the Lincoln-Hooker relationship and had not insisted upon his proper role being acknowledged. Now Halleck began to exercise that role.

Hooker was facing a manpower problem. There were twenty five regiments in the Army of the Potomac whose enlistments expired in late May and throughout June. When they departed the army would be down to 90,000 men, the smallest it had been since before the Peninsula Campaign. Hooker appealed to Halleck to strip other forces to reinforce him, Halleck told him flatly that he would have to work with what he had.

Next, as Hooker aimed the army north in pursuit of Lee, he wired Halleck and demanded that all the troops in the vicinity, those defending Washington, and those in the Valley, all be placed under Hooker's overall command. Halleck replied that he would supervise cooperation.

When Hooker presented his plan for attacking Richmond to draw Lee back to Virginia, Halleck made sure that word was leaked to Hooker that Halleck had argued strongly against the plan.

Finally Halleck began to issue campaign orders to Hooker, telling him to make the protection of Harper's Ferry a priority. With his reduced force, Hooker did not want to detach any troops for what he thought was a fool's errand.

Frustrated by Halleck at every turn, 150 years ago today Hooker did exactly what Halleck had been hoping. He sent a telegram to the president:
Quote:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Fairfax Station,

June 16, 1863-11 a. m.

His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN,

President, &tc.:
......You have long been aware, Mr. President, that I have not enjoyed the confidence of the major-general commanding the army, and I can assure you so long as this continues we may look in vain for success, especially as future operations will require our relations to be more dependent upon each other than heretofore. ......

JOSEPH HOOKER,

Major-General.
eHistory at OSU | Online Books | The Official Records of the Civil War

It was not stated directly, but clearly Hooker was trying to force the president to make a him or me decision. Hooker apparently felt confident in his relationship with the president and expected to be upheld once more. He also apparently was unaware that Lincoln was very displeased with Hooker at the moment. The president had been pressing Hooker to move quickly and strike a blow against some portion of Lee's army while it was in motion and strung out in pieces. Surely, Lincoln argued again and again, with the head of Lee's army already crossing into Pennsylvania while the tail was just now departing Frederickburg, there had to be some spot of weakness. Hooker had ignored this and soon he would be learning that this was a mistake.

The first sign that his toss down the gauntlet maneuver had backfired took place when Hooker received a reply from the president that same evening. Short, blunt, it read:
Quote:
"To remove all misunderstanding, I now place you in the strict military relation to General Halleck, of a commander of one of the armies, to the General in Chief of all the armies. I shall direct him to give you orders , and you to obey them."
A Most Toxic Relationship: Part 3 - Matthew Bartlett, Author Gettysburg Chronicle

This was not the folksy, friendly Old Abe that Hooker had been dealing with up until then. It was a warning.


Things were swinging Henry Halleck's way. And in another two days he would be enjoying the downfall of the # 1 man on his Ugly List.



Rebuffed By The President....The Unhappy Hooker

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Old 06-16-2013, 06:27 PM
 
Location: Parts Unknown, Northern California
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June 17th, 1863:

The day before a telegram had initiated the events which would lead to General Hooker's removal as commander of the Army of the Potomac. 150 years ago today an exchange of messages between Generals Grant and McClernand signaled a more rapid mortification for the military career of that most political of political generals.

The message from Grant to McClernand read:
Quote:
Enclosed I send you what purports to be your congratulatory address to the Thirteenth army corps. I would respectfully ask if it is a true copy. If it is not a correct copy, furnish me one by bearer, as required both by regulations and existing orders of the department
.
Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 1, Chapter 9: , page 363

The reply from McClernand:
Quote:
MAJ.-GEN. GRANT: I have just returned. The newspaper slip is a correct copy of my congratulatory order, No. 72. I am prepared to maintain its statements.
JOHN A. MCCLERNARD, Major-General Commanding.
The Removal of Gen. McClernand. - THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENS, GRANT AND M'CLERNAND. From Gen. McClernand to Gen. Grant. HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS, - NYTimes.com


The congratulatory order being referenced was one which had been issued om May 30th by McClernand to his Corps after the failed assaults against the Vicksburg defenses. It was a thinly disguised self congratulation which when read made it appear that McClernand was responsible for all of the success of the campaign to date. It featured explanations for the failures as well, but implied that had General Grant only listened to McClernand, those shortcomings would not have materialized. There was also indirect criticism of Generals McPherson and Sherman.

This might have been just another one in a series of offenses from McClernand save for one factor. The congratulatory order had "somehow" found its way to the northern press and it appeared in full in the Missouri Bulletin and the Memphis Evening Bulletin. This was in direct violation of Special Order No. One Hundred Fifty One which the War Department had issued. That order had forbade anyone from issuing any official army correspondence to the public. It went on to read that any officer who did so would have his name presented to the president for dismissal.

McClernand's vainglory had now handed Grant the weapon he needed to finally discharge the politician, something he had been wanting to do for a very long time.

It was not a matter of McClernand being a terrible or incompetent general, among the political officers, he had done a far better job of handling troops than had Generals Banks or Butler. It was a matter of McClernand's inability to ever cease being a political creature. He had worked clandestinely to sabotage Grant's command in the west. He had stopped his troops on the march in order to deliver ad hoc political speeches to them. He had conducted interviews with newspaper reporters where he blasted the "elite" West Pointers and blamed their unimaginative thinking for the length of the war, always implying that if matters had been left to McClernand, the rebellion would be over by now. Everything that McClernand did was motivated by his desire for the presidency.

It was that last element, the serial criticism of West Point graduates, that had brought McClernand to the # 1 spot on General in Chief Henry Halleck's Ugly List. Halleck loved the professional army, venerated West Point and hated political officers with a passion. Though the top general had no special love for Grant, in a contest between a West Pointer and a politician, Halleck would always back the military man. In the past McClernand had depended upon his strong political connections to sustain his rank and position in times of controversy, he would need to do so again for he had certainly burned his bridges with Halleck, and with all West Pointers for that matter.

Upon receiving the confirmation from McClernand that the congratulatory order was indeed genuine, Grant at last had the smoking gun he needed. And as always, Grant wasted no time in acting.

On the Hotseat..General John McClernand



__________________________________________________ __________________

While those events were unfolding in the west, in the east the states of Maryland and Pennsylvania were indulging in some panic. The forward elements of Lee's army had reached Chambersburg, filling the roads with refugees who were fleeing the approaching enemy. Many of those seeking safety elsewhere were free blacks who had heard rumors that General Lee's army was coming to capture and enslave them. While such actions were not part of Lee's plans, they took place anyway. Northern Virginia and Maryland contained several irregular units of partisan cavalry, not attached to the Army of Northern Virginia in any official manner, but frequently cooperating with, and supplied by the rebel army. These men saw an opportunity to make some money and when Lee's army penetrated Pennsylvania, they ranged out ahead of it, searching for "runaways."

More than fifty blacks, some of whom might have once been slaves, were rounded up by these irregulars and taken back south to be sold into slavery. The irregulars made no effort to distinguish between former slaves and freemen, all that was required was black skin. Though Lee was to later repudiate these actions, no one in the rebel army lifted a finger to stop the abductions even when they witnessed them.

President Lincoln called on the militias of Maryland, Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia to supply 80,000 men to meet the developing threat. Only one tenth of that number turned out and the majority of the militia that was assembled in Harrisburg was composed of New Yorkers who had marched to the scene. Some 20,000 weekend warriors huddled around the state capitol, knowing that they did not stand any sort of chance against the hard veterans of General Ewell's Corps who were headed their way. They burned the bridges across the Susquehanna and waited, praying for the arrival of Federal army before they were called upon to fight.

One of these units, the 26th Pennsylvania Volunteers wound up seeing some brief action four days before the Gettysburg battle began. A 743 man strong regiment, they showed up, were instantly routed by General John Gordan's brigade, and were swept up by rebel cavalry as they tried to retreat. Someone had felt their story worthy of a book:


Last edited by Grandstander; 06-16-2013 at 06:59 PM..
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Old 06-17-2013, 06:32 PM
 
Location: Parts Unknown, Northern California
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June 18th, 1863:

150 years ago today General Grant was at last able to do what he had been longing to do for the past six months. With his typical terse and economic language, Grant issued an order:

"Major General John A. McClernand is hereby relieved from command of the Thirteenth Army Corps. He will proceed to any point he may select in the state of Illinois and report by letter to Headquarters of the Army for orders."

Grant signed the order in the early evening and anticipated having it delivered the following morning, but the members of his staff could not wait. General James Wilson cornered Grant's chief of staff Colonel Rawlins and argued that the order should go at once. What if, Wilson asked, a skirmish broke out in the morning and McClernand did something to distinguish himself? Then it would be impossible to sack him in the immediate aftermath. Rawlins, who hated anyone who was an enemy of Grant's, was as eager to see McClernand's backside as his boss, so he told Wilson to go ahead and deliver the order now.

Wilson relished the moment. He was a West Pointer, Grant's chief of engineers during the Vicksburg campaign, and he had not cared for McClernand's attacks on Academy men. He decided to go with overkill. Wilson put on his best dress uniform, summoned a provost marshal and a squad of soldiers, and arrived at McClernand's tent at 2 am. He didn't just want to dismiss McClernand, he wanted to humiliate him as well with this little show of force.

McClernand was not so easily surprised. His spies in Grant's headquarters had alerted him to all that was going on and when Wilson arrived, he found McClernand, also in his best dress uniform, sitting up waiting for him. Wilson handed him the order and waited while McClernand read it. "Well, I am relieved" he said upon finishing the document, and looking up at Wilson's barely concealed grin, added "By God, sir, we are both relieved."

McClernand of course was not going to be a passive spectator at his own downfall, not when he was confident of his political support. He telegraphed President Lincoln, complaining that he was being removed for what he described as his "adjutant's error." The rest of his communication was a recycling of McClernand's familiar themes...that it had been he, McClernand who was really responsible for Grant's success and that his removal would leave the siege of Vicksburg in the hands of a drunken incompetent.

He did not get the reply he wanted. Instead Lincoln sent a very gentle, very diplomatic letter, offering McClernand his sympathy, but not offering him a solution. The president pointed out that he could not restore McClernand to his position without overriding Grant, and that if he did, Grant was likely to resign. Grant could not be spared, so McClernand would have to go. The president also added that he had no command for McClernand at the present, all of those positions which would be worthy of McClernand's rank and status, were currently filled by others. It was a politely worded "See you later, Johnny."

That was the cruelest blow of all for the publicity seeking McClernand, he was being put on the shelf where there was no glory. For all his scheming to be the man who captured Vicksburg, now he would not even be in on the finish. McClernand would be restored to field command the following February, but assigned to the Department of the Gulf , far from the spotlight of critical events. Underused and in ill health, he would resign from the army in November of 1864. And despite all of his ambitions, his post war political career was a minor one, serving as a District Judge in Illinois and doing a stint as Chairman of the Democrat Party. He never gained another elective office.

Grant named General Edward O.C. Ord to take command of McClernand's former Corps. Ord was West Point all the way, having been Sherman's roommate at the Academy. Ord had gone through the war with a seeming knack for being on the periphery of the action, but not in it. He was transferred to Grant's Army of the Tennessee a month after Shiloh and participated in the uneventful crawl to take Corinth. At Iuka, it had been Ord who stood idly by waiting for the sounds of battle to signal his closing of the pinchers on Stirling Price. Acoustical shadow had vexed that and Ord saw no action. He arrived at Corinth just after General Van Dorn's army had been forced to call off their attacks and retreat. Ord did manage to get himself wounded in a pursuit skirmish. That wound had kept him out of the Vicksburg campaign until now.

Ord would go through the rest of the war in very much the same manner, missing out on the major events and getting wounded in minor skirmishes.

Edward O.C. Ord

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Old 06-18-2013, 06:55 PM
 
Location: Parts Unknown, Northern California
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June 17th-23rd, 1863:

To collapse this story into a single narrative, I shall today concentrate the events of a week into this one post. I'm getting it out of the way now because on the 23rd I'll have a full plate, for that is when General Rosecrans finally finds first gear and sends the Army of the Cumberland into action.

Headed by General Ewell's Corps, the Army of Northern Virginia was moving NE down the Shenandoah Valley, crossing the Potomac and passing through Maryland on their way to their first objective, the Pennsylvania capitol of Harrisburg on the east bank of the Susquehanna River. General A.P. Hill's Corps followed and trailing them was General Longstreet's men.

General Hooker, on the inside track with a much shorter distance to cover had brought the Army of the Potomac back to an area west of the capitol, but there he had to pause, waiting to determine Lee's intentions. If Hooker headed north to block Lee's passage in that direction, Lee might emerge from the mountains, turn east and attack Washington itself. If Lee continued on through Maryland and into Pennsylvania, then the pursuit would resume.

Three mountain ranges running parallel offered General Lee a screened march so long as his army controlled the passes through the mountains. That job was given to General Stuart's cavalry. Stuart did a very effective job, but it wasn't the romantic adventure he desired to restore his good name in the southern newspapers. Stuart's men were fighting as dismounted infantry, defending the passes from the probes of General Pleasonton's patrols who were trying to fix the enemy location for General Hooker. Stuart's men got the better of these encounters over the course of the week, inflicting 883 casualties on the blue horse while suffering 510 losses. Lee's specific whereabouts remained a mystery.

While Stuart's force was defending the passes, Lee was relying on the rebel irregular cavalry units to keep and eye on the movements of the enemy army. Among these partisan units was the regiment led by the famous Gray Ghost, Colonel John S. Mosby.

Mosby was two months removed from his most fabled exploit of the war when he had conducted an incredibly bold raid on the headquarters of General Edwin H. Stoughton at Fairfax County Courthouse. Mosby had led a squad into the room where the general was sleeping and whacked him on his behind to wake him. When the startled officer demanded to know what was going on, Mosby asked "Have you heard of Mosby?" Stoughton replied, "Yes! have you caught him?" "No" was the answer, "he has caught you. I am Mosby."

It was on a mission to deliver prisoners to Lee for interrogation that Mosby and Stuart met and passed some time exchanging stories of their adventures. At some point in this conversation Mosby raised the idea of Stuart shifting his cavalry from guarding the passes, ride below the Yankee army to the east, and then head north, eventually linking up with Ewell. On such ride Stuart could harass the Federal march, attack the baggage trains and disrupt the speed of their progress. If he was suddenly needed to rejoin Lee's army, that would be no problem according to Mosby. He said that he had been out there himself and seen that there were huge gaps between the marching Union Corps, Stuart could easily pass back to the west through any of them.

Stuart liked the sound of this and took the idea to Lee, meeting with him at Ashby Gap on the 18th. Lee withheld approval for the moment, but told Stuart he would consider the idea. On the 22nd, Lee sent Stuart orders which seemed to nix the plan, ordering him to make contact with Ewell and guard his march. But Lee had added "..with the suggestion that he may pass by the enemy's rear if he thinks he may get through." That suggested that he approved of the ride around.

The following day, Lee, normally so careful in his orders, made things worse with an attempt to clarify the previous one which was even more ambiguous. "If Hooker's army remains inactive" it read, then Stuart was free to pursue the move to the eastern side of the Yankee army. But should Hooker "...not appear to be moving northward.." Stuart was to rejoin the main army and resume screening the passes.

If Stuart devoted any time to trying to figure out the difference between remaining inactive and not moving, it wasn't evident. Instead he decided to ignore that and focus on the next sentence which told him to use his own judgment in determining if he could get around the rear of the Federal army. Stuart took that as "permission granted." It was certainly his preference, capturing wagon trains, taking prisoners, riding in and out of the enemy army at will, those were the sorts of things which got written up in the papers. Guarding mountain passes on foot...not so much.

Thus was born one of the great controversies of the campaign, and thus was laid the groundwork for what was to be an emotionally painful moment for both Lee and Stuart.


Colonel John S. Mosby....




His Victim..General Edwin H. Stoughton..he was so mortified by this humiliation that after being exchanged, he resigned from the army and returned to practicing law in New York.

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Old 06-20-2013, 06:57 PM
 
Location: Parts Unknown, Northern California
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June 21st, 1863:

After finally hearing from General Johnston on the 14th of June, another message from the regional commander got through to General Pemberton on the 16th. That one was no more helpful than the previous communication. Johnston was restating his belief that Vicksburg could neither be held nor saved, and that now not even anything could be done by way of coordinated action to facilitate the escape of the garrison.

Pemberton made a final plea . 150 years ago today he sent this response to Johnston:

Quote:
Vicksburg, June 21, 1863.

General Johnston:

Your dispatches of the 14th and 16th received. If it is absolutely impossible, in your opinion, to raise the siege with our combined forces, and that nothing more can be done than to extricate the garrison, I suggest that, giving me full information in time to act, you move by the north of the railroad, drive in the enemy's pickets at night, and at daylight next morning engage him heavily with skirmishers, occupying him during the entire day, and that on that night I move by the Warrenton road, by Hankinson's Ferry, to which point you should previously send a brigade of cavalry, with two field batteries, to build a bridge there, and hold that ferry; also Hall's and Baldwin's, to cover my crossing at Hankinson's. I shall not be able to move with my artillery or wagons. I suggest this as the best plan, because all the other roads are too strongly intrenched and the enemy in too heavy force for a reasonable prospect of success, unless you move in sufficient force to compel him to abandon his communications with Snyder's, which I still hope we may be able to do. I await your orders. Captain [J. M.] Couper understands all my views, and will explain further.

J. C
eHistory at OSU | Online Books | The Official Records of the Civil War

A few days later he would get another jolting response. Johnston, complaining that he had only been able to raise 23,000 men, did not feel he was strong enough to move against the force Grant had blocking the Big Black River.

And that was the final nail in the Vicksburg coffin. No lifting of the siege, no escape for his men, no help at all from anywhere, and only enough food for another two weeks at best.

The Cave People of Vicksburg....to escape the continuous Yankee shelling of the town and defensive works, the population took to living in these hillside shelters.

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Old 06-20-2013, 07:40 PM
 
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Man, when are you old people going to get over the fact that the civil war is over and the SOUTH LOST?
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Old 06-20-2013, 08:00 PM
 
Location: Parts Unknown, Northern California
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Originally Posted by Blackscorpion View Post
Man, when are you old people going to get over the fact that the civil war is over and the SOUTH LOST?
Couldn't you have covered that with a "spoiler alert?" Now you have ruined the suspense for everyone.
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