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Command of the Department of Missouri was not a position aspired to by most Union generals. It was not a theater of the war in terms of armies and battles, so there was no glory to be won by those serving. What there was in copious amounts was partisan violence. The Confederate sympathizers who remained behind after General Sterling Price had been chased into Arkansas, formed armed gangs to rob, murder and generally terrorize those who supported the Union. In response, congruent gangs of Union loyalists sprang into being and it was Bleeding Kansas all over again, Jayhawkers and Bushwhackers.
The commander of the Department of Missouri was supposed to keep the peace but of course the only means at hand for doing so would be to add more violence to the prevailing violence. The harder the commander came down on the people who supported the guerrillas, the more angry partisans were created. It was an endless, hopeless cycle of revenge.
Since mid 1863 the Department had been under the direction of General John Schofield and he had experienced no better luck in halting the violence than had his predecessors. When a group of leading Union loyalists from the state made a trip to Washington to personally complain to the president that Schofield was being overly sympathetic and helpful to rebel leaning citizens, Lincoln decided to dismiss him.
150 years ago today Schofield's replacement was appointed. It was General William Rosecrans, inactive since his sacking after the Chickamauga disaster. Rosecrans would serve for the next eleven months, never solving the partisan problem, but getting an unexpected chance to redeem himself as a combat commander.
As the month is about to expire and there was nothing of special note taking place on this day 150 years ago, I'll use this spot to address something which unfolded across the entire month but is not associated with a single day.
I noted in previous posts that a major concern for both sides was raising troops for the anticipated battles of 1864, a problem which was far more serious for the South because it had already exhausted the pool of qualified fighting men. A month from now they would find themselves having to once more expand the age limits for their conscription program.
One proposed solution came from General Patrick Cleburne, the Irish born immigrant to Arkansas who commanded a division in the Army of Tennessee, and who had distinguished himself greatly in the otherwise calamity of the Chattanooga battle. Cleburne studied the situation and concluded that the South was certain to lose because it clung to slavery. He saw the institution as a double weakness. 1) By refusing to enlist slaves as soldiers, the South not only was depriving itself of badly needed manpower on the front lines, it was also depriving the southern armies of the men who had to stay at home and supervise them. and 2) Sustaining slavery was the main reason that the South had been unable to gain foreign recognition and aid.
Cleburne knew that any proposals involving the liberation of slaves would be highly controversial, so he first got his message out there by circulating the proposal in writing among the Corps and Division commanders of the army in which he served. The reaction was unanimous opposition, none of the officers embraced the idea and they immediately notified their commander, General Johnston, of this sedition taking place. He in turn notified Richmond of the turmoil being created by Cleburne.
The response of President Davis was immediate and unambiguous. Cleburne's circular was to be suppressed and all were forbidden to discuss the idea in public. So effective was this suppression that hardly anyone knew that there had been such a proposal until three decades after the war had ended and a copy was discovered among army staff papers.
Davis himself was not truly in moral opposition. He had confided to his wife that win or lose, slavery was certainly a doomed institution and that employing slaves as soldiers might be what would still preserve southern independence, albeit without slavery. Davis simultaneously recognized that this was not the opinion of the majority, they were more likely to take their cues from General Howell Cobb of Georgia who had famously responded to the idea by saying "If slaves will make good soldiers, our whole theory of slavery is wrong." Any attempt to enlist slaves as soldiers would trigger a violent schism in the South and might possibly result in some states exercising their asserted right of secession once more.
So, suppression it was.
General Patrick Cleburne...His Idea Was Deemed Too Radical
The first large scale military operation of 1864 got underway 150 years ago this morning as General Sherman, commanding the Army of the Tennessee, set out from Vicksburg and headed east, general destruction as his aim. His 20,000 strong infantry force was to be met at Meridian, Mississippi by the 7000 cavalry marching from Memphis, led by General William Sooy Smith. Their function was to protect Sherman's infantry from interference by General Forrest and his newly raised cavalry army.
This was something of a rehearsal for the way Sherman would be making war at the end of the year. No seizure and occupation of any new territory was desired, just the devastation of the area between Vicksburg and Meridian, the latter of which was an important rail center as well as containing an arsenal. Sherman hoped that if his success was quick, he then might move on to threaten Selma, Alabama and possibly Mobile. To confuse the rebels as to his intentions, Sherman had gunboats advancing up the Yazoo River and sent a request to General Banks in New Orleans asking if the navy might send a force to cruise outside Mobile Bay as though an attack there was planned.
To counter Sherman, General Johnston's small former army, which until now had shown a genius for avoiding any fights, was ordered to defend against the advance. Since Johnston's promotion to the command of the Army of Tennessee, this force was under the direction of Bishop Polk who upon learning that Sherman had set out, frantically began trying to gather his "army" which was actually just a pair of divisions, from its various postings in the region.
Sherman's Line of March...Vicksburg At Left Center
On the second day of its eastern advance, General Sherman's army was nearing the old Champion Hill battlefield where nine months earlier General Grant had routed General Pemberton in the decisive engagement of the Vicksburg Campaign. So far they had met with only token opposition from understrength cavalry units. The other wing of Sherman's movement, the 7000 man cavalry under General William Sooy Smith was supposed to have left Memphis on the 2nd, but when Sherman camped this evening 150 years ago, he received a disheartening message.
One third of Smith's force had been due to arrive from Union City, but flooding from winter rains had left them stranded and unable to march. Smith informed Sherman that he was "exceedingly chagrined" by the delay, but felt it best to delay departure until his entire column was assembled. He assured Sherman that he was still eager to "pitch into Forrest" but assumed that Sherman would agree with the decision to wait.
The tardy brigades would not arrive until the 8th, and then would be so exhausted by their march from Union City in muddy conditions that it was necessary to rest the horses before setting out. Consequently it was not until the 11th, nine days overdue, that Smith's horseman finally began their 230 mile advance toward Meridian and link up with Sherman.
More signs of the desperate nature of their situation emerged from the Confederate Congress 150 years ago today. After the manpower shortage for the coming year, the most severe problem facing the rebels was finance. The value of a Confederate dollar had been in a downward spiral since they were first introduced. What could be purchased for one dollar in 1861 now cost eighteen to twenty dollars, and there was no reason to believe that this rapid inflation would slow rather than accelerate.
The serial devaluation had generated a general absence of confidence in the government notes issued by Richmond and many in the southern states had started refusing to accept them as payment, despite being legally obligated to do so. Instead, many merchants were doing business accepting only bartered goods, or Yankee dollars which had the virtue of far greater stability, as well as the higher probability of there being a government to back them up two years from now. This was viewed as an intolerable situation, so the rebel Congress passed a law which took effect 150 years ago today. All US paper money was declared illegal and it became a crime to use it in any transaction.
Along with this measure, the desperate Congress also passed a law which established an export tax, a heavy export tax, fifty percent. This meant that anyone willing to take the risk of running the blockade to export goods overseas, had to turn over 50% of any profits to the central government.
This was a self defeating measure because it did what the Yankees were already trying to do with the blockade, which was to choke the Confederacy to death by cutting off their trade. Successful blockade running had dropped from nine out of ten in the war's first year, to about a fifty-fifty chance in 1864. With the new export tax law, the potential return for taking that huge risk had been greatly reduced. Whatever additional revenues the Confederacy might have gained by the heavy export tax, they lost by severely reducing attempts at exportation. It was very much in the manner of President Jefferson's 1807 Embargo Act, the product of simply not having a viable alternative. And like the Embargo Act, it was the Confederacy shooting itself in the foot.
Historians have a tendency to write about the tunnel vision, stubbornness, or criminal absence of alertness, whenever something happens which despite warning signs, still took everyone by surprise. From just WW II..Why wasn't the US ready for the attack on Pearl Harbor? How could Stalin have not realized that the Nazis were about to invade? How could the British and French not have recognized that Hitler would not stop after the Munich agreement? How could Ike have diverted resources to deal with the mythological Bavarian Redoubt?
Of course those writing about these matters are doing so with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, without the certainty that comes with post facto timing. The reason that warnings sometimes get ignored with wretched results is that wars are full of false alarms. You may have a piece of vital and accurate information in front of you which demands a reaction, or you may have false information before you which will cause you to waste time and resources for no valid reason. You just do not know until after the event materializes or fails to materialize.
The South had already experienced one major intelligence failure in 1864, concluding that the Yankees were preparing for a winter invasion of Mobile and diverting resources for the immediate defense of that port. An assault on Mobile had been discussed but rejected by the Lincoln administration in favor of other goals deemed more vital at the moment.
150 years ago today it happened again. Rebel intelligence operatives reached the conclusion that the Federals were planning a huge raid against Richmond, an operation which was to involve the escape of all of the prisoners being held in Libby Prison and other incarceration centers in the city, timed to be coordinated with a surprise raid by the Army of the Potomac's cavalry arm. The escaped prisoners were to create confusion and chaos, distracting the rebels from the approach of the cavalry. The cavalry would then arrive, bringing with them sufficient guns to arm the escapees, and together they would capture the Confederate capitol.
This was a fantastic scheme and uncovering the plot was a coup for the rebels ....except....none of it was true. There was no plan for a massive breakout, no cavalry raid contemplated, no threat whatsoever to Richmond. Believing it to be true, 150 years ago today President Davis ordered General Pickett's division, which had been on detached duty in North Carolina, to board trains and rush to the defense of the city.
When no escape or raid materialized, the Confederates intelligence operatives congratulated themselves on having thwarted it via their rapid response...as in the Union planners and prisoners seeing the arrival of Pickett's men and losing heart for executing the plan.
Much ado about nothing....
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Also on this same day General Sherman's Army of the Tennessee captured and occupied the Mississippi state capitol for the third time in the war. Jackson had originally fallen to Sherman during General Grant's sweep to the east before he turned to face Pemberton coming from Vicksburg. It had been reoccupied by the rebels when General Johnston's small army had moved back in while Vicksburg was being besieged. After that citadel had fallen, Sherman set out to chase Johnston from the scene and in doing so, retook Jackson, abandoning it thereafter when his army was called to Chattanooga.
While Sherman's mission was one of destruction and much had been burned or destroyed on the march to Jackson, there was very little of value left in the capitol after the first two visits from Sherman, so this time it was mainly a matter of passing through. Bishop Polk had sent his two divisions to attempt a defense of the town, but seeing that they were facing more than double their number, they wisely retreated without putting up a fight, keeping their combat avoidance record intact.
Sherman did not intend to waste time here, he felt the urgent need to get the march re-started so that he would be on time for his rendezvous with General Smith's cavalry force. Sherman was unaware that Smith still had not even left Memphis.
On the East side of the White House there used to be a stable which housed the horses used by the president and his staffers. 150 years ago it contained President Lincoln's personal horse for riding, the carriage horses used when the president and first lady went for rides together, the horses belonging to his aid John Nicolay , and ponies belonging to Lincoln's sons, including the one ridden by now departed Willie.
Somewhere between 8 and 8:30 pm 150 years ago this evening, the stable caught fire. Lincoln spotted the flames from a second story window in the White House and immediately came out to investigate. Upon learning that the horses were still inside the burning stable, he rushed toward the inferno, vaulting a high hedge in the process, and began tearing open the doors with his own hands. This revealed a conflagration which was already beyond control and the president's staffers pulled him away. The stable was a total loss and all of the animals inside died in the fire.
The president, who had made a point of never talking about the death of the beloved Willie, now mentioned him for the first time since his burial, speaking of how Willie had loved his pony and had been riding him shorty before he came down with what proved to be his fatal illness. And then the president broke down weeping.
The next day Lincoln was restored to his normal equilibrium, enough so as to make a ruling on a claim made by the stable keeper that he had lost 300 dollars in cash in the fire and wanted the government to replace it. Lincoln thought this over and ruled that the fellow was out of luck. He reasoned that while the value of paper money was in the promise of the government to recognize it as legal tender, and not in the bills themselves, still the bills were needed as proof of that promise, otherwise anyone could claim a loss and demand replacement bills.
Arson was suspected as the cause of the fire and the suspicion descended upon Patterson McGee, a coachman who had been fired earlier that day by the First Lady. McGee was arrested and held briefly, but no direct evidence could be found linking him to the fire, so he was released without being charged. It is tempting to assume that the dismissal was another episode of Mrs. Lincoln's unstable temperament which had characterized her behavior since the death of Willie, but in this case whatever animosity McGee may have held was directed at the president.
Earlier there had been an incident where Lincoln had spotted McGee and asked him if he would fetch the morning paper for him. McGee felt insulted, he was the carriage house keeper, not some errand boy, and he told the president this while refusing. Lincoln loved administering quiet lessons to his enemies, and in the case of McGee, had retaliated by ordering McGee to prepare the carriage for a day's ride. McGee got the horses groomed, fed and hitched, Lincoln emerged, got in the carriage and had himself driven from the White House doors to the nearest newspaper vending stand which was less than a block away. He purchased a paper and then had returned to the White House where McGee now had to unhitch the horses, groom them and put the carriage away.
If McGee was responsible for the fire, then this was one lesson which backfired on the president. McGee moved to Europe after the war and is lost to history save for becoming a popular all purpose mystery figure for conspiracy theorists who have tried to link him to the assassination in 1865, with some even arguing that the fire was an attempted assassination, although it is difficult to see how burning a stable detached from the main building was going to kill the president.
150 years ago today General Sherman and the Army of the Tennessee reached Lake Station, Mississippi on its way to Meridian. There was located a rail traffic center with numerous sophisticated turntables and a locomotive repair shop. These were all destroyed by the troops who had been ripping up the tracks as they advanced. The cross ties were made into bonfires over which the detached rails were heated in the center until they became pliable enough to be wrapped around poles and bent into a twisted shape which had come to be known as "Sherman Neckties."
Since Joseph Johnston had been given command of the Army of Tennessee, and Bishop Polk led the 10,000 men in the two divisions of Johnston's former force, Johnston's previous position of overall commander in the west was now officially vacant. President Davis decided to exercise this power from Richmond via telegraphic communications. Davis determined that Sherman's ultimate target was Mobile and he wired Poll to defend against such a movement. The Bishop complied and fell back all the way to Demopolis, Alabama where his plan was to ambush Sherman's rear as it passed by on the way to Mobile.
Then Davis changed his mind and decided that it was Montgomery, the original rebel capitol, which was Sherman's goal. The wires heated up again and Polk was ordered to shift his troops in anticipation of an attack on Montgomery.
All of the above inadvertently aided Sherman by removing the largest force available to oppose him from the region in which he intended to operate. Having reduced Lake Station to uselessness, Sherman moved his army east again, expecting to reach Meridian on the 14th and find it already in the hands of General Smith's cavalry force which was supposed to have been there by the previous day.
Unknown to Sherman, Smith and his 7000 troopers were only this day finally departing Memphis.
Sherman's Men Wrecking The Railways
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