George Washington, a near total failure (generals, raids, military, attack)

[NJGOAT]

markg, I agree with what you said and the moments that you point to as Washington's failings. A far more thoughtful post than what the OP presented. The key is to always place the moments in context and understand why decisions were made, especially ones that we question with hindsight on our side.

Obvioulsy the period most question is from when Washington assumed command in 1775 outside of Boston to the time he retired to Valley Forge. That time is marked by three major moments, all centered on cities; Boston, New York and Philadelphia.

I expounded on the Boston siege in my earlier post and feel it adequately explained Washingtons actions in that campaign. If anything, I think he performed admirably during the siege given what he had to work with. The end result was that the British were driven from Boston and the city was taken intact, the importance of which should not be overlooked.

From there it was on to New York. What a lot of people forget is that Howe didn't simply pack up his army in Boston and set sail for New York. He retreated to Halifax where he received large reinforcements. The British left Boston with roughly 7,500 haggered troops. By the time they landed in New York, they possessed a strength of 25,000 (10,000 initially with another 15,000 arriving within a month). Where Washington formerly held a 2 1/2 : 1 advantage which helped offset the experience and discipline of the British troops, he now found himself outnumbered.

Add to that disadvantage the fact that the British naval squadron available had swelled to almost 400 ships. A force which the Americans had no means to counter in anyway. The naval advantage is critical because there is something people always overlook about the New York campaign...terrain.

Look at a map of New York. What is it...one of the greatest harbors in the world. At the time the city only existed on lower Manhattan, but it could be threatened from the water on multiple sides. Do to the advantage of the British navy, New York was the perfect stomping ground for them. The Americans had no idea where the British would deploy or what their objective was. They simply had a mandate to hold New York City. Washington deployed his troops as best he could to cover all the assumed approaches.

The British were able to concentrate their forces wherever they pleased and easily bypassed the American lines with multiple amphibious landings. Essentially no matter how the Americans deployed in the defense of New York, there was nothing they could do to hold the city, that wouldn't end in them being trapped.

In this case Washington's failure was attempting to hold the city at all as it was an impossibility from the beginning. IMO the proper course of action would have been to hold the army in North Jersey in favorable terrain, allow the British to take the city and then force them to attack the Americans on Washingtons terms. The later successes at Trenton and Princeton, though not decisive proved critical to the American effort in terms of continued French support and continuing the political debate back in England. One can only imagine the effect a larger scale battle on the Americans terms wherein Washington could have achieved a moral victory, even if he yielded the ground, would have had.

Philadelphia was another moment where people question Washington strategically. If you look at the campaign, Washington was in a strong position in the Watchung mountains positioned to block an overland advance on Philadelphia or counter any moves by Howe up the Hudson to assist Burgoyne. Washington believed (most of us probably would too) that the British were going to execute the Hudson campaign and attempt to cut New England off from the rest of the colonies. This was the most logical move the British could make.

Instead, Howe departed New York by ship and Washington had no idea where he would go (there's that navy again). Washington couldn't act until he learned that Howe's forces had entered the Chesapeake Bay. His lack of action was tied to multiple feints that Howe had conducted which left Washington guessing where he would go. Washington couldn't risk being wrong and again joining Burgoyne was the most likely objective for Howe's army.

Washington moved south to defend Philadelphia with a force of 11,000 regulars and was joined by about 9,000 local militia. The British fielded a force of 17,000 regulars and received extensive loyalist support once they were in the area. Washington had no idea as to the strength of Howe's forces as the British made a quick landing and advanced without establishing a campaign camp.

Washington deployed his troops based on limited information about the local terrain. The British were able to exploit an undefended area and turned Washington's flank. This is Washington's greatest failure. He overlooked key terrain and left his flank exposed. If not for the tenacity of a few American units and the lack of cavalry for the British this may have been the end of the war.

So, there you have it. Washington is greatly critiqued for his early actions in the war, but I think a careful study will prove that Washington's two greatest failures are: 1. The strategic choise to defend New York City (he was however ordered to do so by Congress). 2. The tactical choices at Brandywine. Of all of them, the only one I would really lay at Washington's feet is the defeat at Brandywine. I don't think the Americans could have held the ground and defeated the British there and would have ultimately lost Philadelphia. However, a strong showing at Brandywine coupled with Burgoyne's loss at Saratoga may have forced the British into negotiations.

[brooklynborndad]

what about the tactical deployment at the battle of Long Island/brooklyn heights?

[alphamale]

Originally Posted by Florida Exodus

I was going to scan my paper on Washington, but my scanner is so old it won’t even light up anymore. But I will here some of my conclusions.

On July 21, 1775 Washington reported to John Hancock that he was organizing the army into divisions and brigades to promote order, regularity and discipline. However, Washington did not mention his efforts to Congress again until February 9, 1776 and this report was one of failure. Washington’s troops remained undisciplined to the point that they often neglected their equipment so Washington had to ask Congress for new equipment. Washington elaborated in his February 9, 1776 letter that his troops were still undisciplined because they had too much power over their officers. As Washington’s failure to defend New York City showed later in 1776 his efforts to discipline and train his army were an utter failure.

Throughout the latter half of 1775 expiration of enlistments was a constant headache to Washington, but Washington again showed his incompetence as a military leader. He reported on September 9 that enlistments were about to expire. But it wasn’t until November 28 that Washington was able to begin taking re-enlistments and this was possible only because he agreed to grant furloughs at the rate of 50 concurrent furloughs per regiment. So instead of pressing the siege of Boston- which presented a chance to end the war immediately, Washington intentionally weakened the army and thus prolonged the war. For all of Washington’s supposed ability to inspire his troops, he was utterly unable to inspire them when his inspiration could have had the greatest effect. The 50 furloughs per regiment in the face of a besieged enemy show that Washington was not commanding his troops, but rather his troops had him at their mercy.

On September 7, 1775 Washington reported to Congress that he was expecting 7 tons of lead and 500 guns. But Washington never reported to Congress that these supplies arrived. So where did they go? Then on December 4 he told Congress he needed gunpowder and that the lack of powder was keeping him from taking action against the British. He still didn’t have the needed powder come February 26, 1776.

All during the Boston campaign Washington intentionally moved his troops closer to the enemy despite the fact they didn’t have enough guns and powder. And then he even divided his army and ordered Benedict Arnold to invade Canada during the winter with an under-supplied army whose troop enlistments were about to expire. Only a reckless fool would use such a strategy.

In short Washington knew nothing about administering an army.

As a strategist Washington was an utter failure. For most of 1775 he had the British army under siege in Boston- except for Boston harbor. According to Washington’s reports to Congress British ships freely entered and left Boston harbor. He did nothing to prevent the British from being re-supplied; he did nothing to strike at the British fleet and he was glad when the British escaped. Washington did plan to place artillery on Dorchester Heights and this would have put the British fleet at his mercy. But when he learned that the British were planning to evacuate Washington postponed his deployment, telling Congress that the delay would give him more time to move his army to New York City in preparation for the expected British invasion there. But Washington actually did not make any effort to move his army before the British had left Boston.

All's well that ends well.

Washington was the ONLY reason that America won its freedom.

Why do you hate America?

[Fred314X]

Washington understood that the Continental Army was basically formed from scratch; citizens had to be turned into soldiers, and there was no way that was going to happen as soon as 1776. What he succeeded in doing was keeping the army in the field, albeit through the necessity of frequent retreats. But he did turn those citizens into soldiers, and for that he fully deserves recognition as a commander.

Remember, also, that after the war, some people suggested that he should be installed as a king--an idea that horrified him. You can't say that too many politicians in the years since would have turned that offer down.

[NJGOAT]

Originally Posted by brooklynborndad

what about the tactical deployment at the battle of Long Island/brooklyn heights?

You have to start looking at that battle from the strategic position that Washington was dealing with New York. I illustrated earlier the difficulties of defending New York at all given the terrain and the ability of the British navy to move at will.

Washington in New York based his plan around defending Manhattan and the city itself from British attack. Washington did not directly plan on being able to hold the city indefinitely, but believed the Americans could make the British pay dearly for taking it.

Washington commanded a force of roughly 19,000 and was facing a force of unknown size. By the time the Battle for Long Island started, the British force had swelled to over 32,000 troops and 400 ships. The British originally landed on Staten Island where they began their preperations.

Some of Washingtons subordinates felt the British would launch the main attack against Long Island. Washington felt that such an attack would merely be a feint in prelude to the main attack against Manhattan itself. Washington decided at this point to send a small force of roughly 4,500 men to repulse the feint. These troops were commanded by General Greene, but when he became ill command was assumed by John Sullivan. Washington himself remained in Manhattan (this is important as Washington did not direct the defense or the opening stages of the battle).

The British openend the battle by landing approximately 15,000 troops onto Long Island. Washington received word that between 8,000 and 9,000 troops had landed. Do to the reported number of troops, Washington took this as a sign that this was the feint he expected. He dispatched an additional 1,500 troops and placed Israel Putnam in overall command of Long Island.

The American plan was to create a redoubt on the Brooklyn Heights and a forward line on the Guana Heights. The plan was very similar to the one used at Bunker Hill where the British would be forced to assault an entrenched American position on the high ground. They were to inflict as many casualties as possible before retreating to the Brooklyn Heights.

The American defenses spread across the three main passes through the heights (Gowanus Road, Flatbush Road and Bedford Road). There was also a fourth pass, the Jamaica Road that was virtually unkown to the Americans and was only defended with a small scout party.

The British buttressed with a further 5,000 troops bringing them to a total strength of 20,000 were well received by local Loyalists and were shown the lesser known Jamaica pass. The British set out in secret and brought a column of 10,000 men through the Jamaica pass turning the American flank.

In the morning the attack began and Hessian units launched a diversionary attack directly against the Guana Heights. Putnam was awakened, sent signal to Washington on Manhattan and moved out to try and stop the British advance. The Americans on the Guana Heights were virtually surrounded.

Washington arrived on the scene from Manhattan at 9am and realized that this wasn't a simple feint and called immediately for more troops from Manhattan. By 11am the entire American position on the Guana Heights had been overrun. The Americans then staggered back to the Brooklyn Heights and regrouped.

Howe is often critiqued for not pressing the attack at this point, but he believed and logically so that the Americans weren't going anywhere and it was better to rest his men and prepare a staged attack then risk a frontal assault on a major position. The British began digging trench works in preperation for an assualt on the American position.

Washington brought over 1,200 additional troops bringing the total American force to about 9,000 versus the British 20,000. As the day progressed it became obvious that the position was untenable. Washington ordered the withdraw and under cover of night and fog every last American with all of their guns and supplies was withdrawn to Manhattan.

From there on, Washington was forced into a cat and mouse game to ensure the American army would not be encircled and trapped. Everytime the Americans established a position, the British would execute landings and flank it (Harlem) which caused Washington to continue to withdraw and eventually retreat through New Jersey and into Pennsylvania.

So again, the tactical decisions of the battle on Long Island, were not Washingtons (he wasn't even on Long Island until the battle was virtually lost). That failure falls to Putnam and the local commanders. Washingtons contribution was executing the plan to withdraw the army from Brooklyn where they most likely would have been destroyed. The strategic decision to even attempt to defend New York City is where Washington's fault really lies.

[Coldjensens]

Washington was not a general. He was a gentlman farmer with some background in surveying for the British army and running away from indians.

To me it is amazing that he was willing and then able to take command, lead the army, hold them together and blunder into victory. I see that as an amazing accomplishment. He certianly had a lot of common sense and a basic understanding of military tactics. Of course he made some mistakes.

If you were able to bring him into our time and tell him to rebuild a gasoline engine, would you criticize him if he made a bunch of mistakes along the way, nearly ruined the engine, but eventually got it together to it woudl run?

[brooklynborndad]

"So again, the tactical decisions of the battle on Long Island, were not Washingtons (he wasn't even on Long Island until the battle was virtually lost). That failure falls to Putnam and the local commanders. "

my understanding was that Washington was aware of the defensive deployment, including leaving the Jamaica pass lightly guarded. Is that not correct?

[brooklynborndad]

"The American plan was to create a redoubt on the Brooklyn Heights and a forward line on the Guana Heights. The plan was very similar to the one used at Bunker Hill where the British would be forced to assault an entrenched American position on the high ground"

but there was no flank in the air at Bunker Hills, IIUC.

[Grandstander]

You can win a war without winning most of the battles, as was demonstrated by the American Revolution, and again by North Vietnam.

Since what Washington did turned out to be a winning strategy, and since he faired poorly in the majority of his stand up battles, the obvious conclusion is that Washington's strategy was not one which centered on beating the Brits in classic field engagements.

Most of the war was Washington avoiding major battles, fighting when he deemed public morale demanded a showing from the Continental Army, but never forgetting that his most important job was keeping the army intact and in the field. As long as there was such an army in operation, the British did not truly govern America, only those parts where they had forces stationed. If Washington could sustain this situation long enough, the British would ultimately exhaust sufficient blood and treasure to the point where they had to call it off.

And that is what happened.

Washington saw how to win with what he had, he never wavered in loyalty or purpose, and he did indeed win.

That's always my idea of a terrific general.

Within that reality of ultimate triumph, Washington of course had good and bad points as a general. Apart from the Trenton/Princeton campaign, he didn't produce any impressive displays of field tactics, his battle plan for Germantown was one which might have worked with far better trained and experienced troops, but that isn't what he was commanding, so he loses rather than gains points for that one.

On the other hand, Washington was excellent in the intelligence area of warfare. He built and ran his own spy network and it was an extremely effective one. And the man knew how to conduct a good retreat, a skill he needed given his army's tendency to be enthusiasts for leaving a battlefield. Most importantly, he held the army together via strength of character. Washington was the type of leader who managed to make men feel that they would rather face privations and the risk of death, than his disaproval. That is exactly what is needed in a revolution being fought by volunteers.

I'd say that Washington didn't do much to make us think that he would have been a good Napoleonic style general, but as a revolutionary general, he was just what we required.

[Escort Rider]

Originally Posted by Grandstander

You can win a war without winning most of the battles, as was demonstrated by the American Revolution, and again by North Vietnam.

Since what Washington did turned out to be a winning strategy, and since he faired poorly in the majority of his stand up battles, the obvious conclusion is that Washington's strategy was not one which centered on beating the Brits in classic field engagements.

Most of the war was Washington avoiding major battles, fighting when he deemed public morale demanded a showing from the Continental Army, but never forgetting that his most important job was keeping the army intact and in the field. As long as there was such an army in operation, the British did not truly govern America, only those parts where they had forces stationed. If Washington could sustain this situation long enough, the British would ultimately exhaust sufficient blood and treasure to the point where they had to call it off.

And that is what happened.

What a superb summing up. Thank you, Granstander.

Washington saw how to win with what he had, he never wavered in loyalty or purpose, and he did indeed win.

That's always my idea of a terrific general.

Within that reality of ultimate triumph, Washington of course had good and bad points as a general. Apart from the Trenton/Princeton campaign, he didn't produce any impressive displays of field tactics, his battle plan for Germantown was one which might have worked with far better trained and experienced troops, but that isn't what he was commanding, so he loses rather than gains points for that one.

On the other hand, Washington was excellent in the intelligence area of warfare. He built and ran his own spy network and it was an extremely effective one. And the man knew how to conduct a good retreat, a skill he needed given his army's tendency to be enthusiasts for leaving a battlefield. Most importantly, he held the army together via strength of character. Washington was the type of leader who managed to make men feel that they would rather face privations and the risk of death, than his disaproval. That is exactly what is needed in a revolution being fought by volunteers.

I'd say that Washington didn't do much to make us think that he would have been a good Napoleonic style general, but as a revolutionary general, he was just what we required.

What a suberb summing up. Thank you, Granstander.