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It was certainly a tactical success. Without the devastation of the attack, Japan could not have conquered as much land and resources as they did.
However from a strategic point of view, it was a disaster. However, by Japanese thinking, based on the embargo of oil and steel, they were faced with certain disaster anyway.
No, considering they lost the war as soon as they did it. They were bogged down in China and vulnerable against the USSR the last thing they needed was to spark a war against the US, (and the UK) at the same time.
No, considering they lost the war as soon as they did it. They were bogged down in China and vulnerable against the USSR the last thing they needed was to spark a war against the US, (and the UK) at the same time.
Except for Burma, the UK played almost no role in the Pacific War. Towards the very end, following the German surrender, they insisted on having a naval task force participate side by side with the U.S. The Americans, who by that time did not need the help, reluctantly agreed just to avoid needless friction with an ally. The British effort in Burma was considerable, however, but contributed little to the overall defeat of Japan. It was more a question of recovering British colonial territory.
Japan was indeed bogged down in China. But at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack they were not actually "vulnerable against the USSR" because the USSR was on its knees, close to collapse with German troops at the gates of Moscow. In fact, it was massive Soviet troop transfers from the far east back to Moscow which saved the day in the nick of time. If Moscow had fallen (being it was the nerve center of the nation's transportation system), the Soviet military effort may have collapsed. By 1945, of course, it was a different story and Japan was indeed quite vulnerable to the USSR.
The attack is generally viewed as a tactical success, but a strategic failure and not because the Japanese eventually lost the war, but the fact that the strategic goal of the attack was actually pointless.
Tactically, the attack was devastating and very succesful. It was well planned, orchestrated and executed. Any time you can trade 5 midget subs and 29 planes for all of the destruction and loss the US suffered, it is hard to see it as anything but a smashing success.
Strategically, the goal was to incapacitate the US fleet for a period of 6 months while the Japanese siezed their resource objectives and established their island perimeter. To the Japanse this looks like a strategic success, because it worked. However, it belies the fact that the US had shifted strategy in the 1930's to not simply sailing out and engaging a threat directly, but simply defending the eastern Pacific and the "sea lanes" to Australia while building strength. It would have taken the US 6 months to simply sail the fleet out of Pearl with or without a Japanese attack and it would take up to two years for the US to engage in offensive operations.
Basically, the entire Japanese strategic goal was pointless because the US simply was not going to do what they thought they were going to do. The Japanese felt that the US response to any offensives against the Phillipines or the resource areas was going to be to send the entire Pacific fleet to engage them. That is the reason they launched the attack, to prevent that from happening. However, it wasn't going to happen anyway.
The entire Japanese strategy was also not hinged on forcing an immediate surrender through Pearl. It was again, simply to buy time to secure resources and establish their "island perimeter" and then wait for the US fleet to come to them and engage in a decisive battle. This remained the Japanese "goal" throughout the entire war even when such a strategy was obviously not being pursued by the US and the Japanese ability to actually engage in such a battle had been eliminated.
The OP listed four points to discuss...
1.) Didn't launch 3rd attack to take out repair and fuel station. Would been more useful than sinking ships.
Overall, going after the fuel stores and drydock facilities, even without sinking a single ship would have been a far more devastating blow then if they had sunk every last ship at Pearl Harbor that day. The Navy estimated that loss of the fuel stores and facilities would have delayed the US war effort in the Pacific by two years. Pearl was the US's "forward naval base". If the facilities were lost, the fleet would have been forced to the US west coast. This oversight/failure was the biggest.
2.) Failed to destroy any of 3 US Carrier. These would be used effectively by the US later on.
The loss of any of the carriers would have hampered US operations far more then the battleships. However, even losing all of the carriers still would not have dealt a long lasting blow to the US. Enterprise (largely ineffectual save the Doolittle Raid until Midway, Guadalcanal), Lexington (sunk at Coral Sea) and Saratoga (severely damaged weeks after Pearl by a Japanese sub and did not rejoin until Guadalcanal) were in the Pacific at the time of Pearl. The US possessed four other carriers (five including Langley that was in the Pacific, but was converted into a seaplane tender). Of those, Ranger needed extensive overhauls and would not enter service again until 1944. The other three were transferred from the Atlantic; Yorktown (Gilberts Raid, Coral Sea and Midway), Hornet (launched Doolittle Raid, Midway, Guadalcanal) and Wasp (Guadalcanal).
As you can see looking at what the carriers did over the time between Pearl and Midway, it is arguable that even if the US had lost two or even three of the carriers at Pearl that operations, while curtailed, still could have been conducted with the addition of the three CV's from the Atlantic.
3.) Did not delay the US from engaging the Japanese for too long.
This ties back in with number one. It didn't actually delay the US at all as explained above.
4.) Finally couldn't achieve their main goal of negotiating a peace treaty from US to their benefit. Instead, they ended up initiating a costly war they would lose.
That was never really the goal. The goal was to force the US to commit to a "decisive battle" where the US would need to penetrate their island perimeter while being worn down. Following that decisive battle, they had anticipated a negotiated US surrender. Of course, the US didn't play into this at all.
Except for Burma, the UK played almost no role in the Pacific War. Towards the very end, following the German surrender, they insisted on having a naval task force participate side by side with the U.S. The Americans, who by that time did not need the help, reluctantly agreed just to avoid needless friction with an ally. The British effort in Burma was considerable, however, but contributed little to the overall defeat of Japan. It was more a question of recovering British colonial territory.
Japan was indeed bogged down in China. But at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack they were not actually "vulnerable against the USSR" because the USSR was on its knees, close to collapse with German troops at the gates of Moscow. In fact, it was massive Soviet troop transfers from the far east back to Moscow which saved the day in the nick of time. If Moscow had fallen (being it was the nerve center of the nation's transportation system), the Soviet military effort may have collapsed. By 1945, of course, it was a different story and Japan was indeed quite vulnerable to the USSR.
In addition to Burma, India played a key role in resupplying and training the Chinese as a result because of British involvement the Chinese were no where near as isolated as they were in 1940. Additionally, after Khalkin Gol the Japanese knew they could not fight Russia and China at the same time. Taking on the US especially and the UK without having dealt with China was a big mistake that got them into an unwinnable war.
As you can see looking at what the carriers did over the time between Pearl and Midway, it is arguable that even if the US had lost two or even three of the carriers at Pearl that operations, while curtailed, still could have been conducted with the addition of the three CV's from the Atlantic.
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I thought that your post nailed the question before us perfectly and I have nothing to add save for questioning the above.
In November of 1942, the US was down to just two aircraft carriers in the Pacific, four had been sunk ( Yorktown, Lexington, Wasp and Hornet), the Langley had been converted to a seaplane tender...and sunk. The Ranger was still in the Atlantic, the Saratoga was under going an overhaul and refit.
If three carriers had been lost at Pearl, that would have put the US carrier strength in the Pacific at minus one in the fall of 1942.
The first of the Essex class carriers did not get launched until December of that year and the big build up followed, but wasn't instant.
I would not argue that the loss of three carriers at Pearl Harbor would have meant an ultimate Japanese victory, but it certainly would have been an immensely severe setback which would have greatly delayed the eventual Allied triumph. The strategic victory in the Coral Sea, and the tactical and strategic victory at Midway would certainly have far less likely.
I thought that your post nailed the question before us perfectly and I have nothing to add save for questioning the above.
In November of 1942, the US was down to just two aircraft carriers in the Pacific, four had been sunk ( Yorktown, Lexington, Wasp and Hornet), the Langley had been converted to a seaplane tender...and sunk. The Ranger was still in the Atlantic, the Saratoga was under going an overhaul and refit.
If three carriers had been lost at Pearl, that would have put the US carrier strength in the Pacific at minus one in the fall of 1942.
The first of the Essex class carriers did not get launched until December of that year and the big build up followed, but wasn't instant.
I would not argue that the loss of three carriers at Pearl Harbor would have meant an ultimate Japanese victory, but it certainly would have been an immensely severe setback which would have greatly delayed the eventual Allied triumph. The strategic victory in the Coral Sea, and the tactical and strategic victory at Midway would certainly have far less likely.
I think you are correct that my statement was a little too overstated, lol. Losing all three Pacific carriers would have been a major blow. However, all three really wasn't a possibility, but losing one certainly was. As it was, we did lose a carrier in the weeks immediately following Pearl Harbor on a mission that may not have been undertaken had say Enterprise been lost at Pearl, so the loss of one carrier would have certainly been "acceptable" at that stage without too much damage to our ability to fight.
Wasn't the main reason for the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor a reaction by the Japanese to the U.S. oil embargo? The U.S. cut off Japan's oil supply which greatly hampered their war efforts against China. Japan felt they had no choice but to provoke war with the U.S. to knock us out of the war quickly.
Wasn't the main reason for the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor a reaction by the Japanese to the U.S. oil embargo? The U.S. cut off Japan's oil supply which greatly hampered their war efforts against China. Japan felt they had no choice but to provoke war with the U.S. to knock us out of the war quickly.
Yes and no.
In 1941 there were two competing plans for what to do. One faction supported striking north against Russia in concert with Germany's drive. Another wanted to strike south against the Allied colonies to secure the oil and rubber resources there.
The securement of a non-aggression pact with the Soviets and the seemingly imminent success of Germany against Russia allowed the "southern strategy" faction to win out. The question then became what would the US do if Japan moved against the British, French and Dutch colonies? One theory was that the US would do nothing given their isolationist stance. Another held that the US would respond by declaring war.
In July of 1941 the Japanese got the answer to their question. The Japanese moved forces to occupy Vichy controlled French Indochina and sieze the resources and bases there. The Vichy government lodged a slight protest, but was obviously in no position to do anything about it given that Japan was a German ally. The US and Britain on the otherhand reacted sternly, siezed Japanese assets which deprived the Japanese of dollars with which to conduct trade and cut-off their ability to secure war material, in particular oil. There was now little question that the US and Britain would respond to further moves to sieze British and Dutch interests.
The Japanese set about reviewing their position. The IJN informed the emperor that the fleet only had enough oil for 1.5 years of operations and that this was not enough to secure victory. They felt that the best move was to renounce the Tripartite Pact and reach resolution with the US. The IJA and other powerful government officials disagreed and felt that resources were adequate to wage war and that renouncing the Pact would not change the US position.
Prince Konoye agreed with advisers that before any decision could be made on war and peace, the IJA and IJN needed to reach a consensus on what action was possible. A month later they returned a general plan that called for the siezure of the Dutch East Indies followed by attacks on American and British interests in the Far East. This was later refined into four separate plans:
1. Attack East Indies followed by the Phillipines and Malaya.
2. "Island hopping" from the Phillipines to Borneo to Java to Sumatra and then Malaya.
3. Attack Malaya followed by the Phillipines based on US response.
4. Attack the Phillipines and Malaya simultaneously before attacking the Indies.
At this time Yamamoto's Pearl Harbor strategy though long under development was not even part of the discussion. Ultimately, the fourth plan was adopted as it most closely meshed the views of each service. The IJA preferred option one. The IJN preferred option two. Option three was considered too risky because the US could use the Phillipines as a base to disrupt Japanese moves.
As the plan advanced Yamamoto lobbied to have the Pearl Harbor strike incorporated even going so far as threatening resignation if it was not adopted. His opponents relented and the Pearl Harbor strike was incorporated.
The grand strategy became the siezure of the resource areas along the lines of the fourth option coupled with the strike at Pearl Harbor and the siezure of Guam and Wake Island to sever the US's lines of communication in the Pacific. The goal of the Pearl Harbor attack was not to force surrender, but to delay a US response during the crucial first 6 months as the Japanese siezed their objectives. Once the objectives were taken, the Japanese felt they could sit behind their island curtain and comfortably wage defensive war indefinitely.
That is basically the brief summary of their decision making process when it came to launching the Pearl Harbor attack. Why it seems on the surface that the embargo following the Japanese siezure of Indochina caused them to take the course they did, the reality is that siezure of these areas had been a Japanese goal since the 1920's. They felt war with the US was inevitable, it was just a matter of delaying it or starting it on their terms. They even left the ultimate decision up to nearly the last minute. The Pearl Harbor strike force was enroute to Hawaii having departed on November 26th and all other attacking forces had been mustered and prepped before the decision to go to war was finally made on December 1st.
This is an article excerpted on the history.army.mil site from Louis Morton that goes into great detail over the leadup and decision making process for the attack. It also delves into many contingency plans the Japanese considered and shows the depth of their thought on the topic of war with the US.
How they came to sink carriers only and were armed with the wrong ordinance for battleships.
Goodness gracious, just think what would have happened if they had brought the right ordinance for battleships, they might have actually sunk one or two.
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