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Good point. The French had received multiple reports from Belgian and Swiss Intelligence regarding the Meuse-Sedan area as the primary focus of the German assault. In March Swiss Intelligence had informed the French of the massing of 6-7 panzer divisions and multiple motorized divisions in that area, as well as the construction of pontoon bridges on the Our River. The reports largely feel on deaf ears.
As risky as the German strategy was, adjustments by the French and British to contain the armored columns in the Ardennes could have resulted in a much different scenario.
It should not be forgotten that an event which took place on January 10, 1940 had a direct impact on both the German operational plan for the West (Fall Gelb) and Allied defensive positioning to counter the expected German invasion. On that day a plane carrying Major Hellmuth Reinberger, commander of the Luftwaffe parachute school, crash landed near Mechelen, Belgium. Major Reinberger happened to have in his possession an almost complete set of Fall Gelb plans. The major and his pilot were taken into custody by Belgian police, and despite efforts by Reinberger to burn the documents he shouldn't have been flying with in the first place, enough of them remained intact to clearly show that the Germans intended to invade both the Netherlands and Belgium. The key element missing was on what day this operation was to commence, which actually had just been scheduled by Hitler to take place on January 17th.
When Hitler was informed of the incident on January 11th, he was enraged. With the invasion set to take place in just a matter of days, what, if anything, he demanded, did the Belgians know? When partial mobilization of both the Dutch and Belgian armies took place on January 13th, he had his answer; they knew enough that any hope of launching a surprise attack into the Low Countries was now out of the question. While Hitler considered whether to invade anyway, the weather began to turn, so the operation was postponed until the spring. This postponement gave impetus to those German generals who wished to see Fall Gelb revised, largely because they felt that, as originally conceived, Fall Gelb was not very bold or imaginative. Many, in particular General von Runstedt, pushed for the consideration of other ideas, specifically the plan put forth by General von Manstein to launch an armored attack through the Ardennes. Despite serious resistance to contemplating such a radical and risky move, Manstein's plan was tested during war games held at Coblenz from February 7th to the 18th. The end result was agreement by all involved that Manstein's plan would work. Fall Gelb was revised to include Manstein's so-called "sickle cut" maneuver and was presented to Hitler, who gave it his enthusiastic approval.
Reaction on the Allied side to the obtainment of the Fall Gelb documents was mixed. The Belgians and Dutch were rightfully concerned for the safety of their respective countries and immediately sought reassurances from the British and French that they would help defend Belgium and Holland. The British, for their part, were suspicious, believing that the documents must be part of an elaborate hoax. The French, on the other hand, were delighted. Not only did they believe the documents to be authentic, but they also took them as confirmation of what they had convinced themselves of since the war began; if the Germans tried to invade France, they would only be able to do so by attacking from the north through the Low Countries. Thus, their plan to move the bulk of their forces into Belgium and stop the Germans before they could even set foot into France, while relying on the Maginot Line and the Ardennes to protect their flank, seemed both logical and correct.
So in many ways, it is somewhat understandable that intelligence reports forwarded to the Allies by the Belgians and Swiss prior to the May 1940 invasion of France were dismissed. The capture of the pre-sickle cut Fall Gelb plans earlier in the year created such an atmosphere of smug satisfaction on the part of the French General Staff that it is doubtful anything could have swayed them from the course they had set for themselves. In the end, January 10, 1940 turned out to be a lucky day for the Germans, but not so much for the French.
It should not be forgotten that an event which took place on January 10, 1940 had a direct impact on both the German operational plan for the West (Fall Gelb) and Allied defensive positioning to counter the expected German invasion. On that day a plane carrying Major Hellmuth Reinberger, commander of the Luftwaffe parachute school, crash landed near Mechelen, Belgium. Major Reinberger happened to have in his possession an almost complete set of Fall Gelb plans. The major and his pilot were taken into custody by Belgian police, and despite efforts by Reinberger to burn the documents he shouldn't have been flying with in the first place, enough of them remained intact to clearly show that the Germans intended to invade both the Netherlands and Belgium. The key element missing was on what day this operation was to commence, which actually had just been scheduled by Hitler to take place on January 17th.
When Hitler was informed of the incident on January 11th, he was enraged. With the invasion set to take place in just a matter of days, what, if anything, he demanded, did the Belgians know? When partial mobilization of both the Dutch and Belgian armies took place on January 13th, he had his answer; they knew enough that any hope of launching a surprise attack into the Low Countries was now out of the question. While Hitler considered whether to invade anyway, the weather began to turn, so the operation was postponed until the spring. This postponement gave impetus to those German generals who wished to see Fall Gelb revised, largely because they felt that, as originally conceived, Fall Gelb was not very bold or imaginative. Many, in particular General von Runstedt, pushed for the consideration of other ideas, specifically the plan put forth by General von Manstein to launch an armored attack through the Ardennes. Despite serious resistance to contemplating such a radical and risky move, Manstein's plan was tested during war games held at Coblenz from February 7th to the 18th. The end result was agreement by all involved that Manstein's plan would work. Fall Gelb was revised to include Manstein's so-called "sickle cut" maneuver and was presented to Hitler, who gave it his enthusiastic approval.
Reaction on the Allied side to the obtainment of the Fall Gelb documents was mixed. The Belgians and Dutch were rightfully concerned for the safety of their respective countries and immediately sought reassurances from the British and French that they would help defend Belgium and Holland. The British, for their part, were suspicious, believing that the documents must be part of an elaborate hoax. The French, on the other hand, were delighted. Not only did they believe the documents to be authentic, but they also took them as confirmation of what they had convinced themselves of since the war began; if the Germans tried to invade France, they would only be able to do so by attacking from the north through the Low Countries. Thus, their plan to move the bulk of their forces into Belgium and stop the Germans before they could even set foot into France, while relying on the Maginot Line and the Ardennes to protect their flank, seemed both logical and correct.
So in many ways, it is somewhat understandable that intelligence reports forwarded to the Allies by the Belgians and Swiss prior to the May 1940 invasion of France were dismissed. The capture of the pre-sickle cut Fall Gelb plans earlier in the year created such an atmosphere of smug satisfaction on the part of the French General Staff that it is doubtful anything could have swayed them from the course they had set for themselves. In the end, January 10, 1940 turned out to be a lucky day for the Germans, but not so much for the French.
TonyT, excellent information and analysis as always. If you find the time, maybe you could entertain my curiosity with what was going on behind the scenes with Halder as it related to Manstein. I had heard that Halder transferred Manstein to a corps command in Stettin around the end of January (to take effect in early February) to basically get him out of the way (aka "shut him up") and had been working to keep von Manstein's ideas from reaching Hitler. For instance, none of the six memoranda that Manstein issued between November and early January were ever given to Hitler. The story goes that it was ultimately Manstein's staff that found a way to get the plan in front of Hitler who then convened a conference with Jodl, Schmundt and Manstein where Hitler approved Manstein's ideas. The end result being that Halder had a rather radical change of opinion and then ended up having to defend the plan against the vehement protests of a majority of German generals.
As you always have interesting insight into these situations, I am really curious if you have any more details on how this played out behind the scenes. If it was Manstein's staff that got the plan in front of Hitler, how did they manage that when Halder was seemingly hell bent on keeping the idea quiet even to the point of "banishing" Manstein?
Wasn't it that a lower ranking officer under Manstein had a connection to one of Hitler's main guards and was able to pass the message along to Hitler through some backwards channel? As I recall from reading a while back, Hitler was unimpressed with the plans for the invasion put forth by other prominent generals, such as Halder, which Hitler thought were too conservative and would not produce a rapid victory. Halder was particularly negative and thought the invasion was doomed to fail. When Hitler heard Manstein's plan, he was immediately impressed and actually thought the plan gave Germany a chance at a rapid victory.
TonyT, excellent information and analysis as always. If you find the time, maybe you could entertain my curiosity with what was going on behind the scenes with Halder as it related to Manstein. I had heard that Halder transferred Manstein to a corps command in Stettin around the end of January (to take effect in early February) to basically get him out of the way (aka "shut him up") and had been working to keep von Manstein's ideas from reaching Hitler. For instance, none of the six memoranda that Manstein issued between November and early January were ever given to Hitler. The story goes that it was ultimately Manstein's staff that found a way to get the plan in front of Hitler who then convened a conference with Jodl, Schmundt and Manstein where Hitler approved Manstein's ideas. The end result being that Halder had a rather radical change of opinion and then ended up having to defend the plan against the vehement protests of a majority of German generals.
As you always have interesting insight into these situations, I am really curious if you have any more details on how this played out behind the scenes. If it was Manstein's staff that got the plan in front of Hitler, how did they manage that when Halder was seemingly hell bent on keeping the idea quiet even to the point of "banishing" Manstein?
Thank you. This is essentially how things played out:
In October of 1939, Manstein was serving as Chief of Staff for General Gerd von Runstedt’s Army Group A, which was about to move to its new headquarters in Koblenz in preparation for the coming offensive in the West. On October 19th, the OKH released the first draft proposal of Fall Gelb. While on his way to join the rest of the staff of Army Group A, Manstein stopped at the headquarters of the General Staff on the 21st and picked up a copy of the plan. Manstein began to review it, found it wanting in almost every respect, and came to realize that the end result of executing it as set out would not be a decisive victory but rather a stalemate. By the 29th, Manstein had composed the first of what would end up being a total of six different memorandums which were aimed at getting the General Staff to amend and improve Fall Gelb. Von Runstedt, who’s thoughts about Fall Gelb mirrored those of Manstein, penned his own critique of Fall Gelb and forwarded it to the General Staff on October 31st. In both instances, the opinions expressed by the two men were ignored by the General Staff, in large part because the Commander in Chief of the Army, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch and Chief of the General Staff, General Franz Halder were actually opposed to taking any offensive action in the West. They instead wanted Germany to take a defensive posture and wait for the Allies to make the first move. In many respects, the lack of imagination shown in the original Fall Gelb plan was intentional. It was designed to play up the difficulty of achieving the type of swift victory in the West that Germany had just seen in Poland in hopes that Hitler would be dissuaded from even trying it.
On the 3rd of November, Brauchitsch visited Army Group A headquarters and Manstein made a personal plea to him regarding the changes he felt would greatly increase the chances of success of Fall Gelb. Brauchitsch was dismissive and did little to hide his increasing animosity toward Manstein. Despite this, Manstein pressed forward with refining his revisions to Fall Gelb and asked Heinz Guderian to review it in order to establish if his idea to send armor through the Ardennes toward Sedan was operationally feasible. Guderian, who was quite familiar with the region from his army service during World War I, pronounced it not only feasible but quite innovative. Encouraged by Guderian, Manstein continued to make his case by way of memorandums. Brauchitsch, Halder, and Army Group B commander, General Fedor von Bock came to Koblenz on November 21st to discuss Fall Gelb with Rundstedt. Though present at this meeting, Manstein was not asked to speak, so he sent off another memo to the General Staff which summed up his thoughts of what had been discussed. He followed this with another on December 6th and then his final memo on December 18th. As before, his efforts came to nothing and Fall Gelb remained little changed from the original proposal prepared by Halder back in October.
In the wake of the “Reinberger Incident”, Brauchitsch returned to Koblenz on January 25, 1940 to discuss the now postponed operation in the West. This time, Manstein was permitted to speak and once more detailed his ideas to enhance Fall Gelb, in particular the “sickle cut” maneuver through the Ardennes. During the presentation a disagreement ensued between Brauchitsch and Manstein over how strong the armor element advancing toward Sedan would need to be. By some accounts, the disagreement quickly turned into a heated argument, with the end result being a rejection by Brauchitsch to changing Fall Gelb in the manner which Manstein was recommending. Two days later, Manstein received word that he was being transferred from his post of Chief of Staff of Army Group A to take command of the XXXVIII Army Corps based in Stettin. Though there was no direct evidence to support the notion, most at the time believed this move was Manstein’s “reward” for his continuing conflict with both Brauchitsch and Halder. In any event, on February 7th before departing Koblenz for Stettin, Manstein organized a war game for Army Group A that, among other things, essentially tested whether Manstein or Brauchitsch had been right with respect to how much armor was needed to successfully cross the Meuse and advance toward Sedan. Those in attendance, General Halder being among them, were forced to admit that Manstein’s thoughts on the matter had been correct. Another war game held at the headquarters of the Twelfth Army on February 14th, which Halder also attended, further reinforced the opinion that Manstein’s revisions to Fall Gelb should be adopted in total. Yet even though Halder grudgingly acknowledged the soundness of Manstein’s plan, he was still reluctant to present it to Hitler.
All of that changed due to the efforts of two of Manstein’s closest allies from the staff of Army Group A; Colonel Gunther Blumentritt and Major Henning von Tresckow. Hitler’s army adjutant, Major Rudolf Schmundt, paid a visit to the headquarters of Army Group A just after the war game of February 7th. Blumentritt and von Tresckow discussed at length the revised Fall Gelb plan that Manstein had drawn up but which Halder had buried. Schmundt was intrigued and sought out Manstein to go over the plan in even more detail. This talk convinced Schmundt that Hitler must be made aware that someone had finally come up with the type of plan Hitler had been begging for but which Halder either could or would not produce. At a meeting on February 13th, Schmundt briefed both Hitler and General Jodl about Manstein’s proposal. Hitler was quite taken with it, but he wanted to speak with Manstein in person about it without the interference of Halder. To get around this, Schmundt suggested that an informal breakfast meeting should be held in Berlin between Hitler and the five newly appointed army corps commanders, of which Manstein was one. This took place on February 17th, and after the breakfast was over, the other commanders were dismissed and Manstein was asked to stay behind and meet privately with Hitler, Jodl, and Schmundt. After Manstein concluded his presentation, Hitler praised the boldness of the plan and ordered Jodl to inform Halder that Fall Gelb should be amended accordingly. This was done and the final version of Fall Gelb was sent to Hitler on February 27th for his approval.
Long after the war ended, Halder always insisted that Manstein contributed little to the improvements of Fall Gelb and even went so far as to claim the “sickle cut” as his own idea. But the truth is, that were it not for the persistence of Manstein and the support of his friends Blumentritt and von Tresckow, the campaign in the West would never have achieved the results it did had Halder’s plan been left unaltered.
Wel the early years were set by plannig xince the end of WWI. During the war perhaps nt see the buildup that resulted i the battel of the b Bulge that prolonged the war for many months.Wars are always about mistakes and correcting them tho.Germnay and Japan did not really plan well either in reality for the war that came about.War is the most confusing of times.
Thank you. This is essentially how things played out:
*snip*
Long after the war ended, Halder always insisted that Manstein contributed little to the improvements of Fall Gelb and even went so far as to claim the “sickle cut” as his own idea. But the truth is, that were it not for the persistence of Manstein and the support of his friends Blumentritt and von Tresckow, the campaign in the West would never have achieved the results it did had Halder’s plan been left unaltered.
TonyT, as always, thank you for the detailed response and information. It definitely clarified the chain of events for me.
July-August 1943.
Aleutian Islands. Kiska Island.
Few weeks American bombers and battle ships bombed Kiska Island, but on 15 August when American soldiers had landed on Kiska they had found that there were no one Japanese soldier on the island. The Japanese soldiers were evacuated on 28 July. Aleutian Islands Campaign - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Why were, and probably still are, the official History books in HS and College not nearly as well written as this thread.
TonyT - That is an excellent presentation of a very confusing subject. That it includes the "hidden" political manuvering of high command just makes it better.
One US intelligence failure was the water depth off Tarawa island that kept the landing craft from the beach and exposed the invading Marines to flanking Japanese machine gun fire.
The USSR built up 1.7million men on the borders of Manchuria in 1945. They announced at Yalta they would attack Japan within 3 months of a German surrender (9 May 1945) and the Japanese never noticed.
Exactly 3 mobnths later (9 August 1945) the Japanese Kwantung Army was caught entirely by surprise in the midst of a redeployment with their commanders out of position.
The Soviets wiped the floor with them within a week.
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