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Imperial Germany did not help its cause in the USA when a private dipolmatic communication to Mexico from Berlin called the Zimmerman Letter was intercepted and ended up in British hands. The British made sure it got to the right hands in Washington. The Zimmeran Letter, was a proposal to the Mexicans that if they joined the Central Powers and attacked the USA if it joined the Triple Alliance.
When Germany won the war it would see that Mexico got back all the lands it lost to the United States in the 19th century.
Indeed, though unrestricted U-boat warfare might well have done it anyway.
The really daft thing is that 1917 subs couldn't carry enough torpedoes to sink all their targets that way. In practice, a majority still had to be sunk by "cruiser rules". So it would have cost Germany nothing to refrain from torpedoing US merchantmen, and use those torpedoes to sink an equivalent tonnage of Allied vessels. They really torpedoed themselves in the foot.
A major reason and one that`s usually overlooked regarding our entry into WW1 is the fact that we were on the hook for tremendous monetary losses should the Allies have lost. We had been footing the bills for quite some time.
The same occurred in Cincinnati, with a huge German population. Along with harassing German groups and forbidding German language instruction in schools, the city went as far as changing the names of about a dozen streets with German names.
This madness came out of a govt. propaganda agency called the C.P.I. Their m.o. was distributing hysterical anti-German propaganda to stir up support for the war. What happened to the Germans living in America was of no concern. Committee on Public Information - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
A major reason and one that`s usually overlooked regarding our entry into WW1 is the fact that we were on the hook for tremendous monetary losses should the Allies have lost. We had been footing the bills for quite some time.
Not true.
As of April 1917, all loans were secured on Allied property in North America, so the lenders would not have lost their money even in case of a German victory. Unsecured loans were made only after the declaration of war.
In any case few Americans or other neutrals were expecting a German victory at that point. As far as Wilson knew he was joining the likely winners. It came as a terrific shock to discover the Allies' real situation.
As of April 1917, all loans were secured on Allied property in North America, so the lenders would not have lost their money even in case of a German victory. Unsecured loans were made only after the declaration of war.
In any case few Americans or other neutrals were expecting a German victory at that point. As far as Wilson knew he was joining the likely winners. It came as a terrific shock to discover the Allies' real situation.
Imperial Germany did not help its cause in the USA when a private dipolmatic communication to Mexico from Berlin called the Zimmerman Letter was intercepted and ended up in British hands. The British made sure it got to the right hands in Washington. The Zimmeran Letter, was a proposal to the Mexicans that if they joined the Central Powers and attacked the USA if it joined the Triple Alliance.
When Germany won the war it would see that Mexico got back all the lands it lost to the United States in the 19th century.
True, but there is more to it than that. The only way [for me] to explain/illuminate it and other points is a plainly too lengthy piece just written. I will self debate whether to post it or not. If you do read, the personal conclusions are that A) at least some historians have stated that in mainstream America no group has risen so far to be quickly pulled down so low as the German-Americans in the two years of 1917-18. B) there were forces of Germany, America, UK and others at work. Using proxies is a time honored tradition of nearly all successful powers, especially so with super powers. I will have to leave out a lot of information, but probably serious scholars and interest parties will get a pretty fairly balanced description.
[Gist, because of cloak and dagger, the telegram was _not_ accepted by most American people, and most American newspapers were anti war. However, in a rare situation of an ignorant yet honest diplomat, Zimmermann confessed when asked. The British at the time would almost certainly denied all and have ridden out the storm.] [Also of issue was that the Kaiser's deputies had been buying up dying _American_ German language newspapers for about a decade, turning the then flush with cash mouthpieces of the Imperial party line. Very few people would read the newspapers, maybe even less than those who see my posts and mostly recent immigrants who also spoke and could read German. The British services used far more sophisticated methods by forming ties with mainstream publications. Or so I have read in studies of the period.]
Great link. Wonder about the accounting method, but if accurate is amazing, particularly:
"Between 1915 and April 1917, the Allies received 85 times the amount loaned to Germany [by US banks and merchants it is inferred]."
That is a big ratio and clearly not a very neutral situation. One thing that infuriated the banking elite, it has been published, was that Germans were the one immigrant group that consistently had their own banks apart from the Anglo Saxon Wasps. Some others existed, especially Jewish banks and the odd upstart like the Bank of Italy (now Bank of America), but none so independent. Also of dislike were the farmer town banks, and they died in droves during the Great Depression and beforehand. During that period only one midsized NYC bank went under, the Bank of United States.
Total loans did indeed exceed $9 billion by war's end, but $7.5 billion of that was the unsecured loans made after US entry into the war. As of April 1917 only some $2.2 billion had been loaned, and as I say, all those loans were secured on collateral in North America, beyond the reach of even a victorious Germany, so there was no danger of the lenders losing their money.
Indeed, the Federal Reserve, backed by Wilson, took a firm line against unsecured loans, and were seconded in this by as pro-Allied a figure as Robert Lansing. Wilson was fully aware of the danger that such loans might compromise his freedom of action by tying the US too closely to the Allies - and had no intention of allowing it to happen.
But in any case the whole point is academic since, except for a few top men in the British Navy and HM Treasury, hardly anyone yet knew that a German victory was on the cards. Certainly the Germans themselves didn't, hence their otherwise insensate gamble [1] on Unrestricted U-boat warfare. Russia remained in the war despite the February Revolution, and the French army mutinies were still in the future. Nor was the impact of the U-boat campaign yet appreciated. Admiral Sims was shocked when Jellicoe filled him in on Britain's desperate position. The smart money was still on the Allies, and if Wilson delayed much longer he apparently risked being excluded from the peace conference if still neutral at war's end.
Patrick J Devlin Too Proud to Fight - Woodrow Wilson's Neutrality gives a good account of this period, and Justus Doenecke Nothing Less Than War is also well worth a read.
[1][ For reasons given in my earlier message, it wasn't all that smart even so, but Germany's desperate situation at least offered an excuse of sorts.
The U.S. stood to lose a lot in the event of a German victory. Our entire trading system with Europe would have collapsed. Any future trade would be on the terms of the Germans, not the British or French. U.S. influence over Europe would have been severely weakened or non-existent.
Your assertion that the "smart money" was on an Allied victory in early 1917 is questionable. If that were true, why would the U.S. need to draft 4 million troops and send them overseas? Why not just let the British and French clean things up. Perhaps any perception that the Allies were winning was precisely due to the prospect of U.S. involvement?
Regardless, the decision to go to war wasn't made on a whim in 1917 because the Allies were winning. Wilson wanted war for quite some time, even when the Germans had the upper hand, but couldn't find the support. He needed an excuse and the unrestricted submarine warfare gave him his casus belli. I do agree that Wilson wanted a seat at the peace conference and this was a driving force behind him wanting war. But as you pointed out yourself, reality was far from perception (if your assertion is true) that the Allies were "winning". The Allied situation was bleak at best in 1917.
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