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In honor of the 73rd anniversary of the Battle of Midway, I thought I’d throw this out there. Admiral Yamamoto has been criticized (rightly, IMO) in historical circles for his overly rigid and overly complex plan for the Midway sea battle, a plan which fell apart in the face of unexpected American opposition. My question is, if you were in his shoes, what would you have done differently? Assume that all the historical conditions apply, except that you are willing to consider not only America’s perceived intentions (i.e. a supposed reluctance to fight at all, and the consequent need to be goaded into battle) but also her capabilities as well. In that light, how would you have structured the Japanese fleet to conduct the battle?
Under the assumption that the Americans could field a fairly powerful force, and could show up in advance of when they were expected – and further assuming that I still felt the organizational imperative to make use of all 10 carriers and 11 battleships at my disposal -- here’s something I might have tried. First, I would postpone the entire operation a month, in order to enable Shokaku and Zuikaku to participate. I would also defer the Aleutians campaign. Instead, I would use carrier Junyo and light carriers Ryujo, Zuiho, and Hosho (these being the fleet’s smaller and/or less-capable carriers) to attack Midway Island. I would screen them with Ise and Hyuga, two of the older battleships. This would be a force large enough to gain the attention of the Americans, but small enough to not spook us into keeping our fleet at Pearl Harbor and skipping the battle altogether. And, if the Americans launched a stronger counter-attack than expected, the ships of this force would be more “expendable” than the rest of the fleet.
Meanwhile, I would have the six main fleet carriers (Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku, and Zuikaku) lurk somewhere nearby, far enough away to avoid being detected but close enough to quickly get into the battle when needed. I would screen this force with all four of the Kongo-class fast battleships (Kongo, Hiei, Kirishima, and Haruna). While Junyo et al focused solely on dealing with Midway, Akagi et al would be kept ready, given the sole mission of fighting the American carriers when they came charging after the weaker Midway attack force.
I would have the slow-poke ships of the invasion force screened by the old battleships Fuso and Yamashiro. And finally, I would have the big powerful battleships Yamato, Nagato, and Mutsu hover in-between the two carrier fleets, ready to go wherever they were needed. And if the American fleet didn’t happen to be lurking around Midway when the battle commenced, those ships could have been used to shell the island once its air force was knocked out.
What do you think? Could this have worked? What would you have done?
I would have taken a row boat to a remote island and waited for the inevitable defeat of the Japanese empire...HE knew it was a pipe dream attacking the USA
I also understand Midway was the turning point in the war in the pacific...Japan was on the defensive until the 2 nukes...what were they thinking
Yamamoto would probably have been better off changing his naval codes prior to the planning and execution of the Midway campaign. That may have had better results for him in any case.
The Japanese could have discarded the elaborate plan with decoy invasions and used blunt force to take out the three US carriers but in the end Nimitz's march west, assuming he wasn't sacked still would have happened. Perhaps taking resources from MacArthur's wish to return.
The Japanese could have discarded the elaborate plan with decoy invasions and used blunt force to take out the three US carriers but in the end Nimitz's march west, assuming he wasn't sacked still would have happened. Perhaps taking resources from MacArthur's wish to return.
Simple battle plans were never an IJN forte. They even stuck to complex plans long after their men had no where near the skills to carry them out. Consider the battle of the Marianas:
- Japanese pilots fly from their carriers and fly over water. They locate and attack other moving targets while engaging in dog fights. They then fly off and re-fuel at island air fields. They take off again, and fly to their carriers that are now waiting for them in another area... .
Sure, the IJN naval pilots of 1941 could manage it, but by 1944 most of those men were dead. The new recruits had absolutely no chance- even if the US planes were not superior, they were not outnumbered and US ships lacked radar.
You know if all the battles that the United States Navy has participated in this arguably has to be their 'finest hour'. The combination of sacrifice , heroism, planning and decisive and aggressive leadership gave us a victory that practically speaking was a 'must-win'. Just amazing how we had such great admirals like Nimitz, Fletcher, Spruance and Mitscher minding the Midway 'store'. They made some very very courageous decisions out there in the Pacific.
When we read about the battle I got the impression Yammamoto indeed had the right ideas in his attack on Midway . Thing is he just didn't do the things that would help him win the decisive battle he wanted. I'd think if he wanted to win he would have had to pay better attention to his fleet organization. Dividing his fleet all over the place appeared to be a weakness namely the foray into the Aleutians and the different strike forces. Consequently concentration of power in operations was diminished.
It appears that when we look at how the opposing fleets with this ships and carriers were 'managed' we have to say the Japanese simply were not very good taskmasters on that. Mid way to Yammamoto probably looked as a setup piece. Thing is it turned into a free- wheeling battle and we were just sharp in finding the guy first! And I think we had better admirals who knew their stuff.
You know if all the battles that the United States Navy has participated in this arguably has to be their 'finest hour'. The combination of sacrifice , heroism, planning and decisive and aggressive leadership gave us a victory that practically speaking was a 'must-win'. Just amazing how we had such great admirals like Nimitz, Fletcher, Spruance and Mitscher minding the Midway 'store'. They made some very very courageous decisions out there in the Pacific.
And I think we had better admirals who knew their stuff.
I agree about Midway being our 'finest hour'. And we did have very skilled commanders.
It must be noted though that the skilled admirals of the IJN hit back hard and fast after Midway during the Guadacanal battles. They then went on to fight the increasingly superior USN to draws at Santa Cruz and one other battle.
They really shouldn't have had to do much differently, because they very nearly did win it. In fact, if they'd had better communications, they probably would have. We read their mail, so we knew they were coming, but even at that it was a stroke of luck that we found their carriers before they found ours - and that should never have happened at all, because Yamamoto had plenty of warning that the element of surprise may have been lost, but chose to do nothing.
The lead element of the strike force, the carrier task force, was commanded by Admiral Nagumo. The commander of the Combined Fleet, and overall commander of the operation, was Admiral Yamamoto. He was with the battleships and cruisers, several hundred miles behind the carriers - his intention was to sweep in with the big bangers and mop up whatever was still floating when Nagumo's carriers were finished. 3 days before the battle, the Japanese General Staff in Tokyo warned Yamamoto that they now considered it likely that Nimitz knew they were coming and was planning to ambush the carriers. Incredibly, Yamamoto never communicated this to Nagumo, assuming that he had received the same message.
The day before the battle, Yamamoto received further intelligence that some elements of the fleet had been attacked by B-17s from Midway, and other elements spotted by a patrol plane. The morning of the battle, another ship was attacked by a torpedo bomber (probably also from Midway). Again, he never communicated any of this to Nagumo, apparently because he didn't want to break radio silence.
Clearly, by mid-morning of June 4th, Yamamoto knew the element of surprise had been lost, and that there was probably an American carrier task force waiting to ambush Nagumo, and he didn't do a thing about it. He just let Nagumo sail into it. By mid-morning, when the first American planes began to attack the carriers, Nagumo was quite possibly the only flag officer in the entire Japanese navy who didn't know that the American carriers might not be at Pearl Harbor anymore. His first indication was when his carriers started blowing up.
Had Nagumo known that the carriers had probably left Pearl and were on their way to Midway, he would have deployed his forces differently, and changed his entire attack plan to take the threat into consideration. Had he done so, it's very possible - perhaps likely - that we would not have gotten in the lucky first shot we did, that sank 3 of his 4 carriers in one furious 20-minute attack.
I agree it was one of the US Navies greatest victories. And we had great leaders fighting in the battle but I have always felt we (the USA) had a little luck on our side but thats what you need many times to win a battle. We know our torpedo planes were not very good and because the did not launch right with their fighter escort they attacked without fighted escort and the Japenese Zero's shot down almost every torpedo plane we sent. But they did not die in vain as they had pulled almost all of the Japenese carriers fighter cover down low to nearly wavetop level. So when our dive bombers (the SBD's) came in up high no fighters were there to stop them. And on top of that because the one Japenese scout plane was a 1/2 hr late taking off and did not see our carries right away the Japenese comander was rearming his planes from bombs to torpedo's to bomb our carriers. So we got lucky enough to catch them with bombs and fuel all over their flightdecks and one good hit was all it took to make them go up in flames.
I am not saying the USA was lucky to win the battle as our men fought their hearts out but I feel we had a small bit of luck go our way so that the one attack put 3 of their carries ablaze and later sunk. Without the extra bombs and fuel on their decks their carries may not have flamed up as easy. But we played the cards we had the best we could since the US Navy was out numbered at Midway and that did get the job done. Kinda like Henry Fonda says at the end of the movie Midway as he said........were we better or just luckier ? Ron
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