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I have sometimes wondered why the Japanese didn't use their powerful battleship fleet to better effect at Guadalcanal, given that the nature of this campaign (mainly surface battles at night) played to their strengths. True, the Kongo and Haruna were put to good use shelling Henderson Field. But when the Japanese tried to repeat their success a month later, they ended up losing the Hiei and Kirishima.
Other than those four -- which, while certainly powerful ships, were not as heavily-gunned as the other 10 battleships in the IJN's inventory -- the Japanese refused to commit their big boys, even though (in hindsight) their participation might have proven decisive.
One possible explanation that I recently came across was this: Japan simply did not have enough oil available to more thoroughly make use of their gas-guzzling battleships, no matter how much they might have wanted to. Given that the captured Dutch East Indies oilfields were not producing nearly as much as they had hoped, and after blowing a full year's worth of oil during the week-long Battle of Midway, they realized that they had to very carefully husband their remaining oil reserves.
Here's the analysis, showing just what it would have taken to use their fleet to better effect. What do you think?
By then it was obvious that battleships were sitting ducks against enemy air attacks. If anyone knew that early on, it was the Japanese... considering how they virtually wiped out America's battleship fleet at Pearl Harbor.
Japan's last big battleships weren't sent out until things started getting desperate for the Japanese and they were promptly sunk by aircraft before they could do any damage.
By then it was obvious that battleships were sitting ducks against enemy air attacks. If anyone knew that early on, it was the Japanese... considering how they virtually wiped out America's battleship fleet at Pearl Harbor.
Japan's last big battleships weren't sent out until things started getting desperate for the Japanese and they were promptly sunk by aircraft before they could do any damage.
Certainly by 1944 this was true. But in 1942? I'm not so sure. The only air power the U.S. could muster around Guadalcanal was that which was provided by the Enterprise and Hornet and Wasp, and these ships were tied up (and the latter two sunk) by Japanese submarines and their carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku. So this just left the planes of the Cactus Air Force at Henderson Field, and I genuinely doubt that they could have put a behemoth like Yamato or Musashi under the waves by themselves.
You are certainly correct that Japan hoarded the bulk of her battleship fleet until Leyte Gulf, by which time it was too late for them. (Even so, who would have predicted that a force of four big battleships and a bunch of cruisers and destroyers would be turned back by a few destroyers and the planes of a few escort carriers?)
Hindsight is 20/20, of course, but if Japan had left her battleships at home for Midway (where, even if they had won a crushing victory, the battleships probably would not have seen any action), maybe they would have had enough fuel oil to use them at Guadalcanal, where they might have done some good. Lucky for us, not so lucky for them.
Here's the analysis, showing just what it would have taken to use their fleet to better effect. What do you think?
I have read about the Japanese lack of oil and it seems pretty convincing.
Also, I wonder when their two super battle ships (Yamato and Musashi) were truly ready for combat? Yamato sailed for the Midway battle. But the deployment of Yamato for combat might have just been symbolic as she was kept far to the rear and served as Yammamoto's flag ship. Likewise, I think Musashi was completed alot later into the war.
Speed might have been another factor. Japan's tactics at Guadacanal focused on swift destroyers and cruisers coming in fast, hitting hard, then quickly escaping. Their older battleships might not have been able to keep up. Any Japanese ships still in "The Slot" by day break risked being attacked while in closed in waters by aircraft from Henderson field or carriers.
I have sometimes wondered why the Japanese didn't use their powerful battleship fleet to better effect at Guadalcanal, given that the nature of this campaign (mainly surface battles at night) played to their strengths. True, the Kongo and Haruna were put to good use shelling Henderson Field. But when the Japanese tried to repeat their success a month later, they ended up losing the Hiei and Kirishima.
Other than those four -- which, while certainly powerful ships, were not as heavily-gunned as the other 10 battleships in the IJN's inventory -- the Japanese refused to commit their big boys, even though (in hindsight) their participation might have proven decisive.
One possible explanation that I recently came across was this: Japan simply did not have enough oil available to more thoroughly make use of their gas-guzzling battleships, no matter how much they might have wanted to. Given that the captured Dutch East Indies oilfields were not producing nearly as much as they had hoped, and after blowing a full year's worth of oil during the week-long Battle of Midway, they realized that they had to very carefully husband their remaining oil reserves.
Here's the analysis, showing just what it would have taken to use their fleet to better effect. What do you think?
All four of the ships you mentioned, the Kongo, Haruna, Hiei and Kirshima were I believe the fastest battleships that Japan had. In fact they were originally considered battlecruisers, the Kongo Class Battlecruisers that were updated into "fast battleships".
So they were faster and better able to keep up with the aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers that made up most of the Japanese fleet. In contrast, the older WW1 era dreadnaughts were slower and often stayed in port because of their slower speed. The Americans often did the same thing. The older American WW1 era dreadnaughts often stayed in port while the newer "fast battleships" of the 1930s did the fighting.
In addition, the Kongo class ships might have been considered more expendable then the newer Yamato and Musashi.
In addition, the Kongo class ships might have been considered more expendable then the newer Yamato and Musashi.
I suspect you're right. It's almost as if the IJN still thought of the Kongo class ships as battle cruisers, and used them as such, even though they themselves had upgraded them to fast battleships.
Of course, it's ironic that these supposedly "lesser" battleships were kept busy throughout the war, actually providing some useful service for their country; whereas the other 8 "real" battleships -- yes, including Yamato and Musashi -- might as well have been melted down for scrap, for all the good they did. The Japanese had a first-rate navy, but with a few exceptions (such as the Pearl Harbor raid) they really didn't use it very effectively at all.
I still think it had (at least partly) to do with the vulnerability of capital ships to airpower, of which the Japanese were well aware. There were actually 3 ships planned when the Yamato & Musashi were built. The 3rd one, Shinano, was converted to an aircraft carrier during construction, and was torpedoed & sunk by our subs on it's first voyage IIRC. The fact that this hull was converted from a super battleship to an aircraft carrier says that the IJN realized what was needed most to fight the war... airpower. They held their prized battleships back until they had no choice but to use then, because they knew they would probably lose them.
Putting a few more holes in the ground was never going to be decisive, the battleships job in most navies was to take out the others line of battleships. Not to support the ground forces or sink merchanters.
Putting a few more holes in the ground was never going to be decisive, the battleships job in most navies was to take out the others line of battleships. Not to support the ground forces or sink merchanters.
Unfortunately for Japan, the Pacific War did not turn out to be the Big Dreadnought Slugfest that they had envisioned and had trained for. Indeed, there were only TWO occasions in the entire Pacific War in which American and Japanese battleships fired at each other. Thus, the Japanese kept most of their battleships in port, waiting for the Decisive Battle that never came (or, when it did, they didn't recognize it as such). The U.S., meanwhile, instead of sitting around waiting for a chance to use our battleships in the traditional grand manner, put them to use protecting our aircraft carriers and softening up enemy islands before we invaded them.
So while naval bombardment might not have been the battleship's intended role, we got more mileage out of ours by using them for this purpose than the Japanese did by not using theirs in that way.
The paper is an interesting thought exercise. However, I think the fuel oil question is secondary to the classical explanation which was presented in the paper; it was not in line with Japanese strategic thinking. There are two general explanations for the lack of Japanese capital ship commitment to Guadalcanal:
Theory 1: Air power rendered capital ship operations too risky.
My comments: Interesting thought, but no one really paid much credence to the impact of air power at this point, not even the Japanese. The most succesful air operations against naval assets to that point had been raids on port facilities (Taranto, Pearl Harbor). Pearl itself was nothing more than a "sideshow" within the overall Japanese operations. The sinking of Bismarck had featured naval air assets damaging the ship followed by surface assets finishing it off. The sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse had featured overwhelming air power in multiple raids by land based planes when the ships being attacked had no defensive air cover. The Japanese fired 49 torpedos across a dozen sorties at the ships and managed only 8 hits (4 on each) which eventually sunk the battleships. Not very efficient.
It would not be until Midway that the Japanese would really start to pay more attention to the impact of carriers as a decisive force (too late since they could never replace their losses at that battle) and it was the AMERICANS who were the innovators of carrier tactics and placed the carrier as the primary capital ship. Mainly because the US had no other choice post Pearl Harbor. People believe the rise of air power and the dominance of the carrier is a Japanese invention, that is simply not true.
Theory 2: Japanese stategy didn't call for using capital ships that way.
My comments: This is the classical line of thought and the one I believe in. Japanese strategy was predicated on the "decisive battle". They did not see Guadalcanal as the decsive battle and therefore would not commit their main battleship assets. Guadalcanal was a periphery battle at the "defensive ring" that Japan had established.
The article challenges this assertion by pointing out that the Japanese did commit assets piecemeal at different times. Zuikaku and Shokaku were both committed to the Port Moresby operation. This was another periphereal battle. My argument here would be that the Japanese high command did not place the same value on the carriers and the "Kido Butai" was not weakened by the commitment of these two carriers to that battle. The article also mentions Midway as another example, but this is disingenuous. Midway was a direct attempt to force an offensive decisive battle and no matter how poorly the Japanese planned that attack, it cannot be used as evidence to counter the main argument that their lack of committing their battleships was an effort to preserve the "Kido Butai".
Theory 3: The Japanese didn't have enough fuel oil. (what the article presents)
My comments: While the Japanese were constantly aware of their fuel oil situation, the fact of the matter is that they certainly had more than enough available to commit their units IF they felt it was necessary. I don't think the fuel oil situation weighed on their decision about what assets to commit, they simply didn't view the battle as being that important to justify the expense of the fuel oil and the risk of the "Kido Butai".
Overall an interesting theory, but I don't think it really holds water. Had the Japanese wanted to make the commitment they certainly could have. The limited heavy assets they did risk were their battlecruisers which were designed for speed and were assets deemed more acceptable to risk since they did not have a place in the main battle line that formed the "Kido Butai".
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