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I think the Japanese Navy learned the same lesson we did-that battleships are extremely vulnerable to aircraft attack. By the Guadalcanal campaign the bulk of the Japanese Naval air power had been destroyed (Midway) and they had no way to adequately protect the big-gun ships. I think the Japanese realized-too late-that investing massive resources into battleships was a huge waste of production capacity, manpower, fuel, etc. Perhaps the better question is, what would have happened had the Japanese invested the resources used to build Yamato and Musashi into building several new carriers? What if they would have had 5 or 6 carriers at Midway, instead of 4? End result would have been the same; Japan could never equal our production capacity. But the war might have lasted longer and been far bloodier.
I think the Japanese Navy learned the same lesson we did-that battleships are extremely vulnerable to aircraft attack. By the Guadalcanal campaign the bulk of the Japanese Naval air power had been destroyed (Midway) and they had no way to adequately protect the big-gun ships. I think the Japanese realized-too late-that investing massive resources into battleships was a huge waste of production capacity, manpower, fuel, etc. Perhaps the better question is, what would have happened had the Japanese invested the resources used to build Yamato and Musashi into building several new carriers? What if they would have had 5 or 6 carriers at Midway, instead of 4? End result would have been the same; Japan could never equal our production capacity. But the war might have lasted longer and been far bloodier.
I'm not sure it would have been possible; at least, not on a time scale that would have mattered.
Japan was the first major power to fully recognize the importance of naval aviation, and had 10 aircraft carriers at the start of the war. Even as early as the 20s, they had already started to convert battleships to carriers. The Kaga and (I think) the Akagi were both started as battleships, and converted to carriers while under construction. They were already committed to building a powerful carrier fleet long before the war started.
There was a third battleship in the Yamato class, the Shinano, which was in the early stages of construction in late 1941. The decisive success of Pearl Harbor, and the sinking of the Repulse and Prince of Wales by carrier aircraft a few days later, inspired the Japanese to take some time to think things through and reconsider whether they really needed another large battleship or if that hull would be better used to launch aircraft. Construction of the Shinano was suspended for several months while they thought it over.
The crushing defeat (and loss of 4 fleet carriers) at Midway made their minds up for them, and in July of 42 they began converting the Shinano to a carrier. They didn't finish it until November of 44; it was barely commissioned in time for it to be sunk by a submarine. But the point is, it took roughly 2 years for them to construct and commission a carrier. They couldn't build them as fast as we were sinking them.
But even if they had, the larger problem was finding pilots. When the Japanese lost a plane, they almost always lost the pilot too - and it took as long for them to train a pilot as it did to build a carrier. At the start of the war, the Japanese naval air force was one of the finest air forces in the world. But they could not replace the pilots, and the further they got into the war, the fewer good pilots they had. It wouldn't have mattered how many carriers they built if they couldn't crew the planes, and that was a problem they were probably never going to solve, because most Japanese pilots were shot down over unfriendly territory.
It's true that if they'd had another flight deck or two at Midway, the outcome of that battle might have been different. But most of the pilots who lived through Midway would probably have just been killed a few months later in the Solomons.
I read Rise and Fall of the Third Reich when it first came out in paperback.
Etc.
Ah-ha! I read "The Rise and Fall" too! That makes me almost your peer! Well, except for a couple of minor details...
Just kidding, obviously. I'm extremely impressed with your grasp of military history, the depth and breadth of your knowledge. I think I speak for a lot of people when I say that I'm really glad you're posting here, and that you add more to this forum than almost any other single poster here. Thanks for joining in!
Japan was the first major power to fully recognize the importance of naval aviation, and had 10 aircraft carriers at the start of the war. Even as early as the 20s, they had already started to convert battleships to carriers. The Kaga and (I think) the Akagi were both started as battleships, and converted to carriers while under construction. They were already committed to building a powerful carrier fleet long before the war started.
The Akagi started life as a battle cruiser. The Kaga started out as a battleship, as you said. They were contemporaries and roughly analogous to the American carriers Lexington and Saratoga, both of which were converted battle cruisers.
The IJN always seemed schizophrenic when it came to their capital ships. They did indeed recognize the power of the aircraft carrier sooner than probably anyone else; certainly their carrier operations were the most advanced in the world when the war began. And yet, they could never seem to shake their confidence in their battleships as being the ultimate weapons of decision.
They sent out all 11 of their battleships in support of the Midway campaign, though the all-important task of directly protecting their fleet carriers fell to a mere two of them (Haruna and Kirishima). The other 9 did nothing more than parade around and waste fuel. But at Guadalcanal, where their battleships might have made a real difference, they sent out only four, and never more than two at a time.
[quote=bus man;44241009]The Akagi started life as a battle cruiser. The Kaga started out as a battleship, as you said. They were contemporaries and roughly analogous to the American carriers Lexington and Saratoga, both of which were converted battle cruisers.
Quote:
Originally Posted by bus man
The IJN always seemed schizophrenic when it came to their capital ships. They did indeed recognize the power of the aircraft carrier sooner than probably anyone else; certainly their carrier operations were the most advanced in the world when the war began. And yet, they could never seem to shake their confidence in their battleships as being the ultimate weapons of decision.
I think Tsushima may have had something to do with this. The Japanese Naval decision-makers seem to have been preoccupied with the concept of a decisive battle fought up close and personal with big guns.
Quote:
Originally Posted by bus man
They sent out all 11 of their battleships in support of the Midway campaign, though the all-important task of directly protecting their fleet carriers fell to a mere two of them (Haruna and Kirishima). The other 9 did nothing more than parade around and waste fuel. But at Guadalcanal, where their battleships might have made a real difference, they sent out only four, and never more than two at a time.
I think Tsushima may have had something to do with this. The Japanese Naval decision-makers seem to have been preoccupied with the concept of a decisive battle fought up close and personal with big guns.
The One Great All-Out Battle was their ideal scenario, and they prepared for it almost to the exclusion of all others. Japanese warships were "short-legged" because the OGAOB was expected to be fought close to Japan, after the USN had obligingly presented itself to the lines of submarines and continual air attack as they resolutely bore into the maw of the Combined Fleet.
Hyper-focusing on one possible scenario does not allow for a balanced force.
Even with all the IJN BBs - how much of a difference?
Looking @ the IJN battleships @ Guadalcanal, it's hard to say. The IJA was committed to a land battle in China - only 11 of 51 divisions were involved in the conquest of the expanded Japanese empire - as opposed to 3/4 of Axis divisions that Hitler threw into the USSR. The further IJA went into China, the more they conquered, the weaker they became @ each point & the more they strained their logistics (already poor to begin with). The same was true of the IJN expanding outward - if not clear @ the time.
Yah, the IJN longed for a big gun shoot out of battleships, even though the IJN & IJA air forces had already demonstrated the vulnerability of surface combatants without air cover - HMS Prince of Wales & HMS Hood. That's why IJN kept maneuvering & holding back their BBs - for an all-or-nothing gun battle that never came.
@ Guadalcanal - the IJ military were pleased with their overall performance to that date. & I don't think they saw an issue with a peripheral campaign way off on the outer marches of their sphere of interest. That was one reason their sphere was so big - to act as a tripwire & alert them to hits from the West (mostly US) navy.
I don't know that IJN could have thrown all their BBs into the issue @ Guadalcanal. They were having fueling problems - & with all their conquered areas & resource sites. All of those were poorly run, TMK, & the IJ military seemed to go out of their way to outrage the local native elites & ordinary citizens who might have welcomed them otherwise. They deposed all the Europeans they could, but instead of taking a reasonable amount from each conquest, they tried to make off with everything possible - POL, crops, ores, slave labor - & didn't leave enough for the next season's crops - nor much of anything else.
'Why the heck didn't the Japanese send their battleships down to Guadalcanal and put Henderson Field out of business for good?'
Very interesting discussion. He looks @ IJN strategy, fuel consumption by BB & DD & other IJN capital units, & concludes that IJN was fighting the worst kind of war possible in the Solomons, & eating up fuel while unable to adequately reinforce or resupply or deliver heavy weapons to the IJA units fighting for their lives. An excellent read.
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Even with all the IJN BBs - how much of a difference?
