Bill Halsey good or bad Admiral (attack, battle, army, leader)

[BigBlueFleet]

Originally Posted by Irishtom29

Halsey did very well in the Solomons but less well at Leyte where he did just what the Japanese wanted him to do..

The Japanese knew their enemy and could count on him seeking the carriers.

Originally Posted by Irishtom29

It seems his command style was rather casual and this led to Kinkaid and Nimitz thinking he was leaving a force to guard the San Bernadino Strait.

I have to agree the Task Force 34 message was misleading, problem of communication lies with the Army and Navy leadership in Washington. The Seventh Fleet of the USN couldn't communicate with the Third Fleet unless it was through MacArthur and SWPAC.

Originally Posted by Irishtom29

Halsey had the strength to go after Ozawa AND guard the strait. Some think Halsey took the fast battleships after Ozawa because his flag was on the New Jersey.

That was why the IJN kept losing battles, a commander at sea shouldn't split his forces. I'd agree that Halsey on the New Jersey wanted to be right there in the thick of battle when major portions of the Japanese Navy was sent to the bottom , knowing he missed out on the major sea engagements already.

Originally Posted by Irishtom29

Halsey's attacks on Kinkaid after the war didn't help Halsey's position on things.

I suspect the Navy leadership dispatched Admiral Kinkaid to General MacArthur and SWPAC because of his command style. As much as I admired Admiral Halseys service to this country, any public criticsim of Kinkaid was wrong.

[texdav]

If you look Naval warfare is full of wrong moves and alot of very lucky ones. The japanese certainly made more than Hulsey.Anytime you have a aggressive admiral some bad things can happen but when you have unaggressive ones disasters can happen. War is full of blunders and unexpacted triumph.

[Irishtom29]

Originally Posted by BigBlueFleet

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That was why the IJN kept losing battles, a commander at sea shouldn't split his forces. I'd agree that Halsey on the New Jersey wanted to be right there in the thick of battle when major portions of the Japanese Navy was sent to the bottom , knowing he missed out on the major sea engagements already.

Well you have to split your forces if you want to fight two battles; Halsey chose to fight one battle when three were forced upon us. In any event the 3rd Fleet had such overwhelming strength that splitting it wouldn't have been all that risky. He had three carrier groups available, he could have left one behind to guard the strait.

I always thought it odd that Halsey, though a naval airman and great believer in the carrier, used a fast battleship as his flag. Seems like such a use shackled the ship and the other fast battleships to Halsey himself. He might have done better to have used a cruiser as his flagship.

I suspect some naval historians resent Halsey for depriving them of a shootout between the Yamato and the Iowas.

[BigBlueFleet]

Originally Posted by Irishtom29

Well you have to split your forces if you want to fight two battles; Halsey chose to fight one battle when three were forced upon us. In any event the 3rd Fleet had such overwhelming strength that splitting it wouldn't have been all that risky. He had three carrier groups available, he could have left one behind to guard the strait.

At the time the Northern Force was composed of 4 carriers and 2 partially converted carriers from WW1 battleships. Halsey lived by the creed

"No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy." --Lord Nelson

I've always thought outside the box on the Battle off Samar and thought if the Ching Lee's battleships were there it would have been greater loss of life than it already was, The tin cans and pilots of Taffy Three and Escort Carriers close by performed brilliantly, it may have been the USNs finest hour.

Originally Posted by Irishtom29

I always thought it odd that Halsey, though a naval airman and great believer in the carrier, used a fast battleship as his flag. Seems like such a use shackled the ship and the other fast battleships to Halsey himself. He might have done better to have used a cruiser as his flagship.

I think I read he used the New Jersey because of its cutting edge electronics at the time . I can't remember the source however.

Originally Posted by Irishtom29

I suspect some naval historians resent Halsey for depriving them of a shootout between the Yamato and the Iowas.

That would have been a real shootout!

[cpg35223]

Originally Posted by BigBlueFleet

Again, you may have missed...

Admiral Nimitz's orders....

"If a situation presents itself, or can be created, to destroy a major portion of the enemy's carriers, THAT becomes your primary mission."

Spruance was a brilliant commander in his own right but he was more conservative than Halsey. Spruance had a chance to destroy major portions of the Japanese Fleet in the mariannas but chose instead to protect the beach head, which were his orders by the way. the aviators were urging him to attack the carriers but Spruance pursued them too late and they got away. Some of the Navy leadership weren't happy so a change was made to reflect the orders I quoted.

Sorry. I think you make a good point, but I don't buy it. I'm familiar with the contradictory orders that Halsey received. At the same time, an admiral with strategic understanding would have understood how critical it would be to protect the landings and cover the Seventh Fleet's northern flank.

As it was, Halsey's pursuit of Ozawa's fleet took place without the formation of Task Force 34, as originally communicated to Nimitz at Pacific Fleet headquarters. Instead, the ships originally designated to form under Admiral Lee with the express purpose of guarding the critical San Bernandino Strait instead joined Halsey's pursuit of Kurita with Halsey's full knowledge. As a result not even so much as a picket destroyer was left guarding this key stretch of water. Given that the entire disposition and intention of the Japanese remained unknown during a very confusing and large-scale action, imprudence is the most charitable description I can muster.

More damningly, his original intent to form Task Force 34 to guard the San Bernandino Strait clearly implies that Halsey understood that his original mission was to be upheld, regardless of how the battle unfolded and what other initiatives he might undertake. For him to scrap the formation of Task Force 34, particularly without informing Pacific Fleet headquarters or the other fleet admirals, constituted breathtaking negligence on Halsey's part. For the rest of the fleets operated under the assumption that there was a considerable body of ships still guarding the San Bernandino strait, even as Halsey was out chasing Ozawa. Quite frankly, had it not been for the astonishing bravery of American destroyer escorts attacking Japanese capital ships off Samar, it is very likely that the Kurita would have broken through. Now I agree with you that the actions of Taffy Three do indeed constitute the US Navy's finest moment, but rely on a handful of destroyer escorts and escort carriers to face down the Yamato, et al, is essentially resting an enormous military operation on a very, very slender reed. Had it not been for the valor of our destroyers that day, the resulting disaster would have put Halsey's bungle on the same scale as Marshall Ney's failure to spike the Allied artillery at Quatre Bras during the Battle of Waterloo.

This apparent recklessness was compounded by document reports that Halsey and his staff ignored reconnaissance reports from USS Independence
scout aircraft that Kurita's force had turned back towards the San Bernandino Strait. This information was relayed to Halsey's flagship, where it was received and rejected. At the same time, Admiral Lee realized that Ozawa's fleet actions were nothing more than a massive feint, and received the same abrupt and contemptuous reply from Halsey and his staff.

So, no, I think your argument is erroneous. Yes, Halsey might have had standing orders that gave him carte blanche to chase the Japanese, but it's very difficult to believe that a rational commander would not at least have left some reserve in place to ensure that the original mission was not compromised.

[Rhett_Butler]

Originally Posted by BigBlueFleet

Totally false, General Vandegrift and the Marines on Guadalcanal were thrilled with the news of Halsey taking over for Ghormley. I'll quote General Vandegrift when he read the news , "Bill Halsey's been made COMSOPAC. Now we'll get back in the war!"

More from the book Fleet Admiral-

Funny, I didn't state General Vandegrift among actual Marines on the ground that I had spoken to on the subject, but I guess his opinion is that of all Marines.

I didn't speak to any other Generals in my discussions either, but if history wishes to write that the average USMC soldier was thrilled with Halsey, I'll take it with a grain of salt based on my dealings and research on the matter.

Perhaps in lieu of other Naval commanders Halsey was a more polished turd in the mind of the average Marine, but I know the Marines GREATLY resented how much credit the navy received for the victory at Guadalcanal, for instance, of which Halsey was a part.

Also, your quote is a slice of time from when he was first promoted and doesn't address how any pervailing feeling might have changed over time.

So please if you're going to tell the story, tell the WHOLE story. The Marines did not "Like" Halsey.

[woodpond]

Does anyone remember the exact message Halsey sent to the fleet the day he took over, Oct. 13, 1942? As I remember it said, in part "we will kill the yellow bastards..." Our skipper (DD487) read it to the entire ship over the PA and there was a mighty cheer. We knew the war was going badly for us and it was either us or them. It seems appalling now but it sure didn't then.

[Grandstander]

My father was a naval pilot serving aboard the escort carrier the Kitkun Bay, one of the six CVE's in Taffy Three, the task force surprised and attacked by the Japanese force which slipped back through the San Bernadino Straight. As you might well guess, my father never had a good word to say about Halsey and regarded him as massively overrated.

Removed from this prejudicial atmosphere, my reading has left me thinking that Halsey was a mixture of good and bad, his strength being in the area of inspiration and determination, his weakness being in the areas of judgment and incaution.

I'm not sure it is alway very fair for we who have the advantage of knowing the outcomes , to be passing judgment on those making the decisions before they knew the outcomes. We know that Halsey went chasing after Japanese bait, but Halsey didn't know their carriers were just bait when they were first spotted. Of course his mismanagement in not communicating fleet intentions and dispositions is inexcusable, with or without hindsight/foresight.

We also have to deduct points for his macho conduct in parking his fleet in the middle of a hurricane shortly after the action at Leyte.

[BigBlueFleet]

Originally Posted by Rhett_Butler

Funny, I didn't state General Vandegrift among actual Marines on the ground that I had spoken to on the subject, but I guess his opinion is that of all Marines.

I didn't speak to any other Generals in my discussions either, but if history wishes to write that the average USMC soldier was thrilled with Halsey, I'll take it with a grain of salt based on my dealings and research on the matter.

Perhaps in lieu of other Naval commanders Halsey was a more polished turd in the mind of the average Marine, but I know the Marines GREATLY resented how much credit the navy received for the victory at Guadalcanal, for instance, of which Halsey was a part.

It's been awhile since I last posted on this subject so I apologize....
Most don't realize more Sailors died defending Guadalcanal than Marines. I know the Marines and Army personel on the island endured the more hardships because of the ground conditions but credit to all services should be shared for the victory on the Canal. The Navy may not have been enduring the hardships on the ground but they were the service that kept the IJN from reinforcing the island with supplies and men, without the brilliant work by Naval, AAF , Anzac and Cactus Airmen and also Navy ships, Marines and Army ground forces would have never been able to hold Henderson. Perhaps some Marines resented Halsey for the lions share of credit he was given after the fact but I believe any Marine that served on the Canal during the dark days of '42 would prefer his leadership to Admiral Ghormley. I may have posted this earlier but in Frank's Guadalcanal he wrote something to the effect that on the day SOPAC changed commanders Imperial forces made an attack on Henderson and the defenders were so spirited that they thought the Marines landed a fresh division.

Also, your quote is a slice of time from when he was first promoted and doesn't address how any pervailing feeling might have changed over time.

I have to agree , also you should remember you interviewed these Marines well after the conflict ended .

So please if you're going to tell the story, tell the WHOLE story. The Marines did not "Like" Halsey.

I'm sure some Sailors didn't like Halsey, does that mean the Navy didn't like Halsey? Keep in mind there is always going to be branch rivalry amongst the services. Take care now..

[BigBlueFleet]

Originally Posted by Grandstander

My father was a naval pilot serving aboard the escort carrier the Kitkun Bay, one of the six CVE's in Taffy Three, the task force surprised and attacked by the Japanese force which slipped back through the San Bernadino Straight. As you might well guess, my father never had a good word to say about Halsey and regarded him as massively overrated.

Removed from this prejudicial atmosphere, my reading has left me thinking that Halsey was a mixture of good and bad, his strength being in the area of inspiration and determination, his weakness being in the areas of judgment and incaution.

I'm not sure it is alway very fair for we who have the advantage of knowing the outcomes , to be passing judgment on those making the decisions before they knew the outcomes. We know that Halsey went chasing after Japanese bait, but Halsey didn't know their carriers were just bait when they were first spotted. Of course his mismanagement in not communicating fleet intentions and dispositions is inexcusable, with or without hindsight/foresight.

We also have to deduct points for his macho conduct in parking his fleet in the middle of a hurricane shortly after the action at Leyte.

Thanks for sharing that with us Grandstander . FWIW, I'm forever greatful for the deeds of your dad and men just like him.. Regarding Typhoon Cobra
his meteorologist was telling Halsey they were safe. I will say a message should have went out to the fleet to top off ballast tanks and prepare for very high seas. From what I read the ships that capsized didn't add seawater and were riding high needing to be refueled.