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Japan had occupied Korea starting in 1910 and continuing to the end of World War II. August 15th is celebrated as National Liberation Day, a national holiday in Korea. The rest of us know it as V-J Day.
I have a Korean friend who one time was boasting of the brave Korean freedom fighters who, in her telling, all but forced Japan out of their country. She seemed completely unaware of what happened on August 15, 1945 to cause Japan to vacate Korea. I mean no disrespect to the brave Korean freedom fighters (really, I don't; they fought courageously against impossible odds), but the fact remains (which my friend seemed very reluctant to admit) that the only thing that liberated Korea was the fact that America defeated Japan.
The outcome was never in doubt, using 20-20 hindsight. By the time the US had eventually built all the warships and land forces that had been originally planned, the Japanese were already in a retreat and defend posture. Had the US Navy and President Roosevelt given into Churchill's demands to give the highest priority to the war against Germany and its allies, I don't think the date of VE day would have been shortened, while the Pacific War would have been dragged out for another year or so.
The outcome was never in doubt, using 20-20 hindsight. By the time the US had eventually built all the warships and land forces that had been originally planned, the Japanese were already in a retreat and defend posture. Had the US Navy and President Roosevelt given into Churchill's demands to give the highest priority to the war against Germany and its allies, I don't think the date of VE day would have been shortened, while the Pacific War would have been dragged out for another year or so.
While I admire Churchill to some extent he was the kind of friend who was there when he needed you. And also on some issues he talked a good game. For example he billed himself as an ardent Zionist. He did not shred the White Paper upon become PM and thus missed the great opportunity to actually do something to prevent the Nazi Holocaust.
The outcome was never in doubt, using 20-20 hindsight. By the time the US had eventually built all the warships and land forces that had been originally planned, the Japanese were already in a retreat and defend posture. Had the US Navy and President Roosevelt given into Churchill's demands to give the highest priority to the war against Germany and its allies, I don't think the date of VE day would have been shortened, while the Pacific War would have been dragged out for another year or so.
Well, Germany First was indeed the policy of the Allies, as exemplified in Plan D and ratified in the Arcadia Conference. But that didn't preclude the United States going on the offensive in the Pacific. Commanders in the Pacific theater, most notably Admiral King, were always complaining about getting short shrift at the expense of their counterparts in the European theater.
As far as the rest of your premise, the Japanese seriously miscalculated the resolve and fighting ability of the Americans. The Japanese notion was that if they fought to the last man on isolated Pacific atolls, then Americans would soon grow weary of war. They began to be disabused of this notion during the Guadalcanal campaign, which was essentially a bar fight.
Well, Germany First was indeed the policy of the Allies, as exemplified in Plan D and ratified in the Arcadia Conference. But that didn't preclude the United States going on the offensive in the Pacific. Commanders in the Pacific theater, most notably Admiral King, were always complaining about getting short shrift at the expense of their counterparts in the European theater.
As far as the rest of your premise, the Japanese seriously miscalculated the resolve and fighting ability of the Americans. The Japanese notion was that if they fought to the last man on isolated Pacific atolls, then Americans would soon grow weary of war. They began to be disabused of this notion during the Guadalcanal campaign, which was essentially a bar fight.
Part of why the "fight to the last man on every island" strategy didn't work is that the US forces only fought for islands they actually needed. Other islands, perhaps nearby to Guadalcanal and other islands that the US did contest, were irrelevant, just left the cut-off garrison there to sit and wait for orders that never came. Some of these guys held out into the 60's. They were equipped only for repelling an amphibious attack, when that didn't come, no one got around to figuring out how they might get back into the fight some other way.
My old Military Science instructor called this the "Bypass and haul ***" strategy.
IJ not only miscalculated fighting ability and resolve, they apparently didn't think through the whole logistics scenario, and how a protracted war would turn out. The US had all of CONUS, which no Axis power could seriously threaten, to produce all sorts of supplies and material. The Imperial Japanese were hard pressed to build weapons even before bombing on the home islands started. The East Texas oilfield alone could have supplied US forces, or at least most of them, while the Japanese were in a bind for petroleum from the git-go.
I always thought that Japan bombed Pearl Harbor because we cut off their supply of petroleum
Directly, no. Indirectly, yes.
Japan needed oil to fuel its war in China as well as to supply domestic needs. The embargo, were it to remain in place, meant that said oil was unavailable. To restore the supply of petroleum it moved to seize the oil reserves of the Dutch East Indies. Realizing that this attack would probably bring them into conflict with the United States and the UK, it then logically followed that Japan had to seize American and British possessions in the area, including the U.S.-held Philippines - look at a map of the position of the Philippines between Japan and the Dutch East Indies and it is obvious why Japan could not allow a continued American presence there in the event of hostilities. Once that decision had been made, it made sense to whack Pearl and maul the Pacific Fleet as much as possible. Nothing was lost by attacking Pearl Harbor given what they were already doing (attacking Dutch, British and American holdings elsewhere).
Of course, in this historic Choose Your Own Adventure book, Japan read THE U.S. HAS EMBARGOED PETROLEUM IMPORTS BECAUSE OF YOUR WAR IN CHINA. TO WITHDRAW FROM CHINA AND HAVE THE EMBARGO LIFTED, TURN TO PAGE 13. TO GO FOR BROKE AND ATTACK PRETTY MUCH EVERYONE IN SIGHT IN ORDER TO SECURE AN OIL SOURCE, TURN TO PAGE 21 and turned to page 21. Had they opted for page 13, things would have been different.
But it most certainly was not that case of Japan saying "Oh yeah Embargo? Well, then we'll bomb Pearl Harbor!". There was a means to their end well beyond tit-for-tat. It just wasn't an end with high chances of success.
However, the whole death-before-dishonor vibe among the Japanese leadership meant that a high probability of success was not a necessary element for a plan's plausibility. The long-shot perceived to be honorable had merit.
Directly, no. Indirectly, yes. *************
But it most certainly was not that case of Japan saying "Oh yeah Embargo? Well, then we'll bomb Pearl Harbor!". There was a means to their end well beyond tit-for-tat. It just wasn't an end with high chances of success.
However, the whole death-before-dishonor vibe among the Japanese leadership meant that a high probability of success was not a necessary element for a plan's plausibility. The long-shot perceived to be honorable had merit.
I think you are on to something and I will rep the post. In view of the embargo it was "damned if they did, damned if they didn't." If the oil embargo wasn't lifted immediately Japan would have been strangled. Remember, Japan is a winter country, not a tropical one. They could not have done long without Dutch East Indies oil.
I highly recommend "Japanese Destroyer Captain" by Tameichi Hara, translated by Fred Saito and Roger Pineau. Captain Hara was a participant in many important naval battles, and has a rather critical view of the Imperial Japanese Navy's high command, including Admiral Yamamoto. See pages 106 and 107 for some of the comments on Yamamoto.
I think this book will fascinate any student of the Pacific War.
The Japanese believed the US was pulling out of the Pacific and didn't much care (see Philippines promise of Independence by 1945) so they didn't really believe we would fight back in any significant way.
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