Please register to participate in our discussions with 2 million other members - it's free and quick! Some forums can only be seen by registered members. After you create your account, you'll be able to customize options and access all our 15,000 new posts/day with fewer ads.
But turn back the clock to 1914 instead of 1918. What if Germany had played defense in the West? (Germany had insisted on Alsace and Lorraine in 1871 in part to make its western frontier more defensible against French invasion.)
No Hindenburg line, no Passchendaele, no Verdun, no Somme, no Marne. These had fairly equal casualties on both side but hurt Germany more because replacement was harder.
As it was, the French Plan VII was repulsed in 8/14 with losses much greater than France expected. (Plan VII actually allowed an attack on Germany by way of Arlon, Belgium. That would certainly have changed things). Germany had secured it western borders by September.
Instead of Germany dedicating 7 armies to the West and 1 to the East, it could have sent 4 - 5 to the East and kept 3 - 4 in the West. Its victory at Tannenberg could have become general, enveloping the Russian I, II and III armies, collapsing the front from north to south.
Had France played defense in 1914 while Germany struck East, it would have been a very quite front until Russia was beaten. Then, could France have held when Germany turned its attention towards it?
I think a defensive war in the West, from the outset, would have favored Germany. Behind its 1871 borders it could beat its enemies piecemeal. IMO, WWI would have been limited to mainland Europe and over in 2 years.
Sure, a purely defensive posture in the West in 1914 would've been beneficial to the Germans. I made this point before. I'm not sure how it would help the Western allies though. The French did go on the offensive in a half-hearted attempt to take Alsace-Lorraine in 1914, but after suffering significant casualties pulled back rather quickly. After that they were playing defense, reacting to the German onslaught through the Low Countries.
There would be no point for Germany to declare war on France if they do not intend to attack, and no point for the French to declare war on Germany to help Russia if they do not intend to go on the offensive. There's really no scenario under which France would be at war with Germany without either side attacking immediately.
Britain would not have been involved if France was not in danger of being defeated so there's no Western Allies to speak of.
Apparently, none of the military leaders in Europe paid much attention to the American Civil War, which demonstrated quite conclusively (many times - Pickett's charge at Gettysburg, Fredricksburg, etc.) what would happen when a frontal attack was made against an entrenched force armed with modern weaponry like good artillery and machine guns (Civil War units had early type Gatling guns, which were much improved upon by the time of WWI). The Germans might well have reconsidered their war plan had they really learned this lesson from the Civil War.
I heard a historian a while back mention that European military thinkers of the late 19th century didn't pay much attention to the lessons of the U.S. Civil War. I guess they considered America to be a lower form of civilization- in the same vein I don't think American strategists gave much thought to the South American wars of the time, such as those between Brazil and Argentina.
I heard a historian a while back mention that European military thinkers of the late 19th century didn't pay much attention to the lessons of the U.S. Civil War. I guess they considered America to be a lower form of civilization- in the same vein I don't think American strategists gave much thought to the South American wars of the time, such as those between Brazil and Argentina.
They did study the Franco-German war of 1870 though. In the event, much of what they learned was wrong. It didn't account for the advances in weaponry between 1870 and 1914.
The Germans locked into the rapid mobilization and railroads. This led to inflexibility. Plans took years to develop. Railroads were built to implement them. Storage depots, barracks were set up to accommodate planned deployments. Deviations could cause chaos. Even when it became clear that Russia would attack before France, Germany could not change her plan. It would have been a mess.
France and Germany learned that offense wins. Wrong. Defense had become king. First France couldn't attack in Germany. Then Germany was repulsed between Verdun and Belfort. Germany had not only given itself an easier to defend border in 1871, it gave France one, too.
As someone said, there was no point in France going to war if she didn't attack. But even more, French doctrine was offensive both strategically and tactically. Elan would carry the day. 1870 had taught the primacy of artillery. The less time under artillery fire, the fewer casualties. So attack and get it over with.
As it turned out, the French fortifications from Belfort to Verdun were decisive. The forts Moltke the Elder said should be foregone in favor of railroads turned out to be a good investment. They caused Germany to adopt the Schlieffen Plan which caused England to enter the war which was the ultimate cause of Germany's defeat.
I heard a historian a while back mention that European military thinkers of the late 19th century didn't pay much attention to the lessons of the U.S. Civil War. I guess they considered America to be a lower form of civilization- in the same vein I don't think American strategists gave much thought to the South American wars of the time, such as those between Brazil and Argentina.
The Germans had contemporary counter-examples in a number of successful maneuver-battles around the time, such as at Sadowa.
At the outset of the war, their successes at Tannenberg (as well as some of the frontier battles on the west, such as at Mons and against elements of Plan XVII) simply affirmed that 19th century doctrine of the decisive war-winning battle.
The Germans had contemporary counter-examples in a number of successful maneuver-battles around the time, such as at Sadowa.
At the outset of the war, their successes at Tannenberg (as well as some of the frontier battles on the west, such as at Mons and against elements of Plan XVII) simply affirmed that 19th century doctrine of the decisive war-winning battle.
Tannenberg is typical of the Eastern Front and an even better example of Kesselschlacht than Königgrätz. Samsonov lost 140,000 of his 150,000 men while von Benedek managed to save most of his. Although he was so shaken by his close escape he advised Franz-Joseph to sue for peace.
The Western Front had no room for such battles. Too many men.
The Germans were actually quite abashed by Mons. They considered the British army little more than a police force and were surprised by its stout performance. The English might have held had the French 5th not withdrawn, exposing the English right.
Gravalotte was actually a better example of what to expect in WWI. The Germans managed to encircle the French and drive them under the guns of Metz, where they were besieged. But it cost them dearly: 20,000 - 24,000 men vs. 7000 French. Von Moltke said afterwards that however this war (War between France and Germany of 1870) turned out the next one would be a slaughter.
That was the crucial lesson of 1870 that was forgotten by 1914.
Tannenberg is typical of the Eastern Front and an even better example of Kesselschlacht than Königgrätz. Samsonov lost 140,000 of his 150,000 men while von Benedek managed to save most of his. Although he was so shaken by his close escape he advised Franz-Joseph to sue for peace.
The Western Front had no room for such battles. Too many men.
The Germans were actually quite abashed by Mons.They considered the British army little more than a police force and were surprised by its stout performance. The English might have held had the French 5th not withdrawn, exposing the English right.
Gravalotte was actually a better example of what to expect in WWI. The Germans managed to encircle the French and drive them under the guns of Metz, where they were besieged. But it cost them dearly: 20,000 - 24,000 men vs. 7000 French. Von Moltke said afterwards that however this war (War between France and Germany of 1870) turned out the next one would be a slaughter.
That was the crucial lesson of 1870 that was forgotten by 1914.
I think the lesson the Germans took away from Mons was that it was a tactical level stalemate resolved by operational level successes.
By Le Cateau they were pulling off battalion-level encirclements assisted by massed artillery, though obviously nothing on the level of the Eastern Front, as you correctly mention. I can see why they still saw the initial operation as positive conditioning for an offensive maneuver doctrine, putting their casualties down to the Mons-Conde canal and British marksmanship.
However, all of this is from anglo-centric perspective. I'm interested to see if you know of any communiques and other correspondence between German command personnel at the time. It might be helpful to see how they saw events while the battle was developing.
Please register to post and access all features of our very popular forum. It is free and quick. Over $68,000 in prizes has already been given out to active posters on our forum. Additional giveaways are planned.
Detailed information about all U.S. cities, counties, and zip codes on our site: City-data.com.
Please register to participate in our discussions with 2 million other members - it's free and quick! Some forums can only be seen by registered members. After you create your account, you'll be able to customize options and access all our 15,000 new posts/day with fewer ads.
