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Originally Posted by bus man
By January 1945, World War II had all but been decided in favor of the Allies. Most (though obviously not all) of the battles had already been fought, and it was essentially a question of not IF, but WHEN the Allies would win. The air campaign against German industrial targets and population centers was still ongoing, with many cities badly damaged. However, some prominent raids (such as against Dresden) had not yet happened. The air campaign was just getting started against Japan, and its cities were all still largely untouched at that point.
Let's say we had managed to develop and build two bombs by then. (Assume that we would not have any more after that before the war ended.) Where would we have dropped them? Presumably we'd want to attack whatever targets would get the war ended the quickest. Berlin and Tokyo seem like obvious candidates, though I'm not so sure. Berlin was already heavily damaged by conventional bombing, and we did not want to risk killing Emperor Hirohito. (When Tokyo was fire bombed starting in March 1945, targeting the Imperial Palace was strictly forbidden.) If not these places, where else would have given us the most "bang for the buck" in persuading the Axis to surrender?
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ATOMIC BOMBS AGAINST GERMANY
This is not strictly a hypothetical question. We can look to history to see the discussion of targeting and concerns regarding the use of the weapon.
The first discussion of targeting was held in May 1943 with General Groves, Vannever Bush, and other key Manhattan Project figures. It was actually a minor point of discussion at the end of a long meeting concerning other topics. Remember, at this point it was believed (quite incorrectly) that the German bomb program was roughly as advanced as Manhattan. It wasn't, to put it mildly. Tokyo and the Japanese fleet at anchorage on Truk were discussed as targets. The fleet was the preferred target because in the case the bomb did not work, it would be harder for the Japanese to recover if it sank in the ocean. Minutes from the meeting specifically state that the decision was made to first use the bomb against Japan because it was believed (correctly) that Japan was nowhere near producing a bomb, and could benefit less from potentially recovering an Allied atomic weapon that did not detonate.
Targeting was not officially discussed again until spring 1945. By that time it was clear that a deployable device would not be available until after Germany's defeat, and so for that reason the discussion of targets solely referred to Japan. The Roosevelt administration did inquire during the Battle of the Bulge of the availability of atomic weapons to counter the German offensive, but obviously it would be months before any device would be available for combat deployment.
On the other hand, military planners were concerned about German air defenses. At that point in the war, even as degraded as they were they were much better than what Japan had to offer. The Germans made it a point that when a new Allied aircraft type was introduced to German skies, particular effort was made to bring it down for intel purposes. And the only American bomber that could deliver an atomic weapon was the B-29, which was not used in the European theater (except for one, sent as a decoy to England as part of a ruse). This made it particularly hazardous to try and use an atomic bomb against Germany. While the 'high and fast' B-29s could essentially fly too high and too fast for Japanese interceptors, the Me 262 would have been more than capable of bringing one down. There was one other alternative already in-theater: the Avro Lancaster. The Lancaster was unsuited for the long-range atomic bombing runs against Japan due to its inferior range, but that would have been less of an issue against Germany. However, flying lower and slower* than the B-29 by a wide margin completely rules it out as a viable atomic platform. Anyway, American national pride would have made the use of a British aircraft to deliver the bomb an absolute last resort.
[* - This would also have seriously hindered a Lancaster's ability to outrun the blast after deploying the bomb]
I suspect that once the Bulge offensive stalled (Christmas, 1944) there would have been no cause to use the bomb against Germany when balanced against perceived risks and compromises. Germany was inexorably collapsing, psychological profiles of Hitler predicted that as the walls closed in he would commit suicide (as he did), and that would remove that final obstacle to German capitulation.
To get the use of an atomic bomb against Germany, I think you have to accelerate its availability. Say, summer 1944, when the breakout is going slower than expected, or perhaps the failure of Market Garden in September when the dream of an end to the war in Europe by the end of the year is rapidly dwindling. There would still be the problem of the delivery vehicle and German air defenses, but they could be partially overcome and then perhaps just accepted as necessary risks.
EARLY ATOMIC BOMBS AGAINST JAPAN
This would present problems. After the Doolittle raid, no American plane was seen in the skies over Tokyo for more than two years. Tokyo wasn't bombed again until late November 1944. (there had been raids from China, but they were logistically problematic, Tokyo was out of range and only Kyushu could be bombed, and there was no way the U.S. was going to stage atomic attacks overland across Asia). So January 1945 would be rushing things.
There's also the issue of Iwo Jima, which wouldn't be invaded until February 1945. From Tinian to Tokyo, the route goes almost directly over Iwo Jima. While the strategic importance of the island has been much debated, at the time there was considerable concern over Japanese fighters based on the island as well as its potential importance as a divert site, both on outbound and inbound legs. The USAAF coddled its nuclear weapons, for obvious reasons. I highly doubt they would have taken the perceived risk of undertaking an atomic bomb mission from Tinian without first controlling Iwo Jima.
TWO BOMBS, AND ONLY TWO BOMBS, IN JANUARY 1945?
This part of your question is completely ahistorical. The refining of uranium for a Little Boy implosion-type bomb was very time-consuming and energy intensive. However, the production of plutonium was simpler. There was not going to be any shortage of plutonium for the making of multiple Fat Man implosion-type devices. However, the implosion mechanism is so complicated that there is no way there would not first be a test, just as happened in July 1945: Trinity. The uranium bomb didn't need to be tested, and it wasn't - the first time one was ever detonated was 1900 feet over Hiroshima. If you want to limit things to two bombs, that leaves only one for combat deployment.
But regardless of all the other issues, there's simply no way that there would only be two bombs. Essentially, once the process for accumulating the plutonium byproduct from uranium refinement was producing enough for one bomb, it was going to be possible to continue producing enough plutonium for multiple bombs per month. By September 1, 1945, the rate of three months worth of plutonium monthly was established, and if we accelerate the point to which we have a Fat Man available in January 1945, that means the bomb assembly line will be cranking out enough for a new bomb about every ten days.
THE GERMAN BOMB
There's no chance of Germany developing a nuclear weapon. They weren't building one. Germany had gutted its base of physicist knowledge with persecution. Not only had the United States and the UK (and Canada) not done that, but they'd had their ranks of physicists bolstered by German refugees. The Manhattan Project had the full support of three governments. And even then, it wasn't ready until the war in Europe was over. Germany's bomb program didn't have full government support. Furthermore, there's the cost. The Manhattan Project cost $2,000,000,000. With that, Germany could have bought 1000 u-boats. Or 15,000+ Bf 109s. Or every tank Germany built during the war. And therein lies the problem. For Germany to build a bomb, they would have to divert massive resources away from other essential war allocations. Fewer u-boats to hinder Allied shipments of materiel. Fewer fighters to intercept Bomber Command the the Eighth Air Force. Fewer tanks to fend off the Red Army.
Germany just didn't have the capacity to build atomic devices while also fighting
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Originally Posted by BobNJ1960
The danger is, as a land mass adjacent to some nations we regarded as allies, would we risk exposing them to the bombs affects via wind? We did not need to worry about that with Japan, of course.
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Precisely 100 atomic devices were detonated above ground at the Nevada Test Site between 1951 and 1962, less than 90 miles from Las Vegas. Prevailing European winds would have carried fallout to the east. If the government wasn't concerned over dusting Vegas with fallout during peacetime, the possibility of giving Poland a little fallout during wartime wouldn't have registered at all.
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Originally Posted by Bitey
They're lucky we only had enough fissile material for two bombs at the time or they might have gotten a third while they twiddled their thumbs wondering what to do after Nagasaki was turned into a crater.
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There wasn't a shortage of plutonium. The third bomb was being assembled at Tinian, and its core was complete stateside in New Mexico about to be shipped to the Pacific. This was expected to take until August 18 at the latest. But the day after Nagasaki, Truman temporarily halted further use of atomic weapons. He was concerned about the damage being inflicted, and thought what had already been wrought might be enough to convince the Japanese leadership to capitulate. Thus the pause. At any rate, that same day the Japanese government sent out feelers to the Allies about accepting the terms of surrender laid out at Potsdam, with the exception of retaining the Emperor. Truman then temporarily halted all conventional bombing as well. It was clear that the Japanese were folding, even if the final word didn't come until the 15th (actually, U.S. intelligence intercepted and deciphered Japanese transmissions on the 14th to the effect that the decision to surrender had been made and the announcement was being prepared).
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Originally Posted by jtab4994
Obviously. But they wanted to develop it, and they were planning to drop it somewhere or at least threaten to. Look at the mass destruction and slaughter on and off the battlefield the Nazis rained without it!
My point is, I think in the context of World War II that an A-bomb dropped somewhere in Europe by one side or the other, is not as far-fetched as some in 2021 think it is.
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Germany most certainly did not plan to drop any atomic weapons. They were too many years and too many Reichsmarks away from one, and had no delivery vehicle for one - which is to literally say that they did not make plans to deliver one. Wishing and dreaming on one hand, and planning on the other, are different things.
And just in case anyone is wondering, no, the V-2 was incapable of delivering a nuclear weapon. The V-2 had a payload capacity of less than one long ton; both Little Boy and Fat Man weighed more than four times as much. Both weapons were also too long to fit in the missile's allocated warhead space - and Fat Man was, well, too fat.
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