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Old 01-02-2009, 05:15 PM
 
Location: Downey CA
142 posts, read 272,057 times
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I suggest YOU read the book IN THE PRESENCE OF MINE ENEMIES its a book written by Harry Turttledove about what if the germans had won the war its fascinating
as to the question i believe that the americans couldve won againts the russians but with heavy losses
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Old 01-02-2009, 10:02 PM
 
2,654 posts, read 5,448,971 times
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An interesting question.

If the US had the political will to wage all out war on the USSR I believe the US would win for one main reason: Airpower. The Red Army was superior in numbers and in some equipment - particularly the T-34 tank v. a US Sherman, but their Airforce was under equipped. Their best regarded planes were made for ground attack. The cream of the Luftwaffe fought the west over Germany and as such, the Red Air Force was focussd on ground attack, not air superiority. They would have been slaughtered in a straight up fight v. our P-51's, - 47's and -38's Once the USAAF had swept the skies, the Red Army would have been pounded from the air.
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Old 01-02-2009, 10:25 PM
 
Location: Aloverton
6,560 posts, read 14,412,214 times
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Quote:
Originally Posted by OC Investor2 View Post
An interesting question.

If the US had the political will to wage all out war on the USSR I believe the US would win for one main reason: Airpower. The Red Army was superior in numbers and in some equipment - particularly the T-34 tank v. a US Sherman, but their Airforce was under equipped. Their best regarded planes were made for ground attack. The cream of the Luftwaffe fought the west over Germany and as such, the Red Air Force was focussd on ground attack, not air superiority. They would have been slaughtered in a straight up fight v. our P-51's, - 47's and -38's Once the USAAF had swept the skies, the Red Army would have been pounded from the air.
There you raise a pretty good point. My WWII: A Statistical Survey suggests that in April 1945 the USAAF had 31,335 combat aircraft available for service, with 21,572 on station overseas.

Granting that most of the air effort in the Pacific was handled by Naval aircraft, we could probably subtract 10% of that 21K for the Pacific, but we could probably deploy enough domestically based aircraft to compensate. Add some 8,000 RAF aircraft (nearly all in Europe) plus the Canadian contribution if they would come, and that's significant numeric superiority over the 17,000 combat aircraft of the Soviet Air Force. Plus, the tables have a footnote indicating that the 17K figure might be an overstatment, and that sometimes Soviet units were as much as 25% understrength. The Luftwaffe remnants couldn't have done much to help, being reduced to 2,175 aircraft by 4/45.

Interesting bit from these tables: the Luftwaffe seems rarely to have exceeded 5,000 combat aircraft ready for battle, and never by much.

It must also be considered that, depending on the war's timing, the Soviet Union could operate in the Far East, Caucasus and Central Asia. If I were them in that situation I would strike south into the Near East, where it would be much easier for me to field decisive forces than for my enemy to counter them, and where I might well cause a wide variety of headaches from oil field seizure to inciting Arab nationalism. I would consider at least menacing India. I would find a creative way to cause trouble in the Manchuria/Soviet Far East/Japan region. I would certainly open a front in Norway.

In short, I would take advantage of my strategic position: as a beleaguered nation with my adversaries' interests scattered all around my national frontiers, and my own territory contiguous and quite vast and deep to enable ready strategic redeployment, I could put the Allies in a position of fighting in many places they might really not be eager to fight, often at the end of long supply tethers relative to mine.
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Old 01-03-2009, 05:17 AM
 
Location: Turn right at the stop sign
4,473 posts, read 3,985,333 times
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Generals have long considered the capture of an enemy’s capital city to be the ultimate prize in a war. This particular notion was something that Patton fervently believed in as did other American commanders. Churchill and his military chiefs of staff were in agreement as well. And at first, Eisenhower did view Berlin as an objective of the Allied forces once they crossed the Rhine. However, to him, the main goal was to first capture the Ruhr which was the industrial heart of Germany. Keep in mind that two months before this operation began, the Soviets were sitting on the banks of the Oder River, within close striking distance of Berlin. Eisenhower knew this and given that by then he was nearly 300 miles from Berlin, it seemed highly likely the Russians would quickly clear the remaining obstacles before them and get to Berlin long before he ever could. Based on that, Eisenhower pretty much dismissed the idea of going after Berlin. This decision displeased most people, including Patton and Churchill, but Eisenhower had the final say. And unless ordered to do otherwise by the President, that was how it was going to be. Ironically, the Americans actually reached their objectives much faster than the Russians and were within 50 miles of Berlin by April 15, 1945. The Russians were still stuck battling it out with the last major German defenses at the Seelow Heights, some 60 miles from Berlin and would not break free until April 19th. So in theory, the Americans likely could have gotten to Berlin before the Soviets, had Eisenhower permitted it. Instead, he stuck to his decision that American forces would not advance past the Elbe River and would wait there to join up with the advancing Russians.

Another factor was Eisenhower knew what had been agreed upon at Yalta. He saw no use in wasting manpower and machinery to take territory and a city that would simply revert to Russian control once hostilities ceased. Eisenhower also knew that every man he had would be needed for the final push against Japan, so whatever could be done to shorten the war in Europe served that goal best. There was also wide belief that Soviet assistance would be key in helping to defeat Japan, therefore nothing should be done to upset the Russians; like taking Berlin before they did. However, a neutrality pact had been in existence between the Soviets and Japan since 1941. The Russians didn’t dissolve the pact until April 1945, so I’m not sure what would make anyone think they would be of much help to the Allied cause against Japan. As it was, the Russians didn’t enter the war against Japan until August 8, 1945, one day before the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, and six days before the Japanese surrender.

It really all does come back to Yalta. Roosevelt truly believed “Uncle Joe” Stalin to be a man of his word. He thought that Stalin would allow free and fair elections to take place throughout Eastern Europe once the war ended; that an era of peace and co-operation between the Russians and the other Allied powers would flourish for years to come. Roosevelt said of Yalta: “The Crimea Conference ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, all the expedients that have been tried for centuries – and have always failed.” Churchill on the other hand said this: "Make no mistake, all the Balkans, except Greece, are going to be Bolshevized, and there is nothing I can do to prevent it. There is nothing I can do for Poland either." I think we all know who ended up being right.

Regardless of how much Patton did not trust the Russians and how correct his instincts were that once the Russians had Eastern Europe they would never let it go, confrontation between the Russians and Americans would never have taken place. General Eisenhower simply was not going to allow it to happen.

Last edited by TonyT; 01-03-2009 at 06:09 AM..
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Old 01-04-2009, 05:29 AM
 
Location: Turn right at the stop sign
4,473 posts, read 3,985,333 times
Reputation: 4818
Quote:
Originally Posted by Irishtom29 View Post
JKK's excellent post has me thinking this----was it a mistake to let Germany reunify? Is the world a better place with a weak and divided Germany rather than a strong and united one?
In September 1944 at a conference in Quebec, a proposal for postwar Germany that was prepared by Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. and endorsed by FDR, was presented to Winston Churchill. The plan was a bit severe. It called for:

a) The complete demilitarization of Germany, the disarming of the German Army and civilian population, and the destruction of all war material and the German armament industry.

b) Germany was to be partitioned into two self-governing, independent states. The state of South Germany would be made up of Bavaria, Wurttemburg, Baden, and some additional small areas. The state of North Germany would be formed from Prussia, Thuringia, and Saxony. Those areas not comprising North or South Germany would be ceded to Poland, Denmark, and France, with the exception of the Ruhr.

c) The Ruhr would be turned into an International Zone and governed by a international security organization controlled by the United Nations. All heavy industry contained within the Ruhr and it's surrounding areas were to be under direct control and ownership of the international organization. The Ruhr was to function as a free trade zone.

d) War reparations would not be in the form of monetary compensation. Instead, factories would be dismantled and removed from North and South Germany, as well as the Ruhr, and be distributed amongst the countries that had been devastated by German occupation. Another means of reparations would be the forced removal of German citizens from Germany and their placement in other countries to provide labor for those countries.

e) Strict controls were to be placed upon all media as well as the educational system.

f) The Allied Military Government was to do nothing to strengthen, improve, or sustain economic activity within Germany. Further, they would not provide assistance to the people of Germany in the form of food, clothing, or shelter.

The stated goal of the plan was to reduce the standard of living in Germany to subsistence levels. German industrial capacity was to be restricted to the point that it would never be able to be an economic power in Europe again, and thus have no ability to produce armaments to wage war. The plan idealistically envisioned the conversion of Germany from the industrial powerhouse it had once been into a completely argricultural nation.

While Roosevelt and Morgenthau wholeheartedly endorsed implementation of this plan, others were not so keen on it. Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, wrote a long memorandum in opposition to the plan. He believed it utterly foolish to even contemplate the obliteration of German industry, especially given the economic conditions that would exist in Europe at the end of the war. Stimson recognized that both Germany's industrial might and raw materials had been fueling the industries of it's neighbors for years. To turn a nation that occupied the center of Europe into what he referred to as a "ghost territory", seemed completely unrealistic to him. In the end, he felt the whole program would do nothing but build resentment and anger among the German people; a situation that could prove counter-productive in the long term.

The so called "Morgenthau Plan" was never fully put into effect, but elements of it were, most notably the de-industrialization of Germany via the dismantling of German factories and their removal to other nations, and the "hands off" policy toward the German economy and people. By late 1946, the U.S. government was seeing signs that both policies were a failure and that an unprosperous Germany had become a drag on the economies of the rest of Europe. Former President Herbert Hoover was sent on a fact finding mission and reported back in March 1947 that: "There is the illusion that the New Germany left after the annexations can be reduced to a 'pastoral state'. It cannot be done unless we exterminate or remove 25,000,000 out of it". Due in large part to Hoover's report, the few "Morgenthau Plan" ideas in play were abandoned and the "Marshall Plan" was born.

In the end, assisting Germany and facilitating the rebuilding of it's industrial capacity served the interests of it's own people, Europe, and even the United States, far better then a weak and divided Germany ever could.

Last edited by TonyT; 01-04-2009 at 06:04 AM..
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Old 01-04-2009, 06:13 AM
 
Location: Mesa, Az
21,144 posts, read 42,029,141 times
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Quote:
Originally Posted by big daryle View Post
The Russians would've sent us back with our tails between our legs. There was no greater military then the Soviet Army of the 1940's.
I have to strongly disagree there: one huge reason that the Soviets were still even a fighting force was our industry supplying them with war materiel.

Had we cut Stalin off----------he would have crapped his pants.

Remember too that the old USSR was severely damaged already. Taking out just Moscow would have had the Commies crying 'uncle' in short order.

Bottom line: we had Stalin by the throat.
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Old 01-04-2009, 06:15 AM
 
Location: Mesa, Az
21,144 posts, read 42,029,141 times
Reputation: 3861
Quote:
Originally Posted by OC Investor2 View Post
An interesting question.

If the US had the political will to wage all out war on the USSR I believe the US would win for one main reason: Airpower. The Red Army was superior in numbers and in some equipment - particularly the T-34 tank v. a US Sherman, but their Airforce was under equipped. Their best regarded planes were made for ground attack. The cream of the Luftwaffe fought the west over Germany and as such, the Red Air Force was focussd on ground attack, not air superiority. They would have been slaughtered in a straight up fight v. our P-51's, - 47's and -38's Once the USAAF had swept the skies, the Red Army would have been pounded from the air.
And by August 1945 we had The Bomb-------------one dropped on Moscow would have finished off the USSR psychologically.
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Old 01-04-2009, 06:20 AM
 
Location: Mesa, Az
21,144 posts, read 42,029,141 times
Reputation: 3861
Quote:
Originally Posted by Irishtom29 View Post
JKK's excellent post has me thinking this----was it a mistake to let Germany reunify? Is the world a better place with a weak and divided Germany rather than a strong and united one?
Today's Germany I am not worried about.

Between the fact it has been staunchly democratic since 1949 and its population is declining----------the Germans have no real desire for leibensraum (sp).

Remember that nations at either ZPG or lower tend to avoid warfare if it involves lots of troops unless absolutely necessary. The mess in Gaza comes to mind hence Israel needing to put that toxic 'culture' into its place.
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Old 01-04-2009, 10:19 AM
 
Location: Aloverton
6,560 posts, read 14,412,214 times
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Quote:
Originally Posted by ArizonaBear View Post
And by August 1945 we had The Bomb-------------one dropped on Moscow would have finished off the USSR psychologically.
On what do you base that?
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Old 01-04-2009, 11:16 AM
 
Location: Norwood, MN
1,828 posts, read 3,779,320 times
Reputation: 907
Quote:
Originally Posted by TonyT View Post
In September 1944 at a conference in Quebec, a proposal for postwar Germany that was prepared by Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. and endorsed by FDR, was presented to Winston Churchill. The plan was a bit severe. It called for:

a) The complete demilitarization of Germany, the disarming of the German Army and civilian population, and the destruction of all war material and the German armament industry.

b) Germany was to be partitioned into two self-governing, independent states. The state of South Germany would be made up of Bavaria, Wurttemburg, Baden, and some additional small areas. The state of North Germany would be formed from Prussia, Thuringia, and Saxony. Those areas not comprising North or South Germany would be ceded to Poland, Denmark, and France, with the exception of the Ruhr.

c) The Ruhr would be turned into an International Zone and governed by a international security organization controlled by the United Nations. All heavy industry contained within the Ruhr and it's surrounding areas were to be under direct control and ownership of the international organization. The Ruhr was to function as a free trade zone.

d) War reparations would not be in the form of monetary compensation. Instead, factories would be dismantled and removed from North and South Germany, as well as the Ruhr, and be distributed amongst the countries that had been devastated by German occupation. Another means of reparations would be the forced removal of German citizens from Germany and their placement in other countries to provide labor for those countries.

e) Strict controls were to be placed upon all media as well as the educational system.

f) The Allied Military Government was to do nothing to strengthen, improve, or sustain economic activity within Germany. Further, they would not provide assistance to the people of Germany in the form of food, clothing, or shelter.

The stated goal of the plan was to reduce the standard of living in Germany to subsistence levels. German industrial capacity was to be restricted to the point that it would never be able to be an economic power in Europe again, and thus have no ability to produce armaments to wage war. The plan idealistically envisioned the conversion of Germany from the industrial powerhouse it had once been into a completely argricultural nation.

While Roosevelt and Morgenthau wholeheartedly endorsed implementation of this plan, others were not so keen on it. Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, wrote a long memorandum in opposition to the plan. He believed it utterly foolish to even contemplate the obliteration of German industry, especially given the economic conditions that would exist in Europe at the end of the war. Stimson recognized that both Germany's industrial might and raw materials had been fueling the industries of it's neighbors for years. To turn a nation that occupied the center of Europe into what he referred to as a "ghost territory", seemed completely unrealistic to him. In the end, he felt the whole program would do nothing but build resentment and anger among the German people; a situation that could prove counter-productive in the long term.

The so called "Morgenthau Plan" was never fully put into effect, but elements of it were, most notably the de-industrialization of Germany via the dismantling of German factories and their removal to other nations, and the "hands off" policy toward the German economy and people. By late 1946, the U.S. government was seeing signs that both policies were a failure and that an unprosperous Germany had become a drag on the economies of the rest of Europe. Former President Herbert Hoover was sent on a fact finding mission and reported back in March 1947 that: "There is the illusion that the New Germany left after the annexations can be reduced to a 'pastoral state'. It cannot be done unless we exterminate or remove 25,000,000 out of it". Due in large part to Hoover's report, the few "Morgenthau Plan" ideas in play were abandoned and the "Marshall Plan" was born.

In the end, assisting Germany and facilitating the rebuilding of it's industrial capacity served the interests of it's own people, Europe, and even the United States, far better then a weak and divided Germany ever could.
Morgenthau was a bitter jew with revenge on his mind. There was no reason to put his plan into place.
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