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The allies enjoyed the advantage of having learned the utility/futility of the Stuka dive bombers in the European theater. When the war began and the Germans were dealing with opponents who had antiquated, or no air forces to oppose them, the Stuka was used as mobile artillery and it was used to great effect in this role. For creating terror and chaos among columns of refugees or troops in retreat, the Stukas were terrific.
However, when the Stukas were employed in the Battle of Britain where they were opposed by a strong force of fighter aircraft, they turned into serious liabilities for the Germans. They were extremely easy to shoot down, especially during the moments when they were attempting to regain altitude after a bombing dive. In those situations, they were so slow as to be almost stationary targets for the Spitfires and Huricanes. Within a few days of the opening of the battle, it became apparent that Stukas could not be used without being accompanied by an escort of fighters to protect them. Within a few weeks it was decided to withdraw them from the campaign entirely, losses were too severe.
The Stuka had some more success for a brief time...in Africa and the Mediterranean theaters, before the allies had much air power in those regions, the Stuka was once more effective as mobile artillery. Once the allies established air superiority in a theater, the Stukas became useless and were grounded by the Germans.
In general, in the WW II era, the advantage in precision you gained by employing a dive bomber was offset by a jump in vulnerability of the attacking aircraft. The need to hold course while attacking, the exposure involved while regaining altitude after releasing your bombs, and the lack of quick maneuverability in flight, all made for a fragile weapon.
The Hawker Typhoon and the American P-47 Thunderbolt, both designed as fighters, also turned out to be effective low level bombers. They were less accurate than the dive bombers, but they were capable of defending themselves in the air, and they didn't expose themselves to destruction during prolonged diving and escape maneuvers.
The P-47 was an excellent fighter bomber. Many, including the men that flew them in each theater claim the were the best fighter bombers of the war. It was a rugged plane that could withstand a tremendous amount of damage. German fighters who would try and shoot down wounded P-47's would often comment on how they would run out of ammo before they could shoot the plane down. It was very heavy (as heavy as a 1930's era bomber and the heaviest single engine fighter ever made) and due to this weight it could dive in excess of 600 mph. It's true value as a fighter bomber wasn't fully realized at the time of D-day. From the invasion of Europe on June 6, 1944 to VE day on May 7, 1945, the P-47 units destroyed 86,000 railroad cars, 9,000 locomotives, 6,000 armored fighting vehicles, and 68,000 trucks. For heavily-armored targets, P-47 pilots frequently carried two 500 lb bombs. The Thunderbolt's eight .50 in machine guns could inflict heavy damage on lightly armored targets.
There has been a riff between the Army and the Marine Corp for a long time. I read a book about a year ago that gave some good insight into this. The book is named House to House. It's about the battle for Fallujah in Iraq. The Army had been in the city for several days and were going from house to house to clear the city. The Marines had been on the outskirts of the city during this time. The Army tactic was to get to the rooftops and set up positions on every side of the roof. When a firefight broke out their soldiers would continue to keep post on their side of the rooftop while the men on the other side fired on the enemy. When the Marines broke into the city, their tactics were very different. How the book described it was if a single shot came their way the whole battalion would open fire on that one position leaving other positions open and even from time to time they would open fire on Army positions.
GS made an excellent point about the Stuka. Goering later lamented that because of the focus on dive bombing, he threw away projects like the Ural bomber resulting in no true heavy bomber in any numbers in the German air force. More absurdly when larger planes were developed like the HE-177 Grief or the Junkers 88, they were required to have a dive bombing capacity. Udet and the influence of the army on the air force turned the Luftwaffee into mobile artillery and little else strategically.
The Hawkers Typhoon, P-47, and Russian Sturmovik were all awesome ground attack planes all level fighter bombers (commonly with rockets). The key role of ground attack was not bunkers. Its simply to dangerous to drop bombs on bunkers and very difficult to destroy them (before the advent of napalm) from the air. The key role of air craft was away from the battlefield, straffing trucks and the like.
The difference between the marines and army goes beyond tactical doctrine. The marine coprs, which for long was involved in counter insurgency warfare, has consistantly argued the importance of winning support of the local public while the army commonly has stressed firepower to defeat them in classical combat tactics. This occured to a signficant extent in Fallujah, where the Marine Corps was over ruled in arguing the Fallujah assault was a mistake, and even more so in Vietnam.
The M8 high-explosive 110 mm rockets had an explosive force similar to a 105 mm artillery shell and the 500 lb bombs were sufficient to bust bunkers. The naval bombardment was not effective, but in a plane you can see how easy it would have been to spot and attack many or most of the German bunkers bunkers One of the tactics P-47 pilots adopted was the skip bombing technique. When they came across difficult targets they would use this technique to eliminate the enemy. Skipping bombs into railroad tunnels to destroy hidden enemy locomotives or tanks was a favorite tactic. Tunnel-busting became a fine art. When pilots spotted a train entering a tunnel, they skipped bombs into both ends to seal the train inside, then bombed the tunnel itself. They never utilized this planes great potential until the European Campaign was underway.
Its extremely dangerous to attack bunkers when your troops are around particularly with WWII rockets. Nor was navy aviation particularly effective at knocking out Japanese fortifications as Iwa Jima and Okinawa reflect.
Its extremely dangerous to attack bunkers when your troops are around particularly with WWII rockets. Nor was navy aviation particularly effective at knocking out Japanese fortifications as Iwa Jima and Okinawa reflect.
That is a good point. It is easy to look at it now long after the conflict is over and judge what could have been done or should have been done. I was looking at it from the point of softening up the bunkers before the troops hit the shore. Diving at a bunker and bombing it in that fashion would have been more effective and targets would have been easier to spot and hit. As we all know the naval bombardment was ineffective as was the bomber bombing. Most of the shells overshot and missed their targets.
I recently heard and interview done by some B-17 and B-24 airmen and they stated how easy it was to fly near Normandy on D-day. There was no flack and little if any air resistance. All the 88's and every other gun was aimed towards the beach. The problem they had with hiting targets from high altitude was the cloud cover over Normandy. They just could not get a good sight on targets. As I said it's easy to say what could or should have been done, but the P-47 would have been a better utilized tool to soften the bunkers.
The terrain in the Pacific was also very different. Many bunkers were covered with thick jungle growth or dug out of cliff sides. Marines would often comment on how they would not even see or know they were there until they were fired upon.
The Japanese were incredibly good late in the war at fortifications. They hid them very well, placed them in areas that were hard to destroy, and had well thought through fields of fire. The saving grace for the US was that earlier in the war especially the Japanese foolishly used banzai charges and tried to defend the beach area.
The irony at Iwa was that the Japanese would have died of thirst had the US been able (which they were not given time tables) to wait a little longer and blockade the island. By the end, in the last Japanese message from the island, it was noted they had not drunk for three days. You can't live long that way.
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