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Old 08-10-2018, 03:22 PM
 
17,685 posts, read 9,685,040 times
Reputation: 17150

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Quote:
Originally Posted by Arkay66 View Post
Nephew was all nervous about taking the ASVAB, even though he'd been studying and taking practice tests for weeks. I told him to breathe deep, calm down, and let his own native intelligence (he is very, very smart) rule. Answer the questions first that he knows, then go back to the ones he was unsure of.

He just texted that the recruiter told him he'd done super and could apply for all of the more complex specialties. Since his goal was to follow his uncle into Geospatial Intelligence, he's now on Cloud 9.
"Geospatial Intelligence" is what they now call my AFSC.

I loved it. I still miss it every day. We have a closed group on Facebook.
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Old 08-11-2018, 11:02 AM
 
Location: Texas Hill Country
626 posts, read 324,702 times
Reputation: 1646
Yep, he's going for 1N1XX Geospatial Intelligence. His uncle was Army 9309/35C (officer). Army changed from 4 number specialty codes to two and letter while we were still in officer specialty training. Still diddling with them, so I list them all.

I was 9666/36A/35E (Counterintelligence Special Agent [officer]), and didn't recommend the field to either nephew. They don't like that kind of paperwork...

Older nephew is at Rucker to become a helicopter pilot, after 6 years as maintenance crew chief and two tours in Afghanistan as door gunner/maintenance.
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Old 08-11-2018, 12:11 PM
 
Location: Honolulu, HI
4,311 posts, read 1,042,061 times
Reputation: 6114
Quote:
Originally Posted by Ralph_Kirk View Post
The figure as I understand it, is that only 25% of those who attempt to join are determined to be acceptable.

That's really the only figure the military would be able provide with authority--stats on the people they actually researched enough to determine their acceptability.
The figures I’m referring to are from this article that says only 136,000 people of the the 33 million eligible to serve in the “prime recruiting range” of 17-24 would join the army.
Quote:
According to U.S. Army Recruiting Command, there are 33.4 million Americans ages 17 to 24, the Army’s prime demographic for enlisting and commissioning.

But there’s one hitch: When you whittle that number down for standards, quality and interest? Only about 136,000 are left
https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-...join-the-army/

There’s another article that says the military only has a pool of 10 million eligible people from 17-24. So it’s safe to also conclude that only 1% of that pool will even be be intersted joining.
Quote:
Approximately 71 percent of Americans ages 17 to 24, the military's main recruitment source, are ineligibly to serve, according to the Pentagon. That's 24 million of the 34 million people in that age group. This means that the U.S. military has only 10 million people from which it can replenish its ranks in the future.
https://wjla.com/news/nation-world/w...uitment-crisis

I think posters are referring to those who don’t qualify for service. I’m referring to those who do qualify but don’t join as only 1% of those eligible are interested in joining. Basically, out of the pool or any pool of eligible Americans, only 1% wants to join.

I understand the 25% acceptance rate figure mentioned. My post is about only eligible people, most of which will never join the military based on the published statistics.

Last edited by Rocko20; 08-11-2018 at 12:43 PM..
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Old 08-11-2018, 12:52 PM
 
17,685 posts, read 9,685,040 times
Reputation: 17150
Quote:
Originally Posted by Arkay66 View Post
Yep, he's going for 1N1XX Geospatial Intelligence.
I get sucked back in every time I look at Google Earth. We still spend time looking at the "hot spots."

And it's so much more extensive now than it was in the earlier days of remote digital sensing--there is so much more than merely visual data that can be collected and correlated by computer with the visual imagery.
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Old 08-11-2018, 12:59 PM
 
Location: New Mexico U.S.A.
23,984 posts, read 38,555,898 times
Reputation: 27953
Quote:
Originally Posted by Rocko20 View Post
Thereís another article that says the military only has a pool of 10 million eligible people from 17-24. So itís safe to also conclude that only 1% of that pool will even be be intersted joining.
No, it is not. Only you say "safe to also conclude that only 1%".... You are just pilling a number out of who knows what.
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Old 08-11-2018, 02:31 PM
 
17,685 posts, read 9,685,040 times
Reputation: 17150
Quote:
Originally Posted by Rocko20 View Post
The figures Iím referring to are from this article that says only 136,000 people of the the 33 million eligible to serve in the ďprime recruiting rangeĒ of 17-24 would join the army.

https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-...join-the-army/

Thereís another article that says the military only has a pool of 10 million eligible people from 17-24. So itís safe to also conclude that only 1% of that pool will even be be intersted joining.

https://wjla.com/news/nation-world/w...uitment-crisis

I think posters are referring to those who donít qualify for service. Iím referring to those who do qualify but donít join as only 1% of those eligible are interested in joining. Basically, out of the pool or any pool of eligible Americans, only 1% wants to join.

I understand the 25% acceptance rate figure mentioned. My post is about only eligible people, most of which will never join the military based on the published statistics.
I'd say again that the only numbers the Army can authoritatively know are the numbers who make inquiries ("interest"), the number who begin accession processing, and the number who complete it.
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Old 08-12-2018, 12:04 PM
 
Location: Texas Hill Country
626 posts, read 324,702 times
Reputation: 1646
Quote:
Originally Posted by Ralph_Kirk View Post
I get sucked back in every time I look at Google Earth. We still spend time looking at the "hot spots."

And it's so much more extensive now than it was in the earlier days of remote digital sensing--there is so much more than merely visual data that can be collected and correlated by computer with the visual imagery.
For all that computer correlation, it still takes human eyes to note what's important and what's not.
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Old 08-12-2018, 01:59 PM
 
17,685 posts, read 9,685,040 times
Reputation: 17150
Quote:
Originally Posted by Arkay66 View Post
For all that computer correlation, it still takes human eyes to note what's important and what's not.
To the extent that the analyst does it.

In the mid 90s, as more desktop computer power made the data more accessible to the imagery interpreter (the term had evolved in my career from "photo interpreter" to "imagery interpreter" as the imagery evolved from just photography to "multi-spectral" imagery), the debate flared (again) as to how much analysis we should do beyond merely reporting what we saw--whether the "imagery interpreter" should become an "imagery analyst."

Our entire system of receiving intelligence requirements and then reporting requirements was geared to limiting us to what we saw rather than what we knew.

I, personally, was on the side of reporting what we knew from what we saw rather than merely what we saw. In 92, I went to the brand-new Joint Intelligence Center-Pacific that was commanded at the time by Rear Admiral Lowell Jacoby--the smartest intel officer I ever knew, bar none.

He was doing stupid stuff at the time--ripping out the copper and replacing it with fiber ("We're going to need the bandwidth"), dictating that all intel analysts (yes, he meant "analysts") needed a full gig of document storage, putting windows to the NSA, CIA, and DIA databases on our desktops with intent of us combining intelligence sources whenever possible (which CIA despised).

He was a big proponent of intelligence inter-agency chat rooms and news groups where desk analysts of the different agencies would be able to collaborate without going up and down chains of commands (not that anyone else at his level wanted that to happen).

He had hand-carried a floppy from the University of Illinois Champaign-Urbana with a beta of Mosaic, saying, "This is the next big thing," and talking about "living documents" and "collaborative documents" and "multi-media documents."

He did away with the practice of having a professional intelligence briefing team. Instead, he put video-conferencing systems in all the analyst offices so that the guy who wrote the report was talking directly to him and the other leaders across the Pacific in the morning intel briefings.

So he got to know who was working what at the most basic level. It got to the point where he'd sit down at the screen and say, "Is Petty Officer Smith on the line? CIA said something this morning (because DC was half-a-dutyday ahead of Hawaii) about a new Chinese buildup in the Paracels? Fill me in."

He also broke up the "intelligence discipline" mafias. That is, in most organizations we were set up by "discipline."

So all the IMINT guys were in one division together, all the SIGINT guys were in another division together, all the ELINT guys were in their own team, et cetera.

Instead, Jacoby put all the people of all the disciplines working North Korea together in the North Korea Division, all the people of all the disciplines working China on the China Division, et cetera. He forced IMINTers to sit beside SIGINTers and across the cube from ELINTers...and talk directly to each other because we were all looking at the same place.

Stupid stuff like that.

And I'd have Petty Officer Smith ready to talk to the Admiral and whatever other flags were on the line, because we were going to damned well know more about what was going on in our theater than anybody in DC.

I had an epiphany early in the process when I was new to the organization and we'd just been so organized. An Army SSG analyst who worked for me had a problem. He had to know whether a particular armor division was fully equipped. But he couldn't tell for sure because none of the imagery reports over time ever actually identified enough tanks visible at one time for him to make that call.

So I took the opportunity to get back into the weeds a bit and scanned some of the imagery of the facility. I looked at things like track activity in the mud during the spring and winter, melt patterns on the sheds and barracks during the winter, numbers of command vehicles during exercises, things like that in addition to how many tanks were ever visible at one time. So I said, "Yeah, it's fully equipped," and told him why I could say so.

"Why doesn't anyone ever say that? Why do they just give me the number of tanks they see?"

Well...it was because that was how the system was set up. That's the way it had always been set up. "Report what you see." Not what you really know. It was hard-wired that way.

I was looking at the guy and thinking, "We've been doing this wrong. Twenty freaking years, we've been doing this wrong."

So I jumped fully into Jacoby's new concept--the first division top NCO to get on board, and our team did wonderful things. To be fair to the others, I'd had more varied experiences than most, such as having been "accidentally" assigned for a tour as operational intel to a fighter squadron, having worked in the Beltway with CIA and DIA, and having worked in the Strategic Reconnaissance Center. But I had still had to do a bit more mental reconfiguration, when back in the "normal" work environment with a bunch of young troopies.
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Old 08-12-2018, 06:57 PM
 
4,020 posts, read 1,809,128 times
Reputation: 3201
Quote:
Originally Posted by Ralph_Kirk View Post
To the extent that the analyst does it.

In the mid 90s, as more desktop computer power made the data more accessible to the imagery interpreter (the term had evolved in my career from "photo interpreter" to "imagery interpreter" as the imagery evolved from just photography to "multi-spectral" imagery), the debate flared (again) as to how much analysis we should do beyond merely reporting what we saw--whether the "imagery interpreter" should become an "imagery analyst."

Our entire system of receiving intelligence requirements and then reporting requirements was geared to limiting us to what we saw rather than what we knew.

I, personally, was on the side of reporting what we knew from what we saw rather than merely what we saw. In 92, I went to the brand-new Joint Intelligence Center-Pacific that was commanded at the time by Rear Admiral Lowell Jacoby--the smartest intel officer I ever knew, bar none.

He was doing stupid stuff at the time--ripping out the copper and replacing it with fiber ("We're going to need the bandwidth"), dictating that all intel analysts (yes, he meant "analysts") needed a full gig of document storage, putting windows to the NSA, CIA, and DIA databases on our desktops with intent of us combining intelligence sources whenever possible (which CIA despised).

He was a big proponent of intelligence inter-agency chat rooms and news groups where desk analysts of the different agencies would be able to collaborate without going up and down chains of commands (not that anyone else at his level wanted that to happen).

He had hand-carried a floppy from the University of Illinois Champaign-Urbana with a beta of Mosaic, saying, "This is the next big thing," and talking about "living documents" and "collaborative documents" and "multi-media documents."

He did away with the practice of having a professional intelligence briefing team. Instead, he put video-conferencing systems in all the analyst offices so that the guy who wrote the report was talking directly to him and the other leaders across the Pacific in the morning intel briefings.

So he got to know who was working what at the most basic level. It got to the point where he'd sit down at the screen and say, "Is Petty Officer Smith on the line? CIA said something this morning (because DC was half-a-dutyday ahead of Hawaii) about a new Chinese buildup in the Paracels? Fill me in."

He also broke up the "intelligence discipline" mafias. That is, in most organizations we were set up by "discipline."

So all the IMINT guys were in one division together, all the SIGINT guys were in another division together, all the ELINT guys were in their own team, et cetera.

Instead, Jacoby put all the people of all the disciplines working North Korea together in the North Korea Division, all the people of all the disciplines working China on the China Division, et cetera. He forced IMINTers to sit beside SIGINTers and across the cube from ELINTers...and talk directly to each other because we were all looking at the same place.

Stupid stuff like that.

And I'd have Petty Officer Smith ready to talk to the Admiral and whatever other flags were on the line, because we were going to damned well know more about what was going on in our theater than anybody in DC.

I had an epiphany early in the process when I was new to the organization and we'd just been so organized. An Army SSG analyst who worked for me had a problem. He had to know whether a particular armor division was fully equipped. But he couldn't tell for sure because none of the imagery reports over time ever actually identified enough tanks visible at one time for him to make that call.

So I took the opportunity to get back into the weeds a bit and scanned some of the imagery of the facility. I looked at things like track activity in the mud during the spring and winter, melt patterns on the sheds and barracks during the winter, numbers of command vehicles during exercises, things like that in addition to how many tanks were ever visible at one time. So I said, "Yeah, it's fully equipped," and told him why I could say so.

"Why doesn't anyone ever say that? Why do they just give me the number of tanks they see?"

Well...it was because that was how the system was set up. That's the way it had always been set up. "Report what you see." Not what you really know. It was hard-wired that way.

I was looking at the guy and thinking, "We've been doing this wrong. Twenty freaking years, we've been doing this wrong."

So I jumped fully into Jacoby's new concept--the first division top NCO to get on board, and our team did wonderful things. To be fair to the others, I'd had more varied experiences than most, such as having been "accidentally" assigned for a tour as operational intel to a fighter squadron, having worked in the Beltway with CIA and DIA, and having worked in the Strategic Reconnaissance Center. But I had still had to do a bit more mental reconfiguration, when back in the "normal" work environment with a bunch of young troopies.
sometimes common sense can work wonders...ÖÖÖ.
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Old 08-12-2018, 07:38 PM
 
Location: Sierra Vista, AZ
16,115 posts, read 20,067,620 times
Reputation: 8197
Quote:
Originally Posted by SeminoleTom View Post
Iím not overly familiar with how it is determined. But say itís the Iraq war and marines are having to go house by house looking for someone. They are in the frontlines of battle. Iíve heard rumors that every service person is given a test to look at intelligence and other things. If you score low on the test it could put you in the frontlines. If you score high (as in higher IQ) you would probably avoid the frontline and maybe be put in a support or troubleshooting role. Is this accurate? Again I have little experience in this but am looking to see if this is correct.
Thanks
Why would you want to be in the rear, that is where the bombs fall. The Vietnamese called it "hugging the belt" staying so close to the enemy they can't get a shot at you. Why would you want to join the military to hide in the rear, go kill something. Write and tell us how it went
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