Is this an honest assessment of Rousseau?

[pgardner31]

CHAPTER THREE


THE LOGIC OF IT ALL


I will do all my pleasure: ... I have spoken, I will also bring it to pass; I have purposed, I will also do it. (Isaiah 46:10-11)


I. Divine Purpose

Granted the existence and reality of God, let us consider the following extremely relevant question: What would an omniscient, omnipresent, and omnipotent being, knowing, having, and being capable of anything and everything, possibly want? The only possible thing that such a being would want would be an entity, perfectly complementary to Him, that was His of its own choice, and not out of necessity.


II. THE NECESSITY FOR A SECONDARY WILL

Obviously, if there existed only one will (God’s) in the universe, there would be no possible way for such a divine purpose to be realized, as all actions would necessarily be in response to that divine will. Therefore, it is absolutely essential to the attainment of such a divine purpose that there exist in addition to divine will a secondary, opposing will.


III. FREE WILL

It should be equally apparent that, in order for such a complementary entity to choose to belong to God, it must have an independent, free will.


IV. FURTHER STEPS NECESSARY FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF DIVINE PURPOSE

A. Such a being with a free will, in order to practically choose to belong to God, must exist in and be subject to the process of time. A choice made outside of and apart from the process of time would be a one﷓shot thing (pro or con) and would be as much a matter of chance as of choice.
B. Such a being must not only embody a free will, but must also be capable of embodying both the divine will and the opposing will, with the free will located between the two.
C. But God is eternal, necessitating that the part of said being capable of apprehending divine will be of a like eternal nature, necessitating that both the other parts of such a being having the free will and capable of containing the secondary will be temporal. (The specifics of this will be elaborated in the next chapter.) A further and confirmatory reason for the temporality of the part capable of containing the secondary will is, again, the fact that should a being make the wrong choice it would be of eternal consequence if that part of its being capable of containing the secondary will was also eternal. Once again, this would cause matters to be subject as much to chance as choice.
D. It should be somewhat apparent by now that for divine purpose to be achieved on other than a one-shot chance situation, such a temporal being must first choose the secondary will and then by a series of many choices choose the divine will.
E. Yet if such a being chooses the secondary will first, how can it then possibly choose the divine will? Only by God partaking of the temporal nature of such a being by the process of incarnation.
F. There remains but one further step necessary: that of the attainment of E. above being made available to said being. After E. then, God would have to retain the accomplishment of such a temporal incarnation yet make it available to said being in the form necessary for it to be able to choose it, i.e., the same as the eternal part of that being. It should be obvious by now whom the being with a free will that we have been talking about is.

FROM: amessageforthehumanrace

…for God manifested it unto them. For the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity; that they may be without excuse: (Rom. 1:19-20)