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This is the frustrating example fo Aristotle's "two-fold ignorance" . . . when a man is ignorant that he is ignorant. You seemed to be making some progress toward understanding that, Arequipa. Very disappointing. A spark of hope?I see hope that the actual issues are dawning on you, Arequipa. Does this ameliorate or mitigate your arrogant certainty at all?
If there seems any point to respond to your posts I might do that. At the moment, there isn't so it's still finis. However, it isn't miff not admission of defeat and so far, all I have seen does nothing to indicate that the argument I set out is not valid.
I see that it is physical nuts and bolts which I admit but does this metaphysical argument from zombies without consciousness validly imply 'something more'?
I hope that Gaylenwoolf will help me and other in my position to understand the argument. You may take that as a polite response but not a re opening of dialogue. I want to make progress, not watch you go round in circles.
Then you shouldn't like science, since they lie all the time.
In fact, you can take any position you like, and you can find scientific proof that you are correct.
Did God do progress? I should ask. Then the Atheists shall approach religion for the answer of insecurity for progress; honest answers would get frowned upon for they would fail science in a personable value of common wise authority vs. the authority of local community decisions. The dishonest answer now I last hear saves the World from progress.
Incidentally for progressive reasons who agrees with me; progress is alas to be understood as impossible to be achieved in Egypt; and therefore, progress is NOT to be made in the region.
I see that it is physical nuts and bolts which I admit but does this metaphysical argument from zombies without consciousness validly imply 'something more'?
First, keep in mind that the zombie argument is in reference to logical possibility, not natural possibility. It could be a fact about the nature of our world that every physical state of a certain type (i.e., the type found in the brain of a conscious person) is always related to a conscious state. If this is true, then it is naturally impossible for zombies to exist in our world. (And, BTW, I would say that, as a matter of fact, zombies are naturally impossible in our world.)
Now, as for the "something more"…
If a mental state is nothing more than a brain state, and if the atoms composing brains are nothing more than their purely objective properties, then a mental state is nothing more than the collective behaviors of a set of purely objective entities (just as the fluid properties of water are nothing more than the collective behaviors of H2O molecules which, individually, are not fluid). Now, in the case of water, is it logically possible to have "zombie water"? That is to say, is there a logically possible world (W2) such that a large collection of molecules in W2 are atom-for-atom identical to a large collection of room-temperature water molecules in our world (W1), and yet this collection of molecules in W2 is not fluid? I say the answer is no. In order for the molecules in W2 to be atom-for-atom identical to water in W1, the definitions of 'electron', 'proton', 'electromagnetism' and so on would all have to be the same, and this collection of definitions, once the implications are fully drawn out, logically implies that the hydrogen bonds will tend to break and re-form in such a way that macro-scale fluidity will be the result. When the definitions of terms force you to accept certain implications, then it logically impossible for entities with those same definitions to fail to have the same implications. This is just what "logical possibility" means.
Now thinking about these same definitions of these same terms ('electrons', 'protons', etc.) is it logically possible for a conscious-brain-like collection of these entities to fail to be conscious? Here I think the answer has to be yes. Why? Because you can (in principle, according to materialism) give a complete description of atomic activity and draw out all of the logical implications to chemistry, the biology of muscle fibers contracting, etc. such that you get an overall collective behavior that is identical to the behavior of a conscious person telling you what it feels like to see a patch of porno-pink lip gloss. The problem is that, in all of these definitions and in all of the drawing out of logical implications, you never have to mention anything about "what it feels like." According to materialism, the physical explanations of human behavior can, in principle, be given without ever referring to mental states like desires, pains, anxieties, etc. That is just what it means to be a materialist. In other words, materialists paint themselves into this corner whereby they are not logically required to introduce mental terms at any point in a complete description of a physical process, and since they are not logically required to introduce these terms, they lose the option of saying "Yeah, but zombies are logically impossible."Thus, by the very nature of their philosophy, materialists are forced to admit that zombies are logically possible. So their only real option is to somehow argue that the logical possibility of zombies does not imply "something more." And here is where they totally crash and burn.
World's W1 and W2 are, per the argument above, atom-for-atom physically identical, yet in W1 there is something it is like for you to comprehend the words in front of you while you are reading this sentence, while in W2 there is nothing that it is like for your zombie twin to read these same words. Suppose you suddenly have a small itch on your left elbow while reading this sentence. You and your zombie twin both scratch your left elbows, and if asked why you did that, both you and your zombie twin would say "Because my elbow itched." But, according to the zombie argument, your zombie twin did not actually feel anything – he just acts like he did. From a mental point of view, your zombie's mental life is no different than the mental life of a plastic robot programmed to scratch its elbow and say "my elbow itched." Even with today's technology we could easily program a simple "dime-store" robot to scratch its elbow and say "My elbow itched" but I think it would be crazy to say that this toy robot had the actual qualitative experience of an itchy elbow. From a mental point of view, what it is like for the robot is exactly what it is like for your zombie twin – which is to say, "it isn't like anything" because neither has qualitative experience.
Now, W1 and W2 are, per hypothesis, physically identical, but are they truly, really, ultimately identical? I say no. The absence of qualia is metaphysically significant. There is "something more" in W1 that does not exist in W2.
Chalmers believes that this line of argument forces us away from standard materialism, and I agree. He thinks we have to accept property dualism, and here I might somewhat agree, but things get more complicated. Like Chalmers, I think that the qualitative has to be fundamental in some way, but I'm not convinced that dualism is required. Idealists and panpsychists can posit the qualitative as fundamental without admitting dualism. I take an approach similar to theirs, but I allow for the fundamental qualia to be unconscious. This is the point at which Mystic says I become incoherent, and perhaps he is ultimately right, but I'm going to do my best to prove him wrong.
Good. I really do appreciate the education. I must say that my first inclination was to say 'yes, the W2 water molecules could have different properties which did not in fact result in wetness. One could argue they wouldn't be the same (that it is logically impossible is a materialist objection as you say) and I was also inclined to say no, a zombie without consciousness could not scratch his elbow because without consciousness (in any term that is meangiful) he would not know that he wanted to and probably wouldn't even know what an elbow was.
Again, prhaps this is still too nuts and bolts but the sheer idea of chalmer's zombies seems to be based on such a tortured definition of what consciousness is as to be meaningless and the idea of an unconscious zombie doing the things it could only do if it had conscious has me saying ...'Oi..wait a minute..'
If it was postulated that some outside entity was manipulating the zombie, i could understand the point but having the thing scratching its elbow and being able to explain why is so absurd for something having no consciousness that I feel I am either missing the point or someone is pulling a trick.
I must say that s -one accused Chalmers of trickery so presumably there in a valid point. So I'll mull over your post and read up a bit more. Especially on the materialists being painted into a corner since that seems to be the nub of Mystic's point.
"The problem is that, in all of these definitions and in all of the drawing out of logical implications, you never have to mention anything about "what it feels like." According to materialism, the physical explanations of human behavior can, in principle, be given without ever referring to mental states like desires, pains, anxieties, etc. That is just what it means to be a materialist."
But there I can't see why not. If I may risk an analogy it is like arguing for evolution. Yes one can argue about genetic instinct and naturally selected impulses but one never asks what it feels like. In producing a materialist theory (roughly that natural physical processes account for everything) one doesn't see that as very relevant. If the question is asked then I suppose we are in the realms of the biology of emotion and sensation and how it feels while hard to explain (like what does red look like?) it seems to me like asking what does the date august 25th feel like. If the question even has meaning, it is surely all to do with subjective emotions and inherited reactions and learned emotions all of which are comprehensible, if not explainable in terms of biochemistry or, at least there seems no good reason today to assert that they can't be.
So I have to consider this consciousless zombie who acts as though he had conscioussness (I still can't see why or how) and try to see what's being proposed
", they lose the option of saying "Yeah, but zombies are logically impossible."" That seems what I was saying above. That, if consciousness is a requirement of someone who could tell you what it felt like and one postulated a zombie who has not consciousness but is still represented as being able to tell you what it feels like, that is surely a logical impossibility. It would seem to me that the non - materialist has painted himself into a corner. The postulated zombie is apparently a logical contradiction. What am I missing?
There seems this isea that consciousness has some element which the mechanics of materialis evolutioary biology cannot account for and for the life of me I can't see what or why. The arguments for it seem to be based on chimerical postulates or absurdities and I can't entirely put it down to my ignorance as the idea seems such a hard one to get across. Ah, yes, yes, I get it. We can get the zombie or, let's say, a robot to imitate what we do when we feel an itch. But it doesn't actually feel the itch.
The answer is 'why did you scratch your elbow?'
'Because I was programmed to'.
Do what? Scratch its elbow at regular intervals? Ot when it was stimulated to by a sensation in that elbow? If that is not why, then there is no zombie. It is a different thing. It is not a logical imposibility so much as a logical irrelevance. If it has a sensation, I think it is for Chalmers to say why that feeling it has is not consciousness. Eager for your comments.
Last edited by TRANSPONDER; 02-05-2011 at 11:01 AM..
First, keep in mind that the zombie argument is in reference to logical possibility, not natural possibility. It could be a fact about the nature of our world that every physical state of a certain type (i.e., the type found in the brain of a conscious person) is always related to a conscious state. If this is true, then it is naturally impossible for zombies to exist in our world. (And, BTW, I would say that, as a matter of fact, zombies are naturally impossible in our world.)
Now, as for the "something more"…
If a mental state is nothing more than a brain state, and if the atoms composing brains are nothing more than their purely objective properties, then a mental state is nothing more than the collective behaviors of a set of purely objective entities (just as the fluid properties of water are nothing more than the collective behaviors of H2O molecules which, individually, are not fluid). Now, in the case of water, is it logically possible to have "zombie water"? That is to say, is there a logically possible world (W2) such that a large collection of molecules in W2 are atom-for-atom identical to a large collection of room-temperature water molecules in our world (W1), and yet this collection of molecules in W2 is not fluid? I say the answer is no. In order for the molecules in W2 to be atom-for-atom identical to water in W1, the definitions of 'electron', 'proton', 'electromagnetism' and so on would all have to be the same, and this collection of definitions, once the implications are fully drawn out, logically implies that the hydrogen bonds will tend to break and re-form in such a way that macro-scale fluidity will be the result. When the definitions of terms force you to accept certain implications, then it logically impossible for entities with those same definitions to fail to have the same implications. This is just what "logical possibility" means.
Now thinking about these same definitions of these same terms ('electrons', 'protons', etc.) is it logically possible for a conscious-brain-like collection of these entities to fail to be conscious? Here I think the answer has to be yes. Why? Because you can (in principle, according to materialism) give a complete description of atomic activity and draw out all of the logical implications to chemistry, the biology of muscle fibers contracting, etc. such that you get an overall collective behavior that is identical to the behavior of a conscious person telling you what it feels like to see a patch of porno-pink lip gloss. The problem is that, in all of these definitions and in all of the drawing out of logical implications, you never have to mention anything about "what it feels like." According to materialism, the physical explanations of human behavior can, in principle, be given without ever referring to mental states like desires, pains, anxieties, etc. That is just what it means to be a materialist. In other words, materialists paint themselves into this corner whereby they are not logically required to introduce mental terms at any point in a complete description of a physical process, and since they are not logically required to introduce these terms, they lose the option of saying "Yeah, but zombies are logically impossible."Thus, by the very nature of their philosophy, materialists are forced to admit that zombies are logically possible. So their only real option is to somehow argue that the logical possibility of zombies does not imply "something more." And here is where they totally crash and burn.
World's W1 and W2 are, per the argument above, atom-for-atom physically identical, yet in W1 there is something it is like for you to comprehend the words in front of you while you are reading this sentence, while in W2 there is nothing that it is like for your zombie twin to read these same words. Suppose you suddenly have a small itch on your left elbow while reading this sentence. You and your zombie twin both scratch your left elbows, and if asked why you did that, both you and your zombie twin would say "Because my elbow itched." But, according to the zombie argument, your zombie twin did not actually feel anything – he just acts like he did. From a mental point of view, your zombie's mental life is no different than the mental life of a plastic robot programmed to scratch its elbow and say "my elbow itched." Even with today's technology we could easily program a simple "dime-store" robot to scratch its elbow and say "My elbow itched" but I think it would be crazy to say that this toy robot had the actual qualitative experience of an itchy elbow. From a mental point of view, what it is like for the robot is exactly what it is like for your zombie twin – which is to say, "it isn't like anything" because neither has qualitative experience.
Now, W1 and W2 are, per hypothesis, physically identical, but are they truly, really, ultimately identical? I say no. The absence of qualia is metaphysically significant. There is "something more" in W1 that does not exist in W2.
You are doing an excellent job of explaining, GW . . . except for your use of "answering" the question "Why?" about scratching. I understand the need to ask the question to set up the basis for understanding the distinction being made . . . but with concrete thinkers it will only confuse. Absent some external programming (as Arequipa correctly noted in his confusion) . . . the zombie would not be able to answer questions because there is no consciousness to comprehend the question. There is "something that it is like" to comprehend language that the zombie would not have . . . as you noted in the beginning of your paragraph above.
Quote:
Chalmers believes that this line of argument forces us away from standard materialism, and I agree. He thinks we have to accept property dualism, and here I might somewhat agree, but things get more complicated. Like Chalmers, I think that the qualitative has to be fundamental in some way, but I'm not convinced that dualism is required. Idealists and panpsychists can posit the qualitative as fundamental without admitting dualism. I take an approach similar to theirs, but I allow for the fundamental qualia to be unconscious. This is the point at which Mystic says I become incoherent, and perhaps he is ultimately right, but I'm going to do my best to prove him wrong.
You are doing an excellent job of explaining, GW . . . except for your use of "answering" the question "Why?" about scratching. I understand the need to ask the question to set up the basis for understanding the distinction being made . . . but with concrete thinkers it will only confuse. Absent some external programming (as Arequipa correctly noted in his confusion) . . . the zombie would not be able to answer questions because there is no consciousness to comprehend the question. There is "something that it is like" to comprehend language that the zombie would not have . . . as you noted in the beginning of your paragraph above.
Given that the zombie is atom-for-atom identical with you, and these atoms follow the same physical laws as the atoms composing your body, then the zombie's behavior would have to be indistinguishable from yours. So if your answer is "Because it itched" then the zombie answer has to be identical. That is, per definition, required for the zombie. (Here the word "answer" is referring strictly to the objective measurable behavior consisting of lips forming words, etc.)
But (and I think this is what you are getting at) the "ultimate why" that is implicit in the conscious person's answer is different for the conscious person than for the zombie. The reason your lips move to form the verbal expression "Because it itched" can (according to qualia-lovers) be traced back to the qualitative feeling of an itch, whereas the reason for the zombie's lips moving to form the expression "Because it itched" cannot be traced back to any such qualia, becaus no such qualia exist for the zombie. The ultimate reason for the zombie's answer lies purely in a physical chain of events at the atomic level - i.e., the forces of electromagnetism between atomic elements, etc., such that you get a purely mechanical chain of events, without any reference to the qualitative feeling of itching.
So you and your zombie give physically indistinguishable answers to the question, but the underlying metaphysical nature of this answer, or the ultimate reason for the answer, is different.
Given that the zombie is atom-for-atom identical with you, and these atoms follow the same physical laws as the atoms composing your body, then the zombie's behavior would have to be indistinguishable from yours. So if your answer is "Because it itched" then the zombie answer has to be identical. That is, per definition, required for the zombie. (Here the word "answer" is referring strictly to the objective measurable behavior consisting of lips forming words, etc.)
Right and the only way that could possibly be a permissible postulate is if the 'zombie' was just the same as he human. In which case, in what respect is it a zombie? It is no different.
Mystic argued " I understand the need to ask the question to set up the basis for understanding the distinction being made . . . but with concrete thinkers it will only confuse. Absent some external programming (as Arequipa correctly noted in his confusion) . . . the zombie would not be able to answer questions because there is no consciousness to comprehend the question."
Exactly. It could not answer the question because it has not the consciousness to comprehend the question, or, indeed, feel the itch. If it could, it would not be a zombie.
Essentially is the distinction anything valid? I get the impression of a vague indefinable 'difference' (which makes no difference) and which apparently exists only to provide an indefinable and unneccessary entity on which the 'god' -label can be hung. If there is some valid distinction, ...what? (nb. Mystic, that is not an excuse to say: "What? why, God, of course!")
Quote:
But (and I think this is what you are getting at) the "ultimate why" that is implicit in the conscious person's answer is different for the conscious person than for the zombie. The reason your lips move to form the verbal expression "Because it itched" can (according to qualia-lovers) be traced back to the qualitative feeling of an itch, whereas the reason for the zombie's lips moving to form the expression "Because it itched" cannot be traced back to any such qualia, becaus no such qualia exist for the zombie. The ultimate reason for the zombie's answer lies purely in a physical chain of events at the atomic level - i.e., the forces of electromagnetism between atomic elements, etc., such that you get a purely mechanical chain of events, without any reference to the qualitative feeling of itching.
"whereas the reason for the zombie's lips moving to form the expression "Because it itched" cannot be traced back to any such qualia, because no such qualia exist for the zombie."
But what I say is that in such a case, the zombie seems a non - logical entity which lacking this qualia still operates (in a way not explained) as though it did, simply in order to 'engineer' a postulated difference which does not really stand up as a logical posit.
Quote:
So you and your zombie give physically indistinguishable answers to the question, but the underlying metaphysical nature of this answer, or the ultimate reason for the answer, is different.
This difference is apparently qualia, but without the qualia, without the will, the zombie is impossible. The only way it could have the qualia is as part of the consciousness. No consciousness, no qualia. Consciousness, qualia.
But this is only for a simulcrum of a human or indeed, any animal. Given the argument about emergence (which seems clear and valid to me) it is not valid to insist that primordial consciousness needs any more than a primordial qualia. Nothing that we need regard with any more awe than we give to an interstellar gas - cloud.
Mystic is pleased to pin regular 'confused' label in me but you judge. Am I confused or seeing through the confusion?
Last edited by TRANSPONDER; 02-06-2011 at 12:10 PM..
But God did it: that is the ring of Fire around the pacific. The latest theory is that the moon didn't get heaved out of the Pacific.
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That was enjoyable for the panoramic review.
I wonder if I should start unzipping the panoramic software on my computer.
