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What if we assume, as do most philosophers today, that belief assessment in the face of religious diversity will not normally resolve debate over conflicting religious perspectives in an objective manner? That is, what if we assume that while the consideration of criteria such as self-consistency and comprehensiveness can rule out certain options, there exists no set of criteria that will allow us to resolve most religious epistemic disputes (either between or within religious perspectives) in a neutral, nonquestion-begging fashion (Peterson et al. 2003, 40–53)? In what epistemic position does this then place the exclusivist? Or to use the phrasing preferred in the current “epistemology of disagreement” debates, to what extent, if any, is it reasonable for an exclusivist to retain her exclusivistic beliefs when it is acknowledged that epistemic peers disagree?
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The answer, as some see it, is that the exclusivist can no longer justifiably maintain that her exclusivistic beliefs are true. J.C. Schellenberg, for example, argues that because no more than one among a set of incompatible truth claims can be true, a disputant in a debate over such claims is justified in continuing to maintain that her claim is true only if she possesses nonquestion-begging justification for believing the incompatible claim of any competitor to be false. However, since no disputant in religious conflicts possesses such justification, no disputant can be justified “in holding her own claim to be true.” Or, as Schellenberg states this conclusion in another context, we must conclude that in the absence of objective, nonquestion-begging justification, none of the disputants in religious conflicts “has justification for supposing the others' claims false” (Schellenberg 2000, 213). David Silver comes to a similar conclusion: “[Exclusivists] should provide independent evidence for the claim that they have a special source of religious knowledge … or they should relinquish their exclusivist religious beliefs” (Silver 2001, 11).
The proper response for the exclusivist, most in this camp argue, is to suspend judgment — is for the person who was an exclusivist to abandon her exclusivistic position and give equal weight to all the self-consistent, comprehensive perspectives in play (Christiansen, 2009; Feldman, 2007).
Others have not gone this far, arguing rather that while the exclusivist need not abandon religious belief in the face of unresolved conflict, she must or at least will hold her exclusive religious beliefs more tentatively (with less confidence). Philip Quinn argues, for instance, that acknowledged epistemic parity necessarily has a negative (epistemically humbling) impact on the level of justification for any religious belief system. Such parity does not necessarily minimize justification below a level sufficient for rational acceptability. But for those proponents of a religion who are “sufficiently aware of religious diversity, the justification that the [religion] receives from its sources is a good deal less than would be the case were there no such diversity” (Quinn, 2005a, 137). James Kraft agrees. When a person acknowledges that those with whom she disagrees are equivalently informed and capable and have made no obvious mistakes in reasoning, this person's confidence in her perspective, we are told, is rightly reduced (Kraft, 2007).
Do you agree that "there exists no set of criteria that will allow us to resolve most religious epistemic disputes (either between or within religious perspectives) in a neutral, nonquestion-begging fashion"?
If yes, do you agree that it is therefore logical and responsible to suspend judgment or, at the very least, be more tentative in your beliefs?
Do you agree that "there exists no set of criteria that will allow us to resolve most religious epistemic disputes (either between or within religious perspectives) in a neutral, nonquestion-begging fashion"?
If yes, do you agree that it is therefore logical and responsible to suspend judgment or, at the very least, be more tentative in your beliefs?
If no, what is this criteria?
On about the second line down there is the money word "normally". Yes--if all parties are set in their religion and are unwilling to consider the truthfulness, we have no real reason to discuss it further. This would include world-views like atheism, in my opinion. Many times that isn't the case. I was raised Roman Catholic. I left the RC church as a teenager and received Christ in my early 20's. I thank God that a friend of mine that shared the Gospel with me decided it was worth trying.
The criteria, I would suggest, is logic and evidence as applied to anything to which logic and evidence can be applied.
If religious claims are based on anything fixed - such as what is in the Bible or what history or archeology says, then that can be assessed and, if it does not stand up to scrutiny, then it has to be regarded as invalidated.
Of course, it is never going to be 100% proven as all sorts of possibilities or excuses can be thought up, but, if there is no support for them, they really don't count. At least as regards investing degrees of credibility.
Logic is a much abused term. Be that as it may, I would much prefer focus on those who ascribe to one of the Abrahamic religions. With no intent to insult, I am not really interested in your views on the matter.
Last edited by Jayhawker Soule; 09-20-2012 at 07:10 PM..
If yes, do you agree that it is therefore logical and responsible to suspend judgment or, at the very least, be more tentative in your beliefs?
I agree. People never, ever hear me say, "I know that what I believe is right and what you believe is wrong." While I concede that it would be pretty hard for someone to argue convincingly enough against my beliefs that I would be inclined to be influenced by hit input, I would be the first to admit that there is a very definitely possiblity that my beliefs are flawed. Fortunately, I don't believe that anyone's ultimate fate depends upon what he chooses to believe during this relatively short mortal sojourn. I tend to believe that how he behaves will have a much more significant impact on his future in the next life. That includes being willing to acknowledge that the other guy might be right in his beliefs and you might be wrong. The problem with most deeply religious people is that it is more important to them to be right than it is to know the truth. For instance, so many people simply cannot admit that there's more than one way to interpret a given passage of scripture. As far as I'm concerned, there is such a thing as absolute truth, but we don't absolutely need to find it in order to avoid eternal punishment. If it were essential that the "truth" be known, there wouldn't even be so many different possible choices. God certainly is capable of enabling us to get all of the answers on the test 100% correct, if that's what He wanted. Maybe He's just more interested in how we handle the learning process.
From The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophyo you agree that "there exists no set of criteria that will allow us to resolve most religious epistemic disputes (either between or within religious perspectives) in a neutral, nonquestion-begging fashion"?
If yes, do you agree that it is therefore logical and responsible to suspend judgment or, at the very least, be more tentative in your beliefs?
If no, what is this criteria?
Agnosticism is unsatisfying to most people, but it is currently the only truly fair perspective in a imperfect world where we lack key perspectives on the Multiverse and our place in it.
But humans are not rational and logical... they are driven by emotion. It is therefore irrational to expect irrational beings to act in a logical and nonjudgmental manor... and stuff.
The criteria, I would suggest, is logic and evidence as applied to anything to which logic and evidence can be applied.
If religious claims are based on anything fixed - such as what is in the Bible or what history or archeology says, then that can be assessed and, if it does not stand up to scrutiny, then it has to be regarded as invalidated.
Of course, it is never going to be 100% proven as all sorts of possibilities or excuses can be thought up, but, if there is no support for them, they really don't count. At least as regards investing degrees of credibility.
Maybe He's just more interested in how we handle the learning process.
I love that! Be well, my friend ...
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o you agree that "there exists no set of criteria that will allow us to resolve most religious epistemic disputes (either between or within religious perspectives) in a neutral, nonquestion-begging fashion"? 
