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Forgive me if I am wrong but what I feel you are alluding to here is that your god won't interfere with our free will. So, let me ask you this....what if one of us used this free will defence to justify his failure to intervene to prevent a crime from being committed? Here's the scenario:
I am walking down the street and I witness a young child about to be brutally sexually assaulted. I am in a position to prevent this crime from happening but instead of doing so I think it best that I protect the free-will of the attacker by allowing him to carry out his plan.
In the above scenario, would I be judged to have made a moral error?
Why, if this argument would be unacceptable coming from a human being, should we think it any more acceptable coming from an omni-benevolent god?
.....but Hutch!.....who else should we blame? Theists claim that their god is in control of everything. Well, the problem with being in control of EVERYTHING is that it tends to make you responsible for EVERYTHING.
I think you state your case well, Che. I would say three things as part of the Christian response:
(1) There is no logical contradiction between our free will and God's omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence. Unless a contradiction can be shown here--and pointing to evil and suffering in the world does not show such a contradiction--then this remains the cornerstone of the response to the problem of evil and suffering.
(2) And it's consistent with 1 to say that the fact that there is evil in the world does not mean God is the author of evil. Our free will accounts for much of it. In other words, it's possible that God created a world with free agents who choose evil.
(3) There is undeniably evil and suffering in the world, and while an initial reaction would be to ask "why doesn't God stop it?" it still does not necessarily lead us to say that he can't, or he doesn't want to. The missing premise in this reasoning is that God could not possibly have a reason for allowing evil and suffering. The Christian response is that it is possible that there is a reason, but we often don't know it. For the argument against theism to work, you would need to show that this is not possible. (But this seems to come back to trying to show that there is a contradiction between our freedom and God's omni-qualities--and I don't think this can be done).
(1) There is no logical contradiction between our free will and God's omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence.
Good day to you young fella, mi' lad!
I disagree and have put my case for believing that there is a contradiction which, in summary is- if god is all knowing then he knows all that has, is and can happen.... therefore it cannot be changed by our free-will, otherwise it would change into something he did not know about...
So unless someone else joins us and contributes to the discussion, we shall just have to agree to disagree.
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(2) And it's consistent with 1 to say that the fact that there is evil in the world does not mean God is the author of evil.
....but the Christian bible confirms that he is.
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In other words, it's possible that God created a world with free agents who choose evil.
(emphasis added) Then it must also follow that it is possible that he didn't.
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(3) There is undeniably evil and suffering in the world, and while an initial reaction would be to ask "why doesn't God stop it?" it still does not necessarily lead us to say that he can't, or he doesn't want to.
I honestly see no other conclusion my friend! As Epicurus said:
"Either God wants to abolish evil and cannot,
or he can but does not want to,
or he cannot and does not want to,
or lastly he can and wants to.
If he wants to remove evil, and cannot, he is not omnipotent;
If he can, but does not want to, he is not benevolent;
If he neither can nor wants to, he is neither omnipotent nor benevolent;
But if God can abolish evil and wants to, how does evil exists?"
IMO, an omnipotent and omni benevolent god is ruled out by the existence of evil.
I disagree and have put my case for believing that there is a contradiction which, in summary is- if god is all knowing then he knows all that has, is and can happen.... therefore it cannot be changed by our free-will, otherwise it would change into something he did not know about...
So unless someone else joins us and contributes to the discussion, we shall just have to agree to disagree.
....but the Christian bible confirms that he is.
(emphasis added) Then it must also follow that it is possible that he didn't.
I honestly see no other conclusion my friend! As Epicurus said:
"Either God wants to abolish evil and cannot,
or he can but does not want to,
or he cannot and does not want to,
or lastly he can and wants to.
If he wants to remove evil, and cannot, he is not omnipotent;
If he can, but does not want to, he is not benevolent;
If he neither can nor wants to, he is neither omnipotent nor benevolent;
But if God can abolish evil and wants to, how does evil exists?"
IMO, an omnipotent and omni benevolent god is ruled out by the existence of evil.
To answer your last question first: according to the Christian tradition, evil will be abolished. So the question really is this: why is there evil at all? And there are two general answers given: we are the cause of evil, not God, and there is a reason why God allows evil in the world. The Christian only needs this to be a possibility in order to answer the argument. So it then falls back upon the one giving the problem of evil argument to show that this is not possible (that it's not possible for God to have a reason to allow evil in the world for a time).
Second, you mention that the Bible confirms that God is the author of evil. The verse you have in mind must be taken in the context of the Bible as a whole--if you don't do this, then you're making a straw man argument. And there are perhaps a number of ways in which that verse can be understood. (But this is besides the point for the current argument, I think.)
Last, you sum up your argument like this: "if god is all knowing then he knows all that has, is and can happen.... therefore it cannot be changed by our free-will, otherwise it would change into something he did not know about... "
I don't think you appreciate the force of my objection yet. Let me try to clarify what I'm getting at (I'm not getting frustrated or anything, I'm enjoying the exchange--so I hope you are too. These are complicated issues).
The point of God's omniscience in this argument really has nothing to do with omniscience as such, since the real issue as to do with the content of an omnscient mind--namely, the maximum set of all true propositions. So your argument reduces to the claim that if it is true today that I will eat an apple tomorrow, then I don't freely eat the apple tomorrow. It really doesn't change the argument in the slightest by adding "and God, because he is omniscient, knows that this is true."
So it looks like you're assuming that free will entails the ability to change the truth of a proposition. This is what your idea of free will then seems to be: If I am free, then I should be able to eat a banana tomorrow instead of an apple, even if it was true yesterday that I will eat the apple today. To me, that sounds like an unreasonable restriction on what counts as "free will."
I think it can be helpful to keep clear on the distinction between terms like "actual" and "possible." There is what I actually do, and there is what it is possible for me to do. There is what I will do, and there is what I could have done.
So, with these distinctions in mind, maybe it's easier to see how it might be true (and God knows it to be true) that I will actually eat the apple. But at the same time it would still have been possible for me to do something else. Again: it might be true that I will eat the apple, but it can equally be true that I could have done something else. That's the difference between possibility and actuality.
So, I don't think your argument changes things with respect to free will, since much more needs to be shown. Define a free action in the following way:
X is a free action only if X is not determined by any prior causes or antecedent conditions.
Or we could define free will like this:
An agent's will is free with respect to an action X if and only if X is possibly a free action and it is possible for the agent to do some other action Y, which is also possibly a free action.
In either case, the truth of what you actually do in a situation has no bearing on whether the will is free. For your argument to work, you need to show that the definition of free will is inconsistent with the prior truth about a "supposedly" free action. But I really don't know how that can be done.
To answer your last question first: according to the Christian tradition, evil will be abolished. So the question really is this: why is there evil at all? And there are two general answers given: we are the cause of evil, not God, and there is a reason why God allows evil in the world. The Christian only needs this to be a possibility in order to answer the argument. So it then falls back upon the one giving the problem of evil argument to show that this is not possible (that it's not possible for God to have a reason to allow evil in the world for a time).
Second, you mention that the Bible confirms that God is the author of evil. The verse you have in mind must be taken in the context of the Bible as a whole--if you don't do this, then you're making a straw man argument. And there are perhaps a number of ways in which that verse can be understood. (But this is besides the point for the current argument, I think.)
Last, you sum up your argument like this: "if god is all knowing then he knows all that has, is and can happen.... therefore it cannot be changed by our free-will, otherwise it would change into something he did not know about... "
I don't think you appreciate the force of my objection yet. Let me try to clarify what I'm getting at (I'm not getting frustrated or anything, I'm enjoying the exchange--so I hope you are too. These are complicated issues).
The point of God's omniscience in this argument really has nothing to do with omniscience as such, since the real issue as to do with the content of an omnscient mind--namely, the maximum set of all true propositions. So your argument reduces to the claim that if it is true today that I will eat an apple tomorrow, then I don't freely eat the apple tomorrow. It really doesn't change the argument in the slightest by adding "and God, because he is omniscient, knows that this is true."
So it looks like you're assuming that free will entails the ability to change the truth of a proposition. This is what your idea of free will then seems to be: If I am free, then I should be able to eat a banana tomorrow instead of an apple, even if it was true yesterday that I will eat the apple today. To me, that sounds like an unreasonable restriction on what counts as "free will."
I think it can be helpful to keep clear on the distinction between terms like "actual" and "possible." There is what I actually do, and there is what it is possible for me to do. There is what I will do, and there is what I could have done.
So, with these distinctions in mind, maybe it's easier to see how it might be true (and God knows it to be true) that I will actually eat the apple. But at the same time it would still have been possible for me to do something else. Again: it might be true that I will eat the apple, but it can equally be true that I could have done something else. That's the difference between possibility and actuality.
So, I don't think your argument changes things with respect to free will, since much more needs to be shown. Define a free action in the following way:
X is a free action only if X is not determined by any prior causes or antecedent conditions.
Or we could define free will like this:
An agent's will is free with respect to an action X if and only if X is possibly a free action and it is possible for the agent to do some other action Y, which is also possibly a free action.
In either case, the truth of what you actually do in a situation has no bearing on whether the will is free. For your argument to work, you need to show that the definition of free will is inconsistent with the prior truth about a "supposedly" free action. But I really don't know how that can be done.
Does seem to support the Atheists point that one is only free if you do not believe in God, and if you do not believe in God, God does not exist.
Believers are straddled with a self imposed dual personality one part caustically ruling the other part.
I finally made it up to NYC this past weekend. My wife and I went to the World Trade Centers. My first thought upon seeing Ground Zero was subtle amazement.
My first thought walking into the memorial building brought it into perspective for me. On one wall are photocopies of the actual missing posters of many of the people.
On another wall, behind a glass case, are pictures of the people that died. Well, about half of them. It was then that I realized, looking into all those bright shining faces who had so much taken away from them that God must certainly not exist.
I can understand perhaps the difference in good and evil in a childish concept of mischief vs. good. But, is it so necessary to take away almost 3000 people in one fell swoop? Is it entirely necessary to allow things like that to occur? Was it necessary for each one of those families to experience the tragedies that they did? All for what? What was God's purpose for that?
Was it to get people closer to him? Was it to allow people to see him better? To ask him questions? To allow people to commit atrocities like that in HIS name? No, I say. No!
There is no such thing as God. Something like that was not necessary. Sometimes you don't realize the true tragedy until you can experience it in some small way. If there is a God, than I want no part of him for he is as wicked as the men who flew those airplanes into the building for allowing it to happen.
The will of God may not always be the same as man's will. Remember the 6 million Jews that perished in concentration camps in WWII? And going back to Biblical times, when the nation of Israel was enslaved by the Egyptian pharohs, many of whom also died as a result of the persecution. Jesus died on the cross 2000 years ago, was that God's will? Yes it was and Jesus knew it, yet we all know that God's will may not always be the most comfortable for us, but we have to be obedient to his will, no matter where he leads us.
Were the September 11th attacks God's will? Probably not, remember, there were the forces of evil that led to what happened on that Tuesday over 6 years ago. We also have to remember that God reminded us HE is with us and helped strengthen us through the times of tribulation. Yes, about 2700 people were killed at the WTC, but we have to still believe that God is God no matter what trials and tribulations we face in life and to believe that God doesn't exist would be nothing short of blasphemous.
Last edited by Magnum Mike; 11-14-2007 at 03:23 PM..
To answer your last question first: according to the Christian tradition, evil will be abolished. So the question really is this: why is there evil at all? And there are two general answers given: we are the cause of evil, not God, and there is a reason why God allows evil in the world. The Christian only needs this to be a possibility in order to answer the argument. So it then falls back upon the one giving the problem of evil argument to show that this is not possible (that it's not possible for God to have a reason to allow evil in the world for a time).
I feel I have already given sufficient explanation as to why the existence of evil is contrary to an omni-benevolent god. Now if you are going to argue about "possibilities" then yes, you could argue that 'anything' is possible. It's "possible" that your god has his reasons for allowing evil to exist but it's also "possible" that evil exists because your god is not what the bible says he is. I don't think we should be discussing "possibilities" as we'll just keep going around in circles (not that we aren't already doing that).
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Second, you mention that the Bible confirms that God is the author of evil. The verse you have in mind must be taken in the context of the Bible as a whole--if you don't do this, then you're making a straw man argument. And there are perhaps a number of ways in which that verse can be understood.
You mean it depends on one's personal interpretation of how one can make it say whatever one wants it to say!
Quote:
The point of God's omniscience in this argument really has nothing to do with omniscience as such, since the real issue as to do with the content of an omnscient mind--namely, the maximum set of all true propositions. So your argument reduces to the claim that if it is true today that I will eat an apple tomorrow, then I don't freely eat the apple tomorrow. It really doesn't change the argument in the slightest by adding "and God, because he is omniscient, knows that this is true."
So it looks like you're assuming that free will entails the ability to change the truth of a proposition. This is what your idea of free will then seems to be: If I am free, then I should be able to eat a banana tomorrow instead of an apple, even if it was true yesterday that I will eat the apple today. To me, that sounds like an unreasonable restriction on what counts as "free will."
I think it can be helpful to keep clear on the distinction between terms like "actual" and "possible." There is what I actually do, and there is what it is possible for me to do. There is what I will do, and there is what I could have done.
So, with these distinctions in mind, maybe it's easier to see how it might be true (and God knows it to be true) that I will actually eat the apple. But at the same time it would still have been possible for me to do something else. Again: it might be true that I will eat the apple, but it can equally be true that I could have done something else. That's the difference between possibility and actuality.
So, I don't think your argument changes things with respect to free will, since much more needs to be shown. Define a free action in the following way:
X is a free action only if X is not determined by any prior causes or antecedent conditions.
Or we could define free will like this:
An agent's will is free with respect to an action X if and only if X is possibly a free action and it is possible for the agent to do some other action Y, which is also possibly a free action.
In either case, the truth of what you actually do in a situation has no bearing on whether the will is free. For your argument to work, you need to show that the definition of free will is inconsistent with the prior truth about a "supposedly" free action. But I really don't know how that can be done.
You really are making it much more complicated than it actually is my friend!
1. The Christian god omniscient?
2. This mean that he knows every decision you will make from the day you are born until the day you die?
3. Are you able to make any decision that will render gods knowledge of what you are going to do, wrong?
If you answer yes to 3 then the Christian god is not omniscient.
If you answer no to question 3 then you do not have free will to do as you please.
It really is as simple as that AT. No complicated mathematical formula concerning XYZ is necessary.
The will of God may not always be the same as man's will. Remember the 6 million Jews that perished in concentration camps in WWII? And going back to Biblical times, when the nation of Israel was enslaved by the Egyptian pharohs, many of whom also died as a result of the persecution. Jesus died on the cross 2000 years ago, was that God's will? Yes it was and Jesus knew it, yet we all know that God's will may not always be the most comfortable for us, but we have to be obedient to his will, no matter where he leads us.
Were the September 11th attacks God's will? Probably not, remember, there were the forces of evil that led to what happened on that Tuesday over 6 years ago. We also have to remember that God reminded us HE is with us and helped strengthen us through the times of tribulation. Yes, about 2700 people were killed at the WTC, but we have to still believe that God is God no matter what trials and tribulations we face in life and to believe that God doesn't exist would be nothing short of blasphemous.
But that is the point, for an Atheist to deny the existence of God is not blasphemy. We do not have a dual perspective, a controlling part and a controlled part. Each religion has the audacity to consider itself supreme and therein is the lie.
I feel I have already given sufficient explanation as to why the existence of evil is contrary to an omni-benevolent god. Now if you are going to argue about "possibilities" then yes, you could argue that 'anything' is possible. It's "possible" that your god has his reasons for allowing evil to exist but it's also "possible" that evil exists because your god is not what the bible says he is. I don't think we should be discussing "possibilities" as we'll just keep going around in circles (not that we aren't already doing that).
You mean it depends on one's personal interpretation of how one can make it say whatever one wants it to say!
You really are making it much more complicated than it actually is my friend!
1. The Christian god omniscient?
2. This mean that he knows every decision you will make from the day you are born until the day you die?
3. Are you able to make any decision that will render gods knowledge of what you are going to do, wrong?
If you answer yes to 3 then the Christian god is not omniscient.
If you answer no to question 3 then you do not have free will to do as you please.
It really is as simple as that AT. No complicated mathematical formula concerning XYZ is necessary.
Hi Che,
Unfortunately, if you want to really get into the philosophical issues surrounding freedom and omniscience, there is hardly any way to avoid talking about possibility. If you look at current literature on the subject, it's covered with modal logic, which is (basically) the logic of possibility and necessity (modal operators). And this is where the logical analysis leads us. Modal logic is a great tool for helping to clarify our premises, and what's actually being argued. So you shouldn't feel that we "shouldn't be discussing possibilities" or that it just complicates things. This is philosophy, after all, and things are complicated. But it would be nice to have simple, irrefutable arguments, wouldn't it?
Having said that, I can sincerely appreciate your reaction, if this is the first time you've been confronted with modal logic (my head hurt for a week!). So I just hope you give my above response a little more thought. It's not as crazy as it first might seem.
If there is a God, GCSTroop, I'm there with you... there is no way I will accept a God who can allow things like 9-11 and the holocaust to happen... and especially if he will not accept good people into his so called "heaven". If good people don't believe in God then they're not accepted... I know plenty of amazing non-Christians and they don't deserve to go to the hell that Christians believe in.
If there is a God, GCSTroop, I'm there with you... there is no way I will accept a God who can allow things like 9-11 and the holocaust to happen... and especially if he will not accept good people into his so called "heaven". If good people don't believe in God then they're not accepted... I know plenty of amazing non-Christians and they don't deserve to go to the hell that Christians believe in.
Staceface makes me think of another way of looking at this issue, which has sort of nagged me on and off for years. Stace says "If there is a God...there is no way I will accept a God who can allow things like 9-11..." But if there is a God, truly, then you (me anyone) would not really want to say "no way am I accepting that God" especially if God doesn't care about our suffering so much. The opposite would be more prudent: we ought to care more about a God who dishes out pain and suffering, like the Ancients did, sacrificing to gods in order to have safe pasage or what-not. Think of the Norse gods and the Vikings; savagery was no reason at all to not believe in the existence of a god. Instead it gave great reason to try and not tick off the gods, and instead to please them.
It's obvious that the argument from evil (and suffering) to the non-existence of God is a best an argument against a god that has all the omni-properties--the God traditionally thought of in Christianity. The conclusion, then, is that maybe the tradition has details wrong in some way, or maybe we don't understand some important pieces, like the nature of love, or the essence of the good, or evil. But it doesn't necessitate a complete denial of gods--look at all the savage conceptions of the gods in history, even Jewish history, where God was presented as much more savage than modern day thought. So the furthest the argument from evil can take us, I think, is to a disjunction: either God is willing or able to do something about evil, or we don't clearly understand the ways of God, and what 'evil' and 'good' mean. But that's all we get. I think.
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