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I can hear this "Less us assume that there is an exact atom for atom replica of me but has no feelings." I say @No, let's not, because it sounds like an impossible thing done to prove a point. If you have to do that, what is the value of the point being made?
Since the logic of experience is central to debates over consciousness, I want to keep pressing this point because it seems to me you are missing the core idea. First a couple of key terms:
Logical possibility: Something is logically possible if it is not inherently self-contradictory, given the definitions of the terms being used. Given the meanings of the terms "3" and "5" the statement "3=3" is a logical certainty, and the statement "3=5" is a logical contradiction. We can use terms like "certainty" and "proof" when talking about logical possibilities (and impossibilities) because all we need are the precise definitions of terms. I don't need to grab a bucket of rocks and start doing experiments to see whether or not 3=5. All I need are definitions of the terms and an ability to do some logical analysis. The relationships between 3 and 5 are necessary, NOT contingent.
Contingent basically means not necessary. Suppose that, as a matter of fact, all swans are white. Is it therefore a necessary truth that all swans are white? No. In order to be sure that all swans are white, we would have to look at every swan in existence. And even once we confirmed that, in fact, all swans are white, we still couldn't be certain that, tomorrow, a black swan won't be born. This is because the relationship between color and swanhood is logically contingent, not logically necessary. Nothing in the definition of swan necessarily implies that swans absolutely have to be white. (BTW: Of course, if we stipulated 'white' in the definition of 'swan' then things would be different. If something looked like a swan, but it was not white, then it would - by definition - not be a swan.)
Natural possibility: Something is naturally possible if it is allowed by the laws of physics. Even if, as a matter of fact, there are no black swans anywhere in the universe, there is nothing inherent to the meaning of 'swan' that would make a black swan impossible. To discover what is or is not naturally possible, we can't just sit there and think about the definitions of terms. We need to do experiments to find out if this or that logical possibility is also a natural possibility (or impossibility). Prior to QM, we did not know if it was naturally possible for an atom to have 7 electrons in its lowest energy shell. In a manner of speaking, of course, once we discover the laws of nature and apply them to the definitions, then we could say that "in a sense" it is logically impossible for an atom to have 7 electrons in its lowest energy shell, but the "in a sense" is keenly important because it depends on the definitions that were applied based on the empirical evidence we've gathered, and all empirical evidence is logically contingent. If, after carefully observing every swan in existence we codify a natural law saying "All swans are white" then some people might be tempted to use this as a basis for saying it is logically necessary that all swans are white, but this is a dangerous use of the concept of logical possibility. It is like building a castle on a sandy seafront. Scientists basically never propose such laws and, if they did, then almost certainly a bunch of philosophers of science would cry foul. (Deeply buried pun, definitely intended.)
There is nothing inherent in the laws of physics to prevent the possibility of zombies. We have lots of super-excellent reasons for thinking that physics should be able to rule out this possibility, but it currently can't. Why not? Because if you carefully study every term of physics, e.g., electron, quark, gravity, etc., you will find no fundamental definitional references to the subjectively felt qualitative nature of experiences. Obviously the journal articles are filled with experiential references - "We measured this" and "We found that" - and presumably they were all have conscious experiences when they were doing all of this stuff - maybe, for example, the redness of a certain flash of light indicated something about the structure of a certain atom, but the "redness" in this case boils down to a wavelength of radiation - not the subjective experience of red, as such. Mary, the colorblind neuroscientist could perfectly understand what the physicists are saying about the red light, without ever herself personally experiencing red. This is because the subjective feeling of red is not, itself, implicit in the definitions of anything in physics. Physics is "qualia-blind" in a deep way, even if no one could do physics of any sort without experiencing qualia.
Nevertheless, I (and virtually all other philosophers) feel fairly comfortable saying that zombies are, almost certainly, a natural impossibility and I'm fairly confident that, someday, physics will give us insight into why it is a natural impossibility. But, to get there, at least one paradigm shift will be needed.
.... I have always held reincarnation suspect but have not completely ruled it out....
earlier in this thread you said you resist the idea of reincarnation, but did not elaborate why.
on another thread you state this:
Quote:
Originally Posted by MysticPhD
If I thought that I would have to endure another physical life on earth after my death, I would be in an irredeemablefunk and depression that would have no end. It is a monstrous idea. God forbid.
is that why you find reincarnation problematic?
it sounds like the words of someone who is really miserable, who hates life a lot.
what do you find so "depressing and monstrous" about being alive and being human?
Last edited by Tzaphkiel; 04-05-2018 at 05:32 PM..
....
is that why you find reincarnation problematic?
it sounds like the words of someone who is really miserable, who hates life a lot. what do you find so "depressing and monstrous" about being alive and being human?
and since you were a die-hard atheist for many decades, did you feel that way then also?
how (or if) has that feeling ("depressing and monstrous") changed, developed, been affected at all (or not) in relation to being an atheist or after your "meeting with the Divine" ?
It's just such a startling despairing anguished stance.
Last edited by Tzaphkiel; 04-05-2018 at 10:24 PM..
Since the logic of experience is central to debates over consciousness, I want to keep pressing this point because it seems to me you are missing the core idea. First a couple of key terms:
Logical possibility: Something is logically possible if it is not inherently self-contradictory, given the definitions of the terms being used. Given the meanings of the terms "3" and "5" the statement "3=3" is a logical certainty, and the statement "3=5" is a logical contradiction. We can use terms like "certainty" and "proof" when talking about logical possibilities (and impossibilities) because all we need are the precise definitions of terms. I don't need to grab a bucket of rocks and start doing experiments to see whether or not 3=5. All I need are definitions of the terms and an ability to do some logical analysis. The relationships between 3 and 5 are necessary, NOT contingent.
Contingent basically means not necessary. Suppose that, as a matter of fact, all swans are white. Is it therefore a necessary truth that all swans are white? No. In order to be sure that all swans are white, we would have to look at every swan in existence. And even once we confirmed that, in fact, all swans are white, we still couldn't be certain that, tomorrow, a black swan won't be born. This is because the relationship between color and swanhood is logically contingent, not logically necessary. Nothing in the definition of swan necessarily implies that swans absolutely have to be white. (BTW: Of course, if we stipulated 'white' in the definition of 'swan' then things would be different. If something looked like a swan, but it was not white, then it would - by definition - not be a swan.)
Natural possibility: Something is naturally possible if it is allowed by the laws of physics. Even if, as a matter of fact, there are no black swans anywhere in the universe, there is nothing inherent to the meaning of 'swan' that would make a black swan impossible. To discover what is or is not naturally possible, we can't just sit there and think about the definitions of terms. We need to do experiments to find out if this or that logical possibility is also a natural possibility (or impossibility). Prior to QM, we did not know if it was naturally possible for an atom to have 7 electrons in its lowest energy shell. In a manner of speaking, of course, once we discover the laws of nature and apply them to the definitions, then we could say that "in a sense" it is logically impossible for an atom to have 7 electrons in its lowest energy shell, but the "in a sense" is keenly important because it depends on the definitions that were applied based on the empirical evidence we've gathered, and all empirical evidence is logically contingent. If, after carefully observing every swan in existence we codify a natural law saying "All swans are white" then some people might be tempted to use this as a basis for saying it is logically necessary that all swans are white, but this is a dangerous use of the concept of logical possibility. It is like building a castle on a sandy seafront. Scientists basically never propose such laws and, if they did, then almost certainly a bunch of philosophers of science would cry foul. (Deeply buried pun, definitely intended.)
There is nothing inherent in the laws of physics to prevent the possibility of zombies. We have lots of super-excellent reasons for thinking that physics should be able to rule out this possibility, but it currently can't. Why not? Because if you carefully study every term of physics, e.g., electron, quark, gravity, etc., you will find no fundamental definitional references to the subjectively felt qualitative nature of experiences. Obviously the journal articles are filled with experiential references - "We measured this" and "We found that" - and presumably they were all have conscious experiences when they were doing all of this stuff - maybe, for example, the redness of a certain flash of light indicated something about the structure of a certain atom, but the "redness" in this case boils down to a wavelength of radiation - not the subjective experience of red, as such. Mary, the colorblind neuroscientist could perfectly understand what the physicists are saying about the red light, without ever herself personally experiencing red. This is because the subjective feeling of red is not, itself, implicit in the definitions of anything in physics. Physics is "qualia-blind" in a deep way, even if no one could do physics of any sort without experiencing qualia.
Nevertheless, I (and virtually all other philosophers) feel fairly comfortable saying that zombies are, almost certainly, a natural impossibility and I'm fairly confident that, someday, physics will give us insight into why it is a natural impossibility. But, to get there, at least one paradigm shift will be needed.
The All swans are white argument seems irrelevant to me. Let us suppose that all the swans we know of are white. This means that we are justified in saying that the existence of black swans is not validated (until they are proven) and claims that they exist are invalid even if somebody dreamed about them.
But they cannot be ruled out on any practical terms. Nor indeed a strain of swans without wings, though of course vestigial wings would be expected. But to say that there could be a strain of swans which showed no trace of ever having had wings either in vestigial bones, embryonic formation or even DNA, that would be in fact impossible, in evolutionary terms.
"Never mind. Let's assume that there is a sub - species of swans that never ever had wings or any genetic marker for it..."
"In order to prove that evolution is false? Oh no, you don't get away with an invalid mind experiment to prove some idea you have on Faith, it appears."
Do you see why I say that a mind experiment of Zombies that are an exact atom perfect replica of you or me but through some unexplained mechanism have no feelings, is suspect?. How could they not? Why should we take seriously a mind experiment with what I would say IS a logically impossible postulate as much as a swan with no evolutionary trace of wings?
In fact you might manufacture a swan without evolutionary sign of wings (I remember that my argument of no legs or head was dismissed by as logically impossible bur without feelings despite having all the bits for it was claimed by you as Not logically impossible) but I cannot imagine a human simalcrum with an exact nervous system but has no feelings or (as I suspect you mean) experience of the input like of colour, taste or pain.
Pain I am sure you will realise is not the input but the reaction to the input, which of course is itself input to the brain that something painful is happening and you should snatch your hand away. But that's a detail.
Now you may say 'but the exact simalcrum of the human must be without feelings 'in order that it be called a zombie'. So one might say 'but that swan has to be without any evolutionary trace of wings to be called 'the swan that debunks evolution'. Yes, but you must see what's wrong here. The inventing of what seems to be dodgy analogies and mind experiments in order to prove a point that in itself is not validated.
Though what the point is about qualia that the zombie mind -experiment is supposed to be proving or at least illustrating escapes me. To explain what qualia is? I think that's not the question - it is to rule out any possibility that the sensation or experience of colour, taste and pain (a mental pixel screen of sensory experience" I once called it, and you seemed to think that at least gave an idea that I'd grasped it) cannot one day be explained in terms of an emergent property of the complex interreactions of physical/material particles of the kind we are familiar with, or indeed conceptualised right now, or at least an hypothesis postulated that it can be conceptualised, rather as I postulate that the sense of identity (which is not at all unlike the question of qualia in explaining what it is, and indeed how it works) can be conceptualised in terms of an evolutionary need for individuality within a tribal group and the sensation of self identity an emergent property of the way the mind works.
In a way that feeling of identity is a kind of nature looking at itself - self awareness. And there is nothing too magical about that nor I would at least postulate the experiencing of visual, tactile of olfactory input.
Last edited by TRANSPONDER; 04-06-2018 at 12:14 AM..
earlier in this thread you said you resist the idea of reincarnation, but did not elaborate why.
on another thread you state this:
is that why you find reincarnation problematic?
it sounds like the words of someone who is really miserable, who hates life a lot.
what do you find so "depressing and monstrous" about being alive and being human?
I am not miserable and do not hate life, but what I experienced portends such a wonderful next stage that I could never be satisfied with a repeat of this physical life with all its myriad drawbacks. Having to return to complete ignorance and relearn everything is an unbelievably unattractive prospect. What do you find so appealing about this existence??? Why on earth would you ever want a repeat of it???
Very good Yes. Early on I read about an explanation of reincarnation, which had become quite a fad in the west as it assured us a continuation of life (admittedly one had to die first but if it wasn't at the hands of the Spanish Inquisition, one could put up with that) and in a form that we understood and not some different world we are not too sure about (but i certainly get your idea of an experience of such splendor that the idea of an eternity of feeling like that must appeal).
It suggested that we die and go to some spirit realm where we get to review our life and are eager to go back and have another go at doing it better.
I was appalled. Not because of the idea, but because you get sent back without remembering what you had learned. You'd just bugger it up all over again. That's why, though it would be great to go back to the time i walked out of the school gates for the last time (and good riddance) it would have to be knowing what was coming and what I had done or learned, or there is simply no point in the exercise. It might as well be someone else.
Indeed effectively it IS someone else. Which is when i realised that the entire premise of reincarnation in either western or Buddhist terms (soul or not) fell flat for different reasons. Or perhaps the same one. If you don't have your mind in the new body with all your memories and experiences, it is in fact someone else.
I am not miserable and do not hate life, but what I experienced portends such a wonderful next stage that I could never be satisfied with a repeat of this physical life with all its myriad drawbacks. Having to return to complete ignorance and relearn everything is an unbelievably unattractive prospect. What do you find so appealing about this existence??? Why on earth would you ever want a repeat of it???
If we are sent here to learn how to love and extend kindness and compassion ....then we DO keep coming back until we get it right, until we demonstrate competency in that. Honesty, humbleness and integrity are also part of the practicum.
The "wonderful stage" you glimpsed and now desire asks you to be that and embody that and put that into practice. It's like someone greedy for a diploma or high salary without recognizing that the ticket to get those is doing the coursework and laboring at the job.
It sounds like someone demanding to receive that which they are unwilling to give.
Last edited by Tzaphkiel; 04-06-2018 at 07:37 AM..
Do you see why I say that a mind experiment of Zombies that are an exact atom perfect replica of you or me but through some unexplained mechanism have no feelings, is suspect?. How could they not? Why should we take seriously a mind experiment with what I would say IS a logically impossible postulate as much as a swan with no evolutionary trace of wings?
Apparently you still don't understand the concept of logical impossibility (as opposed to natural impossibility).
(BTW: What I've been calling "natural possibility" is often called "nomological" possibility, as you will see in a moment. The term "nomological" is just a fancy philosophy word that basically means "law-like" or "rule based".)
Since my explanations have not helped, I will turn Wikipedia:
Logical possibility is usually considered the broadest sort of possibility; a proposition is said to be logically possible if there is no logical contradiction involved in its being true. "Dick Cheney is a bachelor" is logically possible, though in fact false; most philosophers have thought that statements like "If I flap my arms very hard, I will fly" are logically possible, although they are nomologically impossible. "Dick Cheney is a married bachelor," on the other hand, is logically impossible; anyone who is a bachelor is therefore not married, so this proposition is logically self-contradictory (though the sentence isn't, because it is logically possible for "bachelor" to mean "married man").
Nomological possibility is possibility under the actual laws of nature. Most philosophers since David Hume have held that the laws of nature are metaphysically contingent—that there could have been different natural laws than the ones that actually obtain. If so, then it would not be logically or metaphysically impossible, for example, for you to travel to Alpha Centauri in one day; it would just have to be the case that you could travel faster than the speed of light. But of course there is an important sense in which this is not possible; given that the laws of nature are what they are, there is no way that you could do it. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjunctive_possibility
Do you see that it is logically possible for you, right now, just as you are, to flap your arms and fly, even though we know that, given the laws of nature, this can't happen? Just for a moment, don't worry about the practicality of such weird ideas and don't muddy the waters by trying to imagine possible explanations for how this might happen. All such ideas are just distractions. They are utterly irrelevant to the task at hand, which is simply to understand the meaning of the phrase "logical possibility". At this stage, you don't have to agree that 'logical possibility' is a useful phrase. Your first job is to simply understand what the phrase means.
The key point: Given the definitions of the terms involved, there is nothing inherently self-contradictory about flapping your arms and flying. It is only after you factor in the laws of nature that you conclude "I can't do that."
Repeat this mantra: Given the definitions of the terms. Given the definitions of the terms. Given the definitions of the terms.
Once you understand the meaning of the term 'logical possibility' you should be able to see that zombies are logically possible.
Now the question is: Why should we care that zombies are logically possible?
And the answer is this:
We have some really good reasons to believe that zombies are naturally impossible, but given the definitions of the terms of current physics, there is no way to deductively derive the impossibility of zombies. Why? Because the terms of physics are qualia-blind. Why are the terms of physics qualia-blind? Because science originated with the inspiration that we need to factor qualia out of our theories in order to pinpoint the objective laws and principle underlying our experiences. It is precisely this factoring-out of subjective feelings that made science so doggone useful. But because we have factored the qualia out, we can't use our current theories to deductively derive the natural impossibility of zombies. In order to deductively derive a logical conclusion about the nature of qualia, there needs to be references to qualia in the definitions of the terms constituting the premises of the argument. This is the only way to show that the concept of "zombie" is self-contradictory. But we don't have any qualia terms in our scientific definitions because the entire success of science, so far, has depended upon our success in factoring these terms out. Science has successfully eliminated the very terms it would need in order to demonstrate the natural impossibility of zombies.
The critical theoretical terms of science are all abstractions that were discovered by factoring qualia out. But qualia are not abstractions. Qualia are the exact opposite of abstractions; they are ultimately the most concrete aspects of every experience. Qualia are so profoundly concrete that we can't even put them into words. I can talk about "red" for hours - explaining the physics of electromagnetism and optics and the neuroscience of color perception but, ultimately, I can't get you to really understand "red" without showing you something RED. Repeat: I can't fully explain red to you without showing it to you.
I believe that science can deal with qualia and thus, eventually, provide a theory showing why zombies are naturally impossible, but not in the current paradigm because the success of the current paradigm is based almost entirely on successfully factoring out the meanings of the terms that are essential in order to deductively demonstrate the self-contradictory nature of the concept of 'zombie'. The paradigm that successfully rules out the natural possibility of zombies will be the paradigm that, as it were, brings qualia back to life from the scientific mass grave in which they've been buried.
Last edited by Gaylenwoof; 04-06-2018 at 08:15 AM..
Right, that's very well explained, and of course I was thinking that nominative impossibility of an exact copy that couldn't do what the original could (for some unexplained reason) was all that really mattered. If it was not logically impossible, that's fine, but not very helpful.
Now I get the idea that nobody knows what red is until they see it. For instance if they were colour blind. But that is a knowledge matter, and not a qualia matter. As I said the qualia experience is the same in grey or blue, as in a toothache or a cattle prod in the butt. The brain identifies different types of experience but the experience- mechanism of qualia is the same.
What does this matter? Only that like eolved instincts are nothing to do with the physics of feeling, and the different types of sensory information coming in are irrelevant to the physics of experience.
What this means is that qualia have less to be accounted for. Just how experience is done by the mind, if it is.
Now I agree totally about the unknowns but because they are unknowns that doesn't mean that we can't make logical deductions about hypotheses. There is no logical impossibility and indeed no logical way to say that there can be no zombies. We don't know of any (apart from unverified claims). but that of course means that claiming that they exist is erroneous, but logically they could.
But in your analogy you didn't refer to a zombie that might exist which is logically not impossible, but a zombie that is exactly identical to a person that is not a zombie. And that as well as a nominative impossibility a logical impossibility as reason (based on what we know of biology) would say there is no logical way to say how such a thing could possibly be, unless you invoke magic.
Now if you concede a difference in the nervous system or brain to account for the zombie, I would accept that it is possible logically, but now the difference in 'feeling' (experience/qualia) is accounted for in physical material terms, so it seems to me that analogy is unhelpful in whatever the argument was that you (or Chalmers) were making.
But in your analogy...a zombie that is exactly identical to a person that is not a zombie. And that as well as a nominative impossibility a logical impossibility as reason (based on what we know of biology) would say there is no logical way to say how such a thing could possibly be, unless you invoke magic.
Are you saying that a I cannot be atom-for-atom identical to a zombie because that would imply something like "X is not equal to X"? (I.e., it violates the logical law of identity?)
If that is what you are saying, then the answer is simple. The zombie and I are different individuals who happen to share functionally identical processes at the atomic level (i.e., we are functionally atom-for-atom identical). The law of identity only applies to quantitative identity - i.e., X is literal just one thing, not two individuals as in the case of me and my zombie twin. For every atom, "Am", in my body, there is a similar atom "Az" doing the functionally identical thing in the zombie's body. Am and Az are doing functionally equivalent things, but they are not literally the one-and-same atom.
And then you say "based on what we know of biology" which, of course, immediately means that you are talking about natural possibility, not logical possibility. If P is a logical possibility, and biology discovers that P is naturally impossible, this discovery does not change the logical possibility of P.
Quote:
Now if you concede a difference in the nervous system or brain to account for the zombie, I would accept that it is possible logically, but now the difference in 'feeling' (experience/qualia) is accounted for in physical material terms, so it seems to me that analogy is unhelpful in whatever the argument was that you (or Chalmers) were making.
Yes, you apparently do not yet understand the argument. Let me try this:
Suppose I give you the following domain of numbers: 2, 6, 8, 12, 18, 26, 48 and 74. And then I say: Using any set of numbers from this domain that you want and, using only addition and subtraction, give me a formula where the result is 37.
If you are reasonably good at math, you don't have to do any work at all. You can immediately say "It's logically impossible".
Me: "Ok, I'll give you 10,000 new numbers and, as a bonus, I will also throw in the operations of
multiplication and division."
This sounds promising, so you take a look at the 10,000 new numbers and find that they are all even. Again, without doing any calculations or experiments, you can immediately say "It's still logically impossible."
At this point I'm shocked and annoyed. "How can you know it's impossible? You haven't even tried to do anything! You can't know it's impossible until you try combining the numbers!"
At which point you say: "You can give me all the even numbers you want, but it won't make any difference. You can give me the entire infinite domain of even numbers, it will still be impossible to derived the number 37."
Me: "Ok, so what do I have to do in order for you to give me the number 37?"
You: "Give me at least one odd number, and then I will need to do some calculations to see if I can give you the number 37."
Physics gives us a domain of non-qualia terms. The concept of 'zombie' is defined using qualia terms (as in, "a zombie experiences no qualia"). Just as you can't give me the number 37 using only even numbers, physics can't give us any proofs about the possibility or impossibility of zombies because physics does not have the right kinds of theoretical terms at its disposal. Physics has given itself a domain of objective terms, but qualia are subjective terms. Current physics has no choice but to remain silent on questions of qualia. And - most importantly - when it eventually does introduce qualia terms, it will need to do so by building those terms into its pantheon of fundamental elements (i.e., those elements that are taken as "givens" - i.e., brute facts of reality that can't be derived from anything "more fundamental").
My claim is that there is a deeply logical asymmetry between objective and subjective concepts. It is logically possible to derive objective entities from purely subjective elements, but it is logically impossible to derive subjective elements from purely objective terms (sorta like I can get even numbers from purely odd ones (e.g., 3+3=6), but I can't get odd numbers from purely even ones).
Subjectivity is the real workhorse of Reality. Our ability to recognize the objective nature of objective elements via intersubjective agreement is amazingly useful, but it is always subjectivity doing all the heavy lifting.
Last edited by Gaylenwoof; 04-06-2018 at 12:34 PM..
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Yes. Early on I read about an explanation of reincarnation, which had become quite a fad in the west as it assured us a continuation of life (admittedly one had to die first but if it wasn't at the hands of the Spanish Inquisition, one could put up with that) and in a form that we understood and not some different world we are not too sure about (but i certainly get your idea of an experience of such splendor that the idea of an eternity of feeling like that must appeal).