A Challenge to Atheism (Buddhist, quote, faith, God)

[LogicIsYourFriend]

Originally Posted by The Matrix

He needs to show that naturalism can account for this reliability. And he can do this only by showing that the content of belief is causally efficacious ON THE ASSUMPTION OF NATURALISM. If not, then it doesn't matter how much evidence ("scientifically established") he amasses to show how reliable his cognitive faculties seem to be. I've tried to make this point before.

You think that naturalism is at a disadvantage, but it is in the same boat as every other philosophy in terms of assuming our beliefs are reliable. The bottom line is, we are all using our cognitive faculties to 'prove' our cognitive faculties. The naturalist and the supernaturalist cannot show that the content of belief is causally efficacious ON THE ASSUMPTION OF ANYTHING. If you base your conclusion that beliefs are efficacious on an assumption alone then that conclusion is an assumption. We all assume causal efficacy of 'contents of beliefs'; no one has an advantage just by clapping your hands and repeating "I believe, I believe".

[MysticPhD]

Originally Posted by KCfromNC

This is painfully easy to do using simple off the shelf equipment. Blue's around 470nm while green is closer to 550nm - both easily measured by lots of different tools. It gets a bit more interesting once you move out past ultraviolet (mostly because hard X-rays and gamma rays can be dangerous), but detecting visible light at normal levels is solved problem for the most part.

Responding to an analogy with "concrete" thinking is the epitome of the problem that you have with understanding, period.

[The Matrix]

Originally Posted by LogicIsYourFriend

You think that naturalism is at a disadvantage, but it is in the same boat as every other philosophy in terms of assuming our beliefs are reliable. The bottom line is, we are all using our cognitive faculties to 'prove' our cognitive faculties. The naturalist and the supernaturalist cannot show that the content of belief is causally efficacious ON THE ASSUMPTION OF ANYTHING. If you base your conclusion that beliefs are efficacious on an assumption alone then that conclusion is an assumption. We all assume causal efficacy of 'contents of beliefs'; no one has an advantage just by clapping your hands and repeating "I believe, I believe".

Hey logic. Thanks for the comments. A quick response on your part. I might get back to you in another month.

A quick response to your response: I agree with you. Skepticism in general is a problem for everyone. But that's why I think the belief that my cognitive faculties are reliable (R) is a basic belief. And as a basic belief, it doesn't need evidence. However, R is still fallible, so if there is a reason to withhold belief in R, then even though it is a basic belief, it will be irrational to continue to believe R. That's the situation the naturalist is in. The main problem for the naturalist is NOT that he has to assume the very thing he's trying to prove (though that is one of the pitfalls which must be avoided), rather, it is that naturalism itself provides reason to withhold his (basic) belief in R. So it's not skepticism that plagues naturalism, so much as it is irrationality.

[LogicIsYourFriend]

Originally Posted by The Matrix

Hey logic. Thanks for the comments. A quick response on your part. I might get back to you in another month.

A quick response to your response: I agree with you. Skepticism in general is a problem for everyone. But that's why I think the belief that my cognitive faculties are reliable (R) is a basic belief. And as a basic belief, it doesn't need evidence. However, R is still fallible, so if there is a reason to withhold belief in R, then even though it is a basic belief, it will be irrational to continue to believe R. That's the situation the naturalist is in. The main problem for the naturalist is NOT that he has to assume the very thing he's trying to prove (though that is one of the pitfalls which must be avoided), rather, it is that naturalism itself provides reason to withhold his (basic) belief in R. So it's not skepticism that plagues naturalism, so much as it is irrationality.

I don't agree that naturalism destroys causal efficacy's status as a basic belief. Because, no matter what your philosophical position is, we all still must accept our cognitive faculties as reliable if we choose to experience and interact with this world.

Besides, reliable doesn't have to be correct absolutely, just correct within our subjective experiences of the world. Consistency within the world we experience is why empiricism works (within the world we experience). Anything outside of the world we experience is inaccessible to our cognitive faculties (senses) and therefore inaccessible to our knowledge (unknowable). It is not rational to believe in anything that is unknowable, because it is an arbitrary guess rather than a conclusion based on observation (the only link from the external world to our cognitive faculties).

[The Matrix]

Originally Posted by LogicIsYourFriend

I don't agree that naturalism destroys causal efficacy's status as a basic belief. Because, no matter what your philosophical position is, we all still must accept our cognitive faculties as reliable if we choose to experience and interact with this world.

I don't think I said "destroys" the basic belief? (Is that word "destroys" too strong?) And of course, not every philosophical position requires the acceptance of reliable cognitive faculties as a basic belief: skepticism is a philosophical position. But naturalism does seem to be in danger of undermining the belief in the reliability of the cognitive faculties.

Originally Posted by LogicIsYourFriend

Besides, reliable doesn't have to be correct absolutely, just correct within our subjective experiences of the world. Consistency within the world we experience is why empiricism works (within the world we experience). Anything outside of the world we experience is inaccessible to our cognitive faculties (senses) and therefore inaccessible to our knowledge (unknowable). It is not rational to believe in anything that is unknowable, because it is an arbitrary guess rather than a conclusion based on observation (the only link from the external world to our cognitive faculties).

I'm not sure what you mean when you say this is why "empiricism works." Empiricism is typically understood as a theory of the source of all our knowledge--namely, that all knowledge is ultimately from the senses, from experience. And not every empiricism thought the world was mind-independent (Berkeley is the famous example). So by "works" you mean....proven?

Anyway, your claims in this post seem a bit hasty to me. You're assuming a hard-line empiricism. And then you say:

Originally Posted by LogicIsYourFriend

It is not rational to believe in anything that is unknowable, because it is an arbitrary guess rather than a conclusion based on observation (the only link from the external world to our cognitive faculties).

Maybe you can already guess what my question will be: is THIS claim you make knowable? Is THIS claim you make empirically justifiable? If not, then cast it to the flames as irrational. Besides, I'm not sure naturalism can ever be empirically demonstrated, which, according to your principle here, would imply that it is irrational to believe it. At the least, you should refrain from such belief.

[LogicIsYourFriend]

Originally Posted by The Matrix

I don't think I said "destroys" the basic belief? (Is that word "destroys" too strong?) And of course, not every philosophical position requires the acceptance of reliable cognitive faculties as a basic belief: skepticism is a philosophical position. But naturalism does seem to be in danger of undermining the belief in the reliability of the cognitive faculties.

Your whole point is that naturalism "undermines" the otherwise "basic" belief of reliable cognitive faculties. 'Destroying its status as a basic belief' I don't think is too strong of language to summarize what you were saying.

I'm not sure what you mean when you say this is why "empiricism works." Empiricism is typically understood as a theory of the source of all our knowledge--namely, that all knowledge is ultimately from the senses, from experience. And not every empiricism thought the world was mind-independent (Berkeley is the famous example). So by "works" you mean....proven?

By "works" I mean effective at giving us consistent results that are useful for predicting future results of actions within our subjective world we experience. Is this proven absolutely? Of course not, nothing is nor can be since we can't escape subjectivity.

Anyway, your claims in this post seem a bit hasty to me. You're assuming a hard-line empiricism. And then you say: Maybe you can already guess what my question will be: is THIS claim you make knowable? Is THIS claim you make empirically justifiable? If not, then cast it to the flames as irrational.

My claim is logically justifiable. If something is unknowable (i.e. you can't observe it, your cognitive faculties have no link to it) then obviously you can't know whether it's true or not. A belief in something unknowable is nothing more than an arbitrary guess.

EDIT: (forgot to address)

Besides, I'm not sure naturalism can ever be empirically demonstrated, which, according to your principle here, would imply that it is irrational to believe it. At the least, you should refrain from such belief.

Naturalism, in terms of how I "subscribe" to it, is just a disbelief in anything supernatural. So without belief in anything supernatural, the default is naturalism. Since my 'principle' here is that anything unknowable (including the supernatural) is irrational to believe in because it is nothing more than an arbitrary guess, then no, my principle does not mean it is irrational to disbelieve in the supernatural.

[MysticPhD]

Originally Posted by The Matrix

I think that's the right answer. Maybe the content is something "over and above" the parts? But I think the problem is still there: how does the content causally relate to behavior? If the content is not strictly identified with being a brain state (where the two are ontologically identical), but is "reduced" to a brain state, then there seems to be a causal gap between the content and behavior. That is, there doesn't seem to be a way to explain the causal efficacy of belief content. And if the content really is claimed to be ontologically identical with a brain state, then it looks like the content has been eliminated.

Do you have any other suggestions on what the content might be for a naturalist? Nonetheless, the definition of "metaphysical naturalism" at work here does in fact include reference to materialism. (see my other post)

Because that is the BIG problem with epiphenomenalism. Widely known. Major difficulty. Etc.

This is why I so admire your fine mind, Matrix. The content is an abstraction that exists beyond the physical states that produce it . . . but this seems to be something that cannot be accepted because they cannot imagine how a "non-physical" (in the material "substance" sense for those in Rio Linda) abstraction can exist as a REAL component of the universe. Refusal to acknowledge the necessity for a "non-physical" substrate (universal field) as the essence of the universe is the stumbling block they cannot get past. The fact that they assume away that which they necessarily infer as the explanation for all their "evidence" . . . seems to escape them and could explain their failure to see the irrationality of it.

[KCfromNC]

Originally Posted by The Matrix

Now, what seems more interesting to me is that you claim: So "naturalists" are claiming that we can check the content of belief through other means. What other means are you talking about?

Observation. You know, the stuff you admitted is selected for by evolution earlier in the thread.

[KCfromNC]

Originally Posted by MysticPhD

Responding to an analogy with "concrete" thinking is the epitome of the problem that you have with understanding, period.

I love how the faithful pretend that reason is a weakness when it works against them. The defensiveness couldn't be a more obvious clue that they've got nothing but hot air to back up all of their grandiose claims.

[Old Gringo]

Originally Posted by The Matrix

I'm not sure if anyone here is familiar with Alvin Plantinga, but he has an ingenious argument against naturalism. If the argument is sound, contemporary scientific atheism is in trouble. If you're interested, read on.

Here's my own quick statement of the argument (I'm not doing it full justice):

"Naturalism" is the view that only natural objects exist (or kinds or properties). Basically, this is the view that all that exists is the natural world (nothing supernatural, no gods, no soul, etc.).

The question: granting Naturalism and Evolution, how likely is it that our cognitive faculties produce reliable beliefs? That is, how likely is it that our "belief -producing mechanisms" will, more often than not, produce beliefs that are true?

Here's what's at stake. Evolution and Naturalism together imply that we are the product of blind, unguided, uncaring forces of nature. The name of the game is survival. And this will apply equally to the formation of our cognitive faculties--our cognitive faculties developed and evolved for survival, not truth. And so our belief-forming mechanisms do not necessarily aim at truth, they are not necessarily reliable, since the goal is not essentially truth, but survival.

Our beliefs could of course be true. But the reliability of our cognitive faculties depends upon blind, unguided processes, which select for survival. And it is far from clear that reliable belief-forming mechanisms would ever be selected for (many living things do not have any cognitive capacity for belief formation, and they survive). Furthermore, a belief, on the Naturalistic account, is some sort of biochemical event in the brain. But the "content" of a belief (what the belief is "about") and whether it is true or not, are "blind" to evolutionary forces. The bottom line: as long as a belief aids in survival, "evolution" will not care whether the belief is true, or what it is "about." What ultimately matters is how the belief effects behavior. As long as the mechanisms that produce biochemical events (beliefs) in the brain reliably cause survival behavior, it doesn't matter whether the beliefs are true. As long as I run from the tiger, it doesn't matter whether my beliefs about tigers are true or not--the important thing is that I survive. I could just as well believe that by running away from tigers I am playing a happy game-- for the point is survival, not truth.

So it would seem that, given Naturalism and Evolution, the likelihood of our cognitive faculties being reliable is low (or inscrutable). And if this is the case, then a person who believes both Naturalism and Evolution has a reason to doubt his own beliefs--he has reason to doubt whether his cognitive faculties are trustworthy, for, at best, it is unlikely they are reliable. However, if he has a reason to doubt whether his cognitive faculties reliably produce true beliefs, then he has a reason to doubt all his beliefs, including the belief in Naturalism. Naturalism, then, (when taken in conjunction with the belief in evolution) is "self-defeating," since one has no way of defeating this defeater--that is, one who believes Naturalism has no way of overcoming this doubt about the reliability of his cognitive faculties, for any further conviction, any further belief, is itself subject to the same doubt. In short, it is irrational to believe both Naturalism and evolution, since the conjunction of these two beliefs calls into question the foundation of rationality itself (the reliability of your cognitive faculties).

However, the same is not true for a person who believes both evolution and theism. Evolution and theism are not inconsistent. And the theist does not believe that blind, uncaring forces are ultimately behind the process of evolution. Consequently, she will not believe that her cognitive faculties are the result of blind forces, but instead they are the result of a divinely guided process. And so, the theist may claim her cognitive faculties are reliable, since they are designed by God, who chose to create through the process of evolution. But the Naturalist has no such recourse, and thus, the person who believes both evolution and Naturalism is irrational.

What do you guys think?

I think any argument in favor of deities is quickly degraded into a discussion of semantics. Your post above is an example.

Those claiming there is a god have the burden of proof. They consistently fail to produce any in support of their claims.