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Well certainly France ( with the #1 military in the world) deserves no credit whatsoever.
Location wise, France easily could have stopped Germany in their early invasions of other countries.
Germany knew that " wagging a finger" at them meant nothing.
If you sense inaction by France on countries being invaded where they could have easily stopped Germany, why should Germany take France seriously when warned not to invade Poland?
Logistically, Poland would be much harder for France to defend.
If you are talking about the pre-war period, then I think you are too harsh on France. France DID want to act but didn't want to do it alone, without Britain. After embarrassment of the Ruhr crisis (where they did act alone) the last thing that France wanted was political isolation. By 1938, realistically, France ceased to be an independent player and basically submitted to the British foreign policy.
France was ready to invade the Rhineland in 1936 when the Nazis moved in but decided against it when they realized the British would take no part in it. Also France had an agreement with the Soviets to defend Czechoslovakia but it was the British who made the call in Munich.
So the British should definitely not be left off the hook.
If you are talking about the pre-war period, then I think you are too harsh on France. France DID want to act but didn't want to do it alone, without Britain. After embarrassment of the Ruhr crisis (where they did act alone) the last thing that France wanted was political isolation. By 1938, realistically, France ceased to be an independent player and basically submitted to the British foreign policy.
France was ready to invade the Rhineland in 1936 when the Nazis moved in but decided against it when they realized the British would take no part in it. Also France had an agreement with the Soviets to defend Czechoslovakia but it was the British who made the call in Munich.
So the British should definitely not be left off the hook.
No...they shouldn't be left off the hook. Remember Neville Chamberlaind's famous 1938 visit with Herr Hitler. His "so called peace in our time" statement would come back to haunt. He gave the Czechs to the Germans on a silver platter.
If you are talking about the pre-war period, then I think you are too harsh on France. France DID want to act but didn't want to do it alone, without Britain. After embarrassment of the Ruhr crisis (where they did act alone) the last thing that France wanted was political isolation. By 1938, realistically, France ceased to be an independent player and basically submitted to the British foreign policy.
France was ready to invade the Rhineland in 1936 when the Nazis moved in but decided against it when they realized the British would take no part in it. Also France had an agreement with the Soviets to defend Czechoslovakia but it was the British who made the call in Munich.
So the British should definitely not be left off the hook.
You bring up some very good points. The French were not afraid to act, they just didn't want to do so unilaterally. The British were in no mood to pick a fight and didn't get on board until the last minute.
There is a little known fact that France did indeed invade Germany when they invaded Poland. France had not fully mobilized and the invasion was composed mainly of fortress divisions, but they penetrated 6 miles into Germany and the only resistance was from German reserve units composed of raw recruits and old veterans. It has been theorized that if France had pushed this attack instead of falling back when Poland fell to mobilize and wait for the BEF, that they could have radically changed the course of the war.
Even then, the other point of contention is the resistance of Holland and Belgium to formally join the war. They drew up contingencies with the allies in case they were attacked, but refused to join the war and wanted to maintain their neutrality. Had they joined with the allies from the beginning France and Britain could have deployed their forces in much better positions and avoided the mad dash to the planned defensive lines that ensued after Germany invaded.
1. They didnt know they would lose. They had the maginot line in the east, and in the north they and the BEF were ready to move quickly into Belgium, avoiding their error of WW1. Their only vulnerability was in the Ardennes, and they did not think that German armor could move quickly through the Ardennes.
2. They had good reason not to wait. They had an alliance with Poland - and the loss of Poland to Germany, unchallenged would swing the balance of power in east central europe. To not go to war on behalf of Poland would mean the loss of all credibility, and the full lose of all east central europe to German dominance. Germany would effectively become dominant over all europe west of the USSR, and France would effectively lose its independence.
1. They didnt know they would lose. They had the maginot line in the east, and in the north they and the BEF were ready to move quickly into Belgium, avoiding their error of WW1. Their only vulnerability was in the Ardennes, and they did not think that German armor could move quickly through the Ardennes.
The irony is that German armor couldn't. The German's were limited to four main avenues of advance through the Ardennes. There were so many vehicles trying to move through this area that there was a literal two week long traffic jam heading from the front all the way back over the Rhine.
This operation was extremely risky and only succeeded as much as it did for three reasons:
1. The French units deployed there had little anti-tank capacity and with the main forces engaged in the north alongside the BEF, the French only had reserve units to throw at them.
2. Air-ground assaults would have been devastating on the German columns, but the French lacked local air superiority in the sector and sending their bombers against it was futile.
3. Local German commanders (namely Guderian and Rommel) seized the initiative when they were able to secure bridge heads over the Meuse. Their break out contradicted their direct orders. Had they stopped and dug in as ordered, the French would have had time to move their forces and check this main thrust, if not cut it off and destroy it which is what Hitler and the high command feared when they saw their tanks slicing all the way across France to the Channel.
If only a couple of the better French divisions and their armor and anti-tank weaponry had been held in reserve or sent to the Ardennes sector, there is a very good chance the Germans would not have managed to break out and instead been trapped in the Ardennes trying to force their way across the Meuse. As it was they were only able to gain such an easy foothold as the reserve infantry divisions in the area scattered under heavy Luftwaffe bombardment despite sustaining very few casualties or damage to their positions.
The German moves in the 1940 France campaign were a major gamble, that just happened to pay off big.
We need to also remember the terrible casualties on the Western Front that were sustained by the French. Belgium and France had been tromped through many times by both sides. It must have been really sickening to think about another war, which was why the "invincible" Maginot Line existed. WW1 was just a terrible waste of humanity.
The irony is that German armor couldn't. The German's were limited to four main avenues of advance through the Ardennes. There were so many vehicles trying to move through this area that there was a literal two week long traffic jam heading from the front all the way back over the Rhine.
This operation was extremely risky and only succeeded as much as it did for three reasons:
1. The French units deployed there had little anti-tank capacity and with the main forces engaged in the north alongside the BEF, the French only had reserve units to throw at them.
2. Air-ground assaults would have been devastating on the German columns, but the French lacked local air superiority in the sector and sending their bombers against it was futile.
3. Local German commanders (namely Guderian and Rommel) seized the initiative when they were able to secure bridge heads over the Meuse. Their break out contradicted their direct orders. Had they stopped and dug in as ordered, the French would have had time to move their forces and check this main thrust, if not cut it off and destroy it which is what Hitler and the high command feared when they saw their tanks slicing all the way across France to the Channel.
If only a couple of the better French divisions and their armor and anti-tank weaponry had been held in reserve or sent to the Ardennes sector, there is a very good chance the Germans would not have managed to break out and instead been trapped in the Ardennes trying to force their way across the Meuse. As it was they were only able to gain such an easy foothold as the reserve infantry divisions in the area scattered under heavy Luftwaffe bombardment despite sustaining very few casualties or damage to their positions.
The German moves in the 1940 France campaign were a major gamble, that just happened to pay off big.
This - like your earlier posts - is a REALLY GREAT post. However you left out one REALLY critical factor: there was no modern communication between the French HQ and the front lines. There was no wireless (ie radio) communication setup nor even phone lines. All communications between Gamelin & the front was by dispatch messenger - which was FAR TOO SLOW to allow the French high command to respond to the unexpected speed of Blitzkrieg. The Germans were moving sooooo fast that by the time Gamelin received info on the location of the Germans it was already way out of date (so one can imagine just how out of date his orders were by the time they got to the front in response). The fact is, no commander can expect to exert any kind of command & control over the battlefield if he has no idea what is ACTUALLY GOING ON in a timely manner. It's as if the French High Command was stuck in a time warp 2 days behind the actual events.
On paper the French were more than a match for the Germans - especially considering the fact that as the defenders they have the natural advantage. There are 2 sides to any military force - there is the obvious (things like number of troops, number of tanks, number of airplanes etc) - and there is the subtle (things like morale, training, tactics & logistcal support). In the former the Allies were in pretty good shape and had lots of reason to feel pretty confident. In the latter however, the Allies were in deep deep trouble. The problem is, that 2nd category is REALLY HARD to perceive and understand BEFORE the actual combat takes place - and the Allies failed miserably in that regard. In the final analysis, the Allied loss was a direct result of many things - morale, training, strategy, but most of all the massive insufficiency of overall command and control.
Ken
It's interesting to note that (as mentioned) even the GERMANS were stunned by the speed of the French collapse and the amazing success of their plan.
This - like your earlier posts - is a REALLY GREAT post. However you left out one REALLY critical factor: there was no modern communication between the French HQ and the front lines. There was no wireless (ie radio) communication setup nor even phone lines. All communications between Gamelin & the front was by dispatch messenger - which was FAR TOO SLOW to allow the French high command to respond to the unexpected speed of Blitzkrieg. The Germans were moving sooooo fast that by the time Gamelin received info on the location of the Germans it was already way out of date (so one can imagine just how out of date his orders were by the time they got to the front in response). The fact is, no commander can expect to exert any kind of command & control over the battlefield if he has no idea what is ACTUALLY GOING ON in a timely manner. It's as if the French High Command was stuck in a time warp 2 days behind the actual events.
On paper the French were more than a match for the Germans - especially considering the fact that as the defenders they have the natural advantage. There are 2 sides to any military force - there is the obvious (things like number of troops, number of tanks, number of airplanes etc) - and there is the subtle (things like morale, training, tactics & logistcal support). In the former the Allies were in pretty good shape and had lots of reason to feel pretty confident. In the latter however, the Allies were in deep deep trouble. The problem is, that 2nd category is REALLY HARD to perceive and understand BEFORE the actual combat takes place - and the Allies failed miserably in that regard. In the final analysis, the Allied loss was a direct result of many things - morale, training, strategy, but most of all the massive insufficiency of overall command and control.
Ken
It's interesting to note that (as mentioned) even the GERMANS were stunned by the speed of the French collapse and the amazing success of their plan.
You are very correct that I missed a key component when it comes to communications. You explained very well how the Allies worked, but you have to put that into persepctive with how the Germans did it to see exactly how far behind the Allies were. Not only did the Germans operate a complete radio communications network but in this battle they also had what was really the pinnacle of unified combined arms communication between the ground and air units. Forward liaison officers embedded with each unit were able to communicate directly with the air units (mainly Stukas) and direct them to attack enemy positions. In most cases the Stukas were able to respond in as little as 10 minutes. This level of coordination allowed them to rapidly respond to threats along their line of advance and not get bogged down trying to eliminate entrenched/fortified positions.
It is a shocking contrast against what LordBalfor explained as the Allied method.
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