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That's right. Burnside showed an unwillingness to make decisions in that particular case and the result was not only failure, but tragedy for the troops involved. The same was true at Fredericksburg where his temporizing and indecision had grave consequences when he did finally get across the river.
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Rather than indecision, my read on Burnside is that his most detrimental characteristic was inadaptability. He was good at making plans, good at preparation and organization, and most of the time he was able to have his troops where they were supposed to be. However, if for any reason the plan began to unravel and its utility was no longer applicable, Burnside did not have much in the way of flexibility and imagination to fix matters.
At Fredericksburg he got his army to the river in a timely manner, well before Lee was able to concentrate for a defense, but Burnside was undone when the pontoons failed to arrive as promised. The premise of his plan to cross the river at Fredericksburg had been to get on the SW bank before Lee was there in suffcient force to block the move. Because the pontoons were overdue, Lee wound up with the leisure of aseembling his entire command, emplacing his artillery, and digging in.
At that point, Burnside's plan to cross the river at Fredericksburg no longer made any sense, yet Burnside was unable to think of anything else to do but go ahead with his original program. Once the battle was underway and the first several Union divisions to go up Marye's Heights were broken into pieces without reaching the enemy, it should have been apparent to Burnside that this tactic was hopeless. Yet all Burnside could think to do was to feed more divisions to the front and watch them get slaughtered in the same manner.
At the Crater Battle, Burnside again had an excellent plan and had made excellent preparations. When the 11th hour monkey wrech from Meade and Grant upset those plans, Burnside proved incapable of adjustment. Instead of devoting the available time to improvising a new plan, he pouted and behaved irresponsibly.
In a sense, he was something of the anti-Grant, the latter being at his absolute best when his plans had gone haywire and those around him were going into a panic mode. Grant's m.o. was to remain calm and take the "Very well, lets try something different" approach.
Evidently Grant thought Burnside was a good guy and a true patriot and liked him personally. I don't think he was a good corps commander though and Parke did a good job leading the Ninth Corps after Burnside was run off.
Thinking of Burnside always leads me to think of Longstreet who was one of the best corps commanders of the war, at least when serving in AoNV. Yet he came to grief in east Tennessee against Burnside. And he was downright negligent and mutinous at Chattanooga. Bragg should'a shot him. And Polk and Hindman too.
How does the guy whose corps did what was arguably the single best days fighting in the war (2nd day at Gettysburg) and who cracked the tough westerners of the Army of the Cumberland (with some help from a rattled Rosecrans and a petulant Tom Wood) let Thomas and Hooker open the Cracker Line with little more than a by your leave?
Evidently Grant thought Burnside was a good guy and a true patriot and liked him personally. I don't think he was a good corps commander though and Parke did a good job leading the Ninth Corps after Burnside was run off.
Thinking of Burnside always leads me to think of Longstreet who was one of the best corps commanders of the war, at least when serving in AoNV. Yet he came to grief in east Tennessee against Burnside. And he was downright negligent and mutinous at Chattanooga. Bragg should'a shot him. And Polk and Hindman too.
How does the guy whose corps did what was arguably the single best days fighting in the war (2nd day at Gettysburg) and who cracked the tough westerners of the Army of the Cumberland (with some help from a rattled Rosecrans and a petulant Tom Wood) let Thomas and Hooker open the Cracker Line with little more than a by your leave?
I think that's more on Bragg than it is anyone else. He was no military genius by a long shot and was apparently more than difficult to serve under. Remember, it was during the Chattanooga campaign that Nathan Bedford Forrest slapped him and said something along the lines of, "If you were half a man, I'd challenge you to a duel." Or, something like that. It seems that nobody in the Confederacy had any use for him except Jefferson Davis. He certainly missed an opportunity when he failed to pursue Rosecran's after Chickamauga.
In any case, my understanding is that the cracker line passed over the mountains to a point across the river from Chattanooga. If I'm correct in that understanding, neither Longstreet or anyone else could get to it as there were no Confederate positions on the north side of the river.
One more thing about Longstreet vs. Burnside at Knoxville. Recall that Longstreet didn't want to go. He believed, it turns out correctly, that Bragg was dividing his forces in the face of a superior enemy and that it would bring disastrous results, which it did. In any case, Longstreet had a streak of petulence in him that lasted the rest of his life. When he didn't get his way, he swelled up, as we say down here. He was so ticked off at Lee during the second day at Gettysburg for not allowing him to swing around the Roundtops and attack Meades rear that he refused to issue the order to attack. His post war writings are like Beuregard's and Joe Johnson's...full of blaming everybody else for everything.
Yes, but then again it wasn't difficult for a former Union general to be elected to any office for the next 40 years.
You are no doubt correct,I assume you didn't notice that I put "Providence Plantations" in my post.This is in fact the actual name of the State of Rhode Island.A recent ballot to remove Providence Plantations from the official state name was overhelmingly (75%) defeated by the peoples.
You are no doubt correct,I assume you didn't notice that I put "Providence Plantations" in my post.This is in fact the actual name of the State of Rhode Island.A recent ballot to remove Providence Plantations from the official state name was overhelmingly (75%) defeated by the peoples.
No, I didn't pay much attention because I didn't know that.
Thanks. That's just one more bit of information to file away. Ya never know when stuff like that will come in handy.
Evidently Grant thought Burnside was a good guy and a true patriot and liked him personally. I don't think he was a good corps commander though and Parke did a good job leading the Ninth Corps after Burnside was run off.
Thinking of Burnside always leads me to think of Longstreet who was one of the best corps commanders of the war, at least when serving in AoNV. Yet he came to grief in east Tennessee against Burnside. And he was downright negligent and mutinous at Chattanooga. Bragg should'a shot him. And Polk and Hindman too.
How does the guy whose corps did what was arguably the single best days fighting in the war (2nd day at Gettysburg) and who cracked the tough westerners of the Army of the Cumberland (with some help from a rattled Rosecrans and a petulant Tom Wood) let Thomas and Hooker open the Cracker Line with little more than a by your leave?
You are correct, in that the Army of the Cumberland was composed of mainly western, or midwestern units, but it did include my great-great- grandfather's regiment, the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry.
How does the guy whose corps did what was arguably the single best days fighting in the war (2nd day at Gettysburg) and who cracked the tough westerners of the Army of the Cumberland (with some help from a rattled Rosecrans and a petulant Tom Wood) let Thomas and Hooker open the Cracker Line with little more than a by your leave?
I would not argue against the idea of Longstreet being an excellent Corps commander, but I am less inclined to cite his assault at Chickamauga as an illustration of his talents. When you have formed your troops for an attack, and the enemy inadvertently cooperates by removing the unit that wold have been the defenders of that area, it is difficult to lose. I suspect that nearly any general would have triumphed under such conditions. Well, maybe not McClellan, who would have halted his force, concluded that the gap was a trick, and had his soldiers dig in while he spent two weeks bringing up siege guns to probe the opposition's suspected weak point.
You are correct, in that the Army of the Cumberland was composed of mainly western, or midwestern units, but it did include my great-great- grandfather's regiment, the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry.
There were also two Pennsylvania infantry regiments in the pre Chattanooga AotC. And of course the mainly eastern troops of the 11th and 12th Corps were made part of the AotC at Chattanooga and then organized as a new 20th Corps.
In any case, my understanding is that the cracker line passed over the mountains to a point across the river from Chattanooga. If I'm correct in that understanding, neither Longstreet or anyone else could get to it as there were no Confederate positions on the north side of the river.
The Cracker Line ran on the south side of the river from Kelly's Ferry to Brown's Ferry through Cummings Gap in Racoon Mtn. and then through an upward extension of Lookout Valley. And Hooker came up from Bridgeport into Lookout Valley through the next gap south; the one interstate 24 runs through. This area was Longstreet's to guard and he was very lax; he did have troops in the area, just not enough of them. And he disregarded warnings that the Federals were up to something and then his attack against the 12th Corps at Wauhatchie in Lookout Valley was half hearted, undermanned and poorly organized.
At Chattanooga Old Pete (whom I find one of the more attractive figures of the Rebellion) screwed up big time.
Forrest is said to have threatened to slap Bragg's jaws and "force him to resent it" but he didn't do it and I doubt he intimidated Bragg who if nothing else was a man of dedication and courage.
I would not argue against the idea of Longstreet being an excellent Corps commander, but I am less inclined to cite his assault at Chickamauga as an illustration of his talents. When you have formed your troops for an attack, and the enemy inadvertently cooperates by removing the unit that wold have been the defenders of that area, it is difficult to lose.
No doubt the confusion on the Federal right (and it's weakness, only three divisions; Wood's, Davis's and Sheridan's and they caught on the move) helped a great deal. But Longstreet took great care in planning the assault which was in great depth and struck with the force of a hammer. I think the assault would've crushed the Federal right even had it been prepared; for instance Wood's division of three brigades at the Brotherton Farm was going to be hit by eight enemy brigades. It's quite striking to drive down the Brotherton Rd. east of the Lafayette Rd and see the markers in the woods where Longstreet marshalled the assault.
Longstreet commanded four of the greatest assaults of the war: the 2nd day at 2nd Bull Run, the 2nd day at Gettysburg, 2nd day at Chickamauga and the 2nd day in the Wilderness. Seems to be a pattern there. He was perhaps the heaviest hitter of the war.
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He was perhaps the heaviest hitter of the war.
