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What if Hitler and Japan had both avoided their most basic strategic error, that of overextending themselves? They might have been victorious over the Soviet Union had Japan been convinced to attack in that direction, as one faction in the Imperial Japanese Army wanted to do. Could everthing have played out as follows?
I. Hitler
1. Suppose Hitler had not wasted the Luftwaffe over England so that its strength would have been more available against Russia.
2. Suppose Hitler had prepared better for the bitter cold of the Russian winter.
3. Suppose Hitler had cultivated the initial support the invading Germans had received from some Soviet nationalities, mostly from the Ukrainians and the citizens of the Baltic Republics who greeted the Germans as liberators. But no, he stupidly ended up turning them against him by mistreating them too as inferiors.
4. Suppose Hitler had not declared war on the United States. We would probably have come in eventually, but our full participation beyond the lend-lease program could have been delayed, thus buying Hitler time to concentrate more forces on the eastern front.
5. Suppose Hitler had tried, and succeeded, in cajoling and wooing Japan to attack the Soviet Union from the east? This is my biggest counter-factual of all; if the Soviet Union had been defeated - and they almost were anyway - then Hitler could have much more adequately faced any threat from the west.
II. Japan
1. Suppose Japan had not attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor and in the Phillipines. They could have still taken control of the oil resources which were in the hands of the Dutch and could have still taken over French Indochina while maintaining a smaller defensive perimeter. Again, we would probably have come in eventually, but Japan would have bought itself time with the delay.
2. Suppose Japan had tried to limit the forces which eventually got bogged down in China, with the view to attacking the Soviet Union through Manchuria. It could have still controlled certain Chinese coastal cities if that was deemed desirable. But as it was they failed to take into account the vastness of China; they could win set-piece battles against the rag-tag Nationalist forces but the latter just kept retreating and it became a quagmire for Japan with very large forces committed.
3. Suppose Japan had decided to make common cause with Germany vis à vis the Soviet Union. While the Soviet ground forces were superior to the Japanese, the ferocity of Hitler's onslaught from the west could have made possible Japanese success in the east, which would have then given them the resources of Siberia.
III. Conclusion
A scarey thought, I think, the thought that two such tyrannical and brutal regimes might have been successful. With Russia out, fortress America could have defended its own shores, and perhaps assured the defense of Great Britain. There would have been three great blocs: The U.S. and Great Britain, Germany, and Japan.
What if Hitler and Japan had both avoided their most basic strategic error, that of overextending themselves? They might have been victorious over the Soviet Union had Japan been convinced to attack in that direction, as one faction in the Imperial Japanese Army wanted to do. Could everthing have played out as follows?
I. Hitler
1. Suppose Hitler had not wasted the Luftwaffe over England so that its strength would have been more available against Russia.
Insufficient air power wasn't a big concern in the war against Russia. But more importantly, the reason Hitler invaded the Soviet Union was to force peace with Britain.
2. Suppose Hitler had prepared better for the bitter cold of the Russian winter.
The whole plan called for a quick victory over Russia. Germany had never intended for the war in the east to drag out into one of attrition. If they had they would probably not have invaded. Anyway there is only so much you can do to prepare for -30F cold.
3. Suppose Hitler had cultivated the initial support the invading Germans had received from some Soviet nationalities, mostly from the Ukrainians and the citizens of the Baltic Republics who greeted the Germans as liberators. But no, he stupidly ended up turning them against him by mistreating them too as inferiors.
Would not have mattered at all.
4. Suppose Hitler had not declared war on the United States. We would probably have come in eventually, but our full participation beyond the lend-lease program could have been delayed, thus buying Hitler time to concentrate more forces on the eastern front.
Lend-lease was sufficient. The tide in Europe was turned before any significant numbers of American troops got there.
5. Suppose Hitler had tried, and succeeded, in cajoling and wooing Japan to attack the Soviet Union from the east? This is my biggest counter-factual of all; if the Soviet Union had been defeated - and they almost were anyway - then Hitler could have much more adequately faced any threat from the west.
Not sure the Soviet Union would have been defeated. The Japanese had no way of threatening any of the Soviet strategic regions or resources. The most they could do is block the Soviet pacific ports from receiving American supply ships.
II. Japan
1. Suppose Japan had not attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor and in the Phillipines. They could have still taken control of the oil resources which were in the hands of the Dutch and could have still taken over French Indochina while maintaining a smaller defensive perimeter. Again, we would probably have come in eventually, but Japan would have bought itself time with the delay.
I could be wrong but the US embargo really was crippling to them. And they did take over the French Indochina before Pearl Harbor but there wasn't any oil there. Occupying the Dutch Indonesia would have been a huge gamble - if the US forces moved out before the Japanese had a chance to strike at them, they would have lost even faster than they had.
2. Suppose Japan had tried to limit the forces which eventually got bogged down in China, with the view to attacking the Soviet Union through Manchuria. It could have still controlled certain Chinese coastal cities if that was deemed desirable. But as it was they failed to take into account the vastness of China; they could win set-piece battles against the rag-tag Nationalist forces but the latter just kept retreating and it became a quagmire for Japan with very large forces committed.
The USSR was even more vast than China and did not have any of the resources that Japan desperately needed. The Japanese could have occupied easternmost parts of the USSR but the Soviet forces would have simply retreated and destroyed the Trans-Siberian railroad behind them.
3. Suppose Japan had decided to make common cause with Germany vis à vis the Soviet Union. While the Soviet ground forces were superior to the Japanese, the ferocity of Hitler's onslaught from the west could have made possible Japanese success in the east, which would have then given them the resources of Siberia.
Siberia had very few known resources at the time. It was very underdeveloped. The USSR did not start drilling oil in Siberia in significant quantities until after the war. And those oil fields are in western Siberia - thousands of miles from the Pacific.
III. Conclusion
A scarey thought, I think, the thought that two such tyrannical and brutal regimes might have been successful. With Russia out, fortress America could have defended its own shores, and perhaps assured the defense of Great Britain. There would have been three great blocs: The U.S. and Great Britain, Germany, and Japan.
Until the development of the atomic bomb.
Of greater concern, I think, would be what may have happened if Hitler had honored his existing treaty with Stalin, and focused solely on conquering England and consolidating his gains in Western Europe. (Unternehmen Barbarossa, after all, was what ultimately sealed his doom.) That, my friend, gives me the cold-prickly-goosebumps even today.
The "bumps" get even bigger when I consider what might have happened if the Japanese Empire had stuck to its knitting (so to speak) instead of prematurely bearding the U.S. lion in its den. Chances are we would have let them consolidate their Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, subject only to much wailing, gnashing of teeth, and impotent saber-rattling.
BTW, I recognize you as one who has extensively read, and analyzed, and considered in this area.
Of greater concern, I think, would be what may have happened if Hitler had honored his existing treaty with Stalin, and focused solely on conquering England and consolidating his gains in Western Europe. (Unternehmen Barbarossa, after all, was what ultimately sealed his doom.) That, my friend, gives me the cold-prickly-goosebumps even today.
The "bumps" get even bigger when I consider what might have happened if the Japanese Empire had stuck to its knitting (so to speak) instead of prematurely bearding the U.S. lion in its den. Chances are we would have let them consolidate their Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, subject only to much wailing, gnashing of teeth, and impotent saber-rattling.
In Europe in 1940 Hitler basically reached a dead end when he lost the battle of Britain. The invasion of the British Isles had to be postponed 8 months in any case because it could only be done during the summer. With the United States continuing to resupply Britain, it is very doubtful that Germany could ever be in the position actually mount the invasion.
Another problem for Hitler was the Soviet Union. While officially they were at peace and had a treaty, neither side trusted the other. Thus, if Hitler wanted to finish off the Brits, he still would have had to watch his back. After the Winter War, in 1940 and 1941 the Soviets were modernizing and building up their military at an alarming rate and time was working against Germany. Hitler understood that the USSR was a potential liability and that the sooner he eliminated it, the easier it would be to deal with the British both militarily and politically. Thus the decision was made to launch Operation Barbarossa.
RE: Japan, this is not my forte but I believe that in the consequences of the US enforced embargo, the Japanese basically had no capability to continue their war. They could have invade Dutch East Indies but that would most likely lead to war and not on terms favorable to Japan. The embargo was basically Roosevelt's way of saying that further Japanese expansion was unacceptable. In other words, for Japan to continue their expansion would be like going all in and trying to out bluff the United States.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Nighteyes
BTW, I recognize you as one who has extensively read, and analyzed, and considered in this area.
In Europe in 1940 Hitler basically reached a dead end when he lost the battle of Britain. The invasion of the British Isles had to be postponed 8 months in any case because it could only be done during the summer. With the United States continuing to resupply Britain, it is very doubtful that Germany could ever be in the position actually mount the invasion.
Another problem for Hitler was the Soviet Union. While officially they were at peace and had a treaty, neither side trusted the other. Thus, if Hitler wanted to finish off the Brits, he still would have had to watch his back. After the Winter War, in 1940 and 1941 the Soviets were modernizing and building up their military at an alarming rate and time was working against Germany. Hitler understood that the USSR was a potential liability and that the sooner he eliminated it, the easier it would be to deal with the British both militarily and politically. Thus the decision was made to launch Operation Barbarossa.
I suspect you're having a bit of a calendar problem. The Battle of Britain was, indeed, fought in the late summer of 1940. The "Winter War" that you mentioned was between the Soviet Union and Finland, and was concluded in March of 1940. Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa, did not begin until June of 1941.
It is well-documented that Stalin did not expect Germany to begin offensive operations against the Soviet Union until 1942 at the earliest, because he too thought the Germans would consolidate their victories on the western front before undertaking battle on the eastern front.
Thereby we come back to my original what-if...
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Originally Posted by MrMarbles
Me? *blushing*
I really hate to burst your bubble, MrMarbles, but my comment was directed to the Original Poster, Escort Rider.
I suspect you're having a bit of a calendar problem. The Battle of Britain was, indeed, fought in the late summer of 1940. The "Winter War" that you mentioned was between the Soviet Union and Finland, and was concluded in March of 1940. Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa, did not begin until June of 1941.
It is well-documented that Stalin did not expect Germany to begin offensive operations against the Soviet Union until 1942 at the earliest, because he too thought the Germans would consolidate their victories on the western front before undertaking battle on the eastern front.
Thereby we come back to my original what-if...
Not sure where the confusion is but I assure you I am perfectly aware of all the dates. My point was that soon after the Winter War, the USSR began a large-scale reorganization and build up of its military (in part because of the lessons learned in that war). Thus the longer Hitler waited to attack the USSR, the less likely a favorable outcome was. Simply put, Hitler couldn't ignore Germany's eastern border to take his time to deal with Britain. Spring/early summer 1941 was near the optimal time to invade the USSR and Hitler did not miss his chance. Had he taken another route, the Soviet Union would have become stronger, and there was absolutely no guarantee that he would have succeeded against Britain. Hope my point is clear now.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Nighteyes
I really hate to burst your bubble, MrMarbles, but my comment was directed to the Original Poster, Escort Rider.
1. Suppose Hitler had not wasted the Luftwaffe over England so that its strength would have been more available against Russia.
To start, I wouldn’t necessarily agree that the Luftwaffe was totally wasted over England. The early stages of the air campaign had Germany largely on track to achieving air superiority over Britain. By the end of August 1940, Luftwaffe attacks on RAF Fighter Command sector stations were taking a serious toll on Britain’s available pool of trained and experienced pilots. Continued bombing of these targets would likely have broken Britain’s ability to field an effective defense against German air attacks. Fortunately for the British, the Germans chose this critical moment to switch the objective from purely military targets to attempting to bomb London into oblivion. Now in respect to that particular goal, I would say it was a waste of valuable Luftwaffe resources.
With regard to the Soviet Union, the Luftwaffe dedicated approximately 3,000 planes to Operation Barbarossa, which was more than sufficient to hit the Russians extremely hard and with devastating effect. In the first weeks of the invasion, the Luftwaffe shot down over 200 Russian planes and destroyed nearly 900 more on the ground. The swiftness in which the Germans established air superiority enabled the Luftwaffe to quickly switch over to providing close air support to German ground forces, allowing for a more rapid advance into Russia. While the attrition rate of both pilots and aircraft began to hamper Luftwaffe air operations as the war dragged on, it was not until June of 1944 that the Germans effectively lost air superiority on the Eastern Front.
Though the number of aircraft the Germans could employ was a problem at certain points in time in their fight against Britain and Russia, it can’t really be said it was a major contributing factor to the failure of these operations. However, one could make the case that Germany not possessing a heavy, long range bomber for use in strategic air operations against both countries severely limited the German’s ability to take out facilities vital to the British and Russian war effort. While it’s hard to say if the existence of such a bomber would have necessarily helped Germany win the war, it definitely wouldn’t have hurt.
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Originally Posted by EscortRider
2. Suppose Hitler had prepared better for the bitter cold of the Russian winter.
When putting together Operation Barbarossa, General Halder calculated the Soviets would be able to resist no more than 4 months before the Red Army had either been destroyed outright or be so weakened that it would cause the Soviet Union to collapse. Though the operation was wildly successful in its’ first weeks and inflicted huge losses on the Red Army, no sign of Soviet collapse or surrender were visible. By the middle of July 1941, the German offensive ground to a halt while Hitler and the OKH/OKW generals argued over what to do next. Many, like General Halder, believed an all out drive to capture Moscow would surely end the war. Hitler considered Moscow an objective of secondary importance. The matter wasn’t settled until mid August when Hitler finally decided to concentrate on eliminating threats to the left and right flanks of the invasion force. Yet, even though these operations were successful, they still didn’t bring about a Soviet collapse.
By now it was early September and it was at this moment Hitler decided that taking Moscow was imperative. An offensive (Operation Typhoon) was drawn up and set in motion on September 30, 1941. Operation Typhoon got off to a good start, but by the second week of October, the first rains of autumn began to fall and the countryside turned to mud. The offensive was stalled until the first week of November when a hard freeze set in making it possible for German forces to move forward again. But the delay had only improved things for the Russians, allowing them time to enhance their defenses around Moscow. As December began, the Germans had lost all momentum and the combination of weather, Soviet resistance and then counterattack, ended Operation Typhoon and all hope of taking the Russian capital.
To have had any chance of success against the Soviet Union, the Germans needed a comprehensive plan of attack which would take into account every conceivable contingency and then be executed flawlessly. What was produced instead was a plan which had no clear cut objective and was based on erroneous assumptions about Soviet manpower and capabilities. Had the capture of Moscow been the main goal of Barbarossa from the start, it was certainly within the realm of possibility for the Germans to have taken the city by August or September 1941. The question then would have been whether or not the loss of Moscow was all that was needed to bring about the end of the Soviet Union.
Quote:
Originally Posted by EscortRider
3. Suppose Hitler had cultivated the initial support the invading Germans had received from some Soviet nationalities, mostly from the Ukrainians and the citizens of the Baltic Republics who greeted the Germans as liberators. But no, he stupidly ended up turning them against him by mistreating them too as inferiors.
Ironically, Alfred Rosenberg, the Party’s chief racial theorist, advocated this approach to the occupied terroritories in the East. Rosenberg, an ethnic German from Estonia, envisioned the creation of semi-autonomous “buffer states” which would serve as a bulwark against whatever remained of Russia after the completion of Operation Barbarossa. Chief among these would be Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Baltic nations. It was his belief these areas and the people within them were sufficiently “Aryan” enough to warrant more lenient treatment, especially once they were cleansed of any Bolshevik and Jewish influences. Upon being named “Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories”, Rosenberg attempted to implement his plan.
Unfortunately for Rosenberg and the inhabitants of these territories, his ideas were almost completely at odds with those held by key members of the Nazi hierarchy, including Hitler himself. While Rosenberg was busily trying to foster good will toward Germany amongst the Ukrainians, the man appointed as Reichskommissar Ukraine, Erich Koch, was under orders from Hitler to treat the Ukraine as nothing more than a slave state. Rosenberg quickly found himself marginalized and without influence as the SS, over whom he had no authority, set about administering the occupied territories the “right” way; as in, treating the inhabitants as subhumans of little value.
Since no serious consideration was ever given to trying Rosenberg’s idea, one cannot really say whether the reaction of the local population would have ended up being markedly different after a year or two of German occupation.
Quote:
Originally Posted by EscortRider
4. Suppose Hitler had not declared war on the United States. We would probably have come in eventually, but our full participation beyond the lend-lease program could have been delayed, thus buying Hitler time to concentrate more forces on the Eastern Front.
When Operation Barbarossa began in June 1941, Hitler’s biggest fear then was having sufficient troops in the West to guard against an Allied invasion. As a result, even as German troop losses mounted in the final drive toward Moscow, some half a million men sat idle in occupied Europe, waiting for an attack that never came (at least not in 1941). This included troops based in Norway that had been specifically trained and equipped to fight in severe winter conditions. Despite pleas from the Wehrmacht to release some of the units in the West for use in the East, Hitler refused. He even went so far as to direct recruits be sent to build up troop formations in the West, rather than use them to bolster the depleted army groups in the East.
By the time Hitler declared war on the U.S. on December 11, 1941, Operation Barbarossa had failed and the battle for Moscow had been lost. As the first major Soviet counteroffensive was launched and the exhausted German troops were driven back, Hitler’s only response was to order the Wehrmacht to stand fast and hold its’ ground at all costs with what they had. When, by miracle of miracles, they managed to do so, Hitler viewed this as evidence that troop levels on the Eastern Front were sufficient to contain the Soviets until the spring, at which time the Germans would go on the offensive again.
Considering what troops the Germans did have and what they were able to accomplish in the first 6 months of the war against the Soviet Union, was insufficient manpower really the problem? The answer, I believe is both yes and no. An an infusion of fresh troops, especially winter troops, likely would have improved the overall position of the Germans on the Eastern Front. However, by the time the need for more men became acute, the initiative had already swung over to the Soviet side, so it is questionable whether such a move would have been a game changer at that juncture in the war.
Quote:
Originally Posted by EscortRider
5. Suppose Hitler had tried, and succeeded, in cajoling and wooing Japan to attack the Soviet Union from the east? This is my biggest counter-factual of all; if the Soviet Union had been defeated - and they almost were anyway - then Hitler could have much more adequately faced any threat from the west.
In May of 1939, the Japanese attacked the Soviet Union, or more correctly, the Soviet puppet state known as the “Mongolian People’s Republic”. This move was sparked by growing resentment within Japan over the massive military aid Russia was providing China to help fight the Japanese. Officers of the Kwantung Army based in Manchukuo were chiefly responsible for instigating the hostilities. These men, referred to as the “Strike North” faction of the Imperial Army believed the best way to solve the China “problem” was to invade Mongolia and seize the Trans-Siberian Railway. Once this was done, the Japanese could then take control of the entirety of Mongolia, parts of Siberia and Russia’s Pacific ports. China would be effectively cut off from Soviet assistance and that would be that.
This border war did not go well for the Japanese. On August 31st, one day before Germany invaded Poland, the last in a series of battles that became collectively known as the “Battle of Khalkhin Gol” took place. The Japanese suffered a devastating defeat, courtesy of Soviet general, Georgi Zhukov. The once mighty Kwantung Army was now a virtual shell of itself, having suffered close to 20,000 casualties over the course of the conflict. The defeat of the Kwantung Army also signaled an end to the influence the “Strike North” faction once had over Japanese expansionist policy. Japan now viewed lasting peace with the Soviet Union to be critical to future Japanese plans for expansion southward.
Oddly enough, the Germans actually encouraged and helped facilitate peace discussions between Japan and Russia. From the German perspective, once some sort of formal agreement was in place, Japan could hopefully be enlisted to help Germany in her war against Britain. Hitler believed Japanese attacks on Britain’s Far East possessions, combined with pressure from the Germans in Western Europe and Italians in the Mediterranean, would place the British in an impossible position and force them to the peace table. After the fall of France in June 1940, talks between Russia and Japan became more serious, and on April 13, 1941, a neutrality pact was signed between the two countries.
Despite what Hitler may have wanted the Japanese to do after he invaded the Soviet Union, there was simply no possibility of it happening. The defeat at Khalkhin Gol had left a lasting impression on the Japanese high command, and there existed no desire to tangle with the Soviets again. With nowhere else to go but south, the Japanese fully committed themselves to going after their “weaker” enemies; namely, the British, Dutch, and Americans. And nothing that Hitler said or could possibly offer was enough to get the Japanese to change their minds.
To TonyT: Thank you for your excellent fleshing out of why all of my counter-factuals were, in fact, counter-factuals. I do not believe we are in disagreement over any significant aspect of them, as I had presented them in the light of "what if" these things had been approached differently by Hitler and the Germans. Some of the things you brought up I hadn't known, but I had read in some detail about the Soviet-Japanese fighting of mid-1939, which is interesting in several respects including being largely unknown to most Americans. The Japanese "fighting spirit" was no match for the superior Soviet fire power and command-and-control. But later, in the early jungle fighting of the Pacific islands, the excellent Japanese fieldcraft and the lack of open terrain enabled the IJA to give the Americans and Australian ground forces more of a run for their money.
I hadn't known about Rosenberg's stance toward certain conquered Soviet republics. Very interesting. Thanks again.
The one what if I had generally pondered was in regards to the Africa Campaign. Germany committed very few resources and troops to Africa overall and more of a token force in the beginning. I know that oil had yet to be discovered anywhere near the scale that existed there at the time, so that wouldn't necessarily have been one of the objectives.
However, it seems that if Germany had properly executed such a campaign that culminated with the seizing of Suez, Malta and perhaps even Gibraltar it would have been a major blow to England and would have provided a stable backdoor for Germany.
Suppose this:
German forces press home the incirclement of British and French troops at Dunkirk at the same time Luftwaffe forces gain and maintain control of the air over the coast and all Kriegsmarine assets both surface and subsurface make a no holds barred push into the channel...... England is forced to her knees!
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