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The ricochet shot was employed against formations when they were a few hundred yards distant and firing solid iron balls had the maximum effect. Once an attacking formation closed to 150 yards or so, the gunners would switch to cannister which wasn't impacted by mud.
Napoleonic era tactics called for infantry to shake themselves out into a defensive line when faced with artillery, but crowd together in squares when faced with cavalry. Standard practice for the attacker was to use artillery to force the opponent to fan out to mimimize casualties, and then send in the cavalry which could sweep through or over the loose formation. Or..they would threaten the infantry with cavalry, forcing them to group up into a convenient bunch where artillery became far more effective.
Inability to bring your guns forward when attacking meant that not only were you losing the impact of of bombarding your opponent at close range, but it also rendered your cavalry useless because the enemy could form and remain in squares.
I suspect that this is what Napoleon had in mind when deciding to wait for the field to dry.
I'm sure Napoleon had exactly that in mind in terms of maneuvering his artillery into position to press the Allied infantry. Unfortunately even after the delay, they failed to use their artillery for that purpose until the battle was all but lost and the ground never really dried out, so they were still maneuvering in unfavorable conditions.
My point about rendering the Allied artillery equally ineffective was more about during the French advance. The wet ground would hamper their ricochet fire and minimize casualties on the advance. Cannister was something that would have to be overcome regardless and was not used on the offensive side as they would not move their guns in that close.
In terms of using artillery at close range, it was certainly preferable, but not wholly necessary to defeat infantry squares. In fact, many commanders of the era were cautious to move their guns forward until they had achieved a clear advantage so as not to have their own guns overrun on a counterattack. Infantry stuck in formed squares was just as vulnerable to other infantry as they were to artillery as they could only bring 1/4th of their muskets to bear and the dense formation presented a ripe target.
Cannister shot would need to be dealt with regardless, but this is where the cavalry comes in. The standard square tactic was to use the infantry to shield the guns (or at least their crews) from the cavalry, only uncovering when the cavalry was withdrawing to fire into them.
Say I don't have any artillery to bring along, I can still render my enemy helpless as long as I have my cavalry. Advance with the infantry and deploy into lines just outside cannister range. Charge with the cavalry forcing the enemy infantry into squares, which will also render their guns silent. Advance with my infantry to engage the enemy squares. They then have two choices, break the square to fight my infantry and risk being decimated by my cavalry or remain in square and be torn apart by my infantry. They could counter charge with their own cavalry, but this is where my reserves come in to press the attack.
So, while artillery was certainly a key component it was not wholly necessary in order to press an attack and achieve victory. Throughout the battle of Waterloo the French failure was in not properly utilizing their infantry and cavalry in unison, something they had done to spectacular effect in multiple prior engagements (remember also that Napoleons force at Waterloo was composed of veterans, not green recruits). D'Erlon's first assault lacked major cavalry support and faltered when charged by the British cavalry (which pretty much spent themselves in that charge). Ney then foolishly charged his cavalry without infantry support and the Allied squares rendered his cavlary useless. Had either attack utilized sufficient infantry and cavalry and been supported by the reserve, they could have broken the Allied line.
Infantry stuck in formed squares was just as vulnerable to other infantry as they were to artillery as they could only bring 1/4th of their muskets to bear and the dense formation presented a ripe target.
True, however mud is no friend to infantry either. The offense is required to advance through it while the defense, assuming it holds, doesn't have that mobility problem.
Mud doesn't help anyone in war, but it hurts the offense more. An advance on dry ground which is subject to two volleys from the defense's muskets in the time needed to close with them, is going to be subject to four or five volleys when the charge must be made through mud. If the enemy is stationed on any sort of a slope or high ground, the mud factor is multiplied several times over.
I respect your thinking on this matter, but it is hard for me to conclude that Napoleon would have been any better off had he sent the attack slogging off at 8 am. The advantages he might have gained would have been checkmated by more hostile terrain.
Grandstander, upon further reflection your position in the correct one. I made the same mistake I often accuse others of. Looking back at an event and criticizing a decision made with the benefit of hindsight. While Napoleons delay ultimately did seal his fate (another four "Prussian free" hours may have seen the French finally get their act together) there is no way that Napoleon knew that the Prussians would arrive when they did and that Grouchy had failed in his mission. On the morning of the battle, Napoleon made the best choice he could with the information he had, delaying the attack would improve the terrain in his favor. It is not fair to criticize him for making the choice most commanders would have made given what Napoleon actually knew.
Regardless of the delay, the battle was still winnable tactically in the moments and ways that I described earlier. Napoleons fault was not the delay, but the way the battle was managed with the French missing opportunity after opportunity to achieve a victory.
Grandstander, upon further reflection your position in the correct one. I made the same mistake I often accuse others of. Looking back at an event and criticizing a decision made with the benefit of hindsight. While Napoleons delay ultimately did seal his fate (another four "Prussian free" hours may have seen the French finally get their act together) there is no way that Napoleon knew that the Prussians would arrive when they did and that Grouchy had failed in his mission. On the morning of the battle, Napoleon made the best choice he could with the information he had, delaying the attack would improve the terrain in his favor. It is not fair to criticize him for making the choice most commanders would have made given what Napoleon actually knew.
Regardless of the delay, the battle was still winnable tactically in the moments and ways that I described earlier. Napoleons fault was not the delay, but the way the battle was managed with the French missing opportunity after opportunity to achieve a victory.
You are a poster with grace, GOAT. You have put your finger square on what I think of as "Ewell Syndrome"....as in all of the folks over the years who have chosen to argue that had Ewell attacked Cemetery Hill on the early evening of July 1st, the Confederates would have won at Gettysburg. No where in any of that analysis have I come across someone who incorporated the idea that such an assault by Ewell, might well have been repulsed with great loss...that Ewell's evaluation of things at the time he was facing them...might have been the correct evaluation.
In the aftermath, the correctness of a combat situation decision is typically judged by whether or not the tactics decided upon, worked. However, the correctness of a decision before the outcome is known, is actually a matter of the commander reviewing what is known to him and projecting a probable outcome. If all the appearances suggest that something cannot be done and should not be attempted, that later we learn that indeed it could have been done, doesn't invalidate the original analysis.
You are a poster with grace, GOAT. You have put your finger square on what I think of as "Ewell Syndrome"....as in all of the folks over the years who have chosen to argue that had Ewell attacked Cemetery Hill on the early evening of July 1st, the Confederates would have won at Gettysburg. No where in any of that analysis have I come across someone who incorporated the idea that such an assault by Ewell, might well have been repulsed with great loss...that Ewell's evaluation of things at the time he was facing them...might have been the correct evaluation.
In the aftermath, the correctness of a combat situation decision is typically judged by whether or not the tactics decided upon, worked. However, the correctness of a decision before the outcome is known, is actually a matter of the commander reviewing what is known to him and projecting a probable outcome. If all the appearances suggest that something cannot be done and should not be attempted, that later we learn that indeed it could have been done, doesn't invalidate the original analysis.
Very well said and thank you for the kind words. I endeavor to be a contributor to this forum that is willing to admit when my line of thought or reasoning is flawed; versus one who blindly pounds their position home never considering they may be wrong, or worse yet realizes they are wrong, but still continues to defend their original position.
I find in many cases that if you can put aside your knowledge of the results of decisions, your personal political leanings and limit yourself to what was actually known to the decision maker, most people would have arrived at the same choice that was historically made. That isn't to say that there isn't any room for a little alt-history to discuss the what-ifs, but one should always keep in mind the actual facts that surrounded the events.
From what I have read, Napoleon had a veteran, highly capable army at Waterloo, although lacking enough cavalry, which had been the case since the disaster in Russia, 1812.
It was fortunate for Wellington and Blucher that the Emperor chose to keep Marshal Davout, his best subordinate, in Paris. The " Iron Marshal" may well have made for a different outcome at Waterloo.
But, again, unless a French victory was followed by the total destruction of the Allied & Prussian armies, such as was done at Jena and Auerstadt, the campaign itself would likely have eventually resulted in Napoleon's ultimate defeat.
If so, perhaps, Napoleon may have been able to negotiate a surrender that kept him on the throne; how would the 19th century in Europe then played out?
Then again, after how his exile on Elba turned out, I don't believe the Allies would allow him to remain in power. Off to St.Helena!
From what I have read, Napoleon had a veteran, highly capable army at Waterloo, although lacking enough cavalry, which had been the case since the disaster in Russia, 1812.
It was fortunate for Wellington and Blucher that the Emperor chose to keep Marshal Davout, his best subordinate, in Paris. The " Iron Marshal" may well have made for a different outcome at Waterloo.
But, again, unless a French victory was followed by the total destruction of the Allied & Prussian armies, such as was done at Jena and Auerstadt, the campaign itself would likely have eventually resulted in Napoleon's ultimate defeat.
If so, perhaps, Napoleon may have been able to negotiate a surrender that kept him on the throne; how would the 19th century in Europe then played out?
Then again, after how his exile on Elba turned out, I don't believe the Allies would allow him to remain in power. Off to St.Helena!
Napoleons army was indeed a veteran force at Waterloo. He had foregone conscriptions to raise an army for the campaign instead relying upon veterans from his previous campaigns who rallied to him. He easily had the best force on the field at Waterloo.
However, contrary to your statement, the cavalry Napoleon brought with him to Waterloo was arguably his strongest arm. He had 14,000 veteran cavalry and counted among them 14 regiments of armored heavy cavalry (cuirassiers) as well as 7 regiments of incredibly versatile lancers (chevau-legers). The Grande Armee generally operated with a stated ratio of 1/5th - 1/6th of the force composed of cavalry of all types. The force at Waterloo operated at 1/5th of the force as cavalry. The Allied cavalry amounted to around 11,000 total, but they lacked any armored troops, had almost no lancers and were of inferior quality and poorly utilized. What is also true is that the cavalry on the field at Waterloo represented virtually the entire amount of veteran cavalry that the French could field, these troops to an extent were irreplacable.
I agree that Davout would have most likely had a large impact on the battle. I doubt he would have made the same mistakes that Ney made that ultimately cost the French the battle. However, Davout was serving a very needed role back in Paris rebuilding the French army, the army that they needed to continue the campaign past any victories they may have achieved that year.
Overall, I think you are correcting though. Any victory at Waterloo would have most likely been short lived and a larger coalition force was already on its way to France, a force that even Davout's new army would have been dwarfed by. I can't imagine a scenario wherein the Coalition would have allowed Napoleon to remain in power. France with Napoleon was simply a non-starter for any negotiations.
Napoleons army was indeed a veteran force at Waterloo. He had foregone conscriptions to raise an army for the campaign instead relying upon veterans from his previous campaigns who rallied to him. He easily had the best force on the field at Waterloo.
However, contrary to your statement, the cavalry Napoleon brought with him to Waterloo was arguably his strongest arm. He had 14,000 veteran cavalry and counted among them 14 regiments of armored heavy cavalry (cuirassiers) as well as 7 regiments of incredibly versatile lancers (chevau-legers). The Grande Armee generally operated with a stated ratio of 1/5th - 1/6th of the force composed of cavalry of all types. The force at Waterloo operated at 1/5th of the force as cavalry. The Allied cavalry amounted to around 11,000 total, but they lacked any armored troops, had almost no lancers and were of inferior quality and poorly utilized. What is also true is that the cavalry on the field at Waterloo represented virtually the entire amount of veteran cavalry that the French could field, these troops to an extent were irreplacable.
I agree that Davout would have most likely had a large impact on the battle. I doubt he would have made the same mistakes that Ney made that ultimately cost the French the battle. However, Davout was serving a very needed role back in Paris rebuilding the French army, the army that they needed to continue the campaign past any victories they may have achieved that year.
Overall, I think you are correcting though. Any victory at Waterloo would have most likely been short lived and a larger coalition force was already on its way to France, a force that even Davout's new army would have been dwarfed by. I can't imagine a scenario wherein the Coalition would have allowed Napoleon to remain in power. France with Napoleon was simply a non-starter for any negotiations.
It seems as if I have forgotten a good bit that I have read about Waterloo, at least in regards to French cavalry strength. You are correct that old Boney had substantial cavalry.
But, great victories/defeats often hinge on a few minor twists of fate.
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You are correct that old Boney had substantial cavalry.
