How was life under Imperial Japan vs life under Nazi Germany? (WW2, war)

[Time and Space]

You so often hear, read, about life under Nazi Germany and Adolph Hitlers regime...but I very rarely, if ever, hear about life under Imperial Japan, during that same time period...

I mean how was life under Emperor Hirohito?

You don't generally hear about how Japanese citizens viewed their emperor, or how he treated them...

I mean was it a Love Love relationship?
Or more of a Fear me type relationship?

You never really hear much about the Emperor, citizen relationship...

You often hear how those under Hitler secretly feared him, and thus 'pretended' to go along with his ideology...

But what of Japan, I mean did the people of Japan really truly 'love' their Emporer?, did he treat them well?

Was it a dictatorship?, or was it similuar to how the Royal Class of Britian rules?

If there's any Japanese citizens how were alive back then or in direct line of decendants of people who were, I'd really like to hear from you...

Cause Imperial Japan is a part of history that just seems to get over shadowed by Nazi Germany all the time....

More info would be appreciated...

[NJGOAT]

Interesting questions and certainly worthy of discussion. I don't have much to say other than my own limited understanding of it. Overall, the emperor was not a daily force in peoples lives. Most Japanese had never even heard the emperor speak until the surrender announcement. He was held up as a divine god-like figure that was to be revered and respected, but he had little to do with how people went about their daily lives. While Germans could turn on their radios and listen to Hitler, the Japanese couldn't do that and listen to the emperor.

The Japanese emperors are also unique in that while supposedly being all powerful virtual deities, they tended to wield very little actual power. During the Tokugawa Shogunate years (from roughly the 1100's) until the Meiji Restoration (mid-late 1800's) the emperor was nothing more than a figurehead. Even after the Meiji restoration the emperors power was derived from the coalitions that he built around himself. For example Hirohito upon assuming the throne waged an endless battle of balance among his cabinet members and keeping the military in check. In fact, it was ultimately the military that ruled Japan from the time of the Meiji Restoration until after WW2 and the emperor while figuratively in command, was always at the mercy of keeping his cabinet members and the military happy.

I don't have much to say about the average Japanese persons view on it. Japan was a very reigmented and classed society. The emperor was a god and his word the ultimate authority. Decisions and orders given in his name were followed without question. This isn't to say that there weren't average Japanese who thought those decisions may have been wrong, but there is little evidence of common dissention like you can find in Germany. Any dissention was generally in the ruling classes ranks.

ETA: The correct comparison is not Hitler to the Emperor. It would be Hitler to Tojo. In that way Hirohito was to Tojo what Hindneburg was to Hitler. I think that is a better comparison of the roles and powers.

[Escort Rider]

Originally Posted by NJGOAT

The correct comparison is not Hitler to the Emperor. It would be Hitler to Tojo. In that way Hirohito was to Tojo what Hindneburg was to Hitler. I think that is a better comparison of the roles and powers.

I understand the point you are trying to make about the roles of Hiltler and Emperor Hirohito being different (and I agree they were quite different), but I think your comparison has introduced a different inaccuracy. First, prime minister Tojo never held anywhere near the absolute power that Hitler wielded. Tojo had to resign after one of the major military reversals (if memory serves it was the fall of Saipan in the Marianas). Second, Hitler depended on Hindenburg only to get his start on the road to having absolute power; Hindenburg then died in 1934, and was thus not a figure in World War II at all, whereas the Emperor continued to be revered until his death many years after the war ended. No one was in a position superior to that of Hitler after Hindenburg's death, while the Emperor continued to be superior to Tojo even if he (the Emperor) did not exercise power on a daily basis. He can be called a figurehead, but he was more than that; when push came to shove and the Emperor grew a pair of balls and insisted on the surrender during the cabinet discussions of approximately August 9, 10, and 11 of 1945 (sorry, but I am lazy and have not verified those dates), his influence was sufficient to carry the day.

[jtur88]

Originally Posted by Time and Space

You often hear how those under Hitler secretly feared him, and thus 'pretended' to go along with his ideology...

What one "often hears" is not necessarily true. Is there any substantial body of evidence that Aryan Germans (the great majority of them) "feared" Hitler. They were indoctrinated to think of Hitler as their protector, against non-Aryans who were threatening their well-being and blocking their progress as the master race and draining off their well-deserved wealth. Pretty much the same way that Americans now feel about Hispanics, Muslims and Blacks, and not many white Americans "fear" suggestions of genocide in Hispanic communities or wars of aggression in the Middle East or even Homeland Security concentration camps.

[Time and Space]

Originally Posted by jtur88

What one "often hears" is not necessarily true. Is there any substantial body of evidence that Aryan Germans (the great majority of them) "feared" Hitler. They were indoctrinated to think of Hitler as their protector, against non-Aryans who were threatening their well-being and blocking their progress as the master race and draining off their well-deserved wealth. Pretty much the same way that Americans now feel about Hispanics, Muslims and Blacks, and not many white Americans "fear" suggestions of genocide in Hispanic communities or wars of aggression in the Middle East or even Homeland Security concentration camps.

Wow, I've never examined it from that angle before...comparing Hitlers Ayron Germanies fears or 'legitimate' fears with 'white Americas' or a better term than 'white' would be 'generic' Americas fears of Hispanic or middle eastern immigration...

note* I prefer generic American over white American, cause it's more inclusive...in that there are probably other citizens who share 'white' Americans concerns, but they themselves aren't 'white'...

Like say a middle class black family doing well...although they are not 'white' ethnically, they still hold the same values and fears, concerns as a kind of Apple Pie generic American...like the Huxtables (The Coseby Show)...

Kind of a mainstream generic culture that have more in common rather than less...

Since American is not a monolithic nation...it complicates things when trying to make a point or make comparisions at times...

But back to your post....

I totally see what your saying in that Hitlers fears of non Aryon peoples or intent, could be compared to Mark Levin, or Micheal Savages fears of brown skinned Mexican illegal immigration...

The only and major difference in that is our Government is set up differenlty...

And at the time when Hitler started stirring all that sentiment up against the Jews and others, he wasn't in power...he was more like a Ron Paul running for office....

So I figure most just assumed he'd be another elected official, make a few changes, and society would go on as usual...but that wasn't the case...he went on to consolidate power...and begin to execute his rivals...(Saddam Hussien, or Iraq, advanced into power in a very similuar way...and actually modeled much of his style and Government after 3rd Reich principles, even down to the national symbol)

Most of the general public of Germany were totally unaware of these activities...

Nazism soon became like a all consuming cult...it's like if you weren't apart of it, you were against it...like peer pressure...

Fast forward a few years into the war...by this time the citizens knew they were at war, that people were dying, that Germany was invading other countries, and had plans of mass conquest...

It is during this period, when defections have been documented, that I referenced, 'were they serving him out of love and loyalty or dreaded fear of being shot in the head if they did not'...?

[TonyT]

While the popular perception is that Hirohito was just a figurehead and virtually powerless to check the influence of the Japanese military, that really wasn’t the case. The Meiji Constitution of 1889 stated that because the emperor was descended from a long, unbroken imperial bloodline, on that basis alone, the monarchy held greater authority than the constitutional government. The constitution defined the emperor as being “sacred and inviolable” and holding the titles of “Head of the Empire” and “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces”. As such, only he had the power to declare war or conclude peace treaties. The emperor could call the Imperial Diet, or assembly, into session or dissolve it. He could issue imperial ordinances which had the force of law. And he alone had the authority to appoint or dismiss ministers of state, civil officials, and military officers. In addition, as head of the state religion (Shinto), the emperor was himself considered a divine being and thus an object of worship. While it is true the constitution did not provide for direct imperial rule and created layers of bureaucracy through which he was to exercise power, the structure of the document was such that it gave the emperor the ability to exert a tremendous amount of influence over the government if and when he chose to.

The ascension of Hirohito to the throne in 1926 ushered in a revival of an ultranationalist ideology known as “kodo-ha” or the “imperial way”. The central theme of “kodo-ha” was that the emperor was the living embodiment of Japan itself and a symbol of all things virtuous and just. It envisioned the re-establishment of direct imperial rule, with the military serving as the instrument by which the emperor could exert control over Japan. “Kodo-ha” also emphasized the moral and racial superiority of the Japanese as a people and the responsibility they held to act as the driving force to rid Asia of the corrupting influences of the West. By 1932, the “kodo-ha” ideology had taken a firm hold within the junior officer corps of the Japanese army, largely due to the influence of General Sadao Araki. Adherents of the “imperial way” were stridently anti-communist and believed that Japan’s military might should be directed toward the Soviet Union. Opposing the “imperial way faction” was what was known as the “control faction”. The “control faction” which was considered moderate (and of which General Hideki Tojo was a prominent member) wished to construct a corporatist military state in Japan. They sought to consolidate Japan’s hold on Manchuria and make further inroads into China. They believed that exploitation of these regions held the key to Japan’s goal of achieving economic independence and would provide the resources necessary to build a military equal to that of any nation in the world. The “control faction” also wished to foster good relations with the Soviet Union.

Tensions between the two factions finally reached a breaking point and resulted in what was referred to as the “February 26 Incident”. On that day in 1936, “imperial way” junior officers, supported by approximately 1,400 troops, attempted a coup aimed at “freeing” the emperor from those forces which they believed were usurping his right to rule. The troops took control of central Tokyo and attempted to seize the Diet building, Army Ministry, Metropolitan Police headquarters. Death squads fanned out across the city, targeting high ranking government officials, including the prime minister, Admiral Keisuke Okada. Admiral Okada barely escaped being assassinated as did Admiral Kantaro Suzuki, then serving as Grand Chamberlain to the Emperor, and Count Nobuaki Makino, who was one of Hirohito’s chief advisors. Not as fortunate were Finance Minister, Korekiyo Takahashi; Keeper of the Imperial Seals, Admiral Makoto Saito; and Inspector General of Military Training, General Jotaro Watanabe, all of whom were either shot or stabbed to death. Tokyo was placed under martial law and a standoff ensued between the rebellious troops and those loyal to the government. The coup finally collapsed after three days when, instead of supporting the military action being taken in his name, the emperor labeled the troops “mutineers” and ordered the army to put the rebellion down.

The failed coup led to the suppression of the “imperial way faction” within the ranks of the army as well as the forced retirement of several senior officers, including General Araki. With their one key rival essentially neutered, the “control faction” moved swiftly to cement their hold on the army and enhance their position within the government. The massive buildup of the armed forces they desired began in earnest and Japan’s foreign policy became increasingly belligerent. The army’s next step was to unleash the “Kempeitai” or military police, upon the Japanese populace. Tasked with “safeguarding” the empire, the Kempeitai, numbering some 10,000 members in Japan alone, employed a variety of methods, including but not limited to, censorship, intimidation, arrest and torture, to stamp out internal dissent and root out so called “enemies of the state”. In October 1940, the “Imperial Rule Assistance Association” was created for the purpose of indoctrinating the nation into what can best be described as a uniquely Japanese form of fascism. By 1942, what independent political parties that still remained were incorporated into the “Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association”, completing the military’s goal of creating a one party state in Japan.

Though there were certainly some inside the Japanese power structure who were alarmed and even hostile to the military’s manuevering to take over of the government, the emperor was not among them. If anything, Hirohito, either directly or behind the scenes, did much to aid them. He had two main reasons for doing so. For one, he was grateful to the men of the “control faction” for their role in preventing Japan from slipping into anarchy during the “February 26 Incident”. Secondly and most importantly, Hirohito was not really opposed to the direction the military wished to take Japan. So when his advisors counseled the emperor not to approve the army’s idea to go to war against China because it would likely increase tensions with the West, he ignored them and involved himself in the planning of the campaign. When concerns were raised about the fact that the cabinet was continually putting forth military men to serve in key posts such as prime minister, Hirohito saw nothing wrong with it because he believed it would create a more stable government.

This mindset ultimately led to the willing acceptance of General Tojo as prime minister in October 1941, even though Tojo had made no secret of the fact that he desired to take Japan to war against the West, or more specifically, the United States. In his first audience with Hirohito after assuming office, Tojo was told to do one of two things; reach some sort of peace agreement with the U.S. or prepare Japan for war. Because Tojo had neither the interest in pursuing a diplomatic solution nor believed the possibility existed to reach one, his efforts to do so were no more than half hearted. When he reported to Hirohito that he could see no way to avoid war, the emperor did not urge Tojo to try harder. He simply said “The existence of our empire is threatened..there is nothing else we can do” and gave Tojo permission to go ahead with the plan to attack Pearl Harbor. And long after it became apparent that the tides of war had turned against Japan and those close to the emperor, including members of the imperial family, urged him to dismiss Tojo and sue for peace, Hirohito refused. His refusal was based partly on a personal affection for Tojo but also on his belief that Tojo was the person best suited to lead the government in a time of war.

Unable to sway Hirohito and desperate to end the war, his brothers, Princes Takamatsu and Mikasa, his uncle Prince Higashikuni, as well as Prince Konoe, met on July 8, 1944 and agreed to stage a palace coup which would force Hirohito to abdicate in favor of his ten year old son, Akihito. Prince Takamatsu was to serve as regent for Akihito. Tojo would be dismissed and replaced by Prince Higashikuni as prime minister who would then open immediate peace negotiations with the Allies. News of the plot soon reached the ears of Marquis Koichi Kido, who was both Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and a close adviser to the emperor. He told Hirohito, who was finally shocked into the realization that retaining Tojo was no longer an option if he wished to remain on the throne. The emperor withdrew his support for Tojo and reluctantly accepted the prime minister’s resignation on July 17, 1944.

Yet even with Tojo gone, the war continued, not just because the military wished it to, but because it was a reflection of the “imperial will”. At every imperial conference, Hirohito urged his military leaders to fight on and give Japan that one great victory he believed would win the country more favorable peace terms from the United States. But that victory never materialized and it wasn’t until the surrender of Germany in May of 1945 that the “imperial will” changed, though only slightly; the war was to go on while his government aggressively pursued an acceptable peace agreement with the Allies. Two atomic bombs and the entry of the Soviet Union into the war finally brought home to Hirohito something those closest to him had known for over a year; the war was lost. And so it was that on August 9, 1945 when asked if the “imperial will” was to fight until the bitter end or surrender, Hirohito endorsed surrender.

Responding to a question posed to him in 1948 at his trial for war crimes, General Tojo said the following: “There is no Japanese subject who would go against the will of His Majesty; more particularly, among high officials of the Japanese government”. In a single sentence, Tojo revealed the truth about the emperor; Hirohito was never a puppet. The militarization of Japan, the drive for territorial expansion, and the war itself, all took place because Hirohito both allowed and supported it. But rather than take responsibility for the role he played in all of it, the emperor permitted his retainers, with the assistance of U. S. occupation authorities, to rewrite history and portray him as a mere bystander lacking the authority to affect the events taking place around him. It is said that upon hearing of Tojo’s execution, Hirohito retreated to his office and wept. One can only wonder if his tears were simply over the loss of a man whom he liked and respected or out of regret for the role he played in Tojo being made the scapegoat for crimes committed implementing the “imperial will”.

[markg91359]

Responding to a question posed to him in 1948 at his trial for war crimes, General Tojo said the following: “There is no Japanese subject who would go against the will of His Majesty; more particularly, among high officials of the Japanese government”. In a single sentence, Tojo revealed the truth about the emperor; Hirohito was never a puppet. The militarization of Japan, the drive for territorial expansion, and the war itself, all took place because Hirohito both allowed and supported it. But rather than take responsibility for the role he played in all of it, the emperor permitted his retainers, with the assistance of U. S. occupation authorities, to rewrite history and portray him as a mere bystander lacking the authority to affect the events taking place around him. It is said that upon hearing of Tojo’s execution, Hirohito retreated to his office and wept. One can only wonder if his tears were simply over the loss of a man whom he liked and respected or out of regret for the role he played in Tojo being made the scapegoat for crimes committed implementing the “imperial will”.

As usual, TonyT, you leave me absolutely envious of the extent of your knowledge and facts about World War II.

I just wanted to add one thing to this authoritative and excellent post. The effort to protect the emperor from culpability for war crimes came from literally the top. It came from General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Army of the Pacific, or SCAP. The only concession that the Japanese got when they surrendered to the Allied Powers in 1945 was an agreement that they could keep the emperor, but he would be subject to the SCAP. MacArthur recognized from his years of service in the Orient that the American occupation of Japan would be far easier if the Japanese were allowed to retain their emperor and if he openly capitulated to American authority.

Part of this plan was to avoid implicating the emperor in war crimes. Its an amazing part of history, but even though Tojo and other high Japanese officials pretty much knew they were guaranteed the death penalty, they willingly cooperated with American authorities during the war crimes trials to protect the "good name" of the emperor.

The Japanese have never accepted the notion they are responsible for World War II. Their position appears to be that the USA began the war in 1937, when it imposed an embargo on Japan because Japan had invaded China. Hirohito and the Japanese generals undoubtedly felt that the embargo justified their deadly sneak attack on Pearl Harbor.

Even if one could somehow rationalize the notion of attacking another nation before a declaration of war was delivered, one cannot justify many of the horrible things the Japanese did. They have never owed up and taken responsible for the "Rape of Nanking", the "Bataan Death March", "The Comfort Women", or brutal prison camps that resulted in the deaths of one third of all Allied prisoners of war.

I remember seeing pictures of Hirohito over the years until his death 44 years after the end of the war in 1989. Appearances are deceptive. This small, mild mannered man was probably more responsible for the brutal war in the Pacific than any other single individual. Finally, he didn't use his overwhelming influence to end the war until the very bitter end arrived.

[NJGOAT]

While I think both of the previous posts are very informative and well written, there is still some level of questioning over the exact role that Hirohito played. It was obvious that he was not a simple puppet, but it is also not obvious that he was the direct mastermind. It's no secret that the emperor's position was always tenuous and reliant upon the support base that he formed around himself, particularly that of the military. In that context, the question remains as to whether could Hirohito have really stopped the war or prevented it from happening if he wanted to?

There is much written in Yamamoto's biography about his belief that the emperor was opposed to war but was everntually pressured into it by the military hardliners. Hirohito had grown up believing that his sole mission in life was to defend the throne and institution of the emperor. His biographies all paint this as an undercurrent that governed everything he did. Virtually all of the primary source records that would lend a glimpse into the compex relationship between the emperor, his cabinet and the military were all destroyed. The records that remain are generally personal diaries and of those there are only a few in existence from which the counter-position of a deeply involved, mastermind Hirohito is derived.

Do I think he is innocent? Not in the least.

Do I think he masterminded and drove the whole thing? I'm not convinced. I think Hirohito did what he needed to in order to maintain his position and throne and some of that involved some pretty horrendous things.

[X14Freak]

Originally Posted by markg91359

As usual, TonyT, you leave me absolutely envious of the extent of your knowledge and facts about World War II.

I just wanted to add one thing to this authoritative and excellent post. The effort to protect the emperor from culpability for war crimes came from literally the top. It came from General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Army of the Pacific, or SCAP. The only concession that the Japanese got when they surrendered to the Allied Powers in 1945 was an agreement that they could keep the emperor, but he would be subject to the SCAP. MacArthur recognized from his years of service in the Orient that the American occupation of Japan would be far easier if the Japanese were allowed to retain their emperor and if he openly capitulated to American authority.

Part of this plan was to avoid implicating the emperor in war crimes. Its an amazing part of history, but even though Tojo and other high Japanese officials pretty much knew they were guaranteed the death penalty, they willingly cooperated with American authorities during the war crimes trials to protect the "good name" of the emperor.

The Japanese have never accepted the notion they are responsible for World War II. Their position appears to be that the USA began the war in 1937, when it imposed an embargo on Japan because Japan had invaded China. Hirohito and the Japanese generals undoubtedly felt that the embargo justified their deadly sneak attack on Pearl Harbor.

Even if one could somehow rationalize the notion of attacking another nation before a declaration of war was delivered, one cannot justify many of the horrible things the Japanese did. They have never owed up and taken responsible for the "Rape of Nanking", the "Bataan Death March", "The Comfort Women", or brutal prison camps that resulted in the deaths of one third of all Allied prisoners of war.

I remember seeing pictures of Hirohito over the years until his death 44 years after the end of the war in 1989. Appearances are deceptive. This small, mild mannered man was probably more responsible for the brutal war in the Pacific than any other single individual. Finally, he didn't use his overwhelming influence to end the war until the very bitter end arrived.

Not to defend Japan or anything but why should we care whether the Japanese own up to their crimes? Very few people of any nation ever own up to their crimes unless forced to like Germany. I see few Americans ever own up to their crimes in the Philippines (some of which was just as brutal as the crimes the Japanese committed during the Bataan Death March)and Haiti. The Russians, Chinese, Dutch, and the Belgians aren't that different as well from the Japanese in more or less hiding their crimes. Also, this topic has strayed a little in that it doesn't discuss what life was like in Japan during that era. I also hope you don't actually really think Americans care about the dead Chinese in Nanking because most don't and didn't (they only lifted anti-Chinese immigration laws in the 60s) since the Chinese are now more or less considered the enemy and were also considered racially inferior and feared as the "Yellow Peril".

[Time and Space]

Originally Posted by NJGOAT

Do I think he masterminded and drove the whole thing? I'm not convinced. I think Hirohito did what he needed to in order to maintain his position and throne and some of that involved some pretty horrendous things.

I relate this last part to say any popular talk show host...let's take Savage...Savage basically has become a prisoner to 'himself'...

You build a following based on your on air persona...and after a while..that's what they want...and if you try to change, they will remind you who your suppose to be...

So i can see how in order to stay in power often...you have to live up to a kind of 'characture' version of yourself that may or may not still be who you really are...