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That said, I think they did make a major blunder in that they could have done a lot more damage during their attack on Pearl Harbor but instead chose to retreat. Specifically, they did not destroy the navy yard, the fuel tanks, the submarine pens, and much of the other infrastructure on Oahu. These would have taken a long time to rebuild and Pearl Harbor's value as a military base would have been much reduced for months if not years.
Our friend Wikipedia points out the problems that Nagumo faced which resulted in the aborting of the planned third attack.
Nagumo felt if he launched a third strike, he would be risking three quarters of the Combined Fleet's strength to wipe out the remaining targets (which included the facilities) while suffering higher aircraft losses.[79]
The location of the American carriers remained unknown. In addition, the admiral was concerned his force was now within range of American land-based bombers.[79]
A third wave would have required substantial preparation and turnaround time, and would have meant returning planes would have had to land at night. At the time, only the (British) Royal Navy had developed night carrier techniques, so this was a substantial risk.[81]
The task force's fuel situation did not permit him to remain in waters north of Pearl Harbor much longer, since he was at the very limit of logistical support.
He believed the second strike had essentially satisfied the main objective of his mission—the neutralization of the Pacific Fleet[84]
They could have at least launched another, third wave. With all the airfields and the battleships already hit, the only thing left for them to bomb would have been the infrastructure. Not saying they would have been able to destroy everything but certainly they could have done a lot more damage.
The threat of the American carriers was there to some extent but at the same time I don't think the Japanese fleet was ever sighted by the Americans.
What they should have done is taken out the storage, maintenance, and dry docks at Pearl, and the huge fuel depots and ammo and torpedo storage at Pearl, Hickham, and elsewhere. That would have crippled the American Pacific Fleet (incuding the CVs) for at least six months to a year, according to Admiral Nimitz.
In retrospect, we can all be glad that Japan was inspired by kendo in its attack plan at Pearl, and risked everything on one desperate, daring, and violent strike.
What they should have done is taken out the storage, maintenance, and dry docks at Pearl, and the huge fuel depots and ammo and torpedo storage at Pearl, Hickham, and elsewhere.
Again, I question whether the Japanese airfleet was capable of doing so even if they'd intended to. It's not like the Japanese strike force was made up of hundreds of Lancasters or B-17s. Sinking ships was pretty much what it was intended for (and capable of).
Again, I question whether the Japanese airfleet was capable of doing so even if they'd intended to. It's not like the Japanese strike force was made up of hundreds of Lancasters or B-17s. Sinking ships was pretty much what it was intended for (and capable of).
True. But once they started the oil tanks burning, it would have been hellishly difficult to extinguish the fires. And the nearest alternative source of fuel oil was in California.
I wonder how many WWII battles were lost due to fuel shortages. It's unglamorous but crucial. (Certainly Rommel's maneuvers were limited in North Africa). And the near-total blockade of Japan by the US submarine fleet was a decisive factor. Even if the Japanese could have kept their fleets off the bottom of the sea, they would have been hard-pressed to fuel them.
Again, I question whether the Japanese airfleet was capable of doing so even if they'd intended to. It's not like the Japanese strike force was made up of hundreds of Lancasters or B-17s. Sinking ships was pretty much what it was intended for (and capable of).
It was capable of doing it and it was in fact part of their mission. However, they chose not to for the reasons ovcatto posted earlier. Had they done it, it would have been a much more decisive blow then it actually turned out to be. Nimitz himself is quoted as saying that losing the drydocks and fuel stores at Pearl would have set the war back 12-18 months. Heck the Japanese could have done MORE harm to the US's ability to wage war had they simply ignored the ships and gone after the facilities first.
How so? Given the difficulty heavy British and American bombers had inflicting damage on German machine shops, powerhouses and oil production and storage facilities just how were the small, lightly armed carrier planes of the Japanese fleet going to do lasting damage? Think about it.
There was never really an opportunity. First they needed to completely neutralize the US navy. As devastating as the attack on Pearl Harbor was, it wasn't sufficient. They needed a second blow approximately 6 months after Pearl Harbor. But the Battle of Midway did not exactly go according to Japanese plans.
Also remember the US military bases on Hawaii were well fortified and could not be captured by simply landing troops there. Taking Hawaii would have required months long committed seige, not unlike battles of Iwo Jima or Okinawa.
not to mention Nagumo's third wave never happened, and the carriers were not in port during the attack...
Quote:
Originally Posted by Yeledaf
What they should have done is taken out the storage, maintenance, and dry docks at Pearl, and the huge fuel depots and ammo and torpedo storage at Pearl, Hickham, and elsewhere. That would have crippled the American Pacific Fleet (incuding the CVs) for at least six months to a year, according to Admiral Nimitz.
In retrospect, we can all be glad that Japan was inspired by kendo in its attack plan at Pearl, and risked everything on one desperate, daring, and violent strike.
this.
Last edited by icecreamsandwich; 03-15-2012 at 09:19 AM..
How so? Given the difficulty heavy British and American bombers had inflicting damage on German machine shops, powerhouses and oil production and storage facilities just how were the small, lightly armed carrier planes of the Japanese fleet going to do lasting damage? Think about it.
OK, I've been thinking about it...
Do I think they were capable of launching a third wave to attack the facilities? Yes
Do I think they were capable of destroying them all? No
Do I think they were capable of doing damage to all and major damage to some? Yes
The Japanes employed two type of planes at Pearl that could bomb, the Val and Kate. The Val dive bomber was very accurate and could carry 1x550lb bomb and 2x160lb bombs. The Kate could have carried 1x1,760lb bomb or 2x550lb or 6x290lb. The Kate bombed from low altitude and was fairly accurate.
At Pearl there were around 50 fuel storage tanks. This is what the 25 or so around the sub base looked like:
Let's be honest here, they are pretty big targets and the majority are painted bright white. Any of the bombs landing even near those tanks would have destroyed the tank. Now, the type of fuel in the tanks is hard to ignite, but if it did ignite (no reason to think it wouldn't with all the bombs landing) it would have utterly destroyed large swaths of that area, especially if the containment berms were also damaged which was pretty much a sure thing.
The second target to me was the drydocks. Here is what the drydocks at Pearl looked like at the time:
The one on the left was a floating dock and the only one left at Pearl after the attack as YFD-2 was destroyed when the USS Shaw blew up while inside it (you can see YFD-2 and the USS Shaw in the second dock from the right). Getting another floating dock to Pearl took the US almost a year after the attack since it had to be built in the US and then pulled by tug to Hawaii. The other three docks, but particular the last two on the right are the important ones as these were the only ones that could handle carriers and battleships. Any damage to the locks, walls, etc. rendered the docks useless until they could be repaired. In this photo the battleship in the dock on the right is the Nevada.
Those would be my targets in a third wave and although I don't think I would destroy them all or completely, I think significant damage is realistic. The loss of the fuel especially would have been crippling. I ran the numbers out in a nother thread, but the fuel in those tanks represented something like 24-36 months of operational fuel for the fleet and would have taken almost a year to replace the stores. That's one year with the fleet somewhat gimped in terms of how many ships they could deploy and where.
You also need to remember that Hawaii is an island. As such virtually everything the island needs has to be brought in from the mainland. Lose a crane, you're waiting not only the couple months to get another built, but the time it takes to get it to Hawaii and then set it up. Same deal with the drydock facilities, any machinery or tooling that was hit, etc. It's not that destroying these would render the American completely useless, but it certainly would have slowed them down.
Nimitz himself has been quoted as saying that if the Japanese had hit the fuel and drydocks it would have set the course of the Pacific War back 12-18 months. That's a lot of time for the Japanese to fortify their perimeter islands and exploit their gains. It's still game over for them, but it happens much later.
Obvisouly there was a lot of risk in a third wave, but even destroying 50% of the fuel and drydocks would have been a major blow to the US's ability to wage war over the next year.
British researched drydock disablement regarding St. Nazaire and decided aerial bombing would not work as the cassion doors are too thick for torpedoes and too small a target for vertical bombing and the pump houses too small to strike from the air with accuracy. Brits had to land forces to blow the machinery and then use the Campbeltown to damage the gates as you know.
Only the attack leader had a radio in IJN aircraft. So a strike against shore targets had to be planned prior to the first strike took off and worked into a possible timetable. IJN pilots trained to attack ships. They would need to be properly briefed regarding attacking fuel tanks and maint.shops. Agreed circular tanks are visible but buildings appear as buildings from the air. As we know for how Japan fought WWII is that they tend not to improvise. Did Genda even plan for a third strike when he was detailing the first two?
The Val dive bomber carried a 550lb bomb and 2x130lb
and the Kate a torpedo or 3x250lbs. The 1460lb bomb used against the BBs was a modified naval 14"AP shell. HE would have been needed for installations.
Not an impressive bomb load at all to loiter and attack shore installations.
BTW, as we know, U.S. AA fire was extremely heavy by the second strike resulting in 22 aircraft downed in that attempt. This has been commented on in Japanese accts. Heavier losses could be expected and the USN CVs were unaccounted for.
Nagumo took the type of gamble you are suggesting at Midway and lost four carriers.
Do I think they were capable of launching a third wave to attack the facilities? Yes
Do I think they were capable of destroying them all? No
Do I think they were capable of doing damage to all and major damage to some? Yes
The Japanes employed two type of planes at Pearl that could bomb, the Val and Kate. The Val dive bomber was very accurate and could carry 1x550lb bomb and 2x160lb bombs. The Kate could have carried 1x1,760lb bomb or 2x550lb or 6x290lb. The Kate bombed from low altitude and was fairly accurate.
At Pearl there were around 50 fuel storage tanks. This is what the 25 or so around the sub base looked like:
Let's be honest here, they are pretty big targets and the majority are painted bright white. Any of the bombs landing even near those tanks would have destroyed the tank. Now, the type of fuel in the tanks is hard to ignite, but if it did ignite (no reason to think it wouldn't with all the bombs landing) it would have utterly destroyed large swaths of that area, especially if the containment berms were also damaged which was pretty much a sure thing.
The second target to me was the drydocks. Here is what the drydocks at Pearl looked like at the time:
The one on the left was a floating dock and the only one left at Pearl after the attack as YFD-2 was destroyed when the USS Shaw blew up while inside it (you can see YFD-2 and the USS Shaw in the second dock from the right). Getting another floating dock to Pearl took the US almost a year after the attack since it had to be built in the US and then pulled by tug to Hawaii. The other three docks, but particular the last two on the right are the important ones as these were the only ones that could handle carriers and battleships. Any damage to the locks, walls, etc. rendered the docks useless until they could be repaired. In this photo the battleship in the dock on the right is the Nevada.
Those would be my targets in a third wave and although I don't think I would destroy them all or completely, I think significant damage is realistic. The loss of the fuel especially would have been crippling. I ran the numbers out in a nother thread, but the fuel in those tanks represented something like 24-36 months of operational fuel for the fleet and would have taken almost a year to replace the stores. That's one year with the fleet somewhat gimped in terms of how many ships they could deploy and where.
You also need to remember that Hawaii is an island. As such virtually everything the island needs has to be brought in from the mainland. Lose a crane, you're waiting not only the couple months to get another built, but the time it takes to get it to Hawaii and then set it up. Same deal with the drydock facilities, any machinery or tooling that was hit, etc. It's not that destroying these would render the American completely useless, but it certainly would have slowed them down.
Nimitz himself has been quoted as saying that if the Japanese had hit the fuel and drydocks it would have set the course of the Pacific War back 12-18 months. That's a lot of time for the Japanese to fortify their perimeter islands and exploit their gains. It's still game over for them, but it happens much later.
Obvisouly there was a lot of risk in a third wave, but even destroying 50% of the fuel and drydocks would have been a major blow to the US's ability to wage war over the next year.
Thanks for supporting my earlier argument.
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