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After watching this thread go round and round for a bit, I recalled that I wrote something on this same basic subject a couple of years back. I believe that in many respects, it made the point I suspect the OP has been trying to make, though in a more realistic and reasoned way. I will re-post it here in hopes that it will put things in their proper perspective:
It is rather sad that even with all the new material published in the last ten to fifteen years regarding World War II, people still take every opportunity they can to continue to perpetuate the same old inaccuracies and distortions with respect to the Italian military and Italy’s role in the Axis war effort. They will insist to you that the Italians contributed little or nothing, that the Germans would have been better off without them, and that the Italian war record is but a laundry list of defeats, acts of cowardice, and surrender. While no one could argue that the Italians weren’t seriously deficient in terms of arms, training, and tactics compared to their opponents, they were at least equal to if not better than their junior Axis partners, the Hungarians and Romanians. And though it also true that when the Italians failed, they tended to do so in a spectacular fashion, they didn’t do so every time they went into battle.
Consider first their performance in the Soviet Union. When the “Corpo di Spedizione Italiano” (Italian Expeditionary Corps) arrived in Russia in August 1941, the Italians fought exceedingly well and consistently captured the objectives tasked to them. The Corps saw heavy action against Soviet forces in Ukraine and was responsible for taking the city of Stalino and helping secure the Donets Basin for the Axis. Even when this force was reorganized and expanded into the Italian 8th Army, the level of fighting skill displayed didn’t change. The Italians showed exceptional artillery skills on the Eastern Front and received considerable praise from their German counterparts for it. Italian combat engineers often requested and were given the most difficult and challenging assignments because they had proved their ability to succeed in this area.
On July 28, 1942 at Serafimovich, the Soviets launched a counterattack meant to force the Axis advance back from their positions on the River Don and stall the assault on Stalingrad. The Italian 3rd “Celere” Regiment was ordered to fight and hold against a much stronger Soviet armored brigade. In the ensuing battle, the Italians stopped the Soviet tanks dead in their tracks by using Molotov cocktails, losing 1,700 men in the process, but taking 1,600 Russian troops prisoner and capturing a large cache of small arms. Then on August 24th at another point along the Don, the Russians drove a wedge between the German 6th and Italian armies. The only force available to fill the gap was the Savoia Calvary. Its’ commander, Colonel Allesandro Bettoni-Cezzago, decided to launch a mounted cavalry attack against Soviet forces in hopes of stopping them from advancing further. Armed with Carcano carbines, sabers, hand grenades, captured Soviet submachine guns, and supported by both cavalry acting as dismounted infantry and a machine gun squadron, 600 Italian mounted troops charged the Russian line which was defended by a 2,000 strong Siberian infantry regiment. The Italians completely routed the Russians, killing 150 Soviet soldiers, taking 900 prisoner, and capturing mortars, artillery pieces, and machine guns. The Italians lost 40 cavalrymen. A German officer that observed the cavalry action against the Russians was extremely impressed and said to Colonel Bettoni-Cezzago “We aren’t able to perform such things anymore”. Both of these efforts helped the Axis forces establish a stable front along the Don and continue the attempt to take Stalingrad.
A large part of the blame for the encirclement of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad has been placed at the feet of the Italians. The fact that the Soviets went after the Italians and thoroughly destroyed the 8th Army during “Operation Little Saturn” has often been cited as proof of both the low quality of the Italian soldier and how little respect the Russians had for them. Yet the real reason the Italians, and by extension the Hungarians and Romanians, were targeted by “Operation Little Saturn” at Stalingrad was very specific and had little to do with how the Italians actually performed during the Russian campaign. Instead, it was because the Soviets were well aware that none of these three forces had large amounts of heavy armor or anti-tank weaponry at their disposal, making them the most logical point of attack for the operation. On average, the Italian anti-tank defenses per infantry division amounted to six 75mm anti-tank guns supplemented by an additional twelve 47mm guns. In contrast, the Germans were supported by a total of thirty-five 75mm guns per division. Even still, the Soviets did not launch their attack until they had achieved a 4 to 1 superiority in force over the Italians. This would seem to indicate at least some concern on the Soviets part over the amount of resistance the Italians would put up. And while there is no question that Stalingrad was a disaster for the Axis forces overall, what is largely ignored in history books is the “Battle of Nikolayevka”. Here, the one remaining intact unit of the Italian 8th Army, the Alpine “Tridentina” Division, successfully spearheaded a breakout through encircling Soviet forces, allowing some 40,000 German, Italian, Hungarian, and Romanian troops to escape to the newly established Axis front line. After the battle, Radio Moscow singled out the “Tridentina” for praise, stating that they were the only unit that could truly claim not to have been defeated by Soviet forces.
Let’s look next to North Africa. After Rommel and the “Afrika Corps” landed, the impression one gets in history books is that the renewal and execution of the North African campaign was almost a purely German effort. Oh sure, the Italians were there but they just got in the way, or so the story goes. This ignores the fact that the bulk of the force that Rommel ending up having at his disposal starting in 1941 was primarily Italian. Coinciding with Rommel’s arrival was the entry into the theater of the Italian “Ariete” and “Trento” Divisions which brought with them better tanks, field artillery, and anti-tank guns. This put the Germans and Italians in a much better position to go on the offensive. Rommel himself admitted that were it not for the Italians, there was no possible way that German forces alone could have made the gains they had by May of 1942. With respect to El Alamein, “history” tells us that, as they had done so many times before, the Italians waved the white flag and gave up after barely firing a shot. Again, this is simply untrue. The Folgore Parachute Division held the line against repeated attacks on their position at El Alamein. For three days they pushed back against the Free French and British assault, finally causing the Allies to abandon their attack on that flank. Undefeated, they withdrew across the desert, fighting the entire way until finally having to surrender due to lack of food and water. As a sign of respect to the hard fighting Italians, the British allowed them the honor of keeping their personal weapons. The Bologna Infantry Division broke through encirclement by Allied troops and attempted a fighting retreat across the desert back into Libya. Again, because of lack of water and food, they finally gave up. Upon being taken prisoners by the Allies, the Bologna Division refused to raise their hands in surrender. Their commander, Colonel Dall‘Olio stated: “We are not firing because we haven’t the desire but because we have spent every round.”
Historians seem to universally acknowledge that, regardless of how it ended, the effort to drive the British out of Egypt was well fought and orchestrated. However, all credit is heaped upon Rommel and the Germans. If the string of victories that finally ended in complete defeat at El Alamein were accomplished by a primarily Italian army led by a German general, it seems a bit disingenuous to me to label the victories as German, but the defeat as a failure brought on by the weakness of the Italians. Should there be any question about this last point, consider what Rommel himself said after El Alamein: “The duties of comradeship, for me particularly as their Commander-in-Chief, compel me to state unequivocally that the defeats which the Italian formations suffered at Alamein in early July were not the fault of the Italian soldier. The Italian was willing, unselfish and good, and, considering the conditions under which he served, had always given better than average. There is no doubt that the achievement of every Italian unit, especially of the motorised forces, far surpassed anything that the Italian Army had done for a hundred years. Many Italian generals and officers won our admiration both as men and as soldiers.”
Popular belief also holds that after the signing of the armistice in September 1943, all resistance to the Allies by Italians, ceased. Yet this completely ignores the fact that over 200,000 Italians pledged their allegiance to Mussolini and his “Repubblica Sociale Italiana” or “Salo Republic” of Northern Italy, and continued to fight on with the Germans until May 1945. RSI troops were present at Anzio with German units resisting the Allied landing in January 1944. Italians also made up the bulk of the force used in the last major and successful Axis offensive in Italy, Operation “Winter Storm”, which took place in the Appennine Mountains in December 1944. In the last year of the war, the only Axis planes still challenging Allied aircraft in the skies over Northern Italy were being flown by the Italians. “Gruppo Caccia” of the “Aeronautica Nazionale Repubblicana”, downed over 200 Allied planes, the best record compiled by an Italian air force unit during almost the entirety of the war.
Understand, I am not trying to make the case that the Italians in World War II were a force to be reckoned with, because in truth, they were far from it. But neither were they the collection of bumbling fools they were so often portrayed to be in Allied propaganda and history books, especially when one considers the enormous handicaps they faced when they joined the war in June 1940. Weaponry that was state of the art in the 1930’s but obsolete at the start of the war, poor to non-existent training, timid generalship, and an inadequate industrial base, all took their toll on the Italian war machine. And unlike their Allied or even Axis counterparts, Italian soldiers routinely spent upwards of two years in combat before their units were rotated out for rest and rearming. Yet despite all of their deficiencies, the Italians fought, sometimes well, sometimes not, for three long, bloody years. When you contrast that with the French, who arguably possessed superior weapons and received better training but gave up after little more than a month of fighting, the Italians, in my opinion, don’t look all that bad.
Also, the Us fought terribly in Tunisia. The only thing to get the Allies to win was the fact that they surrounded them.
The US fought poorly in North Africa, there is little debate on that. They steadily improved as the campaign went on and exited a far better force then when they entered.
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In a way yes, being that this drew a lot of forces from the Eastern Front & the Nazis in Italy were destroyed, along with the rest of the Third Reich shortly after.
The defense of Italy never drew more than around 10 German divisions which was a small percentage of their overall combat forces. Italy has incredibly defensible terrain and as you are keen on pointing out the Italian Fascist forces were still in the fight.
After watching this thread go round and round for a bit, I recalled that I wrote something on this same basic subject a couple of years back. I believe that in many respects, it made the point I suspect the OP has been trying to make, though in a more realistic and reasoned way. I will re-post it here in hopes that it will put things in their proper perspective:
Tony, excellent contribution as always, nothing to quibble with. I would hope you would understand that this has been more about having fun with Italian Commando versus being an actually serious discussion. I think the chances for serious discussion went out the window around the second page or so of this thread. Italian Commando made some very good points, many of which you have said in your post. The difference is he always goes a "bridge too far" and can't leave it well enough alone that no one was arguing the Italians were bumbling idiots and cowards. He does no justice to his cause by grossly exaggerating the Italian war record and Italian national character in terms of martial prowess (a ludicrous argument in general for any people). Italian Commando would do well to read what you wrote and perhaps, with your permission, plagiarize it to make his points.
There is little to argue with, other than nitpicking over highlighting Italian actions with a couple thousand troops in the middle of a massive battle that involved hundreds of thousands. The difference is you are only looking for examples to disprove the myth of Italian cowardice and incompetency. Italian Commando would use that example to illustrate how the Italians could have conquered China had only Mussolini been a better leader, lol.
None of us are saying the individual Italian troops were of poor quality. We are arguing that the overall armies the Italians fielded were poor for a variety of reasons OTHER than individual troop quality. The Italians lacked the technology, materials, weapons, leadership, tactics, and strategies of the other powers involved. They were consistently defeated on the battlefield in almost every circumstance due to these reasons.
A telling instance of Italian defeat is the invasion of Egypt. The Italians had an invasion force of 250,000 troops going against 36,000 British. The British, greatly outnumbered, kept the bulk of their forces at a base beyond reach of the Italians and used a small screen force of roughly 6,000 troops to torment the invading Italian Army. The Italians invasion stalled due to terrible logistics and never came into contact with the bulk of British forces at base. Instead, the small screen force of 6,000 British troops absolutely routed the 250,000 Italians. The Italians were turned backwards running from the British. This is the best example for me.
Then we look at the Italian invasion of Greece. Italy sent 500,000 troops against a weak Greek Army and got stalemated. The Italians couldn't bust a grape and made no progress with heavy losses. The Germans then came in and bailed out the Italians.
The Allies had no problems invading the Italian mainland with rather ease. Although it cost many lives, the invasion was swift. Only the rugged terrain of Italy and German reinforcements rushed down prevented the U.S. from marching straight to Vienna.
Italian Commando- Do you realize that the first major North African battle involved 36,000 British destroying the entire Italian 10th Army consisting of 250,000 soldiers? The Italians had a 7:1 numerical advantage, yet got routed. What is your excuse for that?
Also, are you aware that the Italian 10th Army consisted half of soldiers from colonial countries who were not ethnic Italians? You keep saying how the British were "bailed out" by Commonwealth troops, which is false. Yet you ignore that the Italians had their own commonwealth troops and they still got their butts kicked.
Speaking of the British Commonwealth troops, they were already part of the original 36,000. You act like the Commonwealth troops were of higher quality than the British as if that means some sort of Italian victory.
The Italian forces had little to no armor, the British forces were mostly armor.
There were only a small amount of colonial troops, not the half of their forces that you claim. Let me break it down for you. Their forces consisted of the Italian 60th "Sabratha" Infantry Division, 1st, 2nd, 4th Blackshirt Divisions, 63rd Infantry Division Cirene, 61st Infantry Division Sirte & the 64th Infantry Division Catanzaro. The forces that had colonials were the Maletti Group & 1st Libyan Division Sibelle.
The Commonwealth were not part of the original force, they started off with British & Indian forces, but when they got to the Libyan border, the Indians were sent to Sudan to help in East Africa & the Australian & New Zealand Division replaced them. Even if the fresh & new reinforcements didn't grant them their victory, they influenced it. The original plan of the operation was to reconquest Egypt, but it was the reinforcements that caused them to go further. So no, they were not part of the original force.
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Originally Posted by TonyT
After watching this thread go round and round for a bit, I recalled that I wrote something on this same basic subject a couple of years back. I believe that in many respects, it made the point I suspect the OP has been trying to make, though in a more realistic and reasoned way. I will re-post it here in hopes that it will put things in their proper perspective:
It is rather sad that even with all the new material published in the last ten to fifteen years regarding World War II, people still take every opportunity they can to continue to perpetuate the same old inaccuracies and distortions with respect to the Italian military and Italy’s role in the Axis war effort. They will insist to you that the Italians contributed little or nothing, that the Germans would have been better off without them, and that the Italian war record is but a laundry list of defeats, acts of cowardice, and surrender. While no one could argue that the Italians weren’t seriously deficient in terms of arms, training, and tactics compared to their opponents, they were at least equal to if not better than their junior Axis partners, the Hungarians and Romanians. And though it also true that when the Italians failed, they tended to do so in a spectacular fashion, they didn’t do so every time they went into battle.
Consider first their performance in the Soviet Union. When the “Corpo di Spedizione Italiano” (Italian Expeditionary Corps) arrived in Russia in August 1941, the Italians fought exceedingly well and consistently captured the objectives tasked to them. The Corps saw heavy action against Soviet forces in Ukraine and was responsible for taking the city of Stalino and helping secure the Donets Basin for the Axis. Even when this force was reorganized and expanded into the Italian 8th Army, the level of fighting skill displayed didn’t change. The Italians showed exceptional artillery skills on the Eastern Front and received considerable praise from their German counterparts for it. Italian combat engineers often requested and were given the most difficult and challenging assignments because they had proved their ability to succeed in this area.
On July 28, 1942 at Serafimovich, the Soviets launched a counterattack meant to force the Axis advance back from their positions on the River Don and stall the assault on Stalingrad. The Italian 3rd “Celere” Regiment was ordered to fight and hold against a much stronger Soviet armored brigade. In the ensuing battle, the Italians stopped the Soviet tanks dead in their tracks by using Molotov cocktails, losing 1,700 men in the process, but taking 1,600 Russian troops prisoner and capturing a large cache of small arms. Then on August 24th at another point along the Don, the Russians drove a wedge between the German 6th and Italian armies. The only force available to fill the gap was the Savoia Calvary. Its’ commander, Colonel Allesandro Bettoni-Cezzago, decided to launch a mounted cavalry attack against Soviet forces in hopes of stopping them from advancing further. Armed with Carcano carbines, sabers, hand grenades, captured Soviet submachine guns, and supported by both cavalry acting as dismounted infantry and a machine gun squadron, 600 Italian mounted troops charged the Russian line which was defended by a 2,000 strong Siberian infantry regiment. The Italians completely routed the Russians, killing 150 Soviet soldiers, taking 900 prisoner, and capturing mortars, artillery pieces, and machine guns. The Italians lost 40 cavalrymen. A German officer that observed the cavalry action against the Russians was extremely impressed and said to Colonel Bettoni-Cezzago “We aren’t able to perform such things anymore”. Both of these efforts helped the Axis forces establish a stable front along the Don and continue the attempt to take Stalingrad.
A large part of the blame for the encirclement of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad has been placed at the feet of the Italians. The fact that the Soviets went after the Italians and thoroughly destroyed the 8th Army during “Operation Little Saturn” has often been cited as proof of both the low quality of the Italian soldier and how little respect the Russians had for them. Yet the real reason the Italians, and by extension the Hungarians and Romanians, were targeted by “Operation Little Saturn” at Stalingrad was very specific and had little to do with how the Italians actually performed during the Russian campaign. Instead, it was because the Soviets were well aware that none of these three forces had large amounts of heavy armor or anti-tank weaponry at their disposal, making them the most logical point of attack for the operation. On average, the Italian anti-tank defenses per infantry division amounted to six 75mm anti-tank guns supplemented by an additional twelve 47mm guns. In contrast, the Germans were supported by a total of thirty-five 75mm guns per division. Even still, the Soviets did not launch their attack until they had achieved a 4 to 1 superiority in force over the Italians. This would seem to indicate at least some concern on the Soviets part over the amount of resistance the Italians would put up. And while there is no question that Stalingrad was a disaster for the Axis forces overall, what is largely ignored in history books is the “Battle of Nikolayevka”. Here, the one remaining intact unit of the Italian 8th Army, the Alpine “Tridentina” Division, successfully spearheaded a breakout through encircling Soviet forces, allowing some 40,000 German, Italian, Hungarian, and Romanian troops to escape to the newly established Axis front line. After the battle, Radio Moscow singled out the “Tridentina” for praise, stating that they were the only unit that could truly claim not to have been defeated by Soviet forces.
Let’s look next to North Africa. After Rommel and the “Afrika Corps” landed, the impression one gets in history books is that the renewal and execution of the North African campaign was almost a purely German effort. Oh sure, the Italians were there but they just got in the way, or so the story goes. This ignores the fact that the bulk of the force that Rommel ending up having at his disposal starting in 1941 was primarily Italian. Coinciding with Rommel’s arrival was the entry into the theater of the Italian “Ariete” and “Trento” Divisions which brought with them better tanks, field artillery, and anti-tank guns. This put the Germans and Italians in a much better position to go on the offensive. Rommel himself admitted that were it not for the Italians, there was no possible way that German forces alone could have made the gains they had by May of 1942. With respect to El Alamein, “history” tells us that, as they had done so many times before, the Italians waved the white flag and gave up after barely firing a shot. Again, this is simply untrue. The Folgore Parachute Division held the line against repeated attacks on their position at El Alamein. For three days they pushed back against the Free French and British assault, finally causing the Allies to abandon their attack on that flank. Undefeated, they withdrew across the desert, fighting the entire way until finally having to surrender due to lack of food and water. As a sign of respect to the hard fighting Italians, the British allowed them the honor of keeping their personal weapons. The Bologna Infantry Division broke through encirclement by Allied troops and attempted a fighting retreat across the desert back into Libya. Again, because of lack of water and food, they finally gave up. Upon being taken prisoners by the Allies, the Bologna Division refused to raise their hands in surrender. Their commander, Colonel Dall‘Olio stated: “We are not firing because we haven’t the desire but because we have spent every round.”
Historians seem to universally acknowledge that, regardless of how it ended, the effort to drive the British out of Egypt was well fought and orchestrated. However, all credit is heaped upon Rommel and the Germans. If the string of victories that finally ended in complete defeat at El Alamein were accomplished by a primarily Italian army led by a German general, it seems a bit disingenuous to me to label the victories as German, but the defeat as a failure brought on by the weakness of the Italians. Should there be any question about this last point, consider what Rommel himself said after El Alamein: “The duties of comradeship, for me particularly as their Commander-in-Chief, compel me to state unequivocally that the defeats which the Italian formations suffered at Alamein in early July were not the fault of the Italian soldier. The Italian was willing, unselfish and good, and, considering the conditions under which he served, had always given better than average. There is no doubt that the achievement of every Italian unit, especially of the motorised forces, far surpassed anything that the Italian Army had done for a hundred years. Many Italian generals and officers won our admiration both as men and as soldiers.”
Popular belief also holds that after the signing of the armistice in September 1943, all resistance to the Allies by Italians, ceased. Yet this completely ignores the fact that over 200,000 Italians pledged their allegiance to Mussolini and his “Repubblica Sociale Italiana” or “Salo Republic” of Northern Italy, and continued to fight on with the Germans until May 1945. RSI troops were present at Anzio with German units resisting the Allied landing in January 1944. Italians also made up the bulk of the force used in the last major and successful Axis offensive in Italy, Operation “Winter Storm”, which took place in the Appennine Mountains in December 1944. In the last year of the war, the only Axis planes still challenging Allied aircraft in the skies over Northern Italy were being flown by the Italians. “Gruppo Caccia” of the “Aeronautica Nazionale Repubblicana”, downed over 200 Allied planes, the best record compiled by an Italian air force unit during almost the entirety of the war.
Understand, I am not trying to make the case that the Italians in World War II were a force to be reckoned with, because in truth, they were far from it. But neither were they the collection of bumbling fools they were so often portrayed to be in Allied propaganda and history books, especially when one considers the enormous handicaps they faced when they joined the war in June 1940. Weaponry that was state of the art in the 1930’s but obsolete at the start of the war, poor to non-existent training, timid generalship, and an inadequate industrial base, all took their toll on the Italian war machine. And unlike their Allied or even Axis counterparts, Italian soldiers routinely spent upwards of two years in combat before their units were rotated out for rest and rearming. Yet despite all of their deficiencies, the Italians fought, sometimes well, sometimes not, for three long, bloody years. When you contrast that with the French, who arguably possessed superior weapons and received better training but gave up after little more than a month of fighting, the Italians, in my opinion, don’t look all that bad.
Thank you for some accurate points & for someone who actually knows what I'm talking about. I don't entirely agree with the last paragraph, but I'm not complaining, believe me.
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Originally Posted by NJGOAT
The defense of Italy never drew more than around 10 German divisions which was a small percentage of their overall combat forces. Italy has incredibly defensible terrain and as you are keen on pointing out the Italian Fascist forces were still in the fight.
The forces sent into Italy were from the Eastern Front, which caused the Soviet encirclement. The force there were slowly losing territory as it was, those divisions tipped the balance.
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Originally Posted by NJGOAT
Tony, excellent contribution as always, nothing to quibble with. I would hope you would understand that this has been more about having fun with Italian Commando versus being an actually serious discussion. I think the chances for serious discussion went out the window around the second page or so of this thread. Italian Commando made some very good points, many of which you have said in your post. The difference is he always goes a "bridge too far" and can't leave it well enough alone that no one was arguing the Italians were bumbling idiots and cowards. He does no justice to his cause by grossly exaggerating the Italian war record and Italian national character in terms of martial prowess (a ludicrous argument in general for any people). Italian Commando would do well to read what you wrote and perhaps, with your permission, plagiarize it to make his points.
There is little to argue with, other than nitpicking over highlighting Italian actions with a couple thousand troops in the middle of a massive battle that involved hundreds of thousands. The difference is you are only looking for examples to disprove the myth of Italian cowardice and incompetency. Italian Commando would use that example to illustrate how the Italians could have conquered China had only Mussolini been a better leader, lol.
Mod cut: Inappropriate.
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Originally Posted by Nolefan34
None of us are saying the individual Italian troops were of poor quality. We are arguing that the overall armies the Italians fielded were poor for a variety of reasons OTHER than individual troop quality. The Italians lacked the technology, materials, weapons, leadership, tactics, and strategies of the other powers involved. They were consistently defeated on the battlefield in almost every circumstance due to these reasons.
A telling instance of Italian defeat is the invasion of Egypt. The Italians had an invasion force of 250,000 troops going against 36,000 British. The British, greatly outnumbered, kept the bulk of their forces at a base beyond reach of the Italians and used a small screen force of roughly 6,000 troops to torment the invading Italian Army. The Italians invasion stalled due to terrible logistics and never came into contact with the bulk of British forces at base. Instead, the small screen force of 6,000 British troops absolutely routed the 250,000 Italians. The Italians were turned backwards running from the British. This is the best example for me.
Then we look at the Italian invasion of Greece. Italy sent 500,000 troops against a weak Greek Army and got stalemated. The Italians couldn't bust a grape and made no progress with heavy losses. The Germans then came in and bailed out the Italians.
The Allies had no problems invading the Italian mainland with rather ease. Although it cost many lives, the invasion was swift. Only the rugged terrain of Italy and German reinforcements rushed down prevented the U.S. from marching straight to Vienna.
The screening force did nothing but get easily killed in a week.
Yet you ignore the reinforcements into Albania that doubled the entire Greek army. Like North Africa, the Germans weren't the only reinforcements sent, & in this case, the Germans were completely unnecessary.
Of course you forget about the RSI, to which without them the Germans couldn't have done half of what they did without them, offense & defense wise.
Italian Commando- You are full of excuses. The fact is that the Italians got their butts kicked despite having 7:1 numbers advantage. Your entire argument about Commonwealth forces bailing out the British is fiction. No new Commonwealth forces arrived to help the British. The existing 36,000 troops defeated 250,000 Italians. What percent were British versus Commonwealth makes no difference. The main point here is that they still defeated a vastly larger Italian Army consisting primarily of (according to you) Italian troops.
If what you say is true about the Italians not having enough armor, then that just shows how poor the Italian army was. The Italians were poorly equipped, poorly lead, and had inadequate supplies. They were not capable of taking on a major military power. They had some fine individual soldiers who performed well when commanded by Germans, but were incapable of performing well under Italian autonomy.
Regarding the Greeks, the Italians still got their butts kicked. The Italians sent 550,000 of their best troops and got beat against a smaller Greek force. It does not matter what excuses you argue. What are you going to say next? That the Greeks had better armor? If so, how does that help your argument?
Last edited by Nolefan34; 07-21-2013 at 11:45 AM..
The Italian forces had little to no armor, the British forces were mostly armor.
This is true. The original force that invaded Egypt, while having hundreds of tankettes had only a handful of the M11/39 medium tanks. The British enjoyed an armor advantage in these initial battles as most of the Italian tanks weren't even really "tanks".
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There were only a small amount of colonial troops, not the half of their forces that you claim. Let me break it down for you. Their forces consisted of the Italian 60th "Sabratha" Infantry Division, 1st, 2nd, 4th Blackshirt Divisions, 63rd Infantry Division Cirene, 61st Infantry Division Sirte & the 64th Infantry Division Catanzaro. The forces that had colonials were the Maletti Group & 1st Libyan Division Sibelle.
The Commonwealth were not part of the original force, they started off with British & Indian forces, but when they got to the Libyan border, the Indians were sent to Sudan to help in East Africa & the Australian & New Zealand Division replaced them. Even if the fresh & new reinforcements didn't grant them their victory, they influenced it. The original plan of the operation was to reconquest Egypt, but it was the reinforcements that caused them to go further. So no, they were not part of the original force.
10th Army into Egypt had one corps of colonials in the 5 total corps, so around 1/5th. Italian forces in East Africa had a much larger contingent of colonial troops.
I still don't get all of the random arguing about Commonwealth troops. The Italian offensive had stalled a long way from their objective. The British screening force had done their job and had only suffered 40 casulaties (despite your claims that they were decimated/destroyed). The Italian Army was defeated by it's own shortcomings as soon as the offensive started.
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Thank you for some accurate points & for someone who actually knows what I'm talking about. I don't entirely agree with the last paragraph, but I'm not complaining, believe me.
We all know what you are talking about. You made many of the same points that TonyT made. The difference is the part where you "don't entirely agree with the last paragraph" and take the points off on wild tangants to inflate the Italian war record. Had you started this out by saying: "despite common perception, Italian soldiers in WW2 were not incompetent cowards", no one would have argued with you. However, you can't stop there and keep digging yourself a hole.
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The forces sent into Italy were from the Eastern Front, which caused the Soviet encirclement. The force there were slowly losing territory as it was, those divisions tipped the balance.
The forces in Italy were built up overtime and sent primarily post-Kursk. I have never seen anything to suggest that the troops sent to Italy is what "caused the Soviet encirclement" (which one?) or the collapse of the Eastern Front. I think this is another case where you are reaching to make events in Italy more important in the overall war than they actually were.
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The screening force did nothing but get easily killed in a week.
The screening force suffered 40 casualties and inflicted a few hundred on the Italians. The screening force was only there to slow down and harass the Italian advance. They did their job.
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Yet you ignore the reinforcements into Albania that doubled the entire Greek army. Like North Africa, the Germans weren't the only reinforcements sent, & in this case, the Germans were completely unnecessary.
The Italian reinforcements were sent and used before Germany entered the war. The reinforcements you keep referencing were Italy's last push to beat Greece and involved Mussolini personally directing the battle. This failure and the subsequent movement of British troops into Greece is what convinved the Germans they needed to intervene. The German move was so succesful because the Greeks didn't fall back from the Italian front as the British expected and were flanked by the Germans.
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Of course you forget about the RSI, to which without them the Germans couldn't have done half of what they did without them, offense & defense wise.
The RSI was an important support and companion force for the Germans. They allowed the Germans to use their units as force multipliers in key areas. Neither force would have been as succesful without the other. The Germans would have had to commit even more troops without the RSI and the RSI would not have been able to hold out for very long without the Germans.
A telling instance of Italian defeat is the invasion of Egypt. The Italians had an invasion force of 250,000 troops going against 36,000 British. The British, greatly outnumbered, kept the bulk of their forces at a base beyond reach of the Italians and used a small screen force of roughly 6,000 troops to torment the invading Italian Army. The Italians invasion stalled due to terrible logistics and never came into contact with the bulk of British forces at base. Instead, the small screen force of 6,000 British troops absolutely routed the 250,000 Italians. The Italians were turned backwards running from the British. This is the best example for me.
Aside that 10th Army numbered roughly 150,000 men.
Most of generals were indeed brave (Tellera, Maletti, Patassi-Mannella) but most incompetent or not capable of adapting themselves to modern warfare.
Italians advanced by FEET whereas British Army, aside from being almost totally composed of veterans/expert soldier, was widely mechanized.
It's not that hard to encircle an enemy by feet.
It's like boosting the fact that you outwent Usain Bolt by going with a Ferrari, what a courage.
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Then we look at the Italian invasion of Greece. Italy sent 500,000 troops against a weak Greek Army and got stalemated. The Italians couldn't bust a grape and made no progress with heavy losses. The Germans then came in and bailed out the Italians.
lol
Italians on 24 october deployed about 45 battalion plus 19th Venezia Infantry Division and 53rd Arezzo Infantry Division deployed on Yugoslavian borders.
Greek had 39 battalions on rough terrain they knew perfectly, with bad weather and high morale.
Moreover, on 14th november when Papagos begun his attack (the famous battle of Coriza) Greek had added their troops previously located at bulgarian borders outnumbering so italian with 250,000 men against 150,000.
Never Italians had at their disposal 500,000 men.
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The Allies had no problems invading the Italian mainland with rather ease. Although it cost many lives, the invasion was swift. Only the rugged terrain of Italy and German reinforcements rushed down prevented the U.S. from marching straight to Vienna.
Well, considering the difference in industrial powers, number of men and means, I ama amazed it took 3 years to defeat few undersupplies, ill-equipped Italian(mostly)-German forces in North Africa.
Plus, whereas in Sicily there have been shameful episodes (the surrender of Pantelleria and Augusta), there were (and curiously nobody mentions) episodes of valour and bravery at Gela when Division Livorno almost forced Americans to reimbark, the resistence of Italians along Etna and Piano Lupo and at Troina and so on.
Then the country itself literally dissolved when both the Italian government and Allies awfully handled the Italian armistice.
Allies' were too slow to prevent Germans from invading and disarming 600,000 Italians soldiers (which were closed in lagers like animals and still no reparation has been seen).
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Originally Posted by Nolefan34
Also, are you aware that the Italian 10th Army consisted half of soldiers from colonial countries who were not ethnic Italians? You keep saying how the British were "bailed out" by Commonwealth troops, which is false. Yet you ignore that the Italians had their own commonwealth troops and they still got their butts kicked.
False again. Lybian troops (which fought very bravely moreover) consisted roughly of 2 divisions (Sibele and Pescatori) and a bunch of paratroopers, the formers all mixed with a 50% of Italians who constituted the bulk of Officers in other Lybian divisions.
So out of 10 infantry divisions( 60a "Sabratha",63a "Cirene",64a "Catanzaro",61a "Sirte",1a CCNN "23 Marzo",2a CCNN "28 Ottobre",62a "Marmarica",4a CCNN "Gennaio" and 1a Libica "Sibele" and 2a Libica "Pescatori") and 3 armoured groups (1°,2° raggruppamento carristi and raggruppamento "Maletti") only TWO
infantry (very useful in the desert) were Lybians.
Plus, all of you people consider those 150,000 units as they fought altogether, they were not!
Most of fights were sustained by those 3 "raggruppamenti" which means 12 infantry battaillons,1 mobile recon battaillons,6 armoured companies (90% of which were composed of useless L3/35, the remnant was M11/39 still weaker than their British counterpart and fewest-est-est M13/40, these latter all scattered in many formations which never fought together),6 artillery motorized units,6 AA batteries,3 mortars' companies, 6 AT companies(all equipped with 47/32) and 6 pioneers companies which roughly means no more than 15,000 men (including ALL men).
Do your math.
They couldn't replace what they lost in terms of ships. This is why they acted so cautiosly with the fleet. This is why their two aircraft carriers stayed incompleted in drydock for the entire war. AFAIK, the Italians didn't launch any ships larger than a torpedo boat during the entire war. They did refit and repair mutliple vessels including some captured ships they pressed into service, but they didn't build and launch anything major..
Since you are referring to an article written by me on the ComandoSupremo Forum I would like to comment - on your comment - both as to the Italian navy as well as to the other subjects.......
Actually, the Italian Navy was more restriced by their lack of fuel oil than anything else. This, for a large part, explains their cautious tactics and unwillingness to dispatch their heavy ships unnecessarily. They were also hampered by their lack of a dedicated naval air force. While the RN often sortied with an attached carrier, and therefore having the use of aerial reconnaissance, the Regia Marina was dependent on the Regia Aeronautica. Such arrangements worked badly for most countries during WW2.
Like the Japanese they were also at a disadvantage regarding radar equipment.
The Royal Navy's fighting efficiency in the Mediterranean can be illustrated by an early incident in the war - three Italian Torpedo boats (light destroyers, really) were transporting some urgent equipment (ammunition, AT guns) as a deckload to the Italian army in North Africa. They were intercepted by an RN cruiser/destroyer force. As one of the Italian (light) destroyers slowed down to cover the flight of the two others the British cruiser force needed almost two hours to sink it - spending 5.000 rounds of 6-inch ammunition in the process. Needless to say the Italian ship's 10 cm. guns did little harm to the Goliaths. But it delayed the operations of the Mediterranean Fleet for several weeks as the cruisers had spent most of its ammunition.........The two others got away.
Launch any large ships...? What about the "Roma"...?
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Originally Posted by NJGOAT
Your comparison is poor as is what was written in that article. Gun caliber doesn't matter nearly as much as velocity. A German Panther and the American Sherman had the same caliber gun, the difference was that the Panther's gun fired with a much higher velocity. The American M1 Abrams has a smaller gun than the Russian T80, but the M1 is much more effective. The Italian 47mm was sufficient against the Mk1 (A9), Mk2 (A10) and Mk5 (A13) cruiser tanks. It was ineffective against the Mk6 (Crusader). The Mk2 (Matilda) and Mk3 (Valentine) infantry tanks were impervious to all but the heaviest guns such as the German '88'..
I don't think the comparison is poor as much as, like you write, the German Panzers also had problems with the Matildas. I would add to this that the Cruisers were incredibly unreliable. That is also an important item, is it not? These problems were not solved untill later in the war.
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Originally Posted by NJGOAT
On top of that, the article praised the engine for being diesel. While this was definitely praise worthy, it ignores the fact the Italian tanks were slow. As slow as the British infantry tanks..
The early Italian tanks, the M11/39 and M12/40 were faster than the Matildas, particularly off-road. The petrol/diesel question in tanks was just as important as it proved to be for the MTB/S-boat struggle.
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Originally Posted by NJGOAT
I don't think the Italian pilots were any better or any worse than those from other nations. They proved that when some units received BF109's and BF110's which gave them a modern plane equal to their opponents.
They didn't really need the Me's to prove this. Both their Macchi MC.200's and Fiat G.50's, and their pilots, were a match for the Hurricane and P-40. As were the later Fiat G.55 and the Macchi 202 and 205 .
Italian Commando- Do you realize that the first major North African battle involved 36,000 British destroying the entire Italian 10th Army consisting of 250,000 soldiers? The Italians had a 7:1 numerical advantage, yet got routed. What is your excuse for that?
Also, are you aware that the Italian 10th Army consisted half of soldiers from colonial countries who were not ethnic Italians? You keep saying how the British were "bailed out" by Commonwealth troops, which is false. Yet you ignore that the Italians had their own commonwealth troops and they still got their butts kicked.
Speaking of the British Commonwealth troops, they were already part of the original 36,000. You act like the Commonwealth troops were of higher quality than the British as if that means some sort of Italian victory.
That is very true. I was surprised how many were in the Italian army in North Africa fighting a small number of British. But I will say in defense of the Italians the British in Singapore and the US in the Phillipines both surrendered to smaller Japanese forces in the begining of the war with Japan from what I remember. I always heard most Italians did not really want to fight a war with America as we know there were alot of Italians in America. Ron
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