Please register to participate in our discussions with 2 million other members - it's free and quick! Some forums can only be seen by registered members. After you create your account, you'll be able to customize options and access all our 15,000 new posts/day with fewer ads.
What I am going to do hear is lay out some of the oft repeated claims and mis-statements made and try to provide some relevance and perspective to them. Please feel free to use this as a resource in future discussions about the atomic bombings. I am getting tired of re-hashing the same conversation over and over again especially when many of the participants can't take the time to do their own research or are blatantly twisting facts to suit their agenda. I have organized them by general topics based on things I often hear said. My responses are contained in the "spoiler tags" to keep the post organized.
Would there really have been a million casulaties in an invasion?
Spoiler
This is one of the foremost arguments FOR dropping the atomic bomb. It is also one that tends to spark controversy. The argument here is that the bombs collectively killed 105,000 (H:66k and N:39k) and wounded another 94,000 (H:69k and N:25k). Therefore the bombs saved countless lives and the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not die in vain. So, where did the estimates come from?
During the drafting of Operation Downfall (Downfall was the names for the invasion of Japan; Olympic and Coronet were sub-operations within Downfall targeting specific areas) various commanders and advisors were asked to submit casualty figures for the invasion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff drafted an estimate based on historical casualty rates during invasions in the PTO. They estimated that both phases of Downfall would result in a 90-day casulty figure of 1.2 million with 267,000 of those being KIA. Nimitz and MacArthur did studies, but only for Olympic that stated a possibility of 125,000 casualties within 90-days. Admiral Leahy reached an estimate of 268,000 for Olympic with 94,000 being KIA.
Ultimately the best study came from the Secretary of War Henry Stimson. He and his staff estimated that a full conquest of Japan (remember the military were mainly just talking about individual operations, not the entire conquest) would incur 1.7-4 million casualties of which 400,000-800,000 would be KIA. The report went on to also estimate that civilians would widely participate in the defense of Japan and it was believed that the Japanese themselves would suffer 5-10 million casualties.
There are two interesting facts that help drive home how costly an invasion would have been. Had the US merely suffered 5% of the casualty per unit area rate that we did in Okinawa the US would have suffered 297,000 KIA during an invasion...again, that's IF we managed only 5% of the rate on Okinawa. Second, the military ordered 500,000 Purple Hearts in order to have enough to handle the casualties from the invasion. To date the US military still has over 100,000 of these medals in stock which means that in all wars since WW2, we have not exceeded the combat casualties estimated for the invasion of Japan.
It is simply indisputable fact that an invasion would have cost an immense amount of lives. Far more than were lost at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The reason the atomic bomb is so bad is because of the fallout and radiation, that's why we shouldn't have dropped it.
Spoiler
This is one of the foremost morality based arguments. What makes the atomic bomb different is all of the fallout from the radiation. We know this now, but they did not know it then. Had the atomic bombs not forced Japan's surrender they would have been used in preparation for the invasion. This meant that atomic bombs (upwards of nine of them) would have been used to prepare the invasion areas. Scientists from the Manhattan Project estimated that Allied troops could enter the areas where the bombs went off in as little as "24 hours with no ill effects". We now know this to be completely untrue, but at the time, it was believed that after the bomb went off, there would be no lingering effects. Morally it was seen as just a really big bomb. It was not until the results of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were studied as well as additional testing carried out that the full effect of fallout was known.
The US only had two atomic bombs.
Spoiler
This is often repeated and assumed by people, but is completely false. There was already a third assembly at Tinian waiting for its core which was being shipped from Los Alamos as the second bomb was dropped. Had the second not caused the surrender there may or may not have been a third. The military believed that if two didn't cause a surrender, three weren't likely too and they should be saved for the invasion of Japan. Sections of the civilian government believed a third should be used before resigning to having to conduct an invasion. By the time the invasion would have started the US would have had upwards of 15 atomic bombs available and would produce one every ten days ad infinitum.
Weren't the Japanese trying to surrender already?
Spoiler
This is often raised as a point as if to say that the US nuked Japan despite the fact the Japanese were sending out peace feelers. This was not the case. The Japanese military which essentially ruled the nation insisted upon continuing the war right through both atomic bombings and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. It ended up being the emperors personal decision and "divine will" to surrender. Even then some members of the military refused to accept the fact and staged a coup. What follows is the timeline of the final days beginning with the Japanese "peace overtures" through the Soviet Union:
*****
The Japanese government was always dominated by the military which held 4 of the 6 cabinet posts. The military was also able to exercise great control by either refusing to form or resigning from a government as they controlled the appointment of their ministers and cabinet members. Basically, the military ran the country.
Beginning in 1945 the Japanese recognized that the war was going badly. They became divided into two camps. One side wished to pursue a diplomatic settlement through the Soviet Union. The other believed in seeking a "decisive battle" that gain Japan leverage in negotiations.
In January 1945 Prince Konoe persuaded the emperor to agree to send a peace dossier to the Allies. Terms were transmitted to the British and Americans. The military hardliners were completely opposed to the move, but went along with sending out the feelers. The terms were lengthy and included territories to be retained by the Japanese, namely Korea and Formosa and their possessions in China as well as the preservation of the Imperial family, no occupation of the home islands and a voluntary disarmament to be adminstered by the Japanese themselves. FDR and Churchill rejected these immediately based on their desire for unconditional surrender.
In Febraury 1945 Prince Konoe appealed to the emperor again to more seriously consider peace. The emperor rejected the idea thinking that the time was not correct until the Japanese had sought and won the "decisive battle". At the same time the Japanese leadership pondered what the Allied demands would be. These included: unconditional surrender, occupation, disarmament, elimination of militarism, democratic reforms, punishment of war criminals, and the status of the emperor. All of these were a non-sequitor for the Japanese military leaders, but most offensive was the occupation of Japan and the removal of the emperor in any capacity.
On April 5th the Soviets told the Japanese that they were not going to renew the five-year non-aggression pact. The Soviets were simply following their commitments made to the Allies at the Tehran Conference. At Yalta the Allies had also made concessions to the Soviets to bring them into the war against Japan when Germany surrendered. This gravely concerned the Japanese government, but the Soviet ambassadors continually told them that the Soviet Union would honor the final year of the pact, which would take it to April 1946.
At high level meetings in May following the formation of the final Suzuki government serious discussion was made about ending the war. However, none of those included any proposals that would have remotely met the Allied demands. The meetings were held in secret behind closed doors do to the fear that zealous military officers would assassinate anyone who had been speaking of surrender.
Following those meetings on June 6th the new government issued a proclamation laying out the aims of the new government. The government pledged to "fight to extinction rather then surrender". Only one member of the cabinet, the Foreign Minister opposed this statement. At the same time the Japanese laid out their plans for approaching the Soviet Union. They wished to convey to the Soviets that their victory over Germany was made possible by Japan's neutrality and that in a future world where the United States is the enemy of the Soviets it was in the Soviets best interest to maintain a friendly Japan in her current international position of power.
On June 9th Marquis Kido approached the emperor and begged him to consider more generous terms for surrender as the ability of Japan to "wage modern war" would be exhausted by the end of the year. Kido proposed that Japan: withdraw from the occupied European colonies provided they were granted independence, that the nation disarm provided this not occur under Allied supervision, and that Japan for a time be content with minimum defense. Kido's proposal did not contemplate Allied occupation of Japan, prosecution of war criminals or substantial change in Japan's system of government. The emperor authorized Kido to "float" this plan to the minsiters. There was a mixed reception with two in favor, two nominally in favor and two ambivalent and wanting to continue to wait for the decisive battle.
Later in June the emperor learned of the losses on Okinawa and the rapidly deteriorating position of the Japanese military, even at home. Most compelling to him was that iron scrap from bombs being dropped on Japan were now being used to make shovels to clear the rubble, obviously in his mind the situation had become extremely dire. The emperor convened the government on June 22nd and ordered them to solicit Soviet aid in ending the war. The Soviets were chosen over Switzerland, Vatican City or Sweden precisely because they hoped the Soviets would use their influence to gain the Japanese better terms. The other entities could do no more then transmit messages.
On June 30 Togo told the Ambassador Sato in Moscow to start a dialogue with the Soviets. The Soviets ever mindful of their promises to the Allies and the deteriorating situation dealyed any meetings until July 11th with no result from the meeting. On July 12th they met again and Sato informed the Soviets that: "His Majesty the Emperor, mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the peoples of all the belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminated. But so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese Empire has no alternative but to fight on with all its strength for the honor and existence of the Motherland."
Sato informed Togo that in reality the best Japan could hope for was unconditional or near unconditional surrender. The Soviets continued to press for more detailed proposals and this led Sato to question whether or not Togo actually had the backing of the government in his current initiatives. On July 17th Togo sent a message to Sato to inform him of his position: "Although the directing powers, and the government as well, are convinced that our war strength still can deliver considerable blows to the enemy, we are unable to feel absolutely secure peace of mind ... Please bear particularly in mind, however, that we are not seeking the Russians' mediation for anything like an unconditional surrender."
Sato replied: "It goes without saying that in my earlier message calling for unconditional surrender or closely equivalent terms, I made an exception of the question of preserving [the imperial family]." Togo responded to that message on July 21st and made it clear he was speaking for the entire government: "With regard to unconditional surrender we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. ... It is in order to avoid such a state of affairs that we are seeking a peace, ... through the good offices of Russia. ... it would also be disadvantageous and impossible, from the standpoint of foreign and domestic considerations, to make an immediate declaration of specific terms."
It is important to note that US intelligence had long broken the Japanese codes, even their diplomatic ones. All of the messages being transmitted were known in full to the Allies. It is very obvious from these messages that the Japanese government was NOT in any way, shape or form seeking anything but a conditioned surrender favorable to Japan.
On July 26th the Allies (US, Britain and China) issued the Potsdam Declaration. It was made clear that the Potsdam terms were the only terms acceptable to the Allies. They included numerous provisions but most importantly insisted on these points: the Japanese government would be disbanded and reformed along democratic principles, Japanese territory would be reduced to their pre-1894 borders, Japan itself would be occupied by Allied forces, the Japanese military would be completely disarmed, war criminal would be tried for their crimes by an Allied tribunal. At the same time it also declared that: the Japanese people were not to be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, basic human and democratic rights would be put in place and preserved, Japanese industry critical to the economy would remain intact and Japan would have global trade rights, the occupation would end as soon as the above had been accomplished. Completely absent was anything regarding the status of the emperor. The only mention of "unconditional surrender" was in the last line that required that action of all Japanese armed forces or Japan would face "prompt and utter destruction".
On July 27th the Japanese government debated the Declaration. The military cabinet members wanted to reject it ouright. Togo persuaded them to wait until they could discuss it with the Soviets. Japan's ambassador to Switzerland, Kase, made an impassioned plea to the government to consider the Declaration as the language had been carefully chosen to allow the Japanese to save face. The "unconditional surrender" he implored them applied only to the military and not the government and people and contained a "great deal of thought" as to the terms and language used.
The next day Japanese media reported that the Declaration had been rejected. Leaflets had been dropped on Japan announcing the terms and the media responded to that with a further call to arms. The Japanese government through Suzuki needing to manage the situation publicly stated, "I consider the Joint Proclamation a rehash of the Declaration at the Cairo Conference. As for the Government, it does not attach any important value to it at all. The only thing to do is just kill it with silence (mokusatsu). We will do nothing but press on to the bitter end to bring about a successful completion of the war." The word mokusatsu essentially mean to "ignore with contempt". The Allies felt they had gotten their answer.
On July 30th Sato in Moscow reported that Stalin was working with the Allies and would soon join the war. He said: "There is no alternative but immediate unconditional surrender if we are to prevent Russia's participation in the war." On August 2nd Togo replied that: "It should not be difficult for you to realize that ... our time to proceed with arrangements of ending the war before the enemy lands on the Japanese mainland is limited, on the other hand it is difficult to decide on concrete peace conditions here at home all at once."
On August 6th with the last peace overtures made and the ready realization that Japan was rejecting any talk of surrender unless under conditions favorable to Japan, the US dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The Japanese were rather unmoved knowing the difficulties of building a bomb through their own programs. They theorized that even if the US had built one (they still weren't convinced it was actually an atomic bomb) they couldn't have many of them available.
As detailed reports flooded into Tokyo on the destruction in Hiroshima the government delayed officially meeting until August 8th to discuss what had happened. The next day at 4am the Japanese received word that the Soviets had broken the pact and declared war. This deeply shocked Suzuki and Togo and they immediately called for the government to end the war at once. The military block refused and began making preparations to declare martial law on the nation, sieze control of the government and block any attempts at peace. The military underestimated the scale of the Soviet attack and was steadfast in their belief that the US did not possess anymore atomic weapons.
Hirohito implored Kido to control the situation as it was now spiralling out of control with Soviet entry into the war. At 10:30am the council met and Suzuki who had just come from an audience with the emperor told them that was must be ended. Togo suggested accepting Potsdam with one condition, being the preservation of the royal family. The Navy Minister Yonai conceeded that they must make some diplomatic move as the war was lost. At 11am the meeting was interupted with news that Nagasaki had been hit with another atomic weapon. At the end of the meeting, Togo, Suzuki and Yonai were in favor of accpeting Potsdam with the condition of the preservation of the emperor. The remaining military members were against the proposal, the government was split 3-3 after two atomic bombings and the Soviet invasion. The military block steadfastly refused to accept; occupation, disarmament at the hands of the Allies and the loss of Korea, Formosa and sections of China.
At 2:30pm the full cabinet met, but remained split with neither "side" garnering a majority. Anami told the other members about information given to the Japanese from a captured American pilot that the Americans had 100 atomic bombs and that Tokyo and Kyoto were next. The pilot was lying, but even that information given to the highest echelons of the government wasn't enough to make a consensus. That meeting ended at 5:30pm and was immediately followed by a second that lasted from 6pm-10pm and again ended in no consensus.
Suzuki and Togo then went to meet the emperor and proposed holding an Imperial Conference that began near midnight on August 9th/10th. Both sides presented their position to the emperor. By 2am on the 10th no consensus had been reached and Suzuki implored the emperor to decide. The emperor stated:
Quote:
I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. ...
I was told by those advocating a continuation of hostilities that by June new divisions would be in place in fortified positions [east of Tokyo] ready for the invader when he sought to land. It is now August and the fortifications still have not been completed.
There are those who say the key to national survival lies in a decisive battle in the homeland. The experiences of the past, however, show that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance. I do not believe that the discrepancy in the case of Kujukuri can be rectified. Since this is also the shape of things, how can we repel the invaders? [He then made some specific reference to the increased destructiveness of the atomic bomb]
It goes without saying that it is unbearable for me to see the brave and loyal fighting men of Japan disarmed. It is equally unbearable that others who have rendered me devoted service should now be punished as instigators of the war. Nevertheless, the time has come to bear the unbearable.
I swallow my tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister.
The military leaders and head of the Privy Council then questioned the emperor: "Your majesty, you also bear responsibility (sekinin) for this defeat. What apology are you going to make to the heroic spirits of the imperial founder of your house and your other imperial ancestors?" The emperor simply rose and left the room. Suzuki then implored everyone to accept the emperors will. The Japanese then sent a message via Switzerland that they accepted Potsdam on one condition, that the "prerogatives of the emperor should not be prejudiced", essentially saying that the emperor would remain a powerful force in the country.
On August 12th the Allies responded with the following: "From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms. ...The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." Truman also then ordered a complete halt to bombing activities which had been suspended on the 11th do to weather as he did not want the Japanese to think we had rejected their peace proposals and resumed the war.
The cabinet then debated the Allied response. Suzuki wanted to reject it and ask for explicit guarantees for the emperor and imperial family. Anami wanted to reject it on the grounds of the Allied occupation of Japan. Togo and Suzuki privately met and determined that there was no hope of better terms. Kido then informed them that the emperor wanted them to surrender.
At the same time the emperor was hearing from Yonai about growing civil unrest and dischord in the country that threatened to bring down the government. He ascribed the atomic bombings and Soviet attacks as divine gifts that would mask the deteriorating situation at home. The emperor announced his decision to his family and his uncle asked him, "Will we continue the war if the national sovereignty could not be preserved?" The emperor replied succinctly, "of course".
On August 13th the cabinet continued to debate the Allied offer without consensus. The US was growing concerned as they had asked the Japanese to transmit their acceptance "in the clear". However, the Japanese were sending a large volume of coded military and diplomatic messages. This gave the US the impression they were most likely preparing to reject the offer and prepare a final "banzai" assault on the Allies. Truman ordered a resumption of the attacks on Japan by both bomber and naval forces in a "massive show of force" to drive home the message the war was lost.
On August 13th the US had also decided to drop leaflets yet again detailing Japans offer to surrender to the US and the Allied response. These leaflets had a profound impact on the Japanese and Suzuki, Kido and the emperor all agreed that they needed to accept the surrender terms as is, or face a military coup that was gaining growing support among hardliners and devoted citizens.
On August 14th the emperor met with his most senior military officers about the situation. Several spoke in favor of continuing the war, but one notable exception was General Hata who was in command of the Second Home Army which had been headquartered in Hiroshima. Hata believed that it was impossible for his forces to resist invasion and that surrender was the only option to avoid further suffering. The emperor then implored the military to work with him to end the war.
Yet another conference was held by the military officers who made another attempt to pressure the emperor to continue fighting. The emperor responded by saying: "I have listened carefully to each of the arguments presented in opposition to the view that Japan should accept the Allied reply as it stands and without further clarification or modification, but my own thoughts have not undergone any change. ... In order that the people may know my decision, I request you to prepare at once an imperial rescript so that I may broadcast to the nation. Finally, I call upon each and every one of you to exert himself to the utmost so that we may meet the trying days which lie ahead."
The cabinet then convened and unanimously ratified the emperors wishes for surrender. They began extensive operations to destroy documents that could be used against them in war crimes trials while the Foreign minister transmitted the acceptance notice to the embassies in Switzerland and Sweden. The Us picked up these transmissions at the same time the emperor was preparing to record his message to the people.
That night an army officer Hatanaka led a coup to attempt to prevent the surrender. Senior officers knew of the attempt, but did not support it as they had all agreed earlier to abide by the emperors wishes. The coup was stopped by the actions of General Tanaka who convinced the officers to abandon the occupation of the palace. The coup also targeted Suzuki, but he was able to avoid their attempts to kill him.
At noon on August 15th the emperor's speech was played for the nation. Reaction was mixed with some listening and then just going about their business. Some military officers responded by dragging allied prisoners out of their cells and killing them. There were numerous suicides among the military. A large crowd gathered at the palace to weep, the sound being occasionally broken by a gunshot from an officer committing suicide at the gates. On the 17th Suzuki stepped down as Prime Minister and the emperors uncle took the position to help prevent any further coup attempts.
From there, it was just the play out of the formal surrender, cessation of fighting and the beginning of the occupation.
*****
It is beyond doubt that Japan was not brough to the point of surrender until after the atomic bombings and Soviet entry into the war. The Japanese military believed until the very end that they had a chance to win the war in a decisive battle on the plains of Tokyo.
Didn't the Japanese basically only ask for the preservation of the emperor? Since we allowed the emperor to remain anyway, why didn't we just agree?
Spoiler
We didn't agree because the Japanese never offered that until days AFTER the atomic bombings. As detailed above, large portions of the Japanse government were steadfastly opposed to disarmament, war crimes trials and Allied occupation. They also wanted guarantees that they could retain Korea and Manchuria. Had Japan made such a request sooner regarding the "prerojatives of the emperor" while accepting otherwise unconditional surrender the bombings may not have been needed...but they didn't.
Didn't the Soviet entry into the war do more to cause the surrender than the atomic bombings?
Spoiler
This one is difficult to answer. Ultimately both the Soviet entry and the atomic bombings are cited by different groups of the Japanese government as the reason for surrender. The first atomic bombing caused the first serious talk of surrender to begin and was a large influencing factor on one the more moderate elements in the Japanese government and the emperor. The Soviet invasion played a large role softening the stance of the military hardliners. At the end of the day it came down to what influenced the emperor the most. In his speech to the Japanese people he made that clear:
Quote:
“…the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest.
Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.â€
At the same time his address to the Japanese military two days later cited something else:
Quote:
“Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue the war under the present internal and external conditions would be only to increase needlessly the ravages of war finally to the point of endangering the very foundation of the Empire’s existence.â€
The reasons for this are often explained in the nuances of "saving face". The Japanese people could not be expected to endure further atomic bombings. The Americans had changed the game by introducing the weapon. Therefore the people had an out to accepting surrender. The Soviet entry gave the same out to the Japanese military. The Soviets had gone back on their word and attacked Japan. Under this new threat the Japanese military had no chance. See, they didn't lose to Allied military power they lost to science and Soviet treachery.
Weren't many American military leaders against the dropping of the bomb?
Spoiler
There are endless quotes from various US military leaders that seem to imply that the bombing was unncessary. While these quotes are generally 100% factual, they are often taken out of context. Look carefully, many of them state that Japan was already "militarily and/or strategically defeated" ergo the bombing wasn't necessary to "win" the war. These statements were made by commanders who were fighting back against a growing image that it was not the American military that defeated Japan, but American science. Further, many of these comments were made in the late 40's and early 50's during a time when the US was giving very serious consideration to having a military consisting solely of atomic weaponry and nothing conventional. In almost all cases they were tied to defending the record of conventional American arms, not condemning the atomic bombs.
Eisenhower and MacArthur are among the two most quoted. Eisenhower believed that America didn't need to use the bombs as it was simply a matter of time until Japan surrendered anyway. He didn't feel the bombings were wholly necessary. MacArthur's comments are based on his belief that Truman fumbled the end of the war and that peace could have been achieved through better political maneuvering.
What is interesting about these two is that Eisenhower's quotes are given from immediately before the bombs were used when he was asked about them by Stimson. From that point on Eisenhower merely recalled his earlier feelings that it was unnecessary and never made additional comments for or against. MacArthur's comments were made post-facto and based on later knowledge. Indeed MacArthur's comments mirror many of ones made by people like Grew, McCloy and Bard and are made with evidence found out after the fact. Basically that the US should have tried to tell them they were allowed to retain the emperor as a last ditch effort.
So, yes, the bombing was controversial among some within the military itself for varied reasons. You need to look past the individual quote and place it into the context of when it was said. Many of these comments are made in a "looking back" mindset 15, 25, 40 years after the events and with information unknown to the decision makers at the time.
What were the alternatives to dropping the bomb?
Spoiler
Since it is painfully obvious that Japan was not ready to surrender without the impetus of the bomb, we are left to ponder what the other choices would have been. We have already covered invasion and the millions of casualties involved on both sides. There of course was another option. Sit back and continue the conventional bombing and tighten the blockade on Japan as much as possible. Japan was on the brink of starvation in August 1945 and many within the Japanese government feared how much longer Japan could last. Beyond August 1945, starvation would set in and grow worse with every month while the bombings continued unabated. If Japan merely waited one more month, September 1945, under bombings and blockade, an estimated 200,000 Japanese would have died from starvation and bombing. If they waited six months, February 1946, an estimated 1.6 million Japanese would have died of starvation and bombings with hundreds of thousands joining them each month from there forward.
Everyone knows that we only dropped it to intimidate the Soviets.
Spoiler
This is often brought up as some sort of reasoning for why it HAD to be dropped. The fact of the matter is that the Soviets were fully aware of the atomic bomb, what it could do and how much progress the US and Britain had made on it. Stalin acted completely unphased by Trumans news at Potsdam and even sort of smirked about the revelation of this new weapon. There was nothing to be gained by using it as a demonstration of force to the Soviets. Stalin most likely knew more about the bomb Truman did and he was hardly intimidated by it. Look at pictures of Stalingrad and Leningrad and ask yourself if the Soviets were going to be terrified of a big bomb.
America started the war by placing an embargo on Japan.
Spoiler
This is a more recent argument made by some people to really twist things up. The US placed an embargo on oil exports to Japan after Japan annexed French Indo-China and placed military forces there. The US enacted the embargo as a way to convince Japan to end its expansion in SE Asia and placed additional pressure on them for their ongoing war in China. Japan refused to back down and set out on a course for war.
A little known battle occurred in 1939 by the name of Khalkin Gol. It was a short-lived border war between the Soviets and the Japanese. The Soviets mauled the Japanese and forced them to rethink any actions against the Soviets. This battle led to a non-aggression pact that settled the border and made Japan turn southward to get the resources it needed. Japan wanted to take the Dutch East Indies, Singapore, Java and Indo-China. This would give the oil and rubber resources they needed to prosecute a war. Standing between Japan and those territories was the US territory of the Phillipines.
The Japanese knew that if they went after the other territories chances are the US would become involved. In that case the Phillipines would be a perfect base from which to attack Japanese interests. Therefore, Japan must take out the US first to secure what it needed. What followed was a plan to establish a defensive ring of islands from behind which Japan would await the US fleet before engaging it in a decisive battle that would force America out of the war. Japan never believed that it could overwhelm the US and win. They needed a decisive blow to knock them out.
Added to this plan was the radical idea of Admiral Yamamoto to use a carrier strike force to attack the US fleet at Pearl Harbor. The resulting damage to the fleet would ensure that Japan would have ample time to secure its defensive ring before the US could respond.
So, yes, the US placed an embargo, but that embargo was the direct result of Japanese expansion in SE Asia. The embargo forced Japan into a position of either abandoning their expansion plans and standing down or lashing out and taking what they wanted. They chose the latter and the only path was south towards with US territory standing in the way.
You didn't provide any coverage of how leaking atomic radiation was responsible for the creation of monsters like Godzilla and Rodan who went on to attack Toyko numerous times, killing thousands, but otherwise a pretty thorough job.
Also, In times of war, the Samurai classes were the Officers of the army.
The samurai warrior lived by a code called bushido that required 100% loyalty and obedience to his feudal lord, strict self-discipline, and fearlessness in battle. Samurai were expected to commit suicide rather than surrender.
Due to the strong influence of Samurai culture in the Japanese military, unconditional surrender is highly impossible.
On this issue, can anyone note how the Japanese feel about the issue today? Is there perhaps an argument for 'victimization' going on there? Really what is the thinking in Japanese historical circles on their conduct of the war and did Japan ever apologize?
well, I am mixed Japanese/Hawaiian/German/Irish. I've stayed in Japan for a total of 2 years.
People in the U.S. don't really care what happened 60-70 years ago, and neither do Japanese folks. Japan has a solid, stable society, beautiful culture. When Economy gets bad, people get political, it is human nature.
I think for the most part, Japan has come to terms with the past. Most people don't deny the history is there. But most countries in the world have some bad history, but they don't make it a part of daily life.
Well, obviously victims carrying the hatred and baggage a little bit longer, and that's fair. It explains why Chinese, well, some of them are still so angry at Japan. It is understandable, I guess.
I have been to China several times and my impression is that Chinese people in general are very friendly towards Japanese folks. I think the younger generation can care less about the war. They love Japanese inventions, merchandise, and culture. I think that is a positive thing.
Last edited by lilyflower3191981; 08-12-2013 at 08:04 PM..
I liked your post lilyflower. It is not filled with 'recriminations' and say hatred after the experience of war. There's a positiveness to both the Chinese and Japanese spirit. War is hell as we know. And I always wonder how I would have handled myself under the circumstances. At this point, I can only thank the dead for my 'freedom' and read their history.
The difference between the atomic bomb and any other weapon deployed in WW II was that it was the most efficient, so much so that it is the one weapon from that war which can arguably be called the war winner. I do not equate most efficient with automatically immoral.
A factor which Goat did not address is first usage. Once the nuclear bomb came into being, and before the actual effects were known with any certainty, the temptation to use one would exist. The horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki informed the world of what would happen in a manner which the Trinity demonstration blast in the desert never could. Had they not been employed against Japan, then when would the first use have been? During the attempt by the Soviets to starve Berlin? In a last desperate effort to prevent Mao's victory in China? At one of any of the Korean war crisis points? The Cuban Missile Crisis?
We are incredibly fortunate that the first use took place when it did because every other scenario is far worse. The bombs which were dropped on Japan were less powerful than the following generations of nuclear weapons. First use after 1952 would have meant thermonuclear bombs. More importantly, the attack on Japan took place while the US had a monopoly on atomic weapons, no retaliation in kind was possible. Any scenario where one nuclear power attacks another is going to be far worse.
The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki registered the power and horror of the nuclear bomb in our minds and I believe that it is because of this that there has never been another use.
Finally, all of the treasure invested by all of the world's nations in all of the bombs and delivery systems ever built, is still less than what would have been the cost of fighting a World War Three without them.
You were doing fine, and I had no quarrel with you, right up to your last paragraph:
So, yes, the US placed an embargo, but that embargo was the direct result of Japanese expansion in SE Asia. The embargo forced Japan into a position of either abandoning their expansion plans and standing down or lashing out and taking what they wanted. They chose the latter and the only path was south towards with US territory standing in the way.
Why was US "expansion" into territory in the path of Japanese expansion justifiable, but Japanese expansion was not? Even taken all the way to Hawaii, what gave Americans (and French and British and Dutch) natural rights to sovereignty over Pacific islands, "taking what tney wanted", but not the Japanese?
Why was US "expansion" into territory in the path of Japanese expansion justifiable, but Japanese expansion was not? Even taken all the way to Hawaii, what gave Americans (and French and British and Dutch) natural rights to sovereignty over Pacific islands, "taking what tney wanted", but not the Japanese?
Japan's motives for building an empire, starting very late, were very different from the British.
The British Empire was based on conquest and then benevolent liberal rule. The Japanese moved in to their colonies and were hated and reviled by their colonial subjects.
Please register to post and access all features of our very popular forum. It is free and quick. Over $68,000 in prizes has already been given out to active posters on our forum. Additional giveaways are planned.
Detailed information about all U.S. cities, counties, and zip codes on our site: City-data.com.
Please register to participate in our discussions with 2 million other members - it's free and quick! Some forums can only be seen by registered members. After you create your account, you'll be able to customize options and access all our 15,000 new posts/day with fewer ads.
