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It looks like some younger Poles don't understand that it was not about "Danzig" as some young Russians don't understand that it was not about Hitler "fighting Bolshevism."
I think this is the explanation. Hitler was not a well-educated, well-traveled individual. IMO, he likely lacked a real concept of the physical size, population, infrastructure, and resources of both the USSR and the USA, which would have been essential to planning an invasion of the Soviet Union. Hitler, and probably his generals as well, probably thought in terms of the small distances and fairly settled geography of western and central Europe, not the vast roadless steppes of the Ukraine his armies would have to cross before ever getting to Russia proper, not to mention the Urals beyond.
Hitler certainly underestimated the characters of both the Soviets and the Americans, which would not be hard for a meglomaniac and his synchophants deluded by their own racialist myths to do. Of course it never occurred to Hitler or his cronies that the Russians and Americans, like the British, wouldn't tuck tail and run but fight back.
I agree. Another part of the equation was that Hitler was a risk taker. He saw the USSR in a weak position in 1941 and tried to take advantage. Hitler and his generals understood the logistical challenges of Russia's territory. Von Paulus's war game in prelude to Barbarrossa made it clear. But Hitler and his generals, consumed by hubris and racial superiority ignored the warnings. The leadership believed the majority of the Soviet army would be destroyed before the Dnieper River which their war game viewed logistically doable. Consequently, the majority of Soviet industry and population would be in German hands. What is shocking, the Germans in their preparation, had no conception of Soviet industry possibly being shipped eastward. They took the risk that the USSR would crumble to blitzkrieg tactics like France.
Last edited by jobseeker2013; 10-08-2013 at 08:25 PM..
What is shocking, the Germans in their preparation, had no conception of Soviet industry possibly being shipped eastward. They took the risk that the USSR would crumble to blitzkrieg tactics like France.
I couldn't understand this concept for long time either, until I saw that video from "The Unknown war" regarding it.
I mean how do you plan ( and implement) all this stuff ( the relocation of the whole factories, one after another) amidst all the chaos and destruction? Someone in Stavka definitely had very cool head and very calm, rational thinking, apparently, in spite of all the circumstances.
Fascinating, I've never looked into just how the Soviets moved an entire industrial base from one part of the country to another... that's in itself is topic for a good doc.
Anyway, I found this on another forum posted by Graham Clayton on the Axis History forum which he cites as coming from "The Soviet economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945" by Walter S Dunn
"
On June 24, 1941, the Council for Evacuation was appointed. On July 4, 1941, the Council ordered Voznesenskii, director of five-year planning, to organise the movement of industry and workers to the east. Local committees used the five-year plan structure with 3,000 agents controlling the movement. Evacuation of industrial plants began in August 1941 and continued until the end of the year. But evidence shows evacuation began much earlier, or at least the transfer of machine tools and skilled workers to "shadow factories" in the east. The US military attache reported significant transfers of machines and men from the Moscow area to the east in late 1940 and early 1941. The rapid growth in production in early 1942 suggested that the evacuation had started in 1940. The tempo increased in August 1941.
Evacuation began with a recommendation from a local agency to the commissariat of the appropriate industry. After investigation, the recommendation was approved by the Evacuation Council and placed on a schedule giving the date, method of transport, and relocation site. In addition, unapproved evacuations took place on the initiative of local authorities.
Evacuation was well under way in the first week of August 1941. Sacrificing immediate production, many factories closed in August, packed up, and moved to the Ural Mountains. But because their products were needed, some plants remained in production until too late to be moved. Only 17 of the 64 iron and steel plants in the Donbas were evacuated between October and December 1941. The Kharkov tank factory was being dismantled when the Germans arrived.
The railroad made evacuation possible. As the railroads moved 2.5 million men to the front in June, July and August, they moved industrial machinery on their return. For example, on 7 August 1941, 3,000 rail cars per day evacuated iron and steel manufacturing equipment from the Dnieper area - 1,000 cars per day for the electrical industry, 400 cars per day for the chemical industry, and others. From August 8 to August 15, 1941, 26,000 rail cars evacuated industries in the Ukraine. In Moscow, 80,000 cars transported 498 factories, including 75,000 lathes, leaving only 21,000. Production by many factories resumed by December.......The operation was not always orderly. Other indications that planning was not complete and that turnaround time was longer than average were anecdotes of equipment having been dumped beside the tracks to empty the cars for a return journey. Of the 700 plants evacuated in the first months, only 270 arrived at planned destinations fully equipped, and 110 arrived with only part of their equipment....At times, inadequate planning resulted in trains having been loaded with materials and despatched with no destination to prevent capture by the Germans. These orphan trains moved around the country for long periods because there were no plans to use the equipment and no one knew what to do with them.....The evacuation of the factories was an immense undertaking. In the last three months of 1941, GOSPLAN moved 1,360 factories: 455 to the Urals, 210 to Western Siberia, and 250 to Central Asia and Kazahkstan. By the end of 1941, 1,523 large factories were moved. A few went to the Far East. The total was only a small proportion of the 32,000 factories captured by the Germans, but arms-related factories, representing 12% of the industrial potential in the occupied zone, were evacuated."
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