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So the Nazi's couldn't defeat the U.S.S.R. with a 5 million man invasion force and overwhelming air superiority, yet the small British Expeditionary force of 350,000 troops who's biggest triumph was evacuation from Dunkirk is gonna force a Soviet capitulation without a single shot being fired? Please. Your blind overzealous British superiority act is getting old. Why don't you just change your screen name to Adam Tooze because that's all you quote.
Please use common sense, learn some facts and learn to read. "French, British and Belgian pressure". UK forces were far greater than the BEF. Soviet forces in 1939 were not as great as in 1941. The annexing of countries and splitting Poland with the Nazis was to appease them. A French, British and Belgian force that had just defeated Germany would be a in a very strong position.
Don't take everything he says for granted. All of his ideas and opinions come from one author and one book: Adam Tooze's Wages of Destruction.
I mentioned three books in fact. I advise you to read Tooze his is by far the best book on WW2 and Germany.
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He has not ready any other books on WW2. His entire shtick is pro-British zeal and to vastly over-hype the performance of the British in WW2 and to degrade the American contributions. He thinks the British won WW1 by themselves.
I do? New to me. I recognised US industries contribution to WW2. Do not go on Hollywood history. In fact the USA only shortened WW2 not decide its outcome.
Now back to then point...The Allies did lose the battle of France simply due to Allied incompetence. How the French never knew of the massive German build up just across their own borders and opposite the Belgian border is incredulous.
Tooze, page 373:
"In retrospect, it suited neither the Allies nor the Germans to expose the amazingly haphazard course through which the Wehrmacht had arrived at its most brilliant military success. The myth of the Blitzkrieg suited the British and French because it provided an explanation other than military incompetence for their pitiful defeat. But whereas it suited the Allies to stress the alleged superiority of German equipment, Germany's own propaganda viewed the Blitzkrieg in less materialistic terms."
You have to look at the Mannstein plan. It was a rolling conveyor belt. Stop the belt at any point and it fails. It relied on speed. The truck drivers were given the amphetamine "speed" to keep them awake. Fuel dumps were setup near the front with trucks full of petrol cans running the line. It relied on pinning the enemy to a wall, in this case the Channel.
Tooze points out the French had 500 new up to date US planes which could have cleared a way for bombers to smash the German traffic jam in the Ardennes. He states, "Never before had so many motor vehicles been concentrated on such a small segment of European road network, and the potential for gridlock loomed far larger amongst German worries than the supposedly impassable terrain of the Ardennes." The sitting ducks on small roads were never attacked, if they had been, and even with Germany's air superiority of the Ardennes, a massed fighter and bomber attack could make an effect on such a flaky plan to kill it stone dead.
Tooze points out that Germany did not take the initiative, stating that Manstein's plans was a one-shot unrepeatable plan that could fail on many points. If it did the Whremacht was spent as an offensive force. He clearly puts it that the Panzers could have been stopped and reasonably easily too. The reason for the massive and swift German victory was to Allied incompetence rather than German brilliance.
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The French expected a long, drawn out defensive war. They had no contingency for the lines being broken on the first week of battle.
Some French ground units did react to events as they transpired. They did break the German lines at some point, however the Germans pushed the French back and started up the belt again. The French air force was ineffective, although taking heavy losses attempting to get the bridges in the Ardennes, and combined with the RAF they could have stopped the advance attacking the static vehicles piled up in on the German/Belgian border, giving them time to reassess and regroup.
The Germans engaged in a massive gamble which paid off beyond their widest dreams. Being cocky they tried this one-time-shot against the USSR which had no Channel to pin an army against. They a failed miserably.
the differing opinions of Chamberlain, and provided some evidence to support his stand. All commendable,
You wrote "Germany introduced them to Blitzkrieg and a modern mobile fighting force." No they never. I disagreed on that point. The word Blitzkrieg was coined by the British press. The UK invented and were the first to use this method warfare as I explained to you. The mobile British Army was not geared for a WW1 war. In 1940 the British had to conform to the French strategy as they were by far the strongest and largest of the ground forces. But the BEF did use their superior mobility positioned at the rear to move to hot spots. They did this moving north into Belgium swiftly - guns were pulled by fast 4x4 trucks not horses. British forces did not penetrate right into France. When the French capitulated on their flank the small BEF, which stopped the German advance at one point with an inferior force, had no option but to retreat. A body of water was in the way so they went across it.
You wrote "Germany introduced them to Blitzkrieg and a modern mobile fighting force." No they never. I disagreed on that point. The word Blitzkrieg was coined by the British press. The UK invented and were the first to use this method warfare as I explained to you. The mobile British Army was not geared for a WW1 war. In 1940 the British had to conform to the French strategy as they were by far the strongest and largest of the ground forces. But the BEF did use their superior mobility positioned at the rear to move to hot spots. They did this moving north into Belgium swiftly - guns were pulled by fast 4x4 trucks not horses. British forces did not penetrate right into France. When the French capitulated on their flank the small BEF, which stopped the German advance at one point with an inferior force, had no option but to retreat. A body of water was in the way so they went across it.
That was clearly addressed in post #14, it was no mistake, just a matter of interpretation.
For that matter, I also made a mistake on the time period of the "phoney war", saying it was 7 months...it was actually, BRACE YOURSELF EVERYONE, 7 months and 4 days. Such a critical error.
Does this now require a 1,000 word essay on the Gregorian Calander and the origination? Nice to have, but the OP wasn't asking about it. See what I am getting at?
Now move on...
Ironically, I don't think anyone here has answered the OP's questions yet.
Poor comprehension. You are not worth engaging with.
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Originally Posted by John-UK
Please use common sense, learn some facts and learn to read..".
Aren't you a joy to discuss a topic with. And you just joined to forum last month. Soon to have "not a member" under your title I am sure...see ya in banned camp.
Please use common sense, learn some facts and learn to read. "French, British and Belgian pressure". UK forces were far greater than the BEF. Soviet forces in 1939 were not as great as in 1941. The annexing of countries and splitting Poland with the Nazis was to appease them. A French, British and Belgian force that had just defeated Germany would be a in a very strong position.
You turn everything into a British superiority complex argument. The UK forces deployed on the continent were the BEF. They accounted for only 9% of Allied forces in the Battle of France campaign. Other British forces are irrelevant since they were deployed elsewhere around the globe. Your constant rants about how militarily advanced the British were and how they invented Blitzkreig before the Germans are irrelevant to this discussion.
The Allies lost the campaign for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to, Allied incompetence. There were other factors at play. The Germans outnumbered the Allies in planes 2:1, so they were easily able to achieve air superiority. The Germans also perfected combined arms tactics. They concentrated their tanks into large Panzer units that could smash through enemy defenses with little difficulty. The Germans also held advantages in leadership and communications. The French lacked in all of these areas. The French Army was predominantly infantry based and their tanks were widely dispersed in infantry support. They did not have Panzer units to counter the Germans. Finally, the Germans devised the Manstein Plan that was a brilliant plan to exploit the Allied weaknesses. These are all reasons why the Allies lost in quick order. It was not all incompetence.
You are living in a fantasy if you think the combined French/British/Belgian forces could have defeated Germany and the Soviet Union all in 1939. Even if the Allies had defeated Germany in swift fashion, they would have needed time to organize to mount such a large invasion versus the Soviets. The Allies would have been vastly overstretched and ill-equipped to invade the Soviet Union so for east. The Germans couldn't do it, so how in the world could the French-lead Allies do it?
I mentioned three books in fact. I advise you to read Tooze his is by far the best book on WW2 and Germany.
I do? New to me. I recognised US industries contribution to WW2. Do not go on Hollywood history. In fact the USA only shortened WW2 not decide its outcome.
Now back to then point...The Allies did lose the battle of France simply due to Allied incompetence. How the French never knew of the massive German build up just across their own borders and opposite the Belgian border is incredulous.
Tooze, page 373:
"In retrospect, it suited neither the Allies nor the Germans to expose the amazingly haphazard course through which the Wehrmacht had arrived at its most brilliant military success. The myth of the Blitzkrieg suited the British and French because it provided an explanation other than military incompetence for their pitiful defeat. But whereas it suited the Allies to stress the alleged superiority of German equipment, Germany's own propaganda viewed the Blitzkrieg in less materialistic terms."
You have to look at the Mannstein plan. It was a rolling conveyor belt. Stop the belt at any point and it fails. It relied on speed. The truck drivers were given the amphetamine "speed" to keep them awake. Fuel dumps were setup near the front with trucks full of petrol cans running the line. It relied on pinning the enemy to a wall, in this case the Channel.
Tooze points out the French had 500 new up to date US planes which could have cleared a way for bombers to smash the German traffic jam in the Ardennes. He states, "Never before had so many motor vehicles been concentrated on such a small segment of European road network, and the potential for gridlock loomed far larger amongst German worries than the supposedly impassable terrain of the Ardennes." The sitting ducks on small roads were never attacked, if they had been, and even with Germany's air superiority of the Ardennes, a massed fighter and bomber attack could make an effect on such a flaky plan to kill it stone dead.
Tooze points out that Germany did not take the initiative, stating that Manstein's plans was a one-shot unrepeatable plan that could fail on many points. If it did the Whremacht was spent as an offensive force. He clearly puts it that the Panzers could have been stopped and reasonably easily too. The reason for the massive and swift German victory was to Allied incompetence rather than German brilliance.
Some French ground units did react to events as they transpired. They did break the German lines at some point, however the Germans pushed the French back and started up the belt again. The French air force was ineffective, although taking heavy losses attempting to get the bridges in the Ardennes, and combined with the RAF they could have stopped the advance attacking the static vehicles piled up in on the German/Belgian border, giving them time to reassess and regroup.
The Germans engaged in a massive gamble which paid off beyond their widest dreams. Being cocky they tried this one-time-shot against the USSR which had no Channel to pin an army against. They a failed miserably.
You are wrong about the German buildup. It was not across the French-German border or the Belgian border. It was in the thickly wooded Ardennes region of Luxembourg. The French were also fully aware of the German build-up. They were warned by the Belgians and French cavalry patrol units detected the German units ahead of time. The problem was they thought it was a diversion and they underestimated the size of the buildup in that region. They expected the main German attack to come through Belgium.
Your entire theory relies on the faulty premise that the Allies would have stopped the Germans had they known the attack was coming from Luxembourg. Even if the Allies knew, how would they have stopped it? You take this for granted. The Allies had only 1/2 the planes as the Germans. They had thinly spaced tanks that were used in infantry support. They had poor communications and no radios in tanks. The French had no defense for a combined arms attack of Panzers and Luftwaffe. The French relied heavily on infantry for defense. Infantry proved worthless in the face of the Panzers.
"Never before had so many motor vehicles been concentrated on such a small segment of European road network, and the potential for gridlock loomed far larger amongst German worries than the supposedly impassable terrain of the Ardennes."
This is precisely what made the plan brilliant. The Germans knew the French would not expect the main attack to come this route. The Germans took a gamble. They gambled that the French/Allies would react to the diversionary force in Holland/Belgium and be unprepared, uncoordinated, and unable to cope with the Ardenness thrust. The Germans took a chance and it worked. Does this make them "brilliant"? Maybe, maybe not. Nobody is arguing that the Allies were incompetent, but to pass this off as the ONLY reason for their defeat is ignorant and denialism.
You wrote "Germany introduced them to Blitzkrieg and a modern mobile fighting force." No they never. I disagreed on that point. The word Blitzkrieg was coined by the British press. The UK invented and were the first to use this method warfare as I explained to you. The mobile British Army was not geared for a WW1 war. In 1940 the British had to conform to the French strategy as they were by far the strongest and largest of the ground forces. But the BEF did use their superior mobility positioned at the rear to move to hot spots. They did this moving north into Belgium swiftly - guns were pulled by fast 4x4 trucks not horses. British forces did not penetrate right into France. When the French capitulated on their flank the small BEF, which stopped the German advance at one point with an inferior force, had no option but to retreat. A body of water was in the way so they went across it.
Yet none of this British mobility helped the Allies in the Battle of France campaign. And the British never demonstrated these tactics on a widespread basis in any war, so there is no proof they were capable of launching such an attack. The Germans were capable of doing so.
"When the French capitulated on their flank the small BEF, which stopped the German advance at one point with an inferior force, had no option but to retreat."
What German advance did they stop? The one through Belgium? If so, that German force was never meant to advance any further. It was a diversionary force to draw the Allies further and further east into Belgium. The diversion was a success and the BEF/French were tricked into moving too far east, so that when the Allied lines were broken further south, the BEF was helpless because it was encircled on all sides.
I am not denying that the BEF was a good force, just pointing out that its effect on the campaign was negligible. The only triumph of the BEF was the successful evacuation. This was made possible by German "incompetence" by Hitler ordering his armies to stop attacking the Allies at Dunkirk.
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