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To the British fighting the Germans in NA was much, much better than in Europe as German strength would always be limited due to logistics which favored the British approach of warfare in raiding these soft lines. Britain fought the Axis post May 1940 thru late 1942 as they did Napoleon. NA analogous to the Peninsular Campaign, Greece to Walchren. Vichy possessions to the Caribbean, Indian and South Africa. I believe Michael Howard wrote about this.
There is no soft underbelly for Europe. Use a map with topographical features as reference and the terrain does not favor mechanized or manuever warfare. Easier to supply a multi-army group invasion force from across the Channel than from the limited capacity of NA ports to southern Europe. All of the bases and logistics had already been in place in the UK for some time and were buildup prior to 1944. Then there is the established air power assets already based there,etc.etc. Always had to be Northern France.
I am not SE Asia knowledgeable and so trust to your info. regarding 14th...
"Soft underbelly" was Churchill's words. It was easier to get on the Continent via the Med than via the Channel. Via Scandinavia may be better.
By the time the Brits launched an invasion of southern Europe. Barbarossa would have been launched. The Brits would not have to face the full brunt of the large German Army - the Germans and Italians used over 1 million men in Greece, men and resources the Germans could not afford after Barbarossa. Controlling the Med would make it easier to resupply. What if now. If the Brits had say made a foothold in Greece the Soviets could have made a drive to link up with them.
Churchill was not infallible and obviously wrong in this instance as events proved as he was later in resisting Dragoon which he admitted was an error on his part.
One would think he would have learned from the Salonika experience and the British Army in Italy in WW1.
Churchill was not infallible and obviously wrong in this instance as events proved as he was later in resisting Dragoon which he admitted was an error on his part.
One would think he would have learned from the Salonika experience and the British Army in Italy in WW1.
He was adamant that done properly hitting the soft underbelly was the right way.
At Tehran in Nov 1943 if anyone was a minor partner, which no one was, it was Roosevelt. Stalin and Churchill were key in defeating the Germans at that point. No one at the point could have thought the British Empire was spent which it was not. It looked as strong as ever. El Alemein and Stalingrad were a year before and the Med had been turned into an allied Lake with troops pushing up Italy - a minor second land front had emerged beside the front of the bomber force. Without the British that would not have been possible and Stalin knew that.
In the key decisive battles in the USSR, British tanks played a key role. In the vital Battle of Moscow that stopped the German advance in the east, British supplied tanks were 40% of the Soviet total - Matilda and Valentine tanks, classed as heavy and medium tanks by armour at the time. The Soviets requested to keep open the production lines of the Valentine, after the UK had all but abandoned the tank in the latter part of the war, as they liked it and also its reliability.Not far off 500 British tanks were supplied at the Battle of Moscow and hundreds of aircraft. Stalin knew that. He knew British industry could supply themselves and also supply the USSR and deliver via the Royal Navy.
Now so far, all I've read in rebuttal has been to argue that Churchill was a
great orator and inspiration to his people etc, etc.. all things that I believe
to be true, but, I've yet to read an argument that demonstrates that how's and
wherefores to defeat Hitler were based upon Churchill's influence as opposed to
Roosevelt and Stalin.
You know say when Britain was 'alone' very early in the war Churchill was in his bailiwick directing Britain's involevemtn and strategy against Hitler. I'd suggest that as the war went on and the US became much more involved adding increasing troops and materiel Chrichchill would find himself now sharing the spotlight with the Allies. Frankly, that scenario arguably saw the US less sensitive to say 'British' views of the war. Of course, Churchill was highly involved in helping to direct strategy but really starting in '43 Britain experienced the fact that 'strategy' was now flowing more to the hands of the Americans and Soviets who had the lions share of troops in the field. The war had evolved.
One thing though on post-war Eastern Europe. I'd say it was ironic that Churchill, really one of the initial 'statesman-warriors' against Hitler, had to be 'outraged' that Eisenhower did not see the importance of taking Berlin before the Soviets got there. In hindsight, a terrible mistake. Churchill saw it as clear as day but he got overruled by the US. He was right to note it as a dangerous consequence of the war due to his fine political instincts. Even Montgomery chimed in with , 'It became obvious to me...that the way things were being handled was going to have repercussions far beyond the end of the war; it looked to me..as if we were going to muck it up.' I reckon we did'. In this case, Churchill getting 'edged out' there on Berlin proved to see the world apparently free of the frying but then jumping into another fire.
You know say when Britain was 'alone' very early in the war Churchill was in his bailiwick directing Britain's involevemtn and strategy against Hitler. I'd suggest that as the war went on and the US became much more involved adding increasing troops and materiel Chrichchill would find himself now sharing the spotlight with the Allies. Frankly, that scenario arguably saw the US less sensitive to say 'British' views of the war. Of course, Churchill was highly involved in helping to direct strategy but really starting in '43 Britain experienced the fact that 'strategy' was now flowing more to the hands of the Americans and Soviets who had the lions share of troops in the field. The war had evolved.
High level strategy had little to do with numbers of troops in certain theatres.
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One thing though on post-war Eastern Europe. I'd say it was ironic that Churchill, really one of the initial 'statesman-warriors' against Hitler, had to be 'outraged' that Eisenhower did not see the importance of taking Berlin before the Soviets got there. In hindsight, a terrible mistake. Churchill saw it as clear as day but he got overruled by the US. He was right to note it as a dangerous consequence of the war due to his fine political instincts. Even Montgomery chimed in with , 'It became obvious to me...that the way things were being handled was going to have repercussions far beyond the end of the war; it looked to me..as if we were going to muck it up.' I reckon we did'. In this case, Churchill getting 'edged out' there on Berlin proved to see the world apparently free of the frying but then jumping into another fire.
Churchill was not overruled by the US, they just would not go for the direct thrust to Berlin wanting to advance on a wide front. The British did go for a direct concentrated thrust and went straight up to the Baltic to prevent the Soviets from getting to the North Sea while the US spread out south meandering in comparison. Montgomery was annoyed when Eisenhower changed strategy to cater for a US election. In the UK elections were cancelled and a coalition government installed.
High level strategy had little to do with numbers of troops in certain theatres.
You know when it came to trrop levels I'd say the Allies were always cognizant at high command level over where, and who under each of their troops fought under. Commanders naturally were pretty concerned when it came to each of 'their' troops and how they'd be usied in theater operations. I'd wouldn't suggest it dictated high strategy but tactically it came into play during discussions and planning. And I'd be curious what Churchill himself thought about when it came to 'running' the war in conjunction with the Americans. Not sure if he goes over this in his diaries or war reports.
Churchill was a pain in the ass for Roosevelt and his Joint Chiefs. But, gradually, the US got its way.
Churchill was usually right. He got Germany First. The US wanted a large scale invasion of France in 1942. Churchill said hold on we will have slaughter if we do that. The US commanders were cavalier in sacrificing their own troops. Churchill stopped that. Churchill wanted first to trial land in Italy and take German and Italian forces away from France and the eastern front. He got his way. He wanted the US in the desert to get the green troops battle proven. He got his way. Some top US men wanted no part on what they saw as protecting British empire territory. Churchill stopped that.
Churchill wanted no risks on D-Day. A gigantic force of ships, planes and troops were assembled training and waiting. They were so confident they could have trial raids on the French coast to test and assess German defences - the Dieppe raid. The Germans knew they were coming and knew they had little chance of stopping them.
Churchill got his way most of the time.
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