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Old 02-25-2017, 08:57 AM
 
Location: Elysium
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Originally Posted by HappyRider View Post
There were 4 major parties to WW2; Germany, Japan, US and Russia. Of the 3, Germany commands the lion share of interest with regards to weapons, planes, rockets, ships, subs tanks etc. If you browse the news stands you see cover story after cover story about German hardware as well as military tactics. The US side gets some coverage as do the Russians but virtually nothing Japanese. Can't think of a single Japanese light arm that impressed anybody. It is not explicit but you sense a certain admiration for the German military from the leadership on down even when they end up on the losing side of battles. For example, WW2 memorabilia is predominantly German.
An army drove out of the east to the Atlantic Ocean. For the next 45 years we were worried about and planned on how to stop a Soviet Army for doing the same. That accounts for the military interest in the Wehrmacht. Being the ultimate bad guys in human history accounts for the memorabilia as their imagery would affect a larger population than say Viking or other groups that emerged before truly global communications
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Old 02-25-2017, 11:02 AM
 
Location: Finland
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Originally Posted by NJGOAT View Post
Very good points. Germany didn't even set its economy to a complete war footing until well into 1943. The lack of organized weapon production and the endless competition of designs for resources greatly hampered their war effort.



Also excellent points. When the 1940 Battle of France is war gamed by modern military strategists, it is almost impossible for the Germans to win, even given the initial deployments of allied units when the war started. German strategy and tactics were simply more evolved, not their actual war machine. Early in the war, most allied equipment was superior to its German counterparts.

While the Germans were certainly deficient in their logistics planning, the lack of trucks wasn't the worst thing for them. They had limited fuel supplies and the more mechanized the army, the more fuel it requires. The Germans only mechanized that which required it and used more traditional methods for the remainder. The only truly 'fully' mechanized armies were the US and British, but they had the logistics train and fuel supplies to support it.



The majority of losses for German heavy tanks was mechanical breakdown and destruction by their own crews. The macro point though is what you tapped into. These types of weapon systems consumed vast time and resources that could have been better utilized producing more Pz.IV's and Stugs/Marders.



The STG44 concept certainly influenced later weapons design. In particular the method with which it reduced muzzle impulse to achieve combat effective automatic fire influenced all assault rifles that followed. However, the weapon was not without its faults. Ultimately the STG44 came into existence due to failed German efforts to create a weapon that was equivalent to the M1 Garand and SVT-40. They also struggled heavily against Soviet units equipped with PPSh-41's. At the same time, the US had already pioneered the concept with the M1 carbine, which was originally supposed to have a select fire mode. The select fire version (the M2) was eventually rolled out and conversion kits provided for the M1's in the field. A final version, the M3 even incorporated a rather advanced infrared scope that was vastly superior to the "Vampir" used by German forces.

The "88" came in many various flavors, some with exceptional performance, some less so. The best German tank gun of the war however was the 75mm Kwk42. The performance of that gun though was equaled by the British QF-17 pounder and easily exceeded with the use of APDS rounds (an allied creation that is still in use today). While the Germans had some very effective guns, the allies were not deficient in this department and developed some very advanced ammunition to make even their lighter guns have exceptional performance. The QF17 was the basis for the QF20 which itself evolved into the L7 105mm which was mounted on most western MBT's for decades. Then we can look at the Soviet side and guns like the D-10 as mounted in the SU-100 were incredibly effective guns and weapon systems that saw life for decades after the war.

Lugers may be expensive collectors items and were prized as war trophies by Americans during the war, but there is nothing exceptional about the performance of a Luger relative to that of say, a 1911 Colt .45. Personally, I'd take the M1911 on my hip over a Luger any day.

The MG42 was a fantastic LMG and it's influence was felt for decades after the war. However, if we compare it's lineage and history to the M2 .50 HMG or the Soviet DPSHK, we will find equal long term use and influence.

The Germans had an early edge in radio controlled glide bomb technology, but the UK had been developing them as well and the US fielded radio and TV controlled glide bombs extensively in the latter half of 1944.

My argument is not that Germany didn't have good weapons or weapon systems, it was against the idea that Germany's equipment was "advanced" or their technology was "vastly superior" to the allies, it wasn't, especially compared to the US and British who certainly had a technological advantage over the Germans. Many German advances in particular areas were made to cover up their deficits in others. The lack of an effective primary infantry weapon forced the development of more advanced machine guns to make up for their lack of fire power and eventually led to the creation of the STG44, which wasn't all that revolutionary relative to other weapons that were out there.

Ultimately, German innovation and willingness to attempt to field advanced weaponry was born out of the fact that their standard arms had some severe deficiencies versus the allied armies. While some German equipment was advanced relative to what was standard issue to the allies, the technology itself was not unique to Germany and was often not widely adopted by the allies because they simply had no need to do so while they invested in improving their regular weapons platforms that were winning them the war. Even where the relatively advanced weapons were deployed it was often in small quantities and at the detriment of providing and/or improving other desperately needed, more conventional, equipment.
Good points, but I would like to point out that some German equipment was "advanced", ie being the first to utilise it.

The potential of the legendary 88 mm Flak as an anti-tank weapon was realised in already during the Spanish Civil War, far before anyone else, and in 1940 nobody else had anything comparable.

Similarly, the appearance of the Tiger combined armour and firepower which was totally unrivalled for much of the war. By this time the British had only started to deploy the troops with the QF 6 pounder ATG which seemed sufficient for the time. The 17 pdr prototypes were rushed into action to encounter the Tiger threat.

Meanwhile at the time the Germans had brought into action the similar 75 mm Pak 40 which was half the weight of a 17 pdr. With the panzergranate 39 the 75 mm was in every aspect more effective than any Allied gun of similar caliber. This became the standard ATG of the Axis forces, when the 6 pdr / 57 mm M1 remained the standard of the Western Allies and the Russians the Zis-3 76 mm which was inefficient against heavier German armour.

As for the MG42, it was widely used as a squad gun, as well as in MMG and HMG roles. The equivalent for this are not the 50 cal M2 or DSHK, but the Bren, DP and BAR. For the MMG roles the Allies used old bulky water-cooled Vickers, M1917 (later M1919) and Maxim machine guns. It's no doubt that the MG42 was the best and most effective all-purpose machine gun of WWII.

While the Panther came out unreliable from the factories, these issues were largely fixed, and it was an awesome machine. It had the combination of firepower, protection and mobility no Allied tank had. And contrary to popular belief, it wasn't that much more expensive than the panzer IV, and also was the 3rd most produced German tank.

In the air, the German airplanes were highly automatical, had fuel injection, automatic fuel mixture and the fighters ammo counters, while hardly any British or Soviet planes had in 1939.
The 20 mm MG151 is usually considered the best aircraft cannon of WWII and it's predecessor the MG/FF also widely used long before the 20 mm Hispano or 20 mm SHVAK became household names.
The 30 mm MG103 was something the Allies didn't have at all.

The list goes on, but usually it was the Allies who had to implement something to encounter German innovations and not vice versa.
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Old 02-25-2017, 03:03 PM
 
Location: Independent Republic of Ballard
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The French fought the last war, the Germans the next war, at least in the spearhead. The French had more tanks, airplanes, artillery, and troops, but worse leadership, planning, and organization. The Germans had the better arms, but less of it. Ultimately, it was a revolution in strategy (breakthrough) and tactics (coordinated maneuver) that won the day. That the Germans had the better tanks mattered less than that they had radios in their tanks, which the French didn't.

The strategical advantage was later blunted by defenses-in-depth (in North Africa and Russia), draining the Panzers dry, assisted by strategical blunders by Hitler, while at Normandy it was Allied air power that fixed the Germans in place and allowed a breakthrough. By the end of the war, the Allies still had the worse arms, but much more of them. Most post-war arms, whether planes, tanks, rockets, guns, etc., were based on German models.
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Old 02-26-2017, 03:39 PM
 
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Originally Posted by NJGOAT View Post
It is very true that German military thinking has had an influence on modern strategy and tactics. However, I don't think one could go so far as to state that our modern army is based on German military doctrine. I think the one lasting contribution of Prussia/Germany to modern military thought has been professional officer corps who attend specialized schools and war colleges to refine their craft.



What are the "advanced achievements" of the Germans in "every field"? I think the more one studies the war, one comes to the realization that the Germans weren't actually all that advanced in terms of technology relative to the allies.



I would heavily argue the last sentence. Yes, Germany over-performed in the beginning. However, by 1941 when they ground to a halt outside of Moscow, the writing was on the wall, with or without US support. Most military historians and analysts view the US contribution as shortening the length of the war in Europe, but not being decisive in determining the outcome. The Soviets were going to win with or without us and it wasn't even until mid-1943, long after the Germans were being rolled back, that US supplies really started to impact the battlefield on the Eastern Front.
Without the British, Soviet Russia would have probably lost, the UK was engaging a huge portion of the German Air Force, and the vast open plains of Russia make Air Superiority very influential to the outcome of the battles. This is in addition to engaging the majority of the Italian Army in Africa, and some Germans there as well.
Granted, I don't think the USSR would have surrendered if Moscow had fallen but the balance of power on the Eastern Front was hugely effected by the African and European theatres
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Old 02-27-2017, 08:14 AM
 
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Originally Posted by btownboss4 View Post
Without the British, Soviet Russia would have probably lost, the UK was engaging a huge portion of the German Air Force, and the vast open plains of Russia make Air Superiority very influential to the outcome of the battles. This is in addition to engaging the majority of the Italian Army in Africa, and some Germans there as well.
Granted, I don't think the USSR would have surrendered if Moscow had fallen but the balance of power on the Eastern Front was hugely effected by the African and European theatres
The German general staff wanted to capture Moscow ASAP. Moscow was an important armaments center, the hub of Soviet communications and rail transportation. A large part of the retreating Soviet army had fled towards Moscow. Capturing it could have ended the Soviets ability to continue the war, whether they sued for peace or not.

Hitler overruled them in favor of capturing Russian armies around Karkov. As a result, the attack on Moscow was delayed, the autumn rains slowed the German advance when it started again, and the Soviets had time to move their eastern armies from Siberia to Moscow and defeat the Germans in a counter-offensive.
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Old 02-27-2017, 10:08 AM
 
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Originally Posted by Ariete View Post
Good points, but I would like to point out that some German equipment was "advanced", ie being the first to utilise it.
For sure. Ultimately all sides had some areas where they were advanced and others were deficient. Often the necessity for advancement was borne out of the need to overcome a weakness. My only real macro point was to challenge the idea that the Germans fielded a military that was more advanced in terms of technology and armaments than those they faced. This was simply not the case. The war did not really come down to quality vs. quantity as many argue.

Quote:
The potential of the legendary 88 mm Flak as an anti-tank weapon was realised in already during the Spanish Civil War, far before anyone else, and in 1940 nobody else had anything comparable.
The Condor Legion made extensive use of the 88 as an artillery and AT piece. In Spain, it served more in that capacity than any other. During the Battle of France the 88 once again came to prominence because regular German AT and tank guns could simply not penetrate the armor of several French and British tanks. It proved itself a superb weapon in North Africa and became an absolute necessity on the Eastern Front as the Germans had nothing else capable of taking out T34 and KV1 tanks at combat ranges. Ultimately its use as an AT gun was driven by necessity.

As for something comparable, the US (90mm), British (94mm) and even Italian (90mm) AA guns were every bit as good (and in terms of use as an AA gun were flat out BETTER, especially the allied guns once proximity fuses were introduced). The US 90mm was eventually converted for use as an anti-tank gun, but the simple reality was that the US did not feel an express need to convert their AA weapons into AT guns until late in the war.

Quote:
Similarly, the appearance of the Tiger combined armour and firepower which was totally unrivalled for much of the war. By this time the British had only started to deploy the troops with the QF 6 pounder ATG which seemed sufficient for the time. The 17 pdr prototypes were rushed into action to encounter the Tiger threat.
Well, we're skipping over the fact that the Tiger itself was hurried into production and combat in order to counter the Soviet T34 and KV1 which absolutely dominated all German armor early in the war. I feel like much of this discussion has centered on allies = US and UK. In reality, the Soviets and Eastern Front had far more impact on German designs and planning.

The British response to the Tiger was to hurry the deployment of the 17 pounder which had already been under development. Of course, the Tiger was vulnerable to the 6 pounder as well and the first Tiger losses in North Africa were at the hands of 6 pounder AT guns. The 17 pounder had no problem knocking out Tigers at all regular combat ranges and became even more lethal in 1944 with APDS rounds. Sherman Fireflys had no issue knocking out Tigers.

The US response was pretty much a yawn. They felt that Tigers were deployed in such small numbers that countering with AT guns and artillery was more than sufficient.

The Soviet's were a little more concerned about the Tiger, but not to the level of panic. They were concerned that the new 85mm gun they were deploying was not as effective as they wanted it to be, but they had tanks and guns capable of penetrating the Tiger at regular combat ranges. By mid-1943 the SU-152 had proven it's ability to decimate Tigers when firing AP from its 152mm canon. By late 1943 the deployment of IS2's and ISU-152's had virtually neutralized the Tiger threat.

Quote:
Meanwhile at the time the Germans had brought into action the similar 75 mm Pak 40 which was half the weight of a 17 pdr. With the panzergranate 39 the 75 mm was in every aspect more effective than any Allied gun of similar caliber. This became the standard ATG of the Axis forces, when the 6 pdr / 57 mm M1 remained the standard of the Western Allies and the Russians the Zis-3 76 mm which was inefficient against heavier German armour.
...and the Germans needed that gun because of Soviet armor which outclassed everything the Germans had early in the war. Meanwhile, the allied guns were more than sufficient for dealing with the most common German tanks at typical combat ranges.

Combat range is another little talked about factor but mattered massively. The heavier German guns and armor seem very impressive on paper, especially when they have "kill power" at 2,000 meters. However, if you compare the guns and armor between the sides you will quickly realize that by 1944 anything could kill anything at under 1,000 meters...that's a little over half a mile. Only in North Africa and in some areas of the Eastern Front did engagements happen at over a mile out and even then the chance to actually score a hit from that range was minimal. On the Eastern Front average combat range was around 1,000-1,200 meters. On the western front average combat range was around 750 meters. Overall, the German advantage in protection and kill power at range didn't often matter on the actual battlefield.

Quote:
As for the MG42, it was widely used as a squad gun, as well as in MMG and HMG roles. The equivalent for this are not the 50 cal M2 or DSHK, but the Bren, DP and BAR. For the MMG roles the Allies used old bulky water-cooled Vickers, M1917 (later M1919) and Maxim machine guns. It's no doubt that the MG42 was the best and most effective all-purpose machine gun of WWII.
I wasn't comparing the M2 and DSHK to the MG42 in terms of use. I was comparing it based on longevity and impact in terms of being "advanced". Both of those allied machine guns continue to be used today as well.

As for the role of the MG42, it was a direct replacement for the MG34 at the squad level (as the MG34 proved unreliable in poor conditions). The German squad was essentially built around the light machine gun with the rifleman (armed largely with bolt action rifles) supported the LMG. British squads were arranged the same way, but US squads centered on the rifleman with his semi-auto and other weapons were there solely for support. The Russians embraced fully automatic weapons more than anyone and equipped entire divisions with sub machine guns. Here German strategy dictated the weapon design.

I would also point out that as good as the MG42 was, it was not as amazing as most claim. It's combat effective rate of fire was around 150 rounds per minute. The sky high firing rates listed on many sites are for the anti-aircraft models of the MG42. The infantry model could fire around 950 rounds per minute, but this was combat ineffective. The 150 rounds number made it marginally better than other allied support weapons. However, that wasn't due to the bolt design. The true innovation was actually in the interchangeable barrel system which is how it managed to achieve the higher effective rate of fire.

Quote:
While the Panther came out unreliable from the factories, these issues were largely fixed, and it was an awesome machine. It had the combination of firepower, protection and mobility no Allied tank had. And contrary to popular belief, it wasn't that much more expensive than the panzer IV, and also was the 3rd most produced German tank.
...and the Panther project was born out of the need to counter the T34. In fact, Guderian argued that Germany should simply copy the T34 wholesale. The most notable feature of the Panther, its sloped armor, was in fact copied from the Soviets. Overall, the Panther was an excellent tank when it came to fighting other tanks. However, it was woefully deficient when it came to providing infantry support.

The Panther was the tank you wanted to be in for a ranged tank fight, but take the battle to the bocage, a town, a forest, etc. and it becomes very vulnerable and not very effective. Don't believe me? How about General Bayerlein, commander of the Panzer Lehr division...

While the PzKpfw IV could still be used to advantage, the PzKpfw V [Panther] proved ill adapted to the terrain. The Sherman because of its maneuverability and height was good ... [the Panther was] poorly suited for hedgerow terrain because of its width. Long gun barrel and width of tank reduce maneuverability in village and forest fighting. It is very front-heavy and therefore quickly wears out the front final drives, made of low-grade steel. High silhouette. Very sensitive power-train requiring well-trained drivers. Weak side armor; tank top vulnerable to fighter-bombers. Fuel lines of porous material that allow gasoline fumes to escape into the tank interior causing a grave fire hazard. Absence of vision slits makes defense against close attack impossible.

Ultimately, for as "advanced" as the Panther was for WW2, it had virtually zero influence on post-war tank design. It was ultimately the M4, T34 and PzIV which influenced future tank thought towards a universal design capable of both anti-armor and infantry support.

Quote:
In the air, the German airplanes were highly automatical, had fuel injection, automatic fuel mixture and the fighters ammo counters, while hardly any British or Soviet planes had in 1939.
The 20 mm MG151 is usually considered the best aircraft cannon of WWII and it's predecessor the MG/FF also widely used long before the 20 mm Hispano or 20 mm SHVAK became household names.
The 30 mm MG103 was something the Allies didn't have at all.
Only the FW190 featured the automatic controls and it was quite advanced for its time.

While the Germans were advanced in the realm of fuel injection, the allies used vastly superior turbo and superchargers. In fact, German engines had to be larger than their allied counterparts to produce the same power.

The use of a centrally mounted aircraft canon was pioneered by the French and adopted by the Germans. In fact the MG151 you mention was driven by the German need to create a canon to match the French Oerlikon 20mm, since the Oerlikon was too large to fit into the German engines. The Germans stuck with their canons, because the primary role of their fighters was to attack bomber formations.

The MG103 was a development to find something to help counter Soviet armor.

Overall, the western allies fielded the more advanced and effective air force from 1940 onwards. The Spitfire was every bit as good as any fighter the Germans had. In the east the ***-3 while not as technologically advanced, was a superb aircraft and could take on any German plane in a dogfight from 1944 on. If we are looking at strategic bombers, it isn't even close, the allies fielded the vastly superior aircraft.

Quote:
The list goes on, but usually it was the Allies who had to implement something to encounter German innovations and not vice versa.
I think throughout, I've demonstrated that much of the German innovation, especially in tanks, guns and armor, was a direct response to the Soviets and the realities of the eastern front. The western allies then needed to adapt to these developments, but the war in the west was very different and adaptation was not always as imperative. Many of the German decisions were also illogical when you look at their forces as a whole. Panthers and Tigers may have been great in a microcosm, but they were unreliable and sucked down fuel like no ones business. Things the Germans simply couldn't afford.

Both sides were advanced in some ways and deficient in others. Ultimately winning wars comes down to logistics and long term strategy and that is where the allies proved superior.
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Old 02-27-2017, 11:03 AM
 
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Originally Posted by btownboss4 View Post
Without the British, Soviet Russia would have probably lost, the UK was engaging a huge portion of the German Air Force, and the vast open plains of Russia make Air Superiority very influential to the outcome of the battles. This is in addition to engaging the majority of the Italian Army in Africa, and some Germans there as well.
Granted, I don't think the USSR would have surrendered if Moscow had fallen but the balance of power on the Eastern Front was hugely effected by the African and European theatres
When the Germans were stopped at Moscow in late 1941, there was no real influence on that battle from the British. From that moment on, the German tidal wave had broken. In 1942, their ability to launch major offensives ceased and by mid-1943 they ceased to be able to launch sustained offensive operations. All of the defining moments of that time period saw 90%+ of German resources being thrown at the Soviets.

In the grand scale of the Eastern Front, I think it's short sighted to believe that an extra division (essentially what was committed to Africa), or some more fighter planes (when the Germans had total air superiority) or a bunch of under supplied and poorly equipped Italian infantry were going to swing those battles.

That is not to underestimate the British effort, it's that I have not read any historical analysis that states that British and western allied contributions early in the war proved decisive in deciding the outcome.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Troyfan View Post
The German general staff wanted to capture Moscow ASAP. Moscow was an important armaments center, the hub of Soviet communications and rail transportation. A large part of the retreating Soviet army had fled towards Moscow. Capturing it could have ended the Soviets ability to continue the war, whether they sued for peace or not.

Hitler overruled them in favor of capturing Russian armies around Karkov. As a result, the attack on Moscow was delayed, the autumn rains slowed the German advance when it started again, and the Soviets had time to move their eastern armies from Siberia to Moscow and defeat the Germans in a counter-offensive.
The original plan for Barbarossa basically had the German armies advancing towards points on the map and engaging Russian forces in general areas. It was an annihilation battle plan, not a conquest of cities per se. It was only after the Germans had reached the points on the map, had destroyed multiple Soviet armies and the Soviets refused to surrender did they begin debating what to do next.

The general staff did want to push for Moscow rapidly, but much postwar analysis has shown that the situation wasn't so clear cut. The German supply situation for AG Center was critical at that point. They simply didn't have the logistics capacity to support a major offensive operation involving all of AG Center.

Hitler's decision to split off Hoth and Guderians panzer forces was actually pretty sound. Those forces could be supplied from other fronts (Velikyi Luki in the north and Gomel in the south) which relieved pressure on the supply situation in Smolensk. By neutralizing the Kharkov pocket it freed AG South to move again and secured the southern flank of AG Center. That opened up the possibility of an assault on Bryansk to secure the next piece of the supply puzzle in a push on Moscow.

Ultimately, Halder himself wrote that the supply situation for AG Center did not normalize until mid-September. It was not until that time that they could resume offensive operations. The memoirs from Halder are backed up by an extensive study by the US in early WW2. That study and comparisons to the comments of Halder and other generals are detailed in this CIA review:

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-f...4a07p_0001.htm

Bottom line, the German supply situation was incapable of supporting an earlier advance on Moscow and had become most critical in the period of August 21st-September 25th 1941. At that point the overall military was short 12 tons per day at major bases and 36 tons per day at advance rail heads. If you look through the charts in the CIA study, you will see the movement of supply needs going to AG North and AG South (where capacity existed) and then finally back to AG Center beginning in late September as the supply situation normalized and the advance on Moscow could begin.
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Old 02-27-2017, 03:06 PM
 
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Originally Posted by NJGOAT View Post
When the Germans were stopped at Moscow in late 1941, there was no real influence on that battle from the British. From that moment on, the German tidal wave had broken. In 1942, their ability to launch major offensives ceased and by mid-1943 they ceased to be able to launch sustained offensive operations. All of the defining moments of that time period saw 90%+ of German resources being thrown at the Soviets.

In the grand scale of the Eastern Front, I think it's short sighted to believe that an extra division (essentially what was committed to Africa), or some more fighter planes (when the Germans had total air superiority) or a bunch of under supplied and poorly equipped Italian infantry were going to swing those battles.

That is not to underestimate the British effort, it's that I have not read any historical analysis that states that British and western allied contributions early in the war proved decisive in deciding the outcome.



The original plan for Barbarossa basically had the German armies advancing towards points on the map and engaging Russian forces in general areas. It was an annihilation battle plan, not a conquest of cities per se. It was only after the Germans had reached the points on the map, had destroyed multiple Soviet armies and the Soviets refused to surrender did they begin debating what to do next.

The general staff did want to push for Moscow rapidly, but much postwar analysis has shown that the situation wasn't so clear cut. The German supply situation for AG Center was critical at that point. They simply didn't have the logistics capacity to support a major offensive operation involving all of AG Center.

Hitler's decision to split off Hoth and Guderians panzer forces was actually pretty sound. Those forces could be supplied from other fronts (Velikyi Luki in the north and Gomel in the south) which relieved pressure on the supply situation in Smolensk. By neutralizing the Kharkov pocket it freed AG South to move again and secured the southern flank of AG Center. That opened up the possibility of an assault on Bryansk to secure the next piece of the supply puzzle in a push on Moscow.

Ultimately, Halder himself wrote that the supply situation for AG Center did not normalize until mid-September. It was not until that time that they could resume offensive operations. The memoirs from Halder are backed up by an extensive study by the US in early WW2. That study and comparisons to the comments of Halder and other generals are detailed in this CIA review:

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-f...4a07p_0001.htm

Bottom line, the German supply situation was incapable of supporting an earlier advance on Moscow and had become most critical in the period of August 21st-September 25th 1941. At that point the overall military was short 12 tons per day at major bases and 36 tons per day at advance rail heads. If you look through the charts in the CIA study, you will see the movement of supply needs going to AG North and AG South (where capacity existed) and then finally back to AG Center beginning in late September as the supply situation normalized and the advance on Moscow could begin.
If you don't think a "Bunch of undersupplied and undertrained" Italian soldiers could have swung the battle of Moscow or Leningrad, then how did a bunch of undersupplied Soviets do it?
About 500,000 (150,000 being German) Axis Troops were killed or Captured in North Africa, and another 300,000 in East Africa.
Another 100,000 troops were tied up in the Middle East, which Allied Control was instrumental to supplies like Oil throughout the war.
The British lead Yugoslav Coup also had an effect of flipping a country from the Axis to what became a bloody occupation that was a thorn in the side of both the Italians and Germans. The commitment of ~450,000 troops to Yugoslavia and the lack of the (500,000 men)Yugoslav army also had a negative impact of German War efforts.
Of course together this is about 2,000,000 troops. That is 1/2 the size of the invasion force of the Soviet Union. Now the operational capacity of the Italians was less than the Germans, but saying the west handled about 1/4 of the total war effort is not crazy.
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Old 02-27-2017, 04:29 PM
 
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Originally Posted by btownboss4 View Post
If you don't think a "Bunch of undersupplied and undertrained" Italian soldiers could have swung the battle of Moscow or Leningrad, then how did a bunch of undersupplied Soviets do it?
About 500,000 (150,000 being German) Axis Troops were killed or Captured in North Africa, and another 300,000 in East Africa.
Another 100,000 troops were tied up in the Middle East, which Allied Control was instrumental to supplies like Oil throughout the war.
The British lead Yugoslav Coup also had an effect of flipping a country from the Axis to what became a bloody occupation that was a thorn in the side of both the Italians and Germans. The commitment of ~450,000 troops to Yugoslavia and the lack of the (500,000 men)Yugoslav army also had a negative impact of German War efforts.
Of course together this is about 2,000,000 troops. That is 1/2 the size of the invasion force of the Soviet Union. Now the operational capacity of the Italians was less than the Germans, but saying the west handled about 1/4 of the total war effort is not crazy.
The Soviets were fighting for their homes and they were hardly under supplied or ill trained when they launched the counter attacks that finally relieved Moscow. At that same time, the Germans could barely supply the troops they had.

You are quoting gross numbers for the entire campaign. You need to look at what the actual commitments were and compare that to a timeline of events on the Eastern Front. There were three critical moments on the Eastern Front: Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk. My argument is not that the British and western allies had no impact on the war effort, nor is to argue how much of it they "handled" in gross terms (the usual statement is 20% since 80% of German losses occurred on Eastern Front). My argument was simply that the war was decided on the Eastern Front in a handful of campaigns and that virtually nothing the western allies did had any influence on what happened at Moscow and Stalingrad and almost no influence on what happened at Kursk.

The Italians weren't going to abandon all of their war aims and march their entire army off to Russia while abandoing their colonies in Africa. So, we are really left arguing if Rommel and his two divisions would have made a difference at the gates of Moscow. I somewhat doubt that 20,000 or so men and a handful of armored vehicles were going to swing the Battle of Moscow in favor of the Germans.
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Old 02-27-2017, 10:27 PM
 
Location: Montgomery County, PA
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@NJGOAT superb, informative posts. Thank you.
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