So what exactly were the Soviets plan during the Cuban Missile Crisis? (WWII, war)

[mariez149]

I know what happened and what the end result was but I don't quite understand why the Soviets thought they could get away with it. Did they really think the U.S wouldn't notice them building bases practically right next door? Or that, of COURSE once the U.S found out they would raise hell and do everything they could to stop it; something the Soviets surely would have known, so what exactly was their thinking when they decided to start up what could eventually lead to a nuclear showdown?

Or did they know all along they weren't going to be able to just build their bases and leave them there but did it anyway just to **** off the U.S? Kind of like a "turn around, pull your pants down and say na na na na na na" kind of thing?

[Frihed89]

It was a provocation to test the US. Yes, the US knew the Soviets were building the bases in advance of sending the missiles by ship to Cuba. Yes, the Soviets knew full well that the passage of the ship carrying the missiles would be detected by the Danish coastal watch station. They have many of them.

After that, it became a high-stakes showdown, with one hitch: the Soviets were prepared to back down at the last minute if the expected loss of carrying on was unacceptable.

Kennedy and his aids either believed that it was test, or were prepared to go all the way. We'll never know.

[grega94]

What Frihed89 said as well as payback for the US placing missiles in Turkey (border nation) and what they really wanted was so that the US would take their missiles out of Turkey and that is exactly what ended up happening.

[Unsettomati]

Originally Posted by mariez149

I know what happened and what the end result was but I don't quite understand why the Soviets thought they could get away with it. Did they really think the U.S wouldn't notice them building bases practically right next door? Or that, of COURSE once the U.S found out they would raise hell and do everything they could to stop it; something the Soviets surely would have known, so what exactly was their thinking when they decided to start up what could eventually lead to a nuclear showdown?

Or did they know all along they weren't going to be able to just build their bases and leave them there but did it anyway just to **** off the U.S? Kind of like a "turn around, pull your pants down and say na na na na na na" kind of thing?

First, it was as counter to U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe and Turkey. The Soviets felt they were at a strategic disadvantage in that regard - and they were. They were also lagging behind in just about every other way regarding nuclear weapons. The U.S. had far more ICBMs, had targeting capability that was far more accurate, had deployed SLBMS (the USSR hadn't managed this yet) and were just deploying solid-fuel ICBMs - these have a great advantage because they're launch on command, where liquid-fueled ICBMs have to first be fueled, a task that generally takes hours, and once fueled have to be soon launched or drained of their unstable fuel. And the growing British and French nuclear arsenals, primarily amassed with the USSR in mind, didn't help the overall Soviet strategic situation any.

The Soviets were looking for anyway to cut into this advantage. A big launch platform right off the U.S. coast fit that bill nicely.

Second, it was largely about West Berlin, which was a huge thorn in the Soviet side. Khrushchev calculated that if he was able to surreptitiously put missiles in Cuba and the U.S. could not pre-empt their operationality, then they would probably accept it as a fait accompli - at which point Khrushchev would have a sufficient Sword of Damocles hanging over the U.S. with which he could force the Allies out of West Berlin. Alternately, if the U.S. played hardball, Khrushchev figured he could trade away the chit of nukes in Cuba for that of the Allies pulling out of West Berlin.

The crisis in fact ended with Khrushchev getting a deal - he traded Soviet nukes in Cuba away for American nukes in Turkey and Italy and a promise not to ever invade Cuba. The problem, for the Soviets, was that the deal mostly sucked. The Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy were largely obsolete by 1962 (the USAF had never liked them, and basically had the missiles forced on them). Their strategic position didn't improve - it would take them years to build up sizable ICBM force and master deployable solid-fuel launch and SLBM technology. West Berlin remained in the hands of the Allies. And for Khrushchev, it ultimately facilitated Brezhnev's seizing of his leadership.

Khrushchev miscalculated, and badly. He thought JFK was an easy mark - he was very wrong.

[NJGOAT]

Originally Posted by mariez149

I know what happened and what the end result was but I don't quite understand why the Soviets thought they could get away with it. Did they really think the U.S wouldn't notice them building bases practically right next door? Or that, of COURSE once the U.S found out they would raise hell and do everything they could to stop it; something the Soviets surely would have known, so what exactly was their thinking when they decided to start up what could eventually lead to a nuclear showdown?

Or did they know all along they weren't going to be able to just build their bases and leave them there but did it anyway just to **** off the U.S? Kind of like a "turn around, pull your pants down and say na na na na na na" kind of thing?

In the global chess match of nuclear arms, time to target is what matters. The faster I can get my missiles to their targets, the greater my advantage. You could ultimately check mate your opponent if you could position your arms or develop technology that would allow you to strike so fast that your opponent wouldn't have time to respond. Throughout most of the Cold War the US held the advantage in that area. Europe and our NATO allies along with our advanced missile and submarine technology meant that we owned the first strike game.

The Soviets worked hard to get around this and one of the easiest ways was putting missiles closer to the US. Cuba and its friendly communist government was the perfect location. I think Unsettomati did a great job detailing the tit-for-tat after that. If the US protested, which the Soviets were sure they would, they would have gained leverage to negotiate. Using the leverage of the missiles to take West Berlin or negotiate for it would have been quite the coup for the Soviets. Want they didn't expect was the hardline taken by JFK. In a game of brinksmanship, the one who blinks loses. The Soviets blinked.

[Cryptic]

Originally Posted by mariez149

I know what happened and what the end result was but I don't quite understand why the Soviets thought they could get away with it. Did they really think the U.S wouldn't notice them building bases practically right next door?

Or did they know all along they weren't going to be able to just build their bases and leave them there but did it anyway just to **** off the U.S? Kind of like a "turn around, pull your pants down and say na na na na na na" kind of thing?

As Frihed89 stated, the Soviet strategic plan was to counter US missiles in Turkey (which were quietly removed once the Soviets left Cuba).

That aside, the Soviet local plan in Cuba was to build, equip and defend their missile bases there via a "surge" or "blitz". They knew the US would detect them, but they had hoped to have them built blitz style and also to surge enough selected conventional forces into Cuba, that by the time the US decided to do something, the bases would be a fait accompli.

The Soviets had some (emphasis on some) potential aces: The had spend a lot of money developing very capable anti aircraft missiles. They planned to send entire regiments of these to Cuba. Likewise, the Soviets were early leaders in anti ship missiles. Their plan also called for flotillas of small missile boats to be transported to Cuba on cargo ships. They would then deter any amphibious landings.

Of course, neither the SAMs nor the missile boats would stop the US from invading if it really made the choice to do so. The Soviets were betting on deterance. If an invasion still occurred, the Soviet plan B was to either close off west Berlin, or hit Turkey real hard. In the end, they decided that they were just too weak in 1963 (only 18 years after WWII) to fight and win a global confrontation with the US. So, they backed down.

[Old Gringo]

It was provocation, pure and simple. And also it was a countermove to the US erecting missiles in Turkey.

Kruschev saw JFK as a young inexperienced kid he could push around.

He was wrong.

But we did remove those missiles from Turkey when the USSR pulled theirs out of Cuba.

[ukrkoz]

I'd say y'all watch House of Cards. It has quite interesting insight on how arm wrestling in BIG politics is done, in late chapters.
Thing is, USA has quite unfair disadvantage in those games. It's buffered from east and west by oceans and from north and south by "friendly" countries. It is technically impossible for a foe to get as close to the USA as the USA can get to a foe. So a foe will look for any opportunities to get as close as possible and rightfully so. Before you start saying this or that about then USSR, try for a moment to put yourself into that country leadership shoes. Got to do something, right?
But I think it does not really matter now. Russia has ballistic missile that can cover almost entire USA with one shot and is pretty much indestructible as USA does not have anti ballistic missile defense system, as far as I know. And Russia does. At least, they claim they are the only ones in the world that do. And I am not sure how many of those deadly missiles they have. Likely not just one.

[CrazyDonkey]

After the Vienna Summit and the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Krushchev believed he could intimidate Kennedy and force him to back down. Instead, Kennedy stood his ground, or water, and forced him to backdown. In so doing, Kennedy also had to stand up to his own advisors, who wanted him to invade Cuba (again).

[mwruckman]

By the summer of 1962 the strategic balance of power was getting out of hand as far as the USSR was concerned. The USA had over 2500 long range strategic bombers,( B-47, B-52 and B-58), a working areal refueling system the KC-135 so those bombers could practically fly around the globe from the USA (a feat demonstrated in 1958 by Gen LeMay when he sent a pair of B-52s on a flight around the globe). The US was flight testing a Mach 3 bomber the XB-70 that had a flight altitude above 50,000ft and a Mach 3 interceptor the YF-12 to fly in formation with it. Our first ballistic missile submarine the USS George Washington went to sea in 1959 and had the Polaris SBLM by 1962 there were at least 12 of them and an estimated 124 missiles 12 on each boat. For land based missiles the USA had a total of 450 including a wing of the new Minuteman solid fueled launch on command missile. All together US forces had at least 5000 advanced thermonuclear warheads. Even worse for the Soviets with the advent of satelite reconissance we no longer had to guess where stuff was in the USSR that we wanted to strike.

By comparison the USSR never built more than 124 long range Tu-95 Bear bombers capable of one way flights to the Continental USA, The Bear fleet would face Nike antiaircraft missiles and at least 10 US or Canadian fighters for each Bear bomber fighters in contact with and being controlled by NORAD which could detect the Bear bombers while they were still over the Arctic. The USSR had at best 3 diesel subs with at best 3 missiles a piece that required surfacing to launch (The movie the K-19 was about the struggle to get the first Soviet missile boat out to sea. It only had 16 SS-7 liquid fueled ICBMs that could hit the USA from USSR. They had far fewer nuclear bombs estimated total of 500. The did have shorter range missiles and planes that could strike our NATO allies , Japan, South Korea and our bases in Okinawa and Alaska. So the only thing they could do is take our allies hostage and threaten to bomb them and our troops based there if we didn't back off.

So Operation Anadyr the Soviet name for the setting up of SS-4 and SS-5 missile bases in Cuba was a act of a power trying to make the balance of power a little less tilted against them. They hoped to have the bases fully operational so it could be made public Nov 7 the anniversary of the October Revolution.