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Old 01-16-2016, 10:51 PM
 
Location: New York Area
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Quote:
Originally Posted by CrazyDonkey View Post
I'm just pointing out that neutralizing Britain need not have involved complete defeat (invasion and occupation). Terms could have left them their sovereignty, and their navy (the surface fleet, at least), untouched. Regardless, it wouldn't have been up to just Churchill - he wasn't a dictator.
A majority or stable coalition government in a Westminster-style Parliamentary government has many of the powers of a dictatorship; particularly where elections were suspended until after V-E Day. So it was up to Churchill. This was of course subject to fiscal constraints. That's why American involvement, even on the Lend Lease basis was so critical.
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Old 01-16-2016, 10:54 PM
 
Location: New York Area
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Jaggy001 View Post
That speech was made in June of 1940. Fast forward to June 1943 and imagine that Germany has not invaded Russia and the USA is at war with Japan but not with Germany. The war in western Europe is in a stalemate. Britain is secure from invasion but does not have the means to invade France and defeat Germany on her own.

At this point you might start getting political pressure to find an accommodation with Germany. Churchill might oppose that and might prevail. Or he might lose the support of Parliament and be forced to resign as Prime Minister just as Chamberlain had to.
One way or another Roosevelt was going to get the U.S. into the war. I presume that the reason that Britain and the U.S. decided to cut off Japan's supply of oil, both from the U.S. and from modern-day Indonesia was to force Japan off the fence.
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Old 01-18-2016, 09:57 AM
 
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Quote:
Originally Posted by CrazyDonkey View Post
Winston Churchill: "The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril."

Karl Donitz estimated he needed 300 U-boats to force Britain into submission. The estimate was based on 100 boats in port (repair, maintenance, crew rest, etc.), 100 in transit to or from areas of operation, and 100 operating in combat areas.

When war broke out, Donitz had 26 on patrol. The number of U-boats on patrol didn't hit 100 until August 1942. If he had had 100 on patrol in 1940, for instance, could that have forced the British to accept terms? I don't think anyone can say for a certainty. If they had failed to get the bulk of their troops out of Dunkirk, would they have been more open to an offer of terms short of surrender?

Combat strength of the U-boat Force - Kriegsmarine U-boat Operations - uboat.net

Neutralizing Britain need not have meant invasion and occupation. Terms could have included scrapping offensive weapons, such as their strategic bomber and submarine fleets, along with any manufacturing plants and equipment, for instance.
Good points. Had the Germans operated a much larger uboat fleet from the beginning of the war, they may have been able to enforce a near strangulation of Britain. Of course, a broader uboat campaign would inevitably result in greater conflict between the US and the Germans, especially if Britain was facing widespread starvation. In that case the combined efforts of a determined RN plus a USN might be able to tip the balance back over.
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Old 01-18-2016, 02:48 PM
 
Location: On the Great South Bay
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Quote:
Originally Posted by LINative View Post
The Germans in 1939 had no idea they would so easily defeat France. As NJGoat says, Hitler got lucky in 1940. The German offense worked as well as planned but it could have gone the other way. Then it would have become a stalemate in which Germany alone, without any allies, would have faced The British Empire, the Commonwealth and the French Empire for years possibly.

And theoretically with the bulk of the German Army facing France, there was nothing to stop Stalin from eventually stabbing Hitler in the back.
Quote:
Originally Posted by TheWiseWino View Post
Let's review how we got here.

Hypothetical #1



That fact is Hitler won, so to delay an invasion that would bring Britain and France into the war no matter when it began in order to be better prepared for a victory that was won by design, luck or divine intervention is immaterial if not oxymoronic (no offense intended).
I see what you are saying, Hitler thought the French and British were only going to be stronger as time went on. But that does not change what I am saying - The Germans in 1939 had no idea they would so easily defeat France in 1940. Including Hitler.

When Hitler decided to attack Poland in Sept 1939, he and his generals had no idea how or even if they could defeat France. Indeed, the initial German plan was a frontal attack through Belgium, very similar to the one used in WW1 and that had failed.

Hitler wanted to attack France in 1939 right after Poland but he was delayed by his generals to come up with a better plan. Fortunately for Hitler, Generals Von Rundstedt and Von Manstein began working on their own plan. He was further fortunate that Manstein received the help of General Heinz Wilhelm Guderian who knew the Ardennes area. These generals came up with the idea of attacking through the Ardennes. Otherwise, Hitler might have sent his army through Belgium exactly like WW1. And exactly like the Allies planned for.

Hitler gambled everything in 1939. He gambled that the Allies would not declare war on him when he attacked Poland. He gambled that the French army would not invade Germany when most of the German army was invading Poland. He gambled that somehow he would defeat France militarily and not get Germany into another stalemate. He gambled he could somehow get Britain to come to terms. And he gambled that Stalin would keep his word.
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Old 01-18-2016, 05:06 PM
 
Location: Independent Republic of Ballard
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On the other hand, he had nothing but contempt for the "decadent" western democracies and the Slavic untermenschen of the east. He was always much more optimistic than his generals. The failure of the British and French to stand up to him and begin rearmament before 1938, certainly only encouraged him. "Our enemies are tiny little worms."

He did delay the invasion of Poland for a week, after Mussolini and the Italians, who'd been kept out of the loop, warned that Germany would have to go it alone, without help from Italy, if a general war resulted. The whole fiction that it was Germany which had been attacked, not Poland, when the invasion finally occurred, was probably designed more to keep Mussolini on board than not.

The failure of the British, and Chamberlain in particular, to present an ultimatum not full of quibbles and fallbacks undercut whatever native opposition there was within the German general staff to Hitler's plans. Note that Chamberlain did not mobilize Britain's military forces until after the invasion took place. As to the general tenor of British sentiment, it was not his failure to forestall the invasion of Poland that cost him his office, but that of Denmark and Norway in May 1940.
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Old 01-20-2016, 09:34 PM
 
3,910 posts, read 9,441,841 times
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Quote:
Originally Posted by CrazyDonkey View Post
Please provide a source for your contention (at least I took it to be so) that Britain began to ramp up war production well before the start of the war. I provided a source that supported the contrary, which gives credence to the idea that if the war had been delayed, so would have been Britain's preparations for war.

Also, please explain how you can maintain "Hitler won", when Britain, supported by America, remained a strategic threat (resulting in a crushing bombing campaign and invasion), and he was never able to defeat the Soviets. Poland, France, and Norway were his only victories. He lost everywhere else.

Now, it might very well be true that, with a delay of the war, his chances might have been no better, or even worse. I'm simply claiming uncertainty on that score, leaving it as an open question. Are you claiming that you "know" otherwise?
Try Wikipedia for starters, then branch out from there. Link:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Histor...nd_development

The British began to ramp-up war production in 1938 after the Munich Crisis. They introduced conscription in early 1939 before war broke out. No further evidence is needed. I'm sure there are many other sources that document this.

In 1938, the Royal Navy was already the best in the world, and the gap over the German Navy only widened with each passing month. The Royal Airforce lagged way behind the Luftwaffe and began to expand rapidly. The Luftwaffe numbered about 4000-5000 modern planes by 1939, while the British had maybe 500-1000 modern aircraft. Despite aggressive expansion efforts, the British lagged far behind Germany in army size, airplanes, and other areas. The Nazi's had been aggressively rebuilding their military since 1934, while Britain had just begun prior to war breaking out.

You are simply wrong. There is nothing that supports your argument that delaying the war against Poland, Britain, and France could have resulted in a better outcome. There is no evidence that waiting 2-3 years would have been more effective against Britain, the U.S., or Russia. Germany defeated Poland and France within weeks. It does not get better than that. You are arguing the wrong argument. You should be arguing a delayed invasion of the Soviet Union. That theory is more plausible than the one you are peddling.

The U.S. did not enter the war until 2 years after it began, so I don't see how any German delay changes that. A German delay only allows Britain and the Soviet Union more time to rebuild. The Germans were incapable of rebuilding faster than those countries once efforts got fully underway. Germany took advantage of Britain and the USSR being at their weakest points in 1939.
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Old 01-22-2016, 04:45 PM
 
Location: Independent Republic of Ballard
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Nolefan34 View Post
Try Wikipedia for starters, then branch out from there. Link:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Histor...nd_development

The British began to ramp-up war production in 1938 after the Munich Crisis. They introduced conscription in early 1939 before war broke out. No further evidence is needed. I'm sure there are many other sources that document this.

In 1938, the Royal Navy was already the best in the world, and the gap over the German Navy only widened with each passing month. The Royal Airforce lagged way behind the Luftwaffe and began to expand rapidly. The Luftwaffe numbered about 4000-5000 modern planes by 1939, while the British had maybe 500-1000 modern aircraft. Despite aggressive expansion efforts, the British lagged far behind Germany in army size, airplanes, and other areas. The Nazi's had been aggressively rebuilding their military since 1934, while Britain had just begun prior to war breaking out.

You are simply wrong. There is nothing that supports your argument that delaying the war against Poland, Britain, and France could have resulted in a better outcome. There is no evidence that waiting 2-3 years would have been more effective against Britain, the U.S., or Russia. Germany defeated Poland and France within weeks. It does not get better than that. You are arguing the wrong argument. You should be arguing a delayed invasion of the Soviet Union. That theory is more plausible than the one you are peddling.

The U.S. did not enter the war until 2 years after it began, so I don't see how any German delay changes that. A German delay only allows Britain and the Soviet Union more time to rebuild. The Germans were incapable of rebuilding faster than those countries once efforts got fully underway. Germany took advantage of Britain and the USSR being at their weakest points in 1939.
First, I'm far from claiming that delaying the war would have yielded a "better outcome" for Hitler, but am merely posing an open-ended question. I have proposed some "cases" for how Germany might have benefited - more and better submarines, fuller mobilizing of armored forces (including supply lines), more powerful tanks, larger fuel reserves/supply, longer reach of blitzkrieg (possibly meaning the BEF doesn't escape Dunkirk, Moscow falls, the southern Russian oil fields, and maybe Baku, are captured and held, the Me-262 and a strategic bomber are deployed, rather than sidelined/canceled, etc.).

Yes, there are undoubtedly responses, counter-cases, to many or all of these areas, although responding to what I'm presenting by labeling it as "peddling" or "ignorant", without presenting a single viable counter-source (to the sources I have provided), is hardly advancing the conversation. (Wikipedia articles, by the way, are not generally accepted as authoritative sources, although they might reference some.)

As to British re-armament, I'm not denying that it increased beginning in 1938, a year prior to the invasion of Poland, as the threat of war became more imminent. Development/design of the Spitfire, the Churchill tank, the Lancaster bomber, Radar, etc., began well before 1938, but were well short of full deployment even by the Battle of Britain. Chamberlain, himself, was a continuing brake on rearmament, well into 1939:

Quote:
"...when Hitler became chancellor of a Nazi Germany in 1933, Britain had to face rearming against the possibility of another war in Europe as well. Chamberlain presided over finance and defense spending in a Conservative government headed by Stanley Baldwin, who took little interest in foreign affairs. By 1936, Chamberlain had made himself Baldwin’s obvious successor, and was using his Treasury position more and more to dominate issues of national security - the government’s principal decisionmaker on rearmament and Anglo-German relations, instead of the Foreign Secretary. “Sound” financial policy and “normal” industrial production therefore remained the government’s key goals despite the deteriorating international situation.

As a result, and with nervous concurrence from Britain’s service chiefs, Chamberlain
brought about an important alteration of the balance that Whitehall had traditionally striven to maintain between three competing military priorities: imperial defense and defense of the Imperial routes, home defense of the British Isles, and the ability to project a force onto the European continent. The last priority was sharply downgraded now, and the British Army’s force structure and readiness severely curbed. In doing so, Chamberlain studiously chose to ignore the traditional British goal of a balance of power on the European continent, in which Britain served as the linchpin of a coalition of weaker nations against the strongest. Yet at same time, Chamberlain did not build up collective security as a substitute for the balance of power. In fact he began to weaken collective security further now, by reducing the sanctions imposed upon Italy as a result of its invasion of Abyssinia.

...the belief that while a small measure of rearmament might be necessary, for domestic
political reasons if nothing else, Britain’s true security lay in its economic recovery, and rearmament was the least remunerative form of government expenditure. Only a special loan could finance the kind of rearmament demanded by irresponsible people like Churchill, Chamberlain argued, and this, he insisted - unpersuaded by the new Keynesian views just coming into vogue about that time - would be ruinous....

When Chamberlain became prime minister at the end of May 1937, he put his views into action. Rearmament, already far behind in the area now deemed central to a future war in Europe, the Anglo-German air balance, was kept under a tight reign, while a po1icy of active appeasement - in the non-perjorative terms of the day, the peaceful
addressal of Germany’s legitimate grievances - was launched.

...As war Jitters grew, Chamberlain actually weakened his people’s will with his (later notorious) radio address of September 27, 1938, “How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing”. In the final months of peace, Chamberlain, while continuing to assure Hitler of Britain’s wish for peace, attempted to shore up its security position. But where his earlier efforts at appeasement had been strong and tireless, now his measures were half-hearted. Rearmament was stepped up, but had far to go to make up for what Churchill called “the locust years” of 1933-38. No effort was made to rally the British people in ways that would make a useful deterrent impression upon Nazis. And what might have counted most at this juncture, an alliance with the Soviet Union, to threaten Germany with a two-front war if Poland was attacked, was given only desultory and grudging pursuit by Chamberlain....Hitler was freed to attack Poland without fear of war with Russia, and on September 1, 1939, Chamberlain found himself called upon to honor his tardy commitment to Poland. (Even then, it took three days and the threat of a Cabinet revolt for him to do so.)

...Militarily, Chamberlain’s economic policies and restrictions on military spending left Britain at war without forces capable of conducting meaningful operations against Germany in 1939 and 1940. Chamberlain had assiduously avoided developing forces for a continental war, and while peace lasted another eleven months after Munich, it was only after Germany seized the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 that illusions finally gave way to serious rearmament efforts."
"NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN AND THE POLICY OF APPEASEMENT" by National War College, Washington, DC

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA441666

Note that Chamberlain was not forced to resign until May 10, 1940, a full eight months after the start of the war. A more sensible, and less over-confident, Hitler would have tried to keep Chamberlain in power as long as possible. Agreeing to a peace conference of the major powers to decide the Danzig Corridor issue, as proposed by Mussolini, while continuing to build up Germany's military strength (ostensibly "for defense" in face of the Bolshevik threat), might have been enough to keep Chamberlain, or a surrogate (Lord Halifax), in office well into the 1940s. If so, the ramping up of British rearmament which commenced in earnest, according to the source quoted above, only after March 1939 (not from early in 1938) might not have continued, with Chamberlain, declaring "peace in our time", once again, and standing down preparations for a war then, seemingly, avoided.

Note that when Chamberlain, reluctantly, pledged Britain to stand behind Poland, he did not mobilize Britain's military forces other than the navy. No military aid was ever provided to Poland (which might have been possible, if in fact rearmament had been in full swing from early 1938 (instead of from March of 1939, which was really the case). Chamberlain did not commit any Spitfires to the defense of France and Belgium, basing only Hurricanes there, because the short supply of Spitfires meant they were needed for "home defense".

It is quite possible, it seems to me, that a case can at least be made that Churchill, if Hitler had "played nice", might not have come to power at all, or at least not until after Hitler decided to go to war, say in 1942, or later.

Note that the long-term design/development of the Spitfire, Churchill tank, and Lancaster strategic bomber, begun well before 1938, might have been of little help if faced by Me-262s and advanced Me-109s, Tiger tanks, a German strategic bomber, and a fully mobilized (and efficiently supplied) blitzkrieg, as well as many more and better U-boats.

The prime advantage that Germany had at the start of the war was not as much in military armament, than in the military doctrine and tactics of Blitzkrieg, which likely would have been no different in 1942, say, even with better and improved weaponry facing them. It is difficult to see how France wouldn't have fallen in 1942, just as in 1940, assuming their continued reliance on a passive "hedgehog defense", re-fighting WW1, rather than adapting to a "war of maneuver" - indeed, the British might not have got their troops out of Dunkirk.

As to Britain, they might have been lucky that an over-confident and rash Hitler chose to gamble on war (he was betting the British and French would stay out) in 1939, when he still lacked the means to bring Britain to heel, rather than biding his time until his war preparations were complete.

Note, I'm not claiming Hitler would have prevailed even then, but simply that his chances of, at least, bringing Britain to accept terms cannot be discounted out of hand. Certainly, facing the Soviets without the threat of British bombers and eventual invasion at his back (and perhaps supplying him with oil), and with no need to build the Atlantic Wall (repeating France's mistake), would have put him in a much more advantageous position in the east.

Last edited by CrazyDonkey; 01-22-2016 at 05:26 PM..
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Old 01-24-2016, 07:50 AM
 
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I wonder if UK/France had not signed a treaty to help Poland if Hitler would have just attacked Russia next and left France and UK alone.
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Old 01-24-2016, 02:24 PM
 
Location: Independent Republic of Ballard
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Quote:
Originally Posted by totsuka View Post
I wonder if UK/France had not signed a treaty to help Poland if Hitler would have just attacked Russia next and left France and UK alone.
Poland was the last domino, although Hitler was gambling it wasn't. To attack Russia, he had to attack Poland first anyway, which would have caused the Allies to declare war. The only scenario that wouldn't have would be if it was Stalin doing the invading.

Britain and France forming a defense pact with the Soviet Union was a distinct possibility, but Chamberlain, disliking communists more than fascists, nixed it. A problem with that, from the Soviet perspective, is that Britain and France, due to the tardiness of their rearmament efforts, had little or no military aid to give (nor did they have any to give to Poland). Short of that, why would Stalin have trusted the "capitalist" powers (bourgeois democracies) to fulfill any promises they might have made to him?
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