Was the New Guinea Campaign in WWII "necessary" to Invade the Philippines or Reach Japan? (war, bomb)

[Frihed89]

Or was it created to give MacArthur something to do? Or both?

[OpanaPointer]

MacArthur was a WWI general in a WWII war. He was also full of himself, as when he set US political policy at Terowie Station.

[Felix C]

Originally Posted by Frihed89

Or was it created to give MacArthur something to do? Or both?

What part of the campaign are you referring to?

Defensive phase holding Port Moresby?

Limited attack phase on the NE tip?

Reduction of the Japanese airfields on NG?

Reduction and encirclement of Rabaul?

Amph. operations along the NG coast?

Biak Campaign?

Look at it like this the Japanese air hub Rabaul was only considered neutralized by Nov/Dec 1943 and Leyte invaded in Oct 1944. The period in between was to secure airfields where heavies could strike towards the Philippines and Japanese air, naval, fuel installations in Dutch East Asia. Concurrently the USN invaded Tarawa on Nov. 1943 and spent the rest of 1944 clawing west by selective island chain by island chain.

You see why an NG campaign made sense. The Central Pacific USN spearheads were fragile if due to ill luck of war if the CVs were put out of action. Regrouping would consume months. Fortunately the IJN got the worse of it at Marianas but that was not known then in the pre-planning.

Another benefit is it attritioned Japanese airpower which could have been put to use elsewhere.

As for the invasion of Japan item, PTO for the USA a naval air war and logistics war. Actions which stretched and depleted those of the Japanese were beneficial towards the eventual invasions against Japan proper.

I think the Grand Strategy volume is available on line at Hyperwar.

[OpanaPointer]

I've read that MacArthur's staff had to be reminded to take off their "MacArthur for President" buttons when he met FDR and Nimitz at Hawaii. Mac loved his "yes men".

[banger]

The view at the time was that the New Guinea campaign was view as necessary.

First, to stop the expansion of the Japanese victories.

Secondly, It was viewed as necessary to secure the nation of Australia.

People seem to forget, at the start of the war the Japanese were on the march.

Australia was under direct attack by the Japanese forces.

The Japanese sent literally hundreds of aircraft to bomb the city of Darwin.

Remember also, Australia is very large, had a tiny population, and thousands of miles of uninhabited coastline.

If an invasion had occurred, there was very little in place that time, that could have repelled it.

[OpanaPointer]

And once the invasion threat was over we could have done to the IJA forces in New Guinea what we did to all the other outlying forces we cut off from the Home Island.

[Frihed89]

Originally Posted by Felix C

What part of the campaign are you referring to?

Defensive phase holding Port Moresby?

Limited attack phase on the NE tip?

Reduction of the Japanese airfields on NG?

Reduction and encirclement of Rabaul?

Amph. operations along the NG coast?

Biak Campaign?

Look at it like this the Japanese air hub Rabaul was only considered neutralized by Nov/Dec 1943 and Leyte invaded in Oct 1944. The period in between was to secure airfields where heavies could strike towards the Philippines and Japanese air, naval, fuel installations in Dutch East Asia. Concurrently the USN invaded Tarawa on Nov. 1943 and spent the rest of 1944 clawing west by selective island chain by island chain.

You see why an NG campaign made sense. The Central Pacific USN spearheads were fragile if due to ill luck of war if the CVs were put out of action. Regrouping would consume months. Fortunately the IJN got the worse of it at Marianas but that was not known then in the pre-planning.

Another benefit is it attritioned Japanese airpower which could have been put to use elsewhere.

As for the invasion of Japan item, PTO for the USA a naval air war and logistics war. Actions which stretched and depleted those of the Japanese were beneficial towards the eventual invasions against Japan proper.

I think the Grand Strategy volume is available on line at Hyperwar.

I am referring to the whole campaign from end to end. What i am not sure of, and why i ask, this question is, other than Rabul, were any of the New Guinea air and naval bases close enough to the advance through the Eastern Pacific to cause problems after the Soloman Islands campaign? And, if they were, wasn't there an alternative way to mop them up with Mitscher's or McCain's fast carrier task forces later in the war?

Stopping the Japanese from striking Australia was also necessary, but that was settled once Port Moresby was secured at the start of the campaign.

MacArthur was focused on the Phillippines, where the Western and Central Pacific forces joined. FDR did not like MacArthur. King wanted to keep the Army out of the Navy's hair. King and Nimitz conspired to remove the Solomons from MacArthur's theatre in the Western Pacific. To me, it looks all three men viewed New Guinea as side show to keep MacArthur occupied with his "I shall return" vision. He did a pretty good job of following through with that, at a very high price. Although, i would argue that this campaign was a key ingredient in toughening up the US Army. (But MacArthur did love to use the Marines when he could get them).

[Felix C]

The Japanese transferred airgroups, (from China, Fleet CVs, SW Asia) from other areas to Rabaul throughout 1943 due to both the NG campaign and the post-Guadalcanal Solomons climbing campaign. Rabaul was a hub for Japanese air efforts. The attrition favored the Allies as they displaced the Japanese from the NG airfields and then the mid-Solomons location.

The Japanese then moved to blocking positions, more airfields, further up the NG coast as the NE NG tip was lost. These attracted Allied efforts as airpower was the key in this theater.

Once Biak was reached then that concluded the campaign as the Japanese did not have airfields/airforces in a threatening position. The focus then shifted W/NW to the Philippines.

Japanese had significant airgroups at the Marianas. The other islands had their protective air groups either transferred out or depleted by the pre-invasion air strikes. For example Tarawa where the last Japanese aircraft departed in Sept. 1943. B24s would raid the island beginning in early 1943, to be joined by naval aviation late in the year. The invasion was in in late Nov. 1943.

[OpanaPointer]

Operation Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul (17.8 meg PDF) is a relevant read at this point.