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I would offer that his aggressive style of campaigning actually reduced casualties, rather than increased them. After all the planners for the Normandy campaign had D+100 stop lines only reaching halfway to Paris, and D+365 reaching the Franco-German border. His dash across France was absolutely brilliant and, had SHAEF not screwed up by diverting the initiative to Montgomery and his clumsy Market-Garden campaign, Patton would have been sitting on the Rhine by October. The German army was teetering on collapse, and Market-Garden actually gave them a pause to regroup.
The same is true of his campaigns in Sicily and the Ardennes Counteroffensive. His relentless offensive style kept the Germans off balance and unable to solidify positions.
His constant whining about supplies showed his limitations as a commander,many others made do with less,the fact that their HQ's weren't PR firms in disguise is what seperates them from guys like Patton and MacArthur
His constant whining about supplies showed his limitations as a commander,many others made do with less,the fact that their HQ's weren't PR firms in disguise is what seperates them from guys like Patton and MacArthur
How do you argue with his results? And gasoline was indeed in short supply during the fall of 44, meaning that Montgomery got the nod.
Despite what woulda been/coulda been historians say,the Germans would never have tolerated a deep penetration into their industrial heartland like Patton envisioned,even Monty's plan was farfetched,and he wasn't the most imaginative guy.Troops (hard ones at that) would have been transferred from the eastern front, flanked any narrow penetration that would have been by made the Third Army.Western front at the time was only tying down 25% of the German Army.Eisenhowers broad front strategy,wherein the front stayed as straight as possible,therefore limiting frontage worked,even then,he had to thin out positions facing the Ardennes to be able maintain offensives in Hurtgen Forest and Schmidt,and we all no how that turned out!Remember 1918,Allied strength on western front was 4.2 Million men,in December of '44 it was 1.5 Million,can't see 3 Armored and 4 Infantry divisions bringing the Third Reich to its knees in the fall of 1944,no matter how good an operational general Patton was.Additionally,he showed very little loyalty to Eisenhower who saved his chestnuts after the slapping incident,ungrateful indeed is the man who goes behind his benefactors back and belittles him to the press.
Despite what woulda been/coulda been historians say,the Germans would never have tolerated a deep penetration into their industrial heartland like Patton envisioned,even Monty's plan was farfetched,and he wasn't the most imaginative guy.Troops (hard ones at that) would have been transferred from the eastern front, flanked any narrow penetration that would have been by made the Third Army.Western front at the time was only tying down 25% of the German Army.Eisenhowers broad front strategy,wherein the front stayed as straight as possible,therefore limiting frontage worked,even then,he had to thin out positions facing the Ardennes to be able maintain offensives in Hurtgen Forest and Schmidt,and we all no how that turned out!Remember 1918,Allied strength on western front was 4.2 Million men,in December of '44 it was 1.5 Million,can't see 3 Armored and 4 Infantry divisions bringing the Third Reich to its knees in the fall of 1944,no matter how good an operational general Patton was.Additionally,he showed very little loyalty to Eisenhower who saved his chestnuts after the slapping incident,ungrateful indeed is the man who goes behind his benefactors back and belittles him to the press.
Well, it's really a matter of timing. By the time the Allied Advance had stretched into late August, the German situation was getting dire. Units were being cobbled together out of nothing. For example, Manteuffel's Fifth Panzer army was practically annihilated until being reformed on September 9th. So really, the Germans opposite Patton had next to nothing on the ground, having been chewed up by both ground attacks and continual air bombardment. By the time it was late October and November, the Germans had managed to throw together an army to oppose further American advances, thereby thwarting a golden opportunity.
Had the Allies pressed their advantage, rather than stopping for Market Garden, the possibility exists that there would have been three, not one army on the Rhine: The Third, the First, and the Seventh. Using the Rhine as a barrier against German counterattack, then American forces could have pivoted north, thereby cutting off German forces in Belgium and Holland against resupply.
Units were already at the end of a several hundred mile supply line,now we have them moving even further into Germany,pivoting northward,striking ever deeper,especially north with the slow footed British in the lead?They were after all the northern flank of the Allied advance.Three armies couldn't be supplied for an offensive simultaneously,supply situation didn't ease until Marsellies was caputure and link up with Seventh Army affected,way too late in the campaign season to win the war!Also,if you look at the operational history of US Divisions,you will note more than half that were in on the final offensive into Germany didn't reach theatre before late'44/early '45
Units were already at the end of a several hundred mile supply line,now we have them moving even further into Germany,pivoting northward,striking ever deeper,especially north with the slow footed British in the lead?They were after all the northern flank of the Allied advance.Three armies couldn't be supplied for an offensive simultaneously,supply situation didn't ease until Marsellies was caputure and link up with Seventh Army affected,way too late in the campaign season to win the war!Also,if you look at the operational history of US Divisions,you will note more than half that were in on the final offensive into Germany didn't reach theatre before late'44/early '45
But Marseilles was captured on the 28th, and the Seventh Army's linkup with the Third Army took place on September 12, a scant 100 miles from the Rhine, so it was indeed possible to have supply lines coming in from Southern France. Within weeks, a third of allied supplies were coming up from the Mediterranean, a situation that wouldn't change until Antwerp was finally functioning in December of 1944. Further, I would rebut the "His blood, our guts" moniker, chiefly because of the US Army's analysis of casualties. If war historians are correct, Patton's forces inflicted close to half the German casualties in Western Europe, while only suffering 9% of the casualties. To me, this is a endorsement of his breakthrough and exploitation tactics over Eisenhower's broad front strategy.
All that being said, the original point of the thread was whether or not Patton was a good general or not. I argue that he was a superb general, from his turnaround of II Corps in North Africa to Sicily to Operation Cobra to the Ardennes.
But Marseilles was captured on the 28th, and the Seventh Army's linkup with the Third Army took place on September 12, a scant 100 miles from the Rhine, so it was indeed possible to have supply lines coming in from Southern France. Within weeks, a third of allied supplies were coming up from the Mediterranean, a situation that wouldn't change until Antwerp was finally functioning in December of 1944. Further, I would rebut the "His blood, our guts" moniker, chiefly because of the US Army's analysis of casualties. If war historians are correct, Patton's forces inflicted close to half the German casualties in Western Europe, while only suffering 9% of the casualties. To me, this is a endorsement of his breakthrough and exploitation tactics over Eisenhower's broad front strategy.
All that being said, the original point of the thread was whether or not Patton was a good general or not. I argue that he was a superb general, from his turnaround of II Corps in North Africa to Sicily to Operation Cobra to the Ardennes.
I agree only in that he was a good "operational" level commander,grand strategy was best left to those who could work with our Allies,not feud with them,and understood logistics on a theatre level,as far as taking over II Corps from Fredenhall at Kasserine,he did a remarkable job,and thats what saved him later on,But making men under fire wear ties in the foxholes while he goes around with a flying jacket and pearl handled pistols shows the arrogant martinet side that made him so disliked amongst many other professional officers.Regarding any statistics in your previous post I gotta see that on paper from an unbiased source,MacArthur claimed similar economies of force that were later proven false also.
Third Armies stats speak for themselves. Marshall and Eisenhauer both realized that Patton was a phenominal combat commander, even if he was a pain in the derriere.
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