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Old 11-20-2011, 12:19 PM
 
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Quote:
Originally Posted by jdrtx View Post
The next question is why didn't this happen to Al Qeda, a militant military organization that bombed and killed 3000 Americans?
Because terrorists can hide, nations can't.

 
Old 11-20-2011, 01:13 PM
 
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Quote:
Originally Posted by markg91359 View Post
Undoubtedly, the dropping of the atomic bombs was the major factor accounting for the willingness of the Japanese to finally surrender. Its my observation though that every nation tends to give just a little more credit to its own efforts than may actually be due.

At the Potsdam Conference in Germany following the capitulation of the Third Reich, Stalin and Truman had a conversation. There had been some discussion about the Soviet Union entering the war against the Japanese. Stalin told Truman at Potsdam that his armed forces would invade Manchuria and other provinces in Mainland China where there was still a very hefty Japanese army and presence. Stalin actually kept his word that time and his armed forces invaded China just about the time the atomic bombs were used.

In his surrender message, Emperor Hirohito referred to both "the use of a most cruel weapon" and to "the general trends in the world going against Japan". When he said the latter, he was clearly referring to the Soviet invasion of Manchuria.

Clearly, the atomic bombs did shorten the war with Japan--leading to both fewer American and Japanese casualties. However, the Soviet invasion of Manchuria was also a factor. In the tense environment that prevailed in Tokyo prior to the surrender the Soviet invasion certainly helped tip the balance.
I think the Russians probably killed as many Japanese in their assaults in Manchuria as the A-bombs did. Something like 90% of the Japanese soldiers there never made it home.
 
Old 11-21-2011, 08:59 AM
 
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I think some of the comments regarding the Japanese being ready to surrender before the atomic bombs comes from the efforts of part of the civilian government to look for a negotiated peace towards the end of the war. This does not however rise to being equal to the Japanese being ready to surrender.

There were two competing camps within the government, the civilian leaders who were mostly appointments that were close to the Emperor and then there was the military government under Tojo that actually held all of the power.

The civilian government had been working under the Emperor's consent through their contacts in Russia to attempt to send out peace feelers to conclude the war while maintaining the Emperor's existence as head of the Japanese people. The military leadership was not in support of this as they felt that they had the opportunity to hold out and reach a peace settlement that would not only keep the Emperor in power, but also allow them to hold onto some of their possessions like Korea and Manchuria.

The atomic bombings forced the civilian government and the Emperor to finally play their hand and call for a surrender. The military hardliners were not necessarily convinced by the bombings as much as they were convinced by Russian entry into the war, which meant that they would lose whatever territory they had left on the mainland. There was now no point in continuing to fight as the Allies were offering them a peace that included the Emperor remaining in power in exachange for surrender and the mainlaind territories were lost.

Both together provided the impetous, each event influencing a different section of the Japanese government. One could argue that it was actually the invasion of Manchuria by the Russians that had the most impact as this convinced the military leaders that there was no reason to continue. Though the threat of continued atomic bombings certainly was pushing the civilians and the Emperor out of back door channels and begin to openly call for surrender.

Even then there were still factions within the military that attempted to stop the surrender announcement and take control of the Emperor to continue the war.
 
Old 11-21-2011, 09:06 AM
 
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Mathguy View Post
I think the Russians probably killed as many Japanese in their assaults in Manchuria as the A-bombs did. Something like 90% of the Japanese soldiers there never made it home.
It's a well known fact that the strategic bombing campaign launched by the US in the final months of the war easily accounted for more casualties then the atomic bombings did. Estimates range from 330k-500k killed in these raids versus 220k in the atomic bombings (not counting long term deaths from radiation). Japanese sources quote that the impetus for the Emporer to get involved in the peace process was touring Tokyo following the fire bombing of that city.
 
Old 11-21-2011, 09:08 AM
 
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Would Hitler have nuked us if they had developed the bomb in time ? War is hell. Especially for the losers.
 
Old 11-21-2011, 10:15 AM
 
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No, of course not.
It would have been hideous for the American public.
Goering said that in Nuremberg.
 
Old 11-21-2011, 10:00 PM
 
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Manolón View Post
No, of course not.
It would have been hideous for the American public.
Goering said that in Nuremberg.
Forgive me if I can't take Herman's assurances very seriously. He assured Hitler that the Luftwaffe was fully capable of obtaining air superiority.
 
Old 11-22-2011, 12:28 AM
 
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Bideshi View Post
Would Hitler have nuked us if they had developed the bomb in time ? War is hell. Especially for the losers.
They probably would have gone East first, but yes - if there had been enough warheads to go around, New York would have gotten one. The Amerika Bomber project was expected to do exactly what it said on the label. (Interestingly, for all their dictatorial behavior, the Nazis couldn't run a wartime command economy worth a damn, and all the major German plane manufacturers dumped R&D efforts into the project, then abandoned it.)
 
Old 11-28-2011, 04:26 AM
 
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Quote:
Originally Posted by cubssoxfan View Post
If the US had a nuke earlier, would D-day have happened? Would we have used it on Germany? Which city(s)? Just wondering if the percieved cultural biases (Japs are "vermin" German's are like us) came into play.
I think so. We had no problem fire bombing German cities like Dresden and Hamburg. The fire bombing of Hamburg killed at least 50,000 civilians. The atomic bombing of Nagasaki killed 60,000.
 
Old 11-29-2011, 11:30 PM
 
Location: Turn right at the stop sign
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Quote:
Originally Posted by NJGoat
The civilian government had been working under the Emperor's consent through their contacts in Russia to attempt to send out peace feelers to conclude the war while maintaining the Emperor's existence as head of the Japanese people.
Discussions about whether issuing assurances to the Japanese about the retention of the Emperor would entice the Japanese to the negotiating table had actually begun in the Truman White House as the war in Europe drew to a close . As early as May 3, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged President Truman to make a public statement clarifying that “unconditional surrender does not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people”. The State Department went a step further and said language should be added which reassured the Japanese that Emperor Hirohito would remain on the throne. Truman did make a statement on May 8th, however any language pertaining to the final disposition of the Emperor was omitted.

On May 28th, former Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, now serving as Under Secretary of State, met with President Truman and encouraged him to conclude a peace agreement with the Japanese. Grew also counseled Truman to provide a guarantee to the Japanese that American troops would withdraw from Japan once a government that was representative of the Japanese people was established and state “this may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty”. Truman was receptive to the idea at the time saying “I had already given thought to this matter myself and it seemed to me a sound idea”. Truman requested that Grew solicit opinions from Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, and Army Chief of Staff, George Marshall. All agreed it was a good idea. With the additional support of Truman’s Chief of Staff, Admiral William Leahy, Grew reported back to Truman and pushed him to release a statement immediately. Truman refused, stating he would make no comment on the matter until sometime during the upcoming Potsdam Conference. Secretary Grew would later say that Truman’s failure to make clear to the Japanese what “unconditional surrender” actually meant was a lost opportunity to conclude a peace agreement with Japan. Grew stated “If the President had made a public categorical statement that surrender would not mean the elimination of the present dynasty…the surrender of Japan could have been hastened”.

During a July 2nd meeting with Truman, Secretary Stimson delivered the proposed final draft of what would become known as the “Potsdam Declaration”. The document was essentially what Secretary Grew had been pushing for since May. What was most significant was the text contained in paragraph twelve which dealt with Japan’s future government. It stated the Japanese could determine what form such a government could take and that it “may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if the peace loving nations can be convinced of the genuine determination of such a government to follow policies of peace”. Stimson believed inclusion of this language would “substantially add to the chances of acceptance” of an unconditional surrender by Japan. A copy of the draft was also given to new Secretary of State James Byrnes by Secretary Grew. Byrnes decided to consult with former Secretary of State, Cordell Hull about his thoughts on the Potsdam Declaration, specifically paragraph twelve. Hull expressed serious opposition to the inclusion of guarantees of any kind regarding the preservation of the Imperial House or Japanese honor. The final word on the matter rested with Truman and he again deferred this decision until after his arrival in Potsdam. To Truman, the main purpose of going to Potsdam was to obtain a definitive answer from Stalin as to when the Soviets would join the war against Japan; anything beyond that was inconsequential.

On July 17th, three significant events took place at Potsdam; Truman and Stalin met for the first time, news of the successful Trinity bomb test was received, and Stalin revealed to Churchill that the Japanese had contacted the Russians about acting as peace mediators. The initial meeting between Truman and Stalin went well and Stalin told the president that the Soviet Union was prepared to declare war on Japan on August 15th. Truman was extremely pleased by this information and his mood only brightened further when told about the nuclear bomb test. Truman and Churchill met later that day and it was during their discussion that the British were informed of the Trinity results. The news met with mixed responses from the British delegation. Churchill was heartened to hear news of the successful test. Yet his chief military advisor, General Hastings Ismay, felt “revulsion” that such a weapon would likely be deployed against the Japanese, primarily because, as he put it “for some time it had been fixed in my mind that the Japanese were tottering” and could likely be pushed to surrender without use of an atomic bomb.

It was at this point Churchill related to Truman the information from Stalin about the Japanese peace initiative. Churchill said Stalin wished to reassure Truman that Russia was not actively seeking the role of mediator between the Allies and Japan. Truman simply thanked Churchill for the news. Churchill then broached the subject of coming to peace terms with Japan, stating his belief that a significant number of lives would be lost if unconditional surrender was imposed upon the Japanese. Truman did not respond so Churchill dropped the subject. On July 21st, Truman and Stalin met again and Stalin showed Truman the message from Japan’s ambassador to Russia, Naotake Sato in which he asked the Soviet government to receive a peace delegation led by Prince Fumimaro Konoe. Stalin told Truman that Foreign Minister Molotov had been instructed to tell Sato the Soviet government would discuss the matter and relay a response in the near future. Truman was satisified by the Russian reply to the Japanese and confided in his diary that day his belief that “Japs will fold up before Russia comes in”.

At the same time the Potsdam Conference was taking place, a flurry of telgrams began to pass between Ambassador Sato and Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo on July 17th debating which course of action should be taken to signal to the Allies (via the Russians) that Japan wished to talk peace. Sato advocated the acceptance of unconditional surrender provided the United States guaranteed the preservation of the monarchy. Togo stated that if unconditional surrender was not removed from the equation, Japan was prepared to “fight a war of resistance to the bitter end”, but “we would terminate the war if the U.S. recognized Japan’s honor and existence”. On July 20th, Sato contacted Togo again, pleading for the government to agree to unconditional surrender in order to save the lives of both Japan’s soldiers and civilian population. Foreign Minister Togo answered Sato on July 25th and said Japan would not object to a peace agreement based on the terms of the Atlantic Charter of 1941. That being said, Togo conceded “The difficult point is the attitude of the United States, who continues to insist on unconditional surrender”. If this did not change, Togo made it clear that “there is no solution to this situation other than for us to hold out until complete collapse because of this point alone”.

What was not known by the Japanese was the messages exchanged between Togo and Sato had been intercepted and decoded by U.S. Naval Intelligence and forwarded to Truman and his staff at Potsdam. Included with them was a summary stating “though still balking at the term ‘unconditional surrender’ the Japanese have reached the point where they have “no objection to the restoration of peace on the basis of the Atlantic Charter”. Discussions between Truman and his key advisers once again turned to whether the Potsdam Declaration would contain specific language about the Emperor. In conjunction with these talks, Admiral Forrestal met with new British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin and asked his thoughts about retaining the Emperor. Bevin told Forrestal that he saw “no sense in destroying the instrument through which one might have to deal in order to effectively control Japan”. Bevin added “It might have been better for all of us not to have destroyed the institution of the Kaiser after the last war…far better to have guided the Germans to a constitutional monarchy rather than leaving them without a symbol and therefore opening the psychological doors to a man like Hitler”. When Truman and his advisers met again to further discuss the declaration, Secretary Byrnes reminded the president of Hull’s earlier objections to the Potsdam Declaration draft prepared by Secretary Stimson. Truman said he could understand the reasons for Hull’s stance and was now in agreement with it. Over the objections of Admirals Leahy and Forrestal as well as Secretary Stimson, Truman ordered the Potsdam Declaration modified to remove any wording that would make the Japanese believe the monarchy could or would remain in place.

Release of the Potsdam Declaration on July 26th left the Japanese puzzled over how exactly to respond to it and what it meant with respect to their desire to have the Russians broker a peace deal. Part of the problem was the manner in which the text of the Potsdam Declaration was made public. Rather than through the State Department, a statement was issued through the “Office of War Information” which was essentially the U.S. government’s propaganda arm. Of equal importance was the fact that the declaration was labeled a joint statement of the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and the Republic of China; no mention was made of the Soviet Union. This led the Japanese to believe (falsely) that seeking the assistance of the Russians was still a viable option, so Foreign Minister Togo advised Ambassador Sato to keep pressing for a meeting with Molotov. With this in mind, Prime Minister Kantero Suzuki appeared at a press conference in Tokyo on July 28th and made the following statement: “I consider the joint proclamation of the three powers to be a rehash of the Cairo Declaration. The government does not regard it as a thing of any great value; the government will just “mokusatsu” it. We will press forward resolutely to carry the war to a successful conclusion”.

Prime Minister Suzuki’s choice of “mokusatsu” to describe the Japanese government’s stance on the Postdam Declaration was unfortunate due to the fact that the word could be translated a number of ways. The most accurate interpretation was “to withhold comment”. It could also be taken as “to be silent”, “to ignore”, or “to reject”. Internal government documents released after the war indicate the intent of the Japanese was not to reject the terms of the Potsdam Declaration outright. Instead they were seeking to delay an official diplomatic response to the declaration until after they both studied and debated the meaning of the declaration and heard back from the Russians. This was bolstered by the fact that on August 2nd, acting director of the OSS, Charles Cheston, informed President Truman that the Japanese had reached out to the U.S. through the Swiss government to clarify Suzuki’s statement. As Cheston put it “The Allies should not take ‘too seriously’ what was said over Radio Tokyo about the tripartite proclamation. The radio comment was merely ‘propaganda to maintain morale in Japan’. The real reply will be given through some ‘official channel’, possibly by Minister (Shun’ichi) Kase (Japan’s ambassador to Switzerland) or General (Kiyoshi) Okamoto (military attache to Switzerland) if an official government reply is not made over Radio Tokyo”.

Despite having this information in hand, Truman considered Suzuki’s statement to be a flat out rejection of the Potsdam Declaration and a signal the Japanese would continue to fight on. Thus, he ordered the plans for delivery of the atomic bombs against Japan that had been put in motion on July 25th (a day before the Potsdam Declaration was issued) to continue. And even after the bombing of Hiroshima on August 6th, the Japanese still hoped the Russians would agree to broker a peace deal. On the evening of the 6th, Ambassador Sato at long last received a reply from the Russians; Minister Molotov would meet with him on August 8th. At 5 PM that day, Sato entered Molotov’s office and after an exchange of pleasantries, Sato asked if the Russians were willing to take on the role of mediators. Molotov’s response was to advise Sato that as of August 9th, a state of war would formally exist between the Soviet Union and Japan. Sato was stunned by this turn of events and had no choice other than to inform Foreign Minister Togo that the only way to end the war now was to accept the Potsdam Declaration and surrender.

As Russian troops poured over the border into Manchuria in the early morning hours of the 9th and the plane carrying the bomb set to be dropped on Kokura but which would ultimately be diverted to Nagasaki took off from Tinian Island, a debate was raging in Tokyo among Hirohito’s cabinet ministers. Those wishing to fight on and those seeking an end to the war under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration were deadlocked with no resolution in sight. In an extraordinary breach of centuries old protocol, Prime Minister Suzuki turned to Emperor Hirohito and asked him to settle the matter. The Emperor stated “….The time has come to bear the unbearable. I swallow my tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister”. On the morning of August 10th, President Truman was informed the Japanese had agreed to surrender, provided the Emperor’s role as sovereign ruler would not be affected. While still unwilling to make an explicit guarantee of the Emperor’s future, Truman did state “the ultimate form of the government of Japan will be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people”. This was satisfactory to the Japanese and arrangements were made for a formal surrender to the Allies.

Although the words were different, in the end, the U.S. basically gave the Japanese what they had been asking for all along; hope that the Emperor would remain as Japan’s head of state. Why then did Truman resist the calls from so many of his advisers to do just that in the first place? What was gained by offering peace terms (by way of the Potsdam Declaration) to the Japanese that everyone knew they would never accept? Would (as many in the Truman White House and the U.S. military believed) softening the terms have been enough to bring the war in the Pacific to a close without resorting to the use of the atomic bomb? Perhaps. But since Truman ultimately decided to opt for using the stick instead of the carrot to get the Japanese to surrender, there is no way of ever knowing for certain.
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