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As the Duke of Wellington said " it was a close run thing." Yes, Napoleon could have emerged victorious at Waterloo; it was not a foregone conclusion that he lost the battle, as with all battles, various decisions that were or were not made, determined the outcome.
Wellington was unhappy with the overall quality of his Alllied Army, including the British units, as many of the experienced Peninsular War regiments were unavailable, and he had to make do with many untried troops. The Dutch and Belgian contingents were untried, and had a very mixed effort during the battle.
The Prussians could be relied upon, despite their defeat at Ligny, but they would not arrive until late in the battle. IF Marshal Grouchy had followed orders, he would likely have prevented the arrival of the Prussian Army on the field of battle, which may likely have proved decisive.
By early evening, Wellington's army was battered and shaky from the numerous French assaults; could one more be repulsed, without the arrival of Blucher's Prussians on the French flank?
I do believe that even if the Allied Armies were defeated at Waterloo, unless they were totally destroyed like the Prussians in 1806, that they could have reformed, and together, defeated Napoleon in a rematch, especially with additional British reinforcements.
A lot of ifs, needless to say.
The answer is of course yes, it was possible. Ignoring the alt-history factors of Blucher not arriving, Grouchy doing his job and "marching to the sound of the guns" and the fact that the battle itself was a poor choice on Napoleon's part, it was still a winnable affair with changes to the tactics used.
1. Napoleon should not have delayed the battle for 4 hours to let the ground soften. He was on the attack and the same boggy ground that hurt his artillery hurt the British artillery as well. Delaying the attack cost him the momentum.
2. Hougomont was viewed by both commanders as being a decisive area of the battlefield, but this was not necessarily the case. Napoleon and Wellington both poured thousands of troops into the battle, but this had a much larger impact on Napoleon than Wellington. Had portions of Reille's Corp been available to support D'Erlon's assault on the center the French may have succeeded. Instead Reille's Corp was wasted at Hougomont.
3. This is the one that the battle really hinged on. The French failed to effectively support their greatest chances for success by failing to used combined arms or committing reserves. Napoleon had long believed that one should "commit your reserves without reserve, in the best offensive method possible." Even without Reille's Corp for reinforcement, Napoleon should have committed the Guard and Ney's cavalry to support D'Erlon's assault on the Allied center. They were within a breath of victory and the reserves and cavalry would have been enough to break the Allied line even after the British cavalry charge had shattered D'Erlon's troops.
4. This ties back in to number 3. The Guard should have been committed in direct support of Ney's cavalry. Unsupported cavalry is next to useless and needs either artillery or infantry support to carry an attack. By the time Ney realized his mistake and organized a proper combined arms assault it was too late.
So, yes Napoleon could have won. Even if he didn't ignore the trap at Hougomont properly engaging his reserves in support of either D'Erlon's initial attack, or in conjunction with Ney's cavalry most likely would shattered the British line and forced a retreat before the Prussians were on the field. This would have allowed Napoleon to regroup and engage the Prussians piecemeal as they emerged from their march. However, the more likely case is that the Prussians would have withdrawn when the British line broke.
However, a victory at Waterloo would have most likely been hollow. Short of shattering the British force, which wasn't really possible, Napoleon would have simply found himself facing a larger Allied British-Prussian-Austrian-Russian force in a later battle that would have resulted in his defeat. Had Napoleon shattered the British and they withdrew their army from the continent there is a chance he could have broken the alliance, but it was a long shot at best and Waterloo was not the place to do it.
1. Napoleon should not have delayed the battle for 4 hours to let the ground soften. He was on the attack and the same boggy ground that hurt his artillery hurt the British artillery as well. Delaying the attack cost him the momentum.
The Allied artillery was standing on the defensive in fixed positions and would not be handicapped by the need to move the guns around in the muck.
In this era, before rifled muskets forced artillery to stay out of range, it was common for the attacking side to advance its guns along with its infantry. Against muskets, artillery could be brought to within 100 yards of an infantry formation without receiving attrition sufficient to drive it away.
Had Napoleon not waited for the ground to dry, he would have been sending his infantry into the assault without their supporting guns, or seen the attacks fail as they tried to advance the ordinance through mud.
The Allied artillery was standing on the defensive in fixed positions and would not be handicapped by the need to move the guns around in the muck.
In this era, before rifled muskets forced artillery to stay out of range, it was common for the attacking side to advance its guns along with its infantry. Against muskets, artillery could be brought to within 100 yards of an infantry formation without receiving attrition sufficient to drive it away.
Had Napoleon not waited for the ground to dry, he would have been sending his infantry into the assault without their supporting guns, or seen the attacks fail as they tried to advance the ordinance through mud.
The decision to wait was made for three reasons:
1. The ground was not favorable for maneuvering cavalry and artillery.
2. A large portion of the French force had camped a considerable distance to the south of the battlefield and was late rousing.
3. The dominant artillery tactic of the time relied upon ricochet fire, which was firing in front of an opposing formation and allowing the cannon balls to bounce across the ground and into the enemy. This is what I was getting at by saying the Allied artillery was just as handicapped by the wet ground.
I feel the choice to wait was bad for two reasons:
1. The ground never dried and Napoleon chose to press the attack anyway. He had to fight this battle and win, there was little choice. The delay utlimately cost him dearly, but was seemingly made for the right reasons. Given that he had to attack there was no reason to really wait four hours in the hopes the ground might improve, there was little chance it would.
2. Regardless of the condition of the ground the French artillery was horribly utilized in the battle with most pieces staying at extended range in fixed batteries. Very few pieces were moved forward and those that were did not close to sufficient range to really threaten the Allied line. As it was the French never brought their horse artillery into effective range until the battle was all but lost following the two failed assaults (D'Erlon and Ney) on the British center. By the time they were brought into position, the Prussians had arrived.
Overall though, the delay was the least of the issues with the battles. Had Napoleon simply not gotten drawn into Hougomont and properly supproted D'Erlon's first attack by committing his reserves, they could have carried the day.
Megalomaniacs make mistakes at the height of their powers. And they become their own undoing. Napo was no exception.
Napoleon was hardly at the height of his power or abilities at Waterloo. His greatest mistake remains the invasion of Russia, but not for the hindsight of his failure in that campaign. Napoleon should have committed his forces to the destruction of the British and Portugese forces threatening his tenuous grip on Spain. Routing the British from the peninsula and securing Portugal and providing more troops to subjugate Spain would have greatly enhanced his position on the continent. Instead he set off for Russia to do nothing more than try and force them to maintain their treaty obligations to the Continental System.
Napoleon was hardly at the height of his power or abilities at Waterloo. His greatest mistake remains the invasion of Russia, but not for the hindsight of his failure in that campaign. Napoleon should have committed his forces to the destruction of the British and Portugese forces threatening his tenuous grip on Spain. Routing the British from the peninsula and securing Portugal and providing more troops to subjugate Spain would have greatly enhanced his position on the continent. Instead he set off for Russia to do nothing more than try and force them to maintain their treaty obligations to the Continental System.
At Waterloo, yes.
But broadly speaking, prior to Hitler, there wasn't a man other than Bonaparte who was feared throughout Europe. He was clearly the most powerful man in Europe at some point.
And that was his undoing, much like Hitler's downfall.
3. The dominant artillery tactic of the time relied upon ricochet fire, which was firing in front of an opposing formation and allowing the cannon balls to bounce across the ground and into the enemy. This is what I was getting at by saying the Allied artillery was just as handicapped by the wet ground.
The ricochet shot was employed against formations when they were a few hundred yards distant and firing solid iron balls had the maximum effect. Once an attacking formation closed to 150 yards or so, the gunners would switch to cannister which wasn't impacted by mud.
Napoleonic era tactics called for infantry to shake themselves out into a defensive line when faced with artillery, but crowd together in squares when faced with cavalry. Standard practice for the attacker was to use artillery to force the opponent to fan out to mimimize casualties, and then send in the cavalry which could sweep through or over the loose formation. Or..they would threaten the infantry with cavalry, forcing them to group up into a convenient bunch where artillery became far more effective.
Inability to bring your guns forward when attacking meant that not only were you losing the impact of of bombarding your opponent at close range, but it also rendered your cavalry useless because the enemy could form and remain in squares.
I suspect that this is what Napoleon had in mind when deciding to wait for the field to dry.
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