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The situtation at rork's drift was very different than the Big Horn. Rather than attacking with cavalry into a wooded area that limited their lines of fire, they were defending a small fortified permineter with highly trained riflemen with excellent lanes of fire. US cavalry rarely practiced with their rifles to save money, they were notoriously poor on defense. The zulu, unlike the sioux charged in densely packed formations with effectively no rifles (yes I know they took them from the battle Isawana, but accounts agree they did not know how to use them and achieved little).
Virtually none of the defenders of rork's drift were British - they were Welsh.
And the British troops at Rorke's Drift were well led, well trained and well handled, unlike the 7th at the Little Big Horn. Yes, they were in a better situation for defense but I think if handled properly the 7th wouldn't have ended up fighting a defensive fight. However we have stated our cases and there's no need to wrangle.
By the way, the Zulus who fought at Rorke's Drift hadn't fought at Isandlwana, they'd been far out on the right or in the reserve. The firearms they used were their own as during the 1850s large numbers of guns started coming into Zululand. Most of the guns used by the Zulus in the fight were probably Brown Bess muskets although other European and American firearms were present in Zululand as well as a sizeable number of P-53 Enfield rifle muskets. But as a pastoral rather than a hunting people the Zulus had little skill with firearms.
Also at the time the 24th wasn't a Welsh regiment and it's title at the time was the 2nd Warwickshire. There were quite a few Welshmen in the regiment, especially in the 2nd battalion as the regiment's depot had been established in south Wales 6 years before the war. But there were also a large number of Englishmen from Hereford and Gloucester in the regiment as well as a large number of Irishmen; Irishmen being common in all British regiments at the time including Scottish Highland ones. Other defenders were from as far afield as London, Liverpool, Birmingham, Devon and Lancashire.
Indeed, speaking of the Irish among the British dead at Rorke's Drift were Byrne, Horrigan, Scanlon, Keefe and Desmond and other defenders were Gallagher, Meehan, Barry, Collins, Connolly, Murphy, McMahon, Dougherty and two Tobins and two Connors.
Also Colour Sgt Bourne was only 24 years old at the time. He retired at a Lt. Colonel and died in 1945 at the age of 91.
Regards
Last edited by Irishtom29; 12-12-2009 at 09:34 PM..
And the British troops at Rorke's Drift were well led, well trained and well handled, unlike the 7th at the Little Big Horn. Yes, they were in a better situation for defense but I think if handled properly the 7th wouldn't have ended up fighting a defensive fight. However we have stated our cases and there's no need to wrangle.
By the way, the Zulus who fought at Rorke's Drift hadn't fought at Isandlwana, they'd been far out on the right or in the reserve. The firearms they used were their own as during the 1850s large numbers of guns started coming into Zululand. Most of the guns used by the Zulus in the fight were probably Brown Bess muskets although other European and American firearms were present in Zululand as well as a sizeable number of P-53 Enfield rifle muskets. But as a pastoral rather than a hunting people the Zulus had little skill with firearms.
Also at the time the 24th wasn't a Welsh regiment and it's title at the time was the 2nd Warwickshire. There were quite a few Welshmen in the regiment, especially in the 2nd battalion as the regiment's depot had been established in south Wales 6 years before the war. But there were also a large number of Englishmen from Hereford and Gloucester in the regiment as well as a large number of Irishmen; Irishmen being common in all British regiments at the time including Scottish Highland ones. Other defenders were from as far afield as London, Liverpool, Birmingham, Devon and Lancashire.
Indeed, speaking of the Irish among the British dead at Rorke's Drift were Byrne, Horrigan, Scanlon, Keefe and Desmond and other defenders were Gallagher, Meehan, Barry, Collins, Connolly, Murphy, McMahon, Dougherty and two Tobins and two Connors.
Also Colour Sgt Bourne was only 24 years old at the time. He retired at a Lt. Colonel and died in 1945 at the age of 91.
Regards
Its true that the impi that fought at the drift were not at Isawana. My understanding however is that some of the rifles at the earlier battle were used at the drift. A brown bess is horribly inaccurate at more than about a hundred yards and the fire from the zulus clearly came from longer than that in some cases - notably the hills around the station. I don't see how it would have been possible to use muskets, to fire that far.
I was in error about the nationality of the regiment. My understanding was that it was the South Wales Borderers. As you note it became that only later. Thanks for the correction.
11 victorian crosses were granted for the battle, more than any such action in history. Cynics have suggested this occured in part to distract attention from the larger defeat at Isawana
Respectfully I disagree. The camp was the largest ever seen on the plains, well led and with weapons that were commonly as good as the soldiers (one of the ironies of the battle is that some of the sioux had repeating rifles while none of the cavalry did). The fighting was in a hilly wooded area where native Americans could quickly come to grips with the soldiers, negating their mobility. No single regiment then existing could have defeated it, however well led. Its doubtful that any officer but Custer would have even attacked it given its size.
The point of the campaign (which Custer knew) was to unite three seperate columns not attack on his own. Had he waited for the additional troops he might have defeated the camp, he certainly would not have been destroyed.
I, in turn, have to disagree with some of the points you have raised in regards to the Little Bighorn. First, it is true that the hostile encampment turned out to be quite large. However, before Custer even began his march, scouting missions led General Terry to believe that he was dealing with a village made up of between 350 to 400 lodges, which would equate to perhaps 800 warriors. At this point, Custer’s total force numbered 600 men and General Gibbon’s was 400 strong. General Terry felt that either of these columns on their own could handle 800 warriors. What was not known by Terry, or anyone else for that matter, was that bands of so-called “summer roamers†were starting to join up with the camp that Terry was seeking to locate and destroy. Eventually, the number of hostiles that Custer faced on June 25th, 1876, was likely closer to 2,000, not 800 as had been assumed.
The second point is that General Terry’s original battle plan did call for a three-pronged advance on the hostiles. One would be under his command, the other under General Gibbon, and the last led by General Crook. But this plan was based on month old intelligence that placed the likely position of the hostile camp to be either along the Tongue River or Powder River. But a scouting mission undertaken by Major Reno and completed on June 18th, showed the camp had moved and was probably on either Rosebud Creek or the Little Bighorn. What was completely unknown to Terry at that time was that General Crook had met a hostile force at the Rosebud on June 17th, had been routed, and then withdrew his column all the way back to a point near what is now Sheridan, Wyoming. The three pronged attack plan was essentially done before it ever really started.
So, based on the newly gathered information from Reno and not knowing where General Crook was, Terry met with Gibbon and Custer on June 19th and changed his plan to more of a classic “Hammer and Anvil†type maneuver. Thus, Terry divided the columns, turning the Custer led column into a mobile, striking force of all cavalry. The remaining cavalry, infantry, and Gatling battery would stay with Terry and Gibbon to act as a blocking force. Custer was tasked to search for the encampment along the upper Little Big Horn, while Terry and Gibbon would march to and then hold a position at the mouth of the Little Big Horn. Terry expected to arrive at his point on June 26th. The plan called for Custer to attack the camp if he found it, and drive it northward toward where Terry and Gibbon would be waiting to finish them off. There is ample evidence both from Terry’s own orders and notes taken by officers present at the conference on the 19th, that Custer had been given full authority to act as he saw fit, based on whatever conditions he encountered in the field. Further, Terry clearly did not intend to move past the mouth of the Little Big Horn in support of Custer. In essence, Custer was on his own unless he found himself in a predicament that required him to call Terry in as reinforcement. What ended up happening though was Custer discovered the trail leading to the hostile encampment on June 24th, not on the upper Little Big Horn, but the lower. This put Terry completely out of position to assist Custer at all when he attacked the camp on June 25th.
Many have questioned why Custer would attack such a large camp with such a small force of men. Most attribute it to either recklessness or ego. In truth, Custer assaulted the village because those were his orders from General Terry. The fear that Terry had was that the hostiles would discover the presence of his troops and then scatter. This had to be prevented at all costs. That one point was driven home early on June 25th when Custer received reports from his scouts as well as his brother Tom, that the hostiles had in fact become aware of the presence of Custer and his men. This put Custer in a serious bind. He had fully intended to attack the camp in the same manner as he had done so successfully 8 years earlier against Chief Black Kettle; march at night, take up strategic positions around the camp, and launch a surprise attack at dawn on June 26th. With that plan seemingly impossible to enact now, Custer decided (as Terry had given him authority to do) to assault the village at once. It wasn’t until Major Reno was heavily engaged and Custer was able to reach a point where the camp at the Little Big Horn was in full view to him, that he realized just how large a force he was facing. By then, things were too far in motion for him to turn back, so he pressed on.
One can talk about weaponry, tactics, and so on, until the cows come home. But the root of the defeat at Little Big Horn can pretty much be attributed, in my opinion anyway, to one thing, and that is the battle plan drawn up by General Terry. Terry’s plan was based completely on insufficient knowledge of both the size and exact location of the enemy, grossly underestimated that enemy’s willingness to fight, and relied on timing the arrival of two separate columns at disparate points with no guarantee they could do so. It was a recipe for disaster, and that’s exactly what General Terry got.
I, in turn, have to disagree with some of the points you have raised in regards to the Little Bighorn. First, it is true that the hostile encampment turned out to be quite large. However, before Custer even began his march, scouting missions led General Terry to believe that he was dealing with a village made up of between 350 to 400 lodges, which would equate to perhaps 800 warriors. At this point, Custer’s total force numbered 600 men and General Gibbon’s was 400 strong. General Terry felt that either of these columns on their own could handle 800 warriors. What was not known by Terry, or anyone else for that matter, was that bands of so-called “summer roamers†were starting to join up with the camp that Terry was seeking to locate and destroy. Eventually, the number of hostiles that Custer faced on June 25th, 1876, was likely closer to 2,000, not 800 as had been assumed.
The second point is that General Terry’s original battle plan did call for a three-pronged advance on the hostiles. One would be under his command, the other under General Gibbon, and the last led by General Crook. But this plan was based on month old intelligence that placed the likely position of the hostile camp to be either along the Tongue River or Powder River. But a scouting mission undertaken by Major Reno and completed on June 18th, showed the camp had moved and was probably on either Rosebud Creek or the Little Bighorn. What was completely unknown to Terry at that time was that General Crook had met a hostile force at the Rosebud on June 17th, had been routed, and then withdrew his column all the way back to a point near what is now Sheridan, Wyoming. The three pronged attack plan was essentially done before it ever really started.
So, based on the newly gathered information from Reno and not knowing where General Crook was, Terry met with Gibbon and Custer on June 19th and changed his plan to more of a classic “Hammer and Anvil†type maneuver. Thus, Terry divided the columns, turning the Custer led column into a mobile, striking force of all cavalry. The remaining cavalry, infantry, and Gatling battery would stay with Terry and Gibbon to act as a blocking force. Custer was tasked to search for the encampment along the upper Little Big Horn, while Terry and Gibbon would march to and then hold a position at the mouth of the Little Big Horn. Terry expected to arrive at his point on June 26th. The plan called for Custer to attack the camp if he found it, and drive it northward toward where Terry and Gibbon would be waiting to finish them off. There is ample evidence both from Terry’s own orders and notes taken by officers present at the conference on the 19th, that Custer had been given full authority to act as he saw fit, based on whatever conditions he encountered in the field. Further, Terry clearly did not intend to move past the mouth of the Little Big Horn in support of Custer. In essence, Custer was on his own unless he found himself in a predicament that required him to call Terry in as reinforcement. What ended up happening though was Custer discovered the trail leading to the hostile encampment on June 24th, not on the upper Little Big Horn, but the lower. This put Terry completely out of position to assist Custer at all when he attacked the camp on June 25th.
Many have questioned why Custer would attack such a large camp with such a small force of men. Most attribute it to either recklessness or ego. In truth, Custer assaulted the village because those were his orders from General Terry. The fear that Terry had was that the hostiles would discover the presence of his troops and then scatter. This had to be prevented at all costs. That one point was driven home early on June 25th when Custer received reports from his scouts as well as his brother Tom, that the hostiles had in fact become aware of the presence of Custer and his men. This put Custer in a serious bind. He had fully intended to attack the camp in the same manner as he had done so successfully 8 years earlier against Chief Black Kettle; march at night, take up strategic positions around the camp, and launch a surprise attack at dawn on June 26th. With that plan seemingly impossible to enact now, Custer decided (as Terry had given him authority to do) to assault the village at once. It wasn’t until Major Reno was heavily engaged and Custer was able to reach a point where the camp at the Little Big Horn was in full view to him, that he realized just how large a force he was facing. By then, things were too far in motion for him to turn back, so he pressed on.
One can talk about weaponry, tactics, and so on, until the cows come home. But the root of the defeat at Little Big Horn can pretty much be attributed, in my opinion anyway, to one thing, and that is the battle plan drawn up by General Terry. Terry’s plan was based completely on insufficient knowledge of both the size and exact location of the enemy, grossly underestimated that enemy’s willingness to fight, and relied on timing the arrival of two separate columns at disparate points with no guarantee they could do so. It was a recipe for disaster, and that’s exactly what General Terry got.
It is an interesting take on the battle, but accounts I have read on the battle, including the History Channel special on the battle disagree with key points. That is they have no such revised order from Terry (I have never seen that mentioned in any discussion of the battle). Gibbon famously remarked to Custer before the campaign began that he (Custer) should wait for Gibbon to attack. Custer stated: "No I won't." providing strong evidence he intended to attack the camp regardless without waiting for support. This comment completely baffled Gibbon in light of the orders.
Second, your point makes little sense given that Terry arrived the day after the big horn, its why reno's command was not destroyed. I fail to understand why this would have occured had he been intended as a blocking force rather than meeting with Custer. Even if you assume someone went to him discussing the diaster, and I have not seen evidence for that, it was awful quick if he was the blocking force well away from the battle. It makes much more sense if you believe Terry intended to join custer all along. Given Indian campaigns I find it hard to believe a blocking force would have had much capacity to trap the Indians.
Regardless of that point, Custer's Indian scouts clearly told him that there was a massive camp - the largest ever seen. Moreover, they reported later that Custer had actually seen the rout of Reno's command from a surrounding bluff - and ignored it. Obviously he should have (at the very least) waited for Terry to join him orders or not. The division of his force into three (later four) pieces was insane given the information he had before he started the battle. You have to believe he either did not believe his scouts, which was foolish, or was reckless which was criminal.
Given Custer's behavior in the civil war I think he was reckless and this time he paid for it.
It is an interesting take on the battle, but accounts I have read on the battle, including the History Channel special on the battle disagree with key points. That is they have no such revised order from Terry (I have never seen that mentioned in any discussion of the battle). Gibbon famously remarked to Custer before the campaign began that he (Custer) should wait for Gibbon to attack. Custer stated: "No I won't." providing strong evidence he intended to attack the camp regardless without waiting for support. This comment completely baffled Gibbon in light of the orders.
Second, your point makes little sense given that Terry arrived the day after the big horn, its why reno's command was not destroyed. I fail to understand why this would have occured had he been intended as a blocking force rather than meeting with Custer. Even if you assume someone went to him discussing the diaster, and I have not seen evidence for that, it was awful quick if he was the blocking force well away from the battle. It makes much more sense if you believe Terry intended to join custer all along. Given Indian campaigns I find it hard to believe a blocking force would have had much capacity to trap the Indians.
Regardless of that point, Custer's Indian scouts clearly told him that there was a massive camp - the largest ever seen. Moreover, they reported later that Custer had actually seen the rout of Reno's command from a surrounding bluff - and ignored it. Obviously he should have (at the very least) waited for Terry to join him orders or not. The division of his force into three (later four) pieces was insane given the information he had before he started the battle. You have to believe he either did not believe his scouts, which was foolish, or was reckless which was criminal.
Given Custer's behavior in the civil war I think he was reckless and this time he paid for it.
Well, let me start by making a small correction to my post. The conference that I mentioned did not take place on the 19th of June. Instead, that is the day that General Terry issued Special Field Order #15. This called for Custer to rendezvous with both Gibbon and Terry at the mouth of Rosebud Creek for a meeting aboard the supply steamer, “Far West”. The actual meeting took place on the 21st of June.
Lt. James Bradley, Chief of Scouts for General Gibbon, made a diary entry for the date of June 21st, stating that such a meeting took place. He notes that Terry discussed a new battle plan, and stated that it was understood that should Custer find the hostile encampment “he is at liberty to attack at once if he deems prudent”.
General Terry wrote a dispatch to General Sheridan on the 21st of June that also sketched out his new attack plan. Terry makes it clear that Custer will be acting independently of Gibbon, and makes no mention of Custer having to wait for Gibbon or link up with Gibbon.
On June 28, 1876, Major James Brisbin, General Terry’s adjutant, wrote a letter to the “New York Herald” in which he references a “consultation” that took place between Generals Terry, Gibbon, and Custer during which “It was announced by General Terry that General Custer’s column would strike the blow” against the village when found.
A dispatch written by Custer on June 22nd, also to the “New York Herald”, tells of the plan and what was tasked to himself and Gibbon. It corresponds with what Terry states in his own orders to Custer.
Mark Kellogg, the reporter that was traveling with Custer, wrote a dispatch on June 21st that describes how General Gibbon would march “up the Big Horn Valley in order to intercept the Indians, if they should attempt to escape from General Custer down that avenue”.
Lastly there is Terry’s battle order issued to Custer on June 22nd, in which he tells Custer what areas to scout, gives him full freedom of action, and states flatly that General Gibbon’s column would “cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Horns”. It does not detail any further movement by the Gibbon column, tell Custer to co-ordinate his movements with the Gibbon column in mind, or order Custer to wait for the arrival of Gibbon. The only thing it does call for is that Custer, after exhausting his provisions, should rendezvous with Gibbon at the point mentioned in Terry’s order, by the 6th of July. Now if it was Terry’s intent that Gibbon and Custer would link up and fight together, it makes no sense to order him to meet Gibbon at Gibbon’s station after finishing his mission.
The information that I have just laid out is certainly not new or unknown. I can’t speak to why some author’s or the History Channel would choose to ignore that which has been readily available for research since 1876. My guess would be that their primary sources were individuals that were seeking to distance themselves from culpability in the Little Bighorn debacle by shifting the entire blame on to a dead man. Keep in mind that the idea to go to war with the Sioux originated with General Philip Sheridan and was approved by President Grant. Sheridan believed that a stunning victory over the Sioux would be a nice way to celebrate America's upcoming Centennial. Instead, the disaster at Little Bighorn shocked the entire nation, and was viewed as being highly embarrassing to both Sheridan and Grant. So it was certainly in the best interest of some of the principal players to do anything, up to and including, lying about who did what and why.
The Gibbon quote that you mention had nothing to do with Gibbon advising Custer to wait for him, though judging by some sources I have seen, they wish others to believe that it did. The supposed quote from Gibbon to Custer is “Now, Custer, don’t be greedy…wait for us”. The actual quote was “Now, Custer, don’t be greedy. Save some (Indians) for us.” Custer’s response of “No, I won’t” can be interpreted different ways. It may have been a joking response or a serious one. He may have been saying “No I won’t be greedy” or “No I won’t save any Indians for you”. In any event, Custer had been given permission by General Terry to attack on his own anyway. The missquote is simply another in a long line of things intended to “prove” that Custer was disobeying orders.
As to when Terry arrived at the Little Big Horn battle site, it is simply incorrect that he got there on June 26th. That, instead, is the date that he arrived at the point detailed in his orders to Custer, namely“the forks of the Big and Little Horns”. Terry actually reached the battlefield on the 27th. The only reason that he and Gibbon advanced from their previous position is due to being informed of what had happened to Custer. The way the information came to them was from some of the Indian scouts released by Custer prior to the battle on the 25th. They came into contact with scouts sent out by Gibbon to sweep the area immediately around his position late in the day on June 26th. When they related the details to Terry and Gibbon, they didn’t believe them, thinking that surely they were exaggerating for some unknown reason. Still, Terry decided that the matter should be investigated so he ordered an advance and found out himself that the scouts weren’t lying at all.
Everyone can agree that the village was extremely large. It is also true that observations by the scouts from the so-called “Crow’s Nest” indicated to them the presence of a sizeable camp. However, when Custer visited the same spot to view for himself, even through field glasses he could not discern the degree of detail that the scouts could. It was not until Custer went into battle and reached a point known as “Sharpshooter Ridge” that he could for the first time see the full scope of the village. Testimony from Trumpeter John Martin, who was with Custer on Sharpshooter Ridge, stated that all that could be seen was women and children milling about, but no warriors. Martin further testified that Custer remarked that they must have caught the Indians “napping” and felt confident about continuing his advance. As for Custer seeing Major Reno in full rout, that again is not correct. Sergeant Daniel Kanipe testified that when he was with Custer at a point that became known as “Reno Hill”, they could clearly see that Major Reno’s force had formed a skirmish line and was advancing, but that no warriors were visible in front of Reno. Those with Reno testified that on at least three occasions they sighted Custer and his men on the bluffs opposite of where Reno’s force was. The last sighting was by Lt. Charles DeRudio and occurred at around 3:30 PM. At that point, Reno was still holding his position and had yet to fall back in retreat. After that, Custer was no longer at a place where he could see Reno in serious trouble because he was then descending Medicine Tail Coulee in an attempt to reach the village beyond.
Since June 25, 1876, people have been debating whether Custer dividing his force was the right or wrong move. To Custer it seems attacking at two different points was a better strategy then a full attack at a single one. Regardless, Reno giving up and retreating, which Custer didn’t know happened, allowed the warriors to bring their full force against Custer. And that was a fight that he couldn’t win given the number of men he had at his disposal.
So I go back to my original point. In my opinion, Terry set the whole thing in motion with a bad plan, bad intelligence, and the belief that Custer could do it all on his own. It was that overconfidence on Terry’s part that in the end doomed Custer, his men, and the entire operation, to failure.
The Custer discussion is a good one; I have nothing to add but would like to read it. Trudy, suggest we split it into a new thread. I'll RAP this to bring to her attention.
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Well isort of inadvertantly started the whole Custer thing by responding to a post about Patton, by saying that we Americans like our military hero's to be daring and always wanting to attack. Sometimes with terrible results, from Admiral Farragots "Damn the torrpedos, Full speed ahead" to Custer looking down upon the entire Souix Nation and yelling "charge"
Like him or not, he had a set of brass ones.
The more things change, the more they stay the same. Even now we have stilll another president who says that when the fox on the ground tells us we can leave the henhouse, then we will leave.
Well isort of inadvertantly started the whole Custer thing by responding to a post about Patton, by saying that we Americans like our military hero's to be daring and always wanting to attack. Sometimes with terrible results, from Admiral Farragots "Damn the torrpedos, Full speed ahead" to Custer looking down upon the entire Souix Nation and yelling "charge"
Like him or not, he had a set of brass ones.
Woefully underestimating an enemy is not an admirable quality. It's over-the-top foolhardiness.
He got what he deserved. Too bad he had to take so many people with him for "guts and glory". But that was a long time ago...
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Custer thread
