Why were WWII Soviet casualties extremely high? (interior, economy, empire)

[NJGOAT]

Wow, lot's of discussion going on that I wanted to respond to. Instead of responding to multiple posts by Radrook and Torrachris separately, I figured I would just organize my thoughts here:

1. Initial disposition of Russian troops.

The Soviets arrayed their forces in the west in two strategic echelons. The first was stationed at the new western frontier which included recently conquered territory and occupied a front approximately 1,000 miles long and 500 miles deep and was comprised of roughly 60 percent of their available forces in the west. The second echelon began around 250 miles beyond that along a similar front and comprised the remaining forces. This arrangement of forces itself wasn't bad, but the aforementioned factors (training, equipment, communication, etc.) and the lack of war-readiness was.

Another often overlooked factor is that the Soviets had decided in the month before Barbarossa to move the second echelon forward to establish a more in depth defense and provide reserves to the first echelon. These units were still displacing and moving when Barbarossa was launched.

So, FWIW, the actual deployment of Soviet troops in the initial campaign wasn't an issue, but the other factors certainly were and the displacement and movement of the second echelon meant that forces were not in a position to establish a more static defensive line along the traditional border.

2. The Battle of Smolensk

This was not the great German victory, it was actually the battle that cast doubt on the ability of the double pincer envelopment to effectively destroy the Soviet Army. Smolensk was situated along an old defensive line and was the key roadblock on the route to Moscow. As the infantry armies moved to engage the Soviet defenses directly, the panzer armies made their double pincer move. The north army (Hoth) was greatly slowed by bad weather and a Soviet counterattack. Still, they managed to close to within 10 miles of completing the encirclement before being stalled for 8 days. During that time the Soviets managed to evacuate close to 200,000 troops that contributed to the defense of Moscow. The Soviets still lost 300,000 men in Smolensk, but the defenders held out until early August and sapped significant strength from the German infantry divisions and required the committing of large numbers of German reserves.

3. The Battle of Kiev

This is the battle that is hailed as the great tactical/strategic encirclement and is also the moment "Hitler hesitated" and divided his forces.

Hitler's hesitation occurred for two reasons:

First, the German units in the field had exhausted their initial supplies without achieving the freedom of operational movement they had expected. So, the Germans slowed down in order to resupply which in and of itself was a logistical nightmare that deep into Soviet territory. The roads were so bad and their truck fleet so worn down (many were French and Czech trucks with few spare parts) that the Germans relied most on captured Russian ox carts to move their supplies.

Second, the Germans themselves admitted at this moment that they had underestimated Soviet stregnth and resolve. Despite losing 600k troops at Bialystok and Minsk and another 300k at Smolensk the Soviet Army was still in the field and fighting and gaining strength daily. The Red Army was absorbing every blow the Germans through at them. Addtionally Army Group Center was now in a "bulge" with their flanks exposed. The Germans (really Hitler) decided at that moment that they needed to strike at the primary Russian economic and production centers as they lacked the ability to decisevly destroy the Red Army in the field.

Hitler divides his forces:

Army Group South was the only group that had sustained large losses in the initial assault. A major Soviet counterattack against the 1st Panzer Group had destroyed large numbers of German tanks and delayed Army Group South for several days. The Soviets withdrew to Kiev with almost no armor and air power remaining, but Army Group South lacked the ability to effectively destroy the Soviet forces there after having lost so much of their strength in the initial invasion.

It was felt that Army Group Center could not continue the drive on Moscow with their flanks exposed. This meant securing Leningrad in the north and destroying the Soviet armies at Kiev. Hitler decided to split Hoth and Guderians Panzer armies from Group Center and use them to achieve these objectives. The move was tactically masterful.

The Germans completed the encirclement of Leningrad and eliminated the entire Soviet SW Front destroying over 600k Soviet troops in Kiev. However, it took them a month to complete these operations, delaying the launching of Typhoon. The Soviets responded by launching an attack against the forces at Smolensk, but this was unsuccesful and wasted many troops.

This hesitation and splitting is what many point to as the moment that doomed Barbarossa to failure (not to taking Moscow). Personally, I feel it was doomed before that. The actions of the Soviets against Army Group South sapped their combat strength and left the Soviets in a strong defensive position at Kiev checking further advances by Group South. Army Group Center had expended all of its supplies and most of its reserves taking Smolensk. It was the actions of the Soviets (and Russian weather) that doomed the invasion.

A lot of people argue that had Hitler launched Typhoon and assaulted Moscow a month earlier instead of going after Kiev that the Germans had a good chance at taking Moscow. However, that ignores the reality on the ground.

Launching an attack without removing the 600k strong force at Kiev would have left Army Group Centers entire right flank and supply lines exposed to attack. An earlier assault would have found the Germans running into much stronger Soviet forces as they would not have wasted their troops attacking Smolensk. The weather would have been a factor anyway as it was the heavy rains that destroyed the Russian dirt roads and slowed down the German advance. The Germans at best would have reached the outskirts of Moscow by mid-October just as the rains set in hampering their movements and supplies. The 10 reserve armies raised by the Stavka to defend Moscow already existed at that time, so the Germans would have faced no less resistance at Moscow than they actually did.

The German army was good, but it is far from certain that they could have overrun Moscow against even stiffer resistance and a long exposed flank threatened by 600k Soviet troops. In this case I don't think Hitler made a mistake, he made the correct decision as the most likely outcome of an early Operation Typhoon would have been the defeat of Army Group Center in a more resounding fashion.

After the Germans stalled outside Moscow the Germans had nothing more than one good offensive push in a single sector left in them for 1942. The 6 months of the invasion had sapped over an entire years worth of military equipment and materiel production. These losses were never replaced.

[Radrook]

Something can be tactically masterful but strategically flawed. Happens all the time in chess. Beautiful combo but damaging in the long run.

[NJGOAT]

Originally Posted by Radrook

Something can be tactically masterful but strategically flawed. Happens all the time in chess. Beautiful combo but damaging in the long run.

Ah, but would you send your queen down the middle into a wall of pawns rolling the dice on a possible checkmate when your opponent dominates the right side of the board with a knight and a bishop? Also, unlike chess, there's a good chance your opponent won't quit after you say checkmate.

I have a strong feeling that if the Germans had launched Typhoon earlier and ignored the Soviet armies at Kiev, we would be talking about Hitler's blunder in not detaching Guderian to surround and eliminate those forces before pushing on Moscow.

I think the Germans executed the campaign brilliantly, but they ultimately bit off more than they could chew and undersestimated Soviet strength and resolve. It would be like invading the United States along the East Coast and pushing along a front from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico all the way to St. Louis. I think a lot of people don't get the scale of the front we are talking about. Compare that to the invasion of France which was more like invading Nevada.

The Soviets didn't do anything tactically brilliant, but they did what they could to slow the Germans down and sapped their power by putting up one heck of a fight in a couple key battles.

[erasure]

Originally Posted by MrMarbles

I use the word conspiracy loosely but one theory I am referring to is the idea that Stalin planned to invade Germany in 1941. It is peddled by a popular author and former Soviet intelligence officer Vladimir Rezun (aka Victor Suvorov).

I've heard of him and no - I don't take him seriously.
He writes what sells, plus being a defector he likes the hype + feeling of self-importance, apparently, where such theories like this one help to promote his "expertise."

To understand what happened in 1941, this is probably the best summary (in Russian):
Красная Армия летом 1941 года - правда и вымысел. История Ð*оссии. Великая Отечественная .

Basically the reasons can be broken down into two categories:
1. The Red Army was not mobilized and deployed. It needed a full month for mobilization but the warning from intelligence services came much too late. Some measures were taken in mid-June to move the troops to the border there was too little time, plus the Soviet leadership hesitated to declare an open mobilization which would trigger the war immediately (as it did in 1914). The German troops were, on the other hand, fully mobilized. All that they needed to do was transfer their forces from the Balkans.

2. The Red Army was qualitatively much inferior to the Wehrmacht (as was every other other army of the period). Due to very fast growth of the Soviet armed forces, there was shortage of officers. Secondly, following the Winter War which served as a reality check, the Red Army was engaged in a massive reorganization.

Thank you, I've read it all and it didn't sound quite convincing to me. Particularly the "intelligence" part. I'm pretty sure that reports have been put on Stalin's table much earlier than June 21st, that Germany was planning to invade Russia.( Even Sorge could have done it.)
So if Soviet commandment would have considered such thing while being in doubt only regarding the possible date, there would have been plan A and plan B ( according to the possible date of attack.) However it looks like the attack came as a total surprise overall; there was no plan A or B in place at all, only one possible strategy in such situation; "defend our cities till the last drop of blood." And so they did in many cases ( soldiers that is, officers and what's not,) but I don't see any cohesion, any serious initiative or plan on behalf of upper commandment at that point, rather - shock and confusion, if not to say panic. Which makes me think that even after the initial intelligence reports regarding the possible attack of Germany, the upper commandment ( Stalin first of all) were dismissing such possibility for reasons known only to them. There was something they thought ( or perceived as valuable information may be,) that such attack was not going to take place in foreseeable future ( 1941-42 for sure, if at all.) So once "dear leader" made his stance to be known, even the mentioning of the possible war became taboo, ( who would dare to contradict "the most wise and knowledgeable" head of the Soviet State?) That's why it seems to me that the attack on June 22 turned out to be a disaster and it did cost so many lives.
Later on the Soviet commandment did come up with plans and decisions according to the situation of course, and their leadership during the following events was obvious, however same can't be stated about the beginning of the war, I think.

[Torrachris]

Erasure, the rapid growth of the Red Army had nothing to do with its shortage of officers. It seems to me that Stalin inprisoned or shot most of his most capable officers which led to the shortage. A good example is Mikhail Tukhachevsky who was the USSR's great general. He was arrested, tried, and shot on Stalin's orders which was the result of a deliberate and concerted program to destroy the leadership of the Red Army. Stalin's purge had been responsible for the annihilation of many military commanders because of his suspicions which were men that the Red Army needed. The result was the terrible performance of the Red Army in the Finnish War. Although Finland was ultimately forced to give in to the Soviet commands, the Fins fought the Red Army to a standstill. Stalin was given ample warning of the attack and brushed it aside. He refused to believe it was happening. Its seems true that Stalin discounted the information he was receiving and that he was convinced the news was either a provocation or a ruse, right up until the shooting actually began and then some.

[NJGOAT]

TonyT who is probably the forums foremost expert on WW2 had posted recently about the high level discussions going on between Hitler and Molotov on behalf of Stalin about the Soviets actually joining the Axis. These discussions happened during the lead up and change in Barbarossa from planning stages to operational. I think you need to place the information Stalin was getting about a German attack in context against the dicussions he was engaged in to outright join the Axis. A lot of the reports he was getting were from British sources and I think he did write them off. I think Stalin saw war with Germany as an eventuality, but I think he honestly believed it was at least a year off. It wasn't even 6 months ago that the Soviets had been invited to join the Tripartite.

I will quote TonyT's post in full:

During two pre-Tripartite Pact meetings held on the 9th and 10th of September 1940 between German envoy Heinrich Stahmer and Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, the two men reached an “understanding” which stated in part: “After conclusion of an alliance agreement between Japan, Germany, and Italy, it appears extremely profitable to establish closer relations with the USSR immediately”. This statement became the basis for Article 5 of the Tripartite Pact, which said: “Germany, Italy, and Japan affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three contracting powers and Soviet Russia”.

Despite what the Axis powers intended, when word of the Tripartite Pact reached Moscow, the Soviets were less than pleased. For one, they believed they should have received more than a day’s notice from Germany that the agreement was going to be signed. But more importantly, they were not at all convinced, regardless of what it actually said, that the Pact did not in fact represent the formation of an anti-Russian alliance. For their part, the Japanese took great pains to reassure the Russians that it was nothing of the sort. First on October 1, 1940 and then again on October 8th, Matsuoka met with Soviet envoys in Tokyo and stated categorically that the Pact was aimed at the United States and not the Soviet Union. Matsuoka added that his government hoped to “open a new page in Japanese-Soviet relations”.

The Germans also reached out to the Russians in an effort to assuage their hurt feelings. Molotov was invited to Berlin for discussions about the Tripartite Pact. During meetings which took place on the 12th and 13th of November, Hitler and Ribbentrop formally invited the Soviet Union to join the Pact with the idea that all four parties would take part in dividing up between them areas currently in the British sphere of influence . Hitler and Ribbentrop envisioned that the Soviet area of expansion would be “aimed southwards from the Soviet Union’s state border in the direction of the Indian Ocean”. Molotov reacted positively to the idea of joining the Pact, and upon returning to Moscow relayed to Stalin what had been proposed. After some consideration, Stalin informed Molotov that he was in favor of accepting the German invitation and instructed Molotov to communicate that fact to Berlin.

On the evening of November 25th, Molotov met with Germany’s ambassador to Russia, Freidrich von der Schulenburg to inform him that Russia would join the Tripartite. Molotov then set out the conditions which would need to be met for them to do so: German troops would be withdrawn from Finland immediately; Germany would encourage Bulgaria to conclude a mutual assistance agreement with Russia for the purpose of securing Russia’s Black Sea frontiers; Russia would be given right of passage through the Turkish Straits and be allowed to establish military bases there; recognition by Germany, Italy and Japan that the area south of Batumi and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf fell within the Soviet sphere; Japan would give up it’s concessionary rights to the coal and oil fields on the northern part of Sakhalin Island.

When Molotov’s message arrived in Berlin, it met a somewhat chilly reception. Hitler was not much concerned about the removal of German troops from Finland. After all, the only reason they were there was to encourage Finnish involvement in an invasion of Russia if it came to that. Since it was already a known sticking point in establishing better relations with Russia, the Japanese had expressed a willingness to surrender their interests in Sakhalin. The major issue he had with the Russian conditions were in regards to Turkey and Bulgaria. Allowing a Soviet move into Turkey would infringe on the Italian sphere which was defined as the entire Mediterranean basin. As far as Bulgaria was concerned, Germany was in the process of trying to get the country to join the Axis, which the Russians were well aware of. If Bulgaria was instead allowed to become a satellite of the Soviets, Russia would once more be in a position to exert influence in the Balkans; something they had not been able to do since the end of the First World War. And that was not a situation that Hitler was going to permit under any circumstances. Sensing no flexibility on the part of the Russians or a means of reaching a compromise, Hitler ordered the OKH to transition Barbarossa from the preliminary planning stage to an operational one. No formal response to Molotov’s proposal was ever transmitted to Moscow.

So, when you consider the fact that all parties involved seemed to be serious about the addition of the Soviet Union to the Tripartite Pact, I think it’s fair to say it almost happened. Sustaining it long term, as you correctly point out, would have been difficult if not impossible. I suspect though that it would have lasted at least until all four powers had fully absorbed and began exploitation of their newly acquired territories; a process that could have potentially taken years.

On the issue of military purges, they certainly had a major impact, but overall only 4%-8% of the total officers were actually purged and of that around 30% were allowed to return later. The purges were mainly about enforcing Stalinism and his new communist ideleology over the other factions that had vied for power following Lenin's death. This purge was really the culmination of several purges that began with the removal of former tsarist officers and ended up removing anyone remotely associated with Trotsky. It was necessary in Stalin's view to eliminate the men who held opposing views that also had strong backing from the Red Army. The Red Army purge happened right before the greater purge of the nomenklatura, a move that may have actually prompted the purged officers to openly resist and attempt to depose Stalin.

While the purge certainly removed many seasoned officers and was part of the overall issues with the Red Army in the lead up to WW2, none of the major officers involved really held any kind of great military mind to have been a difference maker in the early days of Barbarossa. Zhukov was always their best general.

[Radrook]

NJGOAT wrote:

The Soviets didn't do anything tactically brilliant, but they did what they could to slow the Germans down and sapped their power by putting up one heck of a fight in a couple key battles.

Actually I was responding to the suggestion that Hitler's initial Barbarossa campaign was brilliant.

[erasure]

Originally Posted by Torrachris

Erasure, the rapid growth of the Red Army had nothing to do with its shortage of officers.

Where did I say anything about the "rapid growth of the Red Army?"
I was talking about my impression that Soviet Authorities seemed to be in denial or knew something that made them think that they were not in danger of German attack in any foreseeable future in 1941.

[MrMarbles]

Originally Posted by Torrachris

Erasure, the rapid growth of the Red Army had nothing to do with its shortage of officers. It seems to me that Stalin inprisoned or shot most of his most capable officers which led to the shortage. A good example is Mikhail Tukhachevsky who was the USSR's great general. He was arrested, tried, and shot on Stalin's orders which was the result of a deliberate and concerted program to destroy the leadership of the Red Army. Stalin's purge had been responsible for the annihilation of many military commanders because of his suspicions which were men that the Red Army needed. The result was the terrible performance of the Red Army in the Finnish War. Although Finland was ultimately forced to give in to the Soviet commands, the Fins fought the Red Army to a standstill. Stalin was given ample warning of the attack and brushed it aside. He refused to believe it was happening. Its seems true that Stalin discounted the information he was receiving and that he was convinced the news was either a provocation or a ruse, right up until the shooting actually began and then some.

The rapid growth of the Red Army had everything to do with the shortage of officers. The army grew 5 fold in just a few years. Soviet military academies could not train the necessary numbers of officers. The purges had an effect too but it is generally overestimated. As NJGOAT correctly pointed out, only about 5% of the officers were shot. Most of those arrested were returned to the army.

Originally Posted by erasure

Where did I say anything about the "rapid growth of the Red Army?"
I was talking about my impression that Soviet Authorities seemed to be in denial or knew something that made them think that they were not in danger of German attack in any foreseeable future in 1941.

The Soviet leadership certainly anticipated war at some point. That's why they were expanding the military, militarizing the Soviet industry, making other reforms, building fortifications and so on. But you are right, war in 1941 was not expected for a few reasons.

- Most wars start with some kind of political tension, general worsening of relations, demands, ultimatums and the like. There wasn't anything of the sort in 1941. Europe for the time being was divided into 2 spheres of influence and the Germans seemed to be content with the status quo, especially since the Soviet Union was supplying Germany with important raw materials. Soviet leadership assumed that if and when differences arose, they could be settled politically at least until the USSR was ready for war.

- In 1941 Germany was already engaged in a war against Great Britain. The Soviet leadership assumed that Germany could not and would not start a war on another front, and that some kind of a conclusion (either conquest or peace) with Britain was necessary before the Germans could invade. This was a reasonable assumption since it was proven to be correct in the end. The war with Britain was a considerable drain on German resources and it also drew United States into the conflict. Stalin, not without reason, thought that to invade the USSR would be very foolish for Germany under such circumstances.

- There was little in the way of solid and accurate intelligence indicating that war was imminent. Today everything is 20/20 but back then Stalin had little idea what was credible and what wasn't. There was a lot of information coming in, much of it vague and contradictory. I find this very plausible. Intelligence is not all-powerful. Just like American intelligence missed Pearl Harbor or 9/11 so did the Soviet intelligence miss the immediate German threat. Or, more correctly, German plans were eventually uncovered but then it was too late. USSR needed about a month's notice to prepare the Red Army for war. Finally, keep in mind that if Stalin declared mobilization in, say, early June, then the war would have started immediately and the Soviet Union would likely have been seen as the aggressor. Stalin did not lose hope that war could be avoided so why jump the gun? Again, TODAY we know what we know. Back then things were much less obvious.

[SmilingWolf]

Why so many casualties on Eastern Front
Response to Nicesinging1's points regarding various aspects of Operation Barbarossa/Invasion of the Soviet Union.

1. Why was the Soviet casualties extremely high compared to other Allied nations such as U.K. and U.S.? U.S. only sustained 400,000 casualties during the entire WWII campaign compared to Soviet' 27 million which is almost 70 times the rate.

Response: The full scope of Soviet casualties during Operation Barabarossa and the follow through campaigns on the Eastern Front will probably never really be adequately accounted. I believe that Stalin and his successors in the Kremlin after the war intentionally kept the full magnitude of Soviet losses as classified information for many years for political reasons and whatever actual information as to reasonably accurate figures was released only after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Most of the war casualites both civilian and military took place in the Ukraine region where the Ukrainian people lost a significant portion of their population, along with casualities of the overall Soviet armed forces in this region. Many Ukraine casualties werre inflicted directly not only by the invading German forces but by Soviet forces, especially the NKVD who were under orders to liquidate any and all civilians who were deemed either ethnically and or politically suspect.

Many Ukrainians perished as a direct result of starvation and destruction of shelter when entire villages were destroyed by both sides as part of the overall war strategy denying opposing forces both shelter and food. Civilians were also killed at the hands of various partisan forces in the region who controlled large areas of the countryside while the occupying German army controlled the cities and towns.

Ukranians held a deep hatred for Stalin and his regime, especially because he deliberately created a man made famine killing millions of Ukranians in the early 1930's and much of the population initially embraced the Wehrmacht in the first weeks of the invasion. However, one of Hitler's profound blunders at the onset of the invasion was his callous and myopic disregard for these people and Slavs overall and a complete unwillingness on his part to recognize the enormous pragmatic asset they could have easily provided Germany in its drive to defeat the Russians.

As advanced as the German war machine was, one of it's great failings was its unwillingness to convert Slavic subjugated populations like the Ukranians into a military and political asset against the Russians. They allowed a base emotion such as ethnic and racial hatred to distort and subvert a clear military, polititcal, and even economic asset. Of course, Hitler defined and dictated this racial/ethnic policy and his attitudes clearly filtered down through the German general staff into the lower echelons of the military and, I believe, helped him and Germany to lose the war.

The end result was a genocidal consequence of biblical proportions. Whole cities were denied food and literally starved to death. Though millions of German and Soviet soldiers were wounded and killed on the Eastern Front, it was the Slav civilian population that made up the bulk of the deaths.

The total casualties of the Allies in the western theatre, albeit extensive and honorable in their own right, cannot possibly be compared to the enormous losses experienced on the Eastern Front.

Through the years, it has been a common and sad practice for most of the historical attention paid to World War II be paid to the efforts of the United States and Great Britain in the European Theatre, especially D-Day and the invasion of Normandy and virtually scant attention paid to the collosal struggle taking place for a number of years on the Eastern Front which, in my estiimation, is an act of incredible callousness and insensitivity to the untold millions who perished there during that conflagation.

The result has not only been a callous disregard to those millions of war dead ( on all sides), but a denial of the truth of history which is this: World War II was won by the West on the Eastern Front by countless Russian/Soviet/Ukrainian, etc men and women who have nearly been forgotton by the world.

2. 2. How many of those 27 million deaths were inflicted by Nazi troops? I understand the majority of those 27 million casualties were civilians slaughtered by German troops who regarded Russians as "sub-humans" and "Bolsheviks."

Response: Point #2 is a gross distortion of history based on a false assumpton. The "majority" of civilian deaths on the Eastern Front, especially in the Ukraine, were not "slaughtered" through direct military action by the Germans. Most civilian deaths took place as a result of deprivations of both food and shelter and, as previously mentioned, these actions of food deprivation and shelter destruction was not only excercised by the German military but by both the opposing Russian forces and various partisan groups who took food and shelter at the point of an AK 47. By the way, a number of Ukraine partisan groups fought both the Germans and the Russians.

It is too easy and intellectually convenient to draw the conclusion that 27 million human beings could have been "slaughtered" at the hands of the German army. Nowadays, the world likes to call such actions, "collateral damage" and conveniently make psychological excuses for it, espeically if it's "our side" inflicting the damage and indirectly or directly killing civilians in a war zone.

It's amazing the psychology of human behavior. We so easily condemn the actions of the "enemy" and conveneintly give license to virtually the same actions inflicted by us. The German army obviously caused either directly or indirectly the deaths of countless innocent civilians on the Eastern Front. However, they were not the only ones incriminated in this horror. The Russians were responsible for many civilian casualties/deaths as well.

3. This question is the most mind-boggling to me. How on earth do you beat the best-trained and best-equipped army under the great generals like Von Manstein, Guderian, Paulus and the likes with poorly trained army with old weapons and lack of leadership?
Based on research, "The purge of the Red army in late 1930's removed three of five marshals (then equivalent to six-star generals), 13 of 15 army commanders (then equivalent to four- and five-star generals), eight of nine admirals (the purge fell heavily on the Navy, who were suspected of exploiting their opportunities for foreign contacts), 50 of 57 army corps commanders, 154 out of 186 division commanders, 16 of 16 army commissars, and 25 of 28 army corps commissars."
I don't care if you have 20 million-man army. Without strong and brilliant generals, you can not win a war, especially against well-trained and well-led German troops at the time. How did the Red Army beat the Germans despite the severe lack of leadership?

Response: "How on earth do you beat the best-trained and best-equipped army under the great generals like Von Manstein, Guderian, Paulus and the likes with poorly trained army with old weapons and lack of leadership? ..."

First of all, let's take Paulus out of the imminent and respected group of German generals above. Paulus was a poor commander and leader of men and was not nearly adequate to the task at hand. Though he held talent at a general staff operational level, he should never have been given command of the Sixth Army.

Considering the vast array of circumstances aligned against them, it is amazing the German military was able to prosecute the war for as long as they did and the degree of strategic military successes they realized.

Granted, the superiority of the German Wehrmacht was unquestioned at that point in history. At that time, June, 1941, there was no opposing military to even remotely compare to them. They were absolutely disciplined, perfectly trained, equipped, organized, and were the forerunners of the modern military of today. No one could hold a candle to them and no one could hold off indefinitely a German onslaught.

However, despite these clear military and psychological advantages, they confronted a set of circumstances both man made and natural, that prevented them from accomplishing their strategic objective of defeating the Soviet Union.

1) Hitler made several strategic mistakes even before Operation Barbarossa started.

a) He refused to put Germany on an absolute war footing. By refusing to put the German
economy in a complete war production mode, he instantly hamstrung the Wehrmacht from
being adequately supplied as the war extended beyond his operational time line.

b) Hitler made seveal profoundly disastrous assumptions regarding the pragmatic prosecution
of the approaching war against the Soviet Union. One of these assumptions, was his staunch belief that he could win a lightning fast war against the Soviets just as he did against the French and the Poles across a broad front. Both He and the German high command seriously underestimated the sheer vastness of the Soviet Union and the equally vast requirements of both manpower and material resources required to meet the reality of Soviet geography.

He failed to create in advance a Plan B in the event that his blitzkrieg lightning attack failed to meet its strategic objectives during those first months. He failed to adequately prepare and supply the German Wehrmacht forces with proper winter gear, heavy winter clothing, cold weather supplies and lubricants for machinery, weapons, vehicles, etc and, as a result, this failing created a disastrous first winter attrition of men and material.

c) Perhaps, one of Hitler's greatest mistakes was his decision to attack the entire breadth of the Soviet Union simultaneously from the Baltic to the Black Sea. On such an enormous front, even his 3 million plus army, no matter how well trained and equipped, could prove adequate to such a gigantic task, especially if Plan A - blitzkrieg...was delayed or stalled in any way.

To cover such a massive stretch of territory with a comparatively small invading force, focusing mistakenly on severl strategic objectives simultaneously, seriously reduced their chances of success in the long run.

Duriing the planning stage of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler was presented with an alternate strategic plan, one which centered on the strategy of defeating the Soviet Union in defined stages and time frames, based on the conclusion that it would take longer than a handful of months to conquer such a vast area and such an enormous population. The objective of this plan was the taking of Moscow. Hitler rejected this plan outright, stubbornly sticking to his belief that such a continental expanse could be taken before the beginning of that winter. Big mistake.

d) He refused to adequately supply, equip, and train Germany's allies, espeically the Romanian army which has recieved a bad rap in history due to their perceived incompetence in the face of Russian counterattacks. The Romanian enlisted soldier fought well, considering they were poorly equipped, poorly fed, and poorly led by incompetent officers. These units were generally deployed as support units and were assigned to protect the German flanks during the offensive. However, it was a failure of both Hitler and the general staff to adequately recognize the poor condition of these units and ultimately contributed to the eventual crisis leading up to Stalingrad. Hitler also made the military mistake of allowing Italian soldiers to participate in Operation Barbarossa. The Italian Army was quite possibly the most incompetent, inept military in the history of mankind and became an instant liability and drain on the German military.

e) Hitler and German military intelligence clearly failed to recognize and adequately prepare for the amazing resiliency and courage of the Russian army. It is this lack of foresight that is so astounding since the German Wehrmacht invested decades working alongside the Russian military during countless military training exercises and maneuvers. They failed to take into account the ability of Stalin to pour literally limitless Russian conscripts into the fight and the willingness of the ordinary Russian soldeir to become cannon fodder during the beginning stages of the German onslaught.

By rigidly sticking to these false set of assumptions, misperceptions, and under estimating their opponent, Hitler and Germany's fate was nearly sealed from the beginning. I say, 'nearly' because, despite all of these negatives arrayed against them, Germany actually came quite close to defeating the Soviet Union.

There are some in this thread, who believe that Hitler would have lost his gamble even if he had started Barbarossa a month earlier because of the fall rains, etc. There are some who believe he made the right decision in diverting forces to defeat the defending Russian armies stationed in the area of Kiev, diverting precious armored forces from Army Group Center to Army Group South at the Kiev encirclement as well as diverting panzer units to Army Group North in their drive toward Leningrad.

Though these points have clear merit. In the overall strategic picture, it is my view that Hitler's failure to focus on one ultimate strategic objective: Moscow - was the blunder which ultimately led to the defeat of Germany. It was this failure to focus on one key strategic objective; Moscow, which doomed Hitler and Germany to a protracted and costly struggle which ultimately drained them of manpower and resources.

Along with the many mistakes and disadvantages confronting Hitler and the German military during the beginning stages of Operation Barbarossa, they were also given the benefit of several major advantages in their favor and which gave them a realistic chance of defeating the Soviet Uniion.

Based on the scenario of Hitler actually focusing on accomplishing the strategic objective of taking Moscow, he held a number of aces in his and Germany's favor.

At this point in the war, the Russian military was still in the throes of a massive reorganization and re training of their units. After the Finnish fiasco the previos winter, Stalin and the Russian high command frantically attempted to re organize the Russian military into cohesive and effective fighting units. However, they were only in the beginning stages of this retooling effort.

This put them at a major disadvantage. The Russian military was not properly equipped or trained to fight in a successful counter offensive capacity against the invading Germans. Yes, they did stage valient and enormous counter attacks during even the beginning stages of the German invasion, but, at this early stage, they could not counter the superiority of the German forces.

If Hiter and the German OKW gave this proper consdieration, they would have exploited this weakness at the onset and put their energy and focus on the accomplshing of one major initial objective; the taking of Moscow as quickly as possible. It was within the realm of possibility that they could have adquately protected their stretched flanks as they drove toward Moscow and fended off the resulting counter offensive strikes of the defending Russian armies.

As mentioned, the Russian military structure was a shambles. It's command and control during the first stages of Operation Barbarossa was nearly non existent with entire Russian armies clearly cut off and in a state of desperation and confusion. Many units were initialy ordered to NOT fire on the invading Germans and this gives some clue to the scope of the operational nightmare taking place on the Russian side. Many Russian commanders had no idea what to do or even how to adequately deploy their troops in the face of the German attack.

It was well within the capability of the German military to take Moscow and to take it during the course of a very rapid advance during 1941. Moscow was the nerve center of the entire Soviet Union on ever level; militarily, economically, industrially, politically, etc. It was the communications center/hub of the Soviet Union and the never center of the military.

Despite Hitler's decision to pull out the major armor panzer elements of Army Group Center to shore up Army Group North's attack on Leningrad, to shore up the attack on Kiev, it is an historical fact that Stalin attempted to send out feelers to Hitler to explore the possibity of a truce as Army Group Center approached Moscow.

By following the above outlined alternative strategic objective, Hitler stood a real chance of defeating the Soviet Union and altering the course of the larger world war.


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