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1. My problem isn't with the transfer of ownership, it is with the ability to purchase and inherit more than you have the capacity to contain.
2. Re-read your last post I was replying to, you said their labor was involved in gaining ownership to the bottles, I responded that in capitalism that is not the only way to gain ownership.
You have two problems with this case, either you eliminate private ownership or you eliminate transfer of ownership. You want to keep both which is where the problem arises.
3. The problems I mentioned in my original post.
There is no problem.
I can attain a good by making it myself from previously unused resources or buy/trade/receive it via charity from the owner who made it himself from previously unused resources.
I can attain a good by making it myself from previously unused resources or buy/trade/receive it via charity from the owner who made it himself from previously unused resources.
You can't get around that.
Great, now address my analogy in which I acknowledge this belief of yours.
Let me give you an analogy. Say you’re stranded in the middle of the desert with another person.
There are nine water bottles. You claim eight and say the other has the freedom to use the ninth however he/she wants.
There are two faults with this assumption; the first is that both of you are in an environment where a lack of water equates to a lessening of one’s freedom. The second is that claim ownership is an authoritative claim on what people can and can’t use beyond reason.
I’d like to get rid of both factors.
edit: If you need more help, how does capitalism provide freedom when it uses force to limit the freedom of others?
I can attain a good by making it myself from previously unused resources or buy/trade/receive it via charity from the owner who made it himself from previously unused resources.
You can't get around that.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Winterfall8324
Great, now address my analogy in which I acknowledge this belief of yours.
Some writers accept that indeterminism located in the immediate causation of a decision or other action would diminish the agent's control but hold that indeterminism confined to earlier stages in the process leading to a decision need not do so. Laura Ekstrom (2000: ch. 4 and 2003) and Alfred Mele (1995: ch. 12, 1996, 1999b, and 2006: 9–14) have advanced the most fully developed accounts of this sort. Such views have also been sketched by Daniel Dennett (1978) and John Martin Fischer (1995).
Overt action is sometimes preceded by a decision, and decision is sometimes preceded by a deliberative process in which the agent considers reasons for and against alternatives and makes an evaluative judgment concerning which alternative is best (or better or good enough). Focusing on decisions that follow such deliberation, Mele advances a view that allows (but does not require) the deterministic causation of the decision by the making of the judgment, and of the overt action by the decision. Indeterminism is required only at an earlier stage of the deliberative process. For example, the account is satisfied when it is undetermined which of a certain subset of the agent's nonoccurrent beliefs come to mind in the process of deliberation, where their coming to mind combines with other events to bring about the agent's evaluative judgment. (The subset in question consists of “beliefs whose coming or not coming to mind is not something that one would control even if determinism were true” [1995: 216].)
Mele argues that indeterminism of the sort required here does not diminish (at least not to any significant extent) what he calls “proximal control,” a variety of control constituted by the relatively direct causation of behavior, and one that is compatible with determinism. The required indeterminism nevertheless suffices, he holds, to provide the agent with “ultimate control” over her decision, which an agent has only if at no time prior to the decision is there any causally sufficient condition for the agent's making that decision that consists entirely of events or states external to the agent.
Ekstrom's account emphasizes preference rather than evaluative judgment. A preference, as she understands it, is a desire “formed by a process of critical evaluation with respect to one's conception of the good” (2000: 106). The formation of a preference, she maintains, is an action. She requires indeterminism only in the production of these preferences. A decision or other action is free, on her view, just in case it is brought about, in an appropriate way, by an active formation of a preference (favoring that decision or action), which preference-formation is in turn the result of an uncoerced exercise of the agent's evaluative faculty, the inputs to which nondeterministically cause that preference-formation.
Ekstrom holds that an agent is her preferences and acceptances (reflectively held beliefs), together with her faculty of forming these by reflective evaluation. When the formation of a preference is nondeterministically caused and it deterministically causes a decision and subsequent action, then a preference that partly constitutes the agent, one that is generated by an evaluative faculty that partly constitutes the agent, and one that the agent could have prevented (by not forming that preference) causally determines the decision and subsequent action. What the agent does is then, Ekstrom holds, up to her.
Both Mele's and Ekstrom's deliberative theories allow that a decision or other action can be free even if it is causally determined by events none of which is a free action, and to none of which has the agent contributed by performing any prior free action. Indeed, given the basic features of these accounts, both of them must (on pain of regress) allow this. Incompatibilists do not typically allow such a thing.
If an event is not itself a free action, and if no free action by the agent in question contributed to that event, then, we may say, it is not up to the agent whether that event occurs. Incompatibilists generally hold that if one event determines another, then it is not up to anybody whether if the first event occurs then the second event occurs. And arguments for incompatibilism often employ a principle like the following: if it is not up to a given agent whether a certain event occurs, and it is not up to that agent whether if that event occurs then the agent performs a certain action, then it is not up to the agent whether she performs that action. Given this principle, it will have to be said of certain decisions that deliberative theorists count as free that it is not up to us whether we make those decisions. Deliberative theorists, then, apparently reject this principle; but the rejection raises the question whether their incompatibilism is well motivated. (my bold for emphasis)
Something you paid for and own by the process of ownership of production or financial acquisition.
Think a certificate of ownership in the most formal case.
This definition is so foreign and odd I can't even address the proposition.
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