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If he determined that the "Will of the legislator" was for common people to understand the amendment then his opinion is valid.
At the time the U. S. Constitution was made, there was well established law that dictated rules and principles for the "interpretation of laws."
Since Scalia didn't follow those rules when he interpreted the Second Amendment, his opinion on what it means is just worthless personal opinion.
In many cases "the will of the lawmaker" is unclear. That's why the English Courts adopted "rules of construction" covering the "interpretation of laws."
The rules of legal interpretation are rules...adopted by the courts in the construction of the laws.
--Alexander Hamilton, pitching the proposed Federal Constitution to the People of the State of New York, The Federalist Papers: No. 83.
At the time the U. S. Constitution was made, there was well established law that dictated rules and principles for the "interpretation of laws."
Since Scalia didn't follow those rules when he interpreted the Second Amendment, his opinion on what it means is just worthless personal opinion.
What were those rules & what opinion should have been formed by useing them?
Quote:
How do you want me to go about determining that?
You seem to feel you know better than the SC the best way to interpret a simple statement so why not tell me how you would go about determining their intent?
In many cases "the will of the lawmaker" is unclear. That's why the English Courts adopted "rules of construction" covering the "interpretation of laws."
The rules of legal interpretation are rules...adopted by the courts in the construction of the laws.
--Alexander Hamilton, pitching the proposed Federal Constitution to the People of the State of New York, The Federalist Papers: No. 83.
.
We are not discussing "many cases" We are discussing a singular case regarding a very simple statement on the preservation of a right of the people. While there may be arguement about wether the second amendment simply forbids Congress from infringing this right or if it applies to the states as well, its very clear that the intent was not to allow the Feds to ban civilian firearms. My own feeling on the matter are its binding for the states as well, what good is a constitution if it forbids the Feds from enslaving you but permits the states such a luxury.
I think its clear that just as free speech & freedom of religion cannot be ignored by municipalities or states, so to is the second amendment a limitation on ALL govt fed, state & municipal in regards to gun rights.
‘The Court’s reliance on Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England is unpersuasive for the same reason as its reliance on the English Bill of Rights. Blackstone’s invocation of " ‘the natural right of resistance and self-preservation,’" ante, at 20, and " ‘the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defence’ " ibid., referred specifically to Article VII in the English Bill of Rights. The excerpt from Blackstone offered by the Court, therefore, is, like Article VII itself, of limited use in interpreting the very differently worded, and differently historically situated, Second Amendment.
‘What is important about Blackstone is the instruction he provided on reading the sort of text before us today. Blackstone described an interpretive approach that gave far more weight to preambles than the Court allows. Counseling that "[t]he fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs the most natural and probable," Blackstone explained that"[i]f words happen to be still dubious, we may establish their meaning from the context; with which it may be of singular use to compare a word, or a sentence, whenever they are ambiguous, equivocal, or intricate. Thus, the proeme, or preamble, is often called in to help the construction of an act of parliament." 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 59–60 (1765) (hereinafter Blackstone).In light of the Court’s invocation of Blackstone as " ‘the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation,’ " ante, at 20 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527U. S. 706, 715 (1999)), its disregard for his guidance on matters of interpretation is striking.’ District of Columbia v. Heller, Stevens, J, dissenting; Slip Opinion at 30, 31, 554 U.S. _____ (2008).
He's Obviously Cherry Picking: Justice Scalia’s Methodology Of Constitutional Interpretation Is Just An Excuse..........
Justice Scalia’s Methodology Of Constitutional Interpretation Is Just An Excuse To Cherry Pick Evidence That Squares With His Personal Views.
In the excerpt below, from the U. S. Supreme Court's opinion in the case of Heller v. D. C, authored my favorite activist on the Court, Justice Scalia attempts to ascertain the meaning of the term "keep arms." However, the term "keep arms" doesn't actually appear in the Second Amendment and he's already ascertained the meaning of the word "arms."
The phrase “keep arms” was not prevalent in the written
documents of the founding period that we have found,
but there are a few examples, all of which favor viewing
the right to “keep Arms” as an individual right unconnected
with militia service. William Blackstone, for example,
wrote that Catholics convicted of not attending
service in the Church of England suffered certain penalties,
one of which was that they were not permitted to
“keep arms in their houses.” 4 Commentaries on the Laws
of England 55 (1769) (hereinafter Blackstone); see also 1
W. & M., c. 15, §4, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 422 (1689)
(“[N]o Papist . . . shall or may have or keep in his House
. . . any Arms . . . ”); 1 Hawkins, Treatise on the Pleas of
the Crown 26 (1771) (similar). Petitioners point to militia
laws of the founding period that required militia members
to “keep” arms in connection with militia service, and they
conclude from this that the phrase “keep Arms” has a
militia-related connotation. See Brief for Petitioners 16–
17 (citing laws of Delaware, New Jersey, and Virginia).
This is rather like saying that, since there are many statutes
that authorize aggrieved employees to “file complaints”
with federal agencies, the phrase “file complaints”
has an employment-related connotation. “Keep arms” was
simply a common way of referring to possessing arms, for
militiamen and everyone else.7
When Scalia was ascertaining the meaning of the word "arms", he went to "Samuel Johnson’s dictionary." However, this time he goes to "Commentaries on the Laws of England." He's obviously cherry picking.
Last edited by FlashTheCash; 07-14-2008 at 09:09 AM..
Reason: He's Obviously Cherry Picking: Justice Scalia’s Methodology Of Constitutional Interpretation Is Just An Excuse To Cherry Pick
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He's Obviously Cherry Picking: Justice Scalia’s Methodology Of Constitutional Interpretation Is Just An Excuse..........
